Coffee Break: Armed Madhouse – The Dragon’s Teeth

Military analysts anticipated a substantial display of advanced Chinese weaponry at the September 3 parade in Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of victory in WWII, and were not disappointed. This article will review the significance of the weapons displayed in terms of the balance of military power and draw some conclusions regarding U.S. plans for a conflict with China.

Military parades in Beijing are designed as dual messages. Domestically, they symbolize national unity, technological progress, and Party legitimacy. Internationally, they are acts of deterrence signaling: visual statements that China can deny access, strike far, and survive counterattack. By presenting not only weapons but their enabling systems, such as VLS decks and mobile launchers, the PLA reveals its doctrinal modernization as much as its hardware. The qualitative signal is that China is no longer catching up; it is innovating in domains where it can impose costs and risks on superior adversaries. The following areas of military capability were showcased in the Beijing military parade.

Strategic Missiles and Hypersonics

Among the most striking revelations were the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile. The DF-17 is the world’s first operationally deployed HGV missile, designed to penetrate missile defenses with unpredictable maneuvering at very high speed. The DF-41, road-mobile and capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), demonstrates the PLA’s determination to modernize its nuclear deterrent. Together, these systems elevate China’s strategic credibility and complicate any adversary’s missile defense planning.

DF-17 Hypersonic Missile

Anti-Ship and A2/AD Weapons

China also paraded its DF-21D and DF-26 ballistic missiles, often described as “carrier killers.” These weapons are designed to hold U.S. carrier strike groups at risk within the first and even second island chains. Coupled with advances in targeting and surveillance, they present a formidable anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge. Qualitatively, this shifts the maritime balance, undermining the assumption that U.S. naval forces can operate unchallenged in the Western Pacific.

DF-26 Ballistic Missile

Airpower Modernization

The air component of the parade underscored the PLA Air Force’s leap forward. J-20 stealth fighters flew in formation, a visible reminder that China now fields a maturing fifth-generation fleet. While still numerically smaller than U.S. F-22 and F-35 inventories, the J-20 symbolizes an important shift: China is no longer only imitating Western designs but refining its own. Reports suggest that prototypes of the J-35 naval stealth fighter are in advanced development, signaling that China’s carrier aviation will soon incorporate stealth capabilities. This airpower modernization gives the PLA a credible long-range interdiction and maritime strike arm.

Chinese fighter jets: J16, J20, and J35

Naval Power and VLS Revelation

One of the subtler but highly significant elements revealed at the parade and in its supporting media was China’s vertical launch system (VLS) technology. Although entire destroyers cannot be paraded, the PLA showcased models and deck mock-ups of its Type 055 destroyer, including close-up footage of its large universal VLS cells. The Chinese VLS cells are more versatile than the smaller U.S. Mk-41 system, and thus can launch more capable long-range surface-to-air missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, and even hypersonics. Because this standardized VLS is now common across China’s surface fleet, it provides enormous flexibility: ships can be reconfigured by payload rather than design. The qualitative impact is significant — greater magazine capacity, adaptability, and firepower concentrated in fewer hulls.

Chinese Type 055 Warship

Unmanned and Emerging Systems

The parade also highlighted the PLA’s advances in unmanned systems. The GJ-11 Sharp Sword unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) was displayed, representing a stealthy long-range strike platform. Drone swarms and electronic warfare UAVs point toward China’s embrace of ‘intelligentized warfare,’ where artificial intelligence and automation play a central role. These systems multiply reach, resilience, and survivability, allowing the PLA to project power at lower cost and with less risk to personnel.

Chinese Reconnaissance and Attack Drones

China’s Emerging Lead

The military hardware on display at the parade indicates that China has overtaken U.S. weaponry in several key areas. Although the U.S. still dominates in other categories, China is mounting a powerful challenge.

The prospects for the U.S. to regain the military technology lead in all areas where China is ahead are dubious for several reasons. China’s enormous population and extensive educational system provide a larger pool of engineers. In 2024 China graduated approximately 1.4 million students with engineering degrees. In the same year, the U.S. added 127,000 university-trained engineers. This human capital advantage is also reflected in research leading to patent applications.

Faced with ballooning deficits, the U.S. will struggle to increase its already massive defense budget, but China, with a lower debt to GDP ratio, can keep building up its forces with fewer budgetary constraints. Moreover, the performance of U.S. defense contractors is hobbled by perverse incentives and inadequate government oversight, so the U.S. wastes much of the money it spends on defense contracts. China’s ability to overtake U.S. defense technology in multiple areas while spending less indicates superior government management of weapons development.

Conclusion

The Beijing parade revealed more than weapons; it revealed a coherent doctrine. China’s emphasis on hypersonics, road-mobile ICBMs, ballistic anti-ship missiles, stealth fighters, universal VLS cells, and unmanned platforms underscores a posture of deterrence by denial. The PLA is crafting an arsenal designed not for global dominance but to prevent U.S. and allied intervention in its near seas. This qualitative transformation marks China as a peer-level deterrent actor, reshaping the security environment of the Indo-Pacific.

The U.S. no longer holds a broad qualitative edge in weaponry to offset China’s geographic and quantitative advantages. In many significant areas of weapons development, China has overtaken U.S. capabilities, and this disparity is likely to widen.  Faced with these developments, U.S. policy makers appear to be reaching the conclusion that the window for a successful military conflict with China has closed, and that the strategy of using defense of Taiwan as a casus belli is a dead end. We should all welcome this unexpected hint of sanity in the chaos of Washington foreign policy.