The US again is going through its debt ceiling ritual, although there are a few variants on established themes. Rest assured, there will be no voluntary default. As a currency issuer, the US can only choose to default, and the debt ceiling device would be for Congress to be the part that chose to force a default. But Congresscritters personally and via their constituent have far too much at stake to send the the financial markets into a tailspin.
However, a debt ceiling can and often has resulted in spending freezes called shutdowns, the longest of which occurred during the Trump Administration, in a staredown over his southern border wall. Trump eventually blinked and decided to declare a national emergency to bypass the need for Congressional approval.
The important lesson from the Trump and past shutdowns is that voters don’t like them and the party perceived to be responsible usually takes an approval hit. So the real threat is triggering a shutdown, and that is enough to force horsetrading and some spending concessions.
Recall that the Democrats have had opportunities to abolish the debt ceiling and haven’t. It would have gone almost unnoticed had it been included in the early Obama crisis response. Its opponents are correct when they say that the debt ceiling serves to prevent the Administration from spending money already authorized by Congress. And Twitter demonstrates how the two parties are in blame game mode. For instance:
Your “child” is Donald Trump. We are extending the debt ceiling to pay the debts he racked up. https://t.co/3LTRLCw42F
— Rep. Eric Swalwell (@RepSwalwell) January 20, 2023
Sadly, the Democrat message seems to be “Republicans need to own up to Donald Trump profligacy” which still has the effect of perpetuating the Big Lie that government spending is bad. Government spending buys critically important things like bridges and in the old days paid for important social goods like substantial support to public schools. And before neoliberalism sold the myth that corporate spending is good and collective spending is bad, many countries practiced industrial policy. As yours truly has said, we now have industrial policy by default, with pet interest groups getting regulatory and tax breaks that enable them to extract rents. Favored sectors include the military-intelligence complex, real estate, higher education, and health care.
For those who would like to circulate a short-form debunking of debt ceiling misconceptions, Jamie Galbraith has a fine new piece in The Nation that serves nicely. A representative section:
The United States does not borrow in order to have funds to pay its obligations. It pays its obligations by check (or electronic transfer) as specified by law. It then issues bonds so that “investors across the globe” can save a safe US dollar-denominated asset, the Treasury bond, that pays interest, as cash and bank deposits do not.
So the debt ceiling theatrics might not be a bad thing if they fostered more discussion of what national priorities should be. Instead they serve as a device for fiscal conservatives to have a second go at creating conditions to foster more overt or stealthy tax cuts. And Democrats go along because this charade gives them cover to cut politically extremely popular programs like Social Security and Medicare…so privatizers can profit.
We have Janet Yellen in an unseemly manner acting as if the measures she has implemented to handle the US hitting its debt limit are “extraordinary” when in fact they are familiar and have been deployed by numerous times by her predecessors. Disappointingly, the business media, which ought to know better, has has taken up Yellen’s framing.
Treasury’s fancy footwork includes steps like suspending the reinvestment of a fund in the Federal Employees Retirement System Thrift Savings Plan as well as more symbolic measures like closing Federal parks (although it won’t seem symbolic if you had planned to take your family to Yellowstone). Accordingly, Mr. Market yawned. But it is disconcerting to see a Treasury Secretary, whose job includes talking like an adult to investors, instead resorting to language that looks designed to create hysteria, when the actual crunch time is months away, in early June.
As James Carville said, “I would like to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody.” Yellen is making clear she does not understand her place in the finance hierarchy.
Yellen has rejected a proposal much loved by Modern Monetary Theory advocates, that of minting a platinum coin to circumvent the debt ceiling. From the Wall Street Journal:
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said the Federal Reserve likely wouldn’t accept a $1 trillion platinum coin if the Biden administration tried to mint one to avoid breaching the debt limit, dismissing an idea that has been floated to circumvent Congress on the issue.
Some Biden administration officials and Democrats on Capitol Hill have discussed the possibility that the Treasury could use an obscure law authorizing platinum coins in the event of a potential default. Under the proposed scheme, the Treasury would mint a $1 trillion coin and deposit it at the Fed, and then draw the money to pay the country’s bills.
Ms. Yellen, who is a former chair of the Fed and meets regularly with current Fed chair Jerome Powell, said the central bank may not go along with such a plan. Fed officials have previously raised concerns about being relied upon to resolve fiscal debates in Congress.
This is an insult to intelligence. First, Yellen admits she hasn’t actually consulted the Fed, she simply assumes they won’t go along. Secondly, and worse, Yellen effectively admits she has not taken a serious look at the relevant legal issues.
Nathan Tankus, in the Financial Times, explained that the Fed as Treasury’s fiscal agent in fact was obligated to accept the coin:
So why wouldn’t the Fed accept the coin? This is not actually a simple question.
The platinum coin would be legal tender when issued, and the Fed is a fiscal agent to the Treasury. Being a fiscal agent means making payments, accepting deposits and providing other payment-related services to the Treasury. Thus, the Fed would appear to be obliged to accept the coin. But there’s one catch: coins are only “issued” and monetised when they are purchased.
As a result, if the Treasury were to try to deposit the coin at the Fed, the Fed could claim they don’t have an obligation to accept it and credit Treasury’s accounts, because it has not yet been “issued”. In other words, the central bank would decide that the round chunk of platinum from the US Mint is not yet a coin. (This makes the catch we cite above more of a Catch-22, as the Fed’s acceptance is what would “issue” it as a coin.)
There are a few important things to notice about this argument. First, it implicitly accepts that it would be legal for the Treasury to mint and seek to deposit the coin. In other words, the idea is that the Fed would interfere with the Treasury making payments and avoiding a default on its debts for non-legal reasons. This, in and of itself, would be an abrogation of the Fed’s obligations as a fiscal agent of the Treasury, a relationship defined by regulations and legislation.
There is also no documented historical precedent for a fiscal agent rejecting the deposit of any coin on this basis, or any other for that matter. As the Second Circuit determined in 2019, “Congress specified the fiscal agency relationship for the purpose of putting the [Federal Reserve Banks] under the direction of the Treasury Department in certain limited circumstances”.
By claiming that the coin has not been issued yet, then refusing to accept it, the Federal Reserve is also interfering with the issuance of a coin. Indeed, that would be the purpose of not accepting it; if Fed officials thought the coin would be successfully issued no matter what, there would be no point to their refusal.
This is important because the Fed does not have the authority to interfere with the Treasury using its congressionally granted powers.
Tankus points out that the Fed could still try to seek an injunction, and nobody likes uncertainty, so the time to legitimate the coin would have been way before any debt ceiling staredown. However, it is noteworthy that the platinum coin proposal has gone mainstream enough that Yellen feels compelled to address it.
Since Yellen, when she was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, supported “chained CPI,” which was a way to cut Social Security by having CPI adjustments lag normal-people’s-shopping-basket inflation even further. So one has to wonder if her “lady doth protest too much” is to give the Biden Administration cover for going after Social Security and Medicare because they had to to prevent the Republicans from ending the world as we know it.
An excuse for the heightened spending anxiety is the 20 feral Republicans in the House, who managed to extract considerable procedural concessions to House rules for this term as a condition of approving Kevin McCarthy as House Majority Leader, such as turning the chamber into a Parliamentary system (any member can initiate what amounts to a vote of no confidence) and a promise to return to regular order (budget bills have to be reviewed and aggregated from the 12 relevant committees) and provide for a minimum of 72 hours to review bills before a vote. The professed fear is that this unruly bunch really would tank Treasuries. The reality is they won’t but they could cause other types of trouble.
The untamed 20 actually do have a legitimate beef, which is the $1.7 trillion spending bill passed in the lame duck Congress. Not only did it not go through the normal 12 committee bottom’s up process, so that Congresscritters with nominal expertise had had a look-see at provisions in their committee’s ambit, but it was done back-room style, with only a handful of Congresscritters somewhat appraised as to what was in it. Ukraine was the cover for ramming it through.
The uppity 20, like most of the Republican base, are done with supporting the Ukraine welfare queen, and want to use the debt ceiling fight to re-open the $1.7 trillion package, particularly the Ukraine component. This is an overly dynamic situation, but House Republicans have told McCarthy that they are willing to authorize only 2022 spending levels for 2023. Among other things, that would lead to a 10% cut, or about $75 billion, in the official defense budget (the narrowly defined one; the broader definition includes activities like the intelligence agencies and the Department of Homeland Security). That level is focusing a lot of minds. This demand is even more of a headache for McCarthy since he is a big Ukraine backer and was one of the handful in the room when the $1.7 trillion sausage was made.
So we could have a wilder than usual debt ceiling ride. But if Biden turns out to be seriously weakened
by insider efforts to get him to drop his 2024 bid by his classified document scandal, Biden may be less able to stick to his “no negotiation”‘ guns than his posturing suggests.
Why doesn’t the Treasury just demand that the Federal Reserve make interest rates negative so that the Fed pays the Treasury so the debt ceiling come down? Who’s actually in charge, the US government?
Ah! Good question. In my opinión It is not the government.
Make interest rates on repos negative. Now there is an idea that would get the attention of the golfers.
…perfect way to end the dollar reserve currency status. China holds around 1 trillion dollars in Treasuries. I own a much smaller amount, as well. I’d be pissed.
Congress: “If you don’t let me do something stupid, I’m going to do something stupider.”
It’s the usual dumb greedy moneybags with no vision, the curse on us all.
Gonzalo has a recent short podcast about that last cross-out line. Spoiler Alert: O behind the curtain with a dagger.
Link? Started looking for it in some of his content, but he’s got a lot of content.
Gotta say that with all this going on in Washington, that it seems to be strange timing for US Treasury Secretary Yellen to go choofing off to Africa on a whistle-stop tour-
I took note of that too. Yellen is like an under cover agent. Cue the amusing music. We are very disconcerted about China’s growing influence in Africa, like it’s the last frontier for cowboy neoliberalism. And it’s good for Yellen’s mission to have a strong dollar regardless of the fact that this country, the USA, doesn’t understand the word “strong”. To wit, the coin is appropriate. I would prefer an ornate silver shield with lots triumphant symbolism but a coin is OK. Because like all things money it is just a tactic with a gobbledegook for a strategy for guiding national goals. I wish we could hear more about those actual goals. Not just the daily whack a mole. We could eliminate a lot of frenzy if we just hold referendums on our goals. Even for Janet because if we want a strong dollar for international purposes, it requires a healthy economy, which requires a healthy society, which requires building it, which requires… spending money. Money is nothing more than a symbol of and reward for cooperation.
The whole “debt ceiling” contretemps is a manufactured crisis which relies upon the ignorance of the electorate where fiat monetary operations and monetary sovereign budgets are concerned. It lets both parties sling mud at the other by implying it’s their opponents who are fiscal reprobates, while they are rock-ribbed defenders of the public purse manning the ramparts against the vandals who are threatening future generations. It’s all lies and both parties are complicit, which is why it will only end when the electorate realizes that the “household budget analogy” is fallacious.
Not holding my breath …
And I see it’s still hands-off for the Dems re: W.’s tax cuts and spending binge. You might have thought it might be mentioned if it’s truly a matter of partisan division. On-brand to the closing curtain.
Perhaps because the 2001 pkg wouldn’t have passed either house without Dem crossovers.
Those on the Senate side not voting are an interesting list.
Well, mayfly memory and cough drop to Michelle…
I would say that in a proper Parliamentary system, members has the right to make proposals and have them voted on. It can be subject to rules on how many signatures from other members is needed to keep it moving, but the US Congress system giving the speaker the power not even holding a vote is as far as I know rather unique.
And if I understand correctly, the rule isn’t even that new, so maybe functional rules can be copied from whatever worked before mister Hastert instituted his rule.
The “debt ceiling crisis” reminds me of Joni Mitchell’s song “The Circle Game.” “We go round and round and round on the circle game.” Do a YouTube search. It’s a beautiful song.
A follow on.
Amdt14.S4.1 Overview of Public Debt Clause
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 4:
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Although Section 4 was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the government issued during the Civil War, its language indicates a broader connotation. . . . ‘[T]he validity of the public debt’. . . [embraces] whatever concerns the integrity of the public obligations, and applies to government bonds issued after as well as before adoption of the Amendment.1
Prof. Stephanie Kelton wrote two great posts this weekend on this topic. Well worth reading for the clear explanations.
Mint the Coin!!
I wonder how Triffin’s dilemma plays into these debates. Triffin postulated back in the ’60’s that the sovereign controlling the global reserve currency MUST sustain structural trade deficits to expand the global money supply to accommodate global dollar transactions. The current system is such that most countries are striving to achieve net positive exports to keep the IMF at bay. How will this occur if the sovereign does not “take the hit” (in a weaker domestic economy, as Triffin predicted) via a negative trade balance?
I wonder if a corollary of Triffin’s dillema is suggested by the Jamie Galbraith quote:
In other words, in order to sustain structural trade deficits, the US government MUST issue enough interest bearing debt to induce countries to hold their surplus of dollars.
Who benefits from this? Well, those who make investments abroad so they can sell goods back to U.S. consumers at a profit. Where are all of those dollars going to come from? From domestic government spending deficits.
If all of this logic is roughly correct, the spending deficits (or part of them) have nothing to do with the “profligacy” of the government but the math of international trade: pumping enough dollars abroad via interest bearing debt to keep the system going.
Another corollary is that if the government actually balanced its domestic budget, it wouldn’t have a basis for continuing to finance trade the way it does. It would then also have to balance its international trade. What would that mean to the global economy?
Another corollary is that U.S government spending abroad–e.g. via wars and arms sales–helps to pump more dollars into the global economy. This implies that a lot of this spending may have a motivation beyond power projection–i.e. economic. If we stopped such spending, as many here at NC probably would like to see, what would that do to the global economy?
That’s like the question, ‘what happens globally if our 1.1T trade deficit, which includes our foreign adventures, were balanced?’
Row would not be able to save, or hold, $, or $ investments. They would be more likely to invest locally in their own economies. Trade surplus economies like China, Japan and (formerly) Germany would also tend more in balance in the absence of the massive U.S. deficit.
Imo Balanced trade reduces the need for a reserve currency, in which case us probably could not so easily bully financially weaker countries.