Yves here. With the too frequent and clearly hyperbolic attacks on New York City’s now mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani as sure to usher in Communism, this look at Russia’s actual revolutions seemed timely. Most of you likely know this history, but some might learn or be reminded that Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks were socialists, as in concerned with the treatment of industrial labor, and found it necessary to implement land redistribution to peasants to hang on to power.
There are many in-depth histories of this period, including ones that have the space to provide more coverage of how the Great War and economic pressures played into this great upheaval. I hope knowledgeable readers will add details in comments.
By Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic, Ex-University Professor, Research Fellow at Centre for Geostrategic Studies, Belgrade, Serbia
Russia in the Great War
Both revolutions of 1917 in Russia, the so-called February and the so-called October, took place during World War I (the Great War) when Russia fought against the Central Powers and their allies as a full member of the Entente powers together with France and Great Britain and their allies (i.e. associated members), including the Kingdom of Serbia, for which Tsarist Russia selflessly and self-sacrificing entered the war, even though in the summer of 1914 it was not sufficiently prepared for war against the Central Powers, especially in terms of purely military parameters. However, in August 1914, in St. Petersburg, moral and cultural-historical reasons prevailed rather than purely military-political ones, given that Russia, i.e., its Tsar Nicholas II, decided to defend Serbia’s independence at all costs against Pan-German imperialism and Berlin’s policy of Drang nach Osten (driving through the Balkans to Basra and the Persian Gulf).
Although Russia reluctantly entered the Great War in 1914, it entered it with great enthusiasm and faith in a final victory. However, soon after the initial military successes, it became clear that the Russian army was unable to effectively confront the army of the Second German Reich, which was then the strongest military land force in Europe. The first days of war enthusiasm in the Russian army began to disappear after the heavy defeat at Tannenberg in the summer of 1914, during the first month of the German offensive on the Eastern Front (the so-called Second Battle of Tannenberg or Grünwald, August 23rd–30th, 1914).
In Russia at that time, only the Bolsheviks resolutely opposed the war, and they were accused by the authorities of Tsarist Russia and Russian patriots of being German mercenaries. Therefore, five Bolshevik deputies in the Duma (Russian parliament) were exiled to Siberia by the Tsarist authorities. The leader of the Bolsheviks, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870‒1924), saw in the military defeat of Russia the only and surest way to achieve the revolutionary goals of the Bolsheviks, who were fighting fervently for the destruction of Tsarist Russia by any means necessary.
February/March Revolution
It became clear as the war dragged on that the longer the hostilities lasted, the less capable the Tsarist Russian government was of bringing the war to an end in its favor. There was also the possibility that the Tsarist government would sign a separate peace with the Central Powers, given that the Western Front had not moved and that a stationary trench war was being waged without any major results for either side. In this context, Russia believed that the Western Allies (France and Britain with all their rich overseas colonies) were not fully willing to break through the Western Front, thus leaving Russia in a difficult position on the Eastern Front. Something similar happened in World War II. Namely, only when J. V. Stalin, after the successful battles of the Red Army against the German army in 1943 (Stalingrad, Kursk), threatened to begin negotiations with the Germans with the possibility of signing a separate peace with Berlin unless the Western Allies launched a ground invasion of Germany, thus opening the Western Front. This same front, agreed upon at the Tehran Conference in the fall of 1943, was finally opened on June 6th, 1944, with the Allied landings in Normandy, France (D-Day).
In addition to the above, the Gallipoli Operation of 1915 by the Western members of the Entente failed, and the Central Powers overran Serbia in the autumn of that year making at such a way a direct connection with the Ottoman Empire via Serbia and Bulgaria. In any case, the Tsarist government was unpleasantly surprised by the revolution in March (February, according to the old calendar) 1917, as were its opponents. Tsar Nicholas II (1868–1918), who was forced to abdicate on March 15th, was overthrown from power by hungry peasants, a disillusioned and dissatisfied aristocracy, and a rebel army. Power in St. Petersburg was transferred to a provisional government whose task was to govern the country until a new constitution could be adopted by the Constituent Assembly, and based on it, a legal government would be formed. The first provisional government did not want to take Russia out of the war and therefore had the support of the Western Allies, but at the same time, on the other hand, it fell because it failed to end the war, which in 1917 was unfolding unfavorably for Russia.
At that time, peace (i.e., Russia’s withdrawal from the war) and land redistribution (i.e., agrarian reform) were in the closest connection. It must be emphasized that by that time, Russia had paid a huge price in human casualties due to its unpreparedness for war and its inability to wage a long and exhausting modern war, unlike, for example, Germany. By mid-1917, more than 15 million people had been mobilized in Russia. About 1.7 million people had disappeared on the battlefield, 4.9 million were wounded, and 2.4 million were captured. On the one hand, during the war, Russia was superior to the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary, but it proved to be an inferior side on the main battlefield against its main enemy, Germany. If Russia had withdrawn from the war under any conditions, the soldiers, i.e., mostly peasants in uniform, would demand that they be given more land to cultivate. If peasants were given land as part of the wartime agrarian reform, the soldier-peasants would desert to take their share. At the same time, the Russian provisional government had to fight against new forms of governing – the soviets (councils). The most influential and famous soviets were located in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but others sprang up throughout Russia after the March Revolution.
The April 1917 demonstrations against the war led to the fall of the first provisional government and the resignation of Foreign Minister Milyukov (1859–1943). However, Russia continued its war effort, and the soviets increasingly supported the Bolsheviks, who were in favor of Russia’s withdrawal from the war, which undoubtedly suited the Central Powers and especially Germany. V. I. Lenin, who had lived abroad since 1900, returned from Switzerland in an armored train with the help of the Germans in April and set out his demands for a socialist revolution and his views on socialism in the April Theses.
Demanding peace and a gradual transfer of power from the provisional government to the soviets, the demonstrators in June 1917 showed that, on the one hand, the influence of the Bolsheviks was growing, and on the other hand, support for the provisional government was rapidly declining. Despite the support of moderate socialists (Mensheviks and social revolutionaries), the provisional government was resolutely opposed by the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin. Armed demonstrations of workers and soldiers broke out in St. Petersburg on July 16th‒18th, 1917, when the demonstrators demanded all power from the soviets and tried to seize power, but the provisional government suppressed this rebellion. The provisional government officially accused V. I. Lenin of being a German agent, of being financed by Germany, and of aiming to stage a revolution in order to seize power illegitimately and then conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers to the detriment of Russia, thus taking Russia out of the war, which would allow Germany to transfer all of its armies in the east to the Western Front against the French and British, which would give the Germans a crucial military advantage on the Western Front, which would likely lead to the end of the war in Germany’s favor.
After the failed July demonstrations and a street coup in St. Petersburg, Lenin was forced to flee to Finland (which was then effectively separated from Russia), and Alexander Kerensky (1881–1970) became Prime Minister on July 22nd, 1917, and attempted to restore order in the capital. Kerensky himself played an important role in implementing the policies of all the provisional governments of the revolutionary 1917. He was a minister in the first two provisional governments, Prime Minister from July onwards, and after the suppression of a military uprising in September, he became Commander-in-Chief of the Army. However, Kerensky’s failure to resolve the country’s major problems paved the way for Lenin and his Bolsheviks to seize power in November 1917 (October/November Revolution). Kerensky himself made a cardinal mistake in September 1917 that, later in November, further facilitated the Bolsheviks’ path to power. Namely, General L. G. Kornilov (1870–1918), commander-in-chief in the government of Alexander Kerensky, marched with his troops on St. Petersburg in August 1917. Kerensky actually perceived this military action as an attempted coup against him and the Provisional Government, and in order to oppose the putschists, he turned to Lenin’s Bolsheviks for armed assistance. This political maneuver clearly indicated that Kerensky was unable to overcome the crucial problems and challenges at the given moment with the Provisional Government alone, and he even had to rely on the Bolsheviks, who were able to exploit this maneuver somewhat later for their political goals in the October Revolution.
October/November Revolution
V.I. Lenin secretly returned from Finland (as well as from Switzerland in April) on November 7th, 1917 (October 25thaccording to the Julian calendar) to St. Petersburg, where he organized an armed uprising in which the rebel soldiers and workers under the leadership of the Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky government and carried out a revolutionary change of power and, as it later turned out, a change of the entire socio-political system after the civil war that followed. The Tsar’s Winter Palace was captured by the Bolsheviks on November 7th, almost bloodlessly, while A. Kerensky fled, and the other members of the Provisional Government were arrested. Now the Bolsheviks were left to fight to consolidate their power against the pro-tsarist reactionaries (“Whites”) and the Western invading armies. During the ensuing civil war between the “Reds” and “Whites”, the Bolsheviks managed to use propaganda to present themselves as fighters for preserving the independence and integrity of Russia against the foreign (Western) occupiers (the Americans, for example, had occupied Vladivostok in August 1918 and the area around was kept till spring 1920, etc.).
During the October/November Revolution, the workers hoped that the new Russia would be ruled by the soviets, but the course of events very quickly took a different course. It should be noted that the peasantry did not participate in the revolution, nor did Lenin make any crucial attempts during the revolution in St. Petersburg to animate the peasants and attract them to the side of the Bolsheviks. The revolution was Marxist, and the peasantry was not viewed very favorably in Marxism, given that all attention was focused on the working (urban-industrial) class of producers. The peasantry was even labeled in many cases as a conservative-reactionary element. However, the basic problem with the peasantry was that the peasants constituted the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia, as much as 80%, and without them, victory in the civil war was practically impossible.
Due to the very limited revolutionary-political base, given that in November 1917 there were slightly less than 300,000 Bolsheviks in all of Russia, Lenin and his comrades faced great opposition on all fronts. In order to expand the revolutionary base immediately after the revolution in St. Petersburg, when the achievements of the revolution had to be defended under the threat of a severe civil war, Lenin promised the broad masses of the people two things:
1) Peace (i.e., Russia’s exit from the war under extremely unfavorable conditions from the point of view of national interests), and
2) The distribution of land to the peasants, who at that time constituted 80% of the population (i.e., an agrarian reform that at the same time would provoke an oppositional counter-reaction of the aristocracy and large landowners from whom the land was to be confiscated for distribution to the peasants).
The Bolsheviks, for purely political reasons, but not ideological ones, implemented an agrarian reform, i.e., a new land policy, which they adopted from the social revolutionaries, given that the revolution had to be defended at all costs. Of course, based on Marxist program principles, the land was nationalized and collectivized (state farms and collective farms) shortly after the successful defense revolution during the civil war, so that in the end, the peasants were cheated. However, in the revolutionary year of 1917 and in the following years of the civil war, the peasants considered the acquired land their own.
During the Russian Civil War (1918‒1920), grain and some other food products were forcibly requisitioned by the Bolshevik authorities in order to feed the Red Army soldiers at the military front and the urban population in the background. However, in response to this policy, the peasants began to sow less grain, which led to famine and disease. Finally, Lenin himself was forced to give in, and immediately after the Civil War, in 1921, he introduced the NEP – the New Economic Policy, which was in favor of the peasants, since it was based partly on a market economy. The political goal of this economic policy, at least for a while, was not to turn the peasants against the new Soviet Russia, which on December 30th, 1922, became the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – the USSR.
During the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War (1917–1920), there were supporters of a revolutionary war in order to accelerate the development of socialism on Marxist foundations in Europe. This specifically meant exporting the Bolshevik revolution beyond the borders of Soviet Russia. Lenin himself wanted to first consolidate Bolshevik revolutionary power in Russia and therefore advocated signing a separate peace with the Central Powers that would take Russia out of the war and make the Bolsheviks’ position easier in the fight against the “white” tsarist reaction. At that revolutionary time, some Bolsheviks advocated the abolition of money, which should be destroyed, as well as the overnight introduction of a socialist economy, while the peasants wanted the new government to leave them alone and their newly acquired land within the framework of agrarian reform. However, the fiercest resistance to the Bolshevik government was provided by supporters of the tsarist system known as the “White Guards”.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918
By signing a separate peace in Brest-Litovsk on March 3rd, 1918, with the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire), V. I. Lenin ended the war with Russia’s main enemy, Germany, but the price of peace was too high for Russia. After the victory of the October/November Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Soviet government immediately took diplomatic measures to ensure that Soviet Russia would withdraw from the Great War and thus create favorable conditions for the consolidation of the new Bolshevik government and the economic reconstruction of the country. On November 8th, 1917, the government issued the Decree on Peace, in which it addressed all warring parties with an appeal to conclude a general peace without annexations and contributions on the principle of status quo ante bellum. Thus, the geopolitical map of Europe would not change, i.e., it would remain the same as before the war. This peace proposal was entirely suitable for Russia, given that at that time the Baltic territories of Russia in the west were already occupied by Germany, and if the war were to continue, there was a real danger that the Central Powers would soon occupy Belarus and Ukraine.
The Entente powers rejected Lenin’s proposal and offered Soviet Russia funds and assistance to prolong the war, considering that Russia’s withdrawal from the war would give a great advantage to the Central Powers, even though the United States had entered the war in April 1917.
Lenin resolutely rejected this Entente proposal, arguing that Russia’s further participation in the war would turn it into an agent of Anglo-French imperialism. However, things went more easily with the Central Powers, because Germany was essentially interested in Russia’s withdrawal from the war. Thus, Soviet Russia signed an armistice with the Central Powers on December 15th, 1917, in Brest-Litovsk, and on December 22nd, final negotiations began for the signing of a separate peace treaty between the Central Powers and Soviet Russia. By then, Russia had lost a huge territory in the west from Estonia to the Black Sea, and German troops had broken out on the Dnieper River. Kiev was occupied in early January 1918. On January 18th, 1918, a delegation of the Central Powers demanded that Russia renounce all occupied territories in the west as a condition for signing a peace.
Simultaneously with these negotiations, the Ukrainian counter-revolutionary government, which was patronized by Germany, began negotiations and on February 9th, 1918, concluded a separate peace with the Central Powers, which now uncompromisingly and ultimatum-wise demanded that Moscow accept the dictated terms for peace. The head of the negotiating team of Soviet Russia, Leon Trotsky (real name Lev Davidovich Bronstein, 1879–1940), contrary to Lenin’s instructions, broke off the negotiations on February 10th, with a declaration of refusal to sign the peace treaty, announced the end of the war, and the demobilization of the Russian army.
The German army decided to take advantage of the new situation on the Eastern Front, and on February 18th, 1918, the Germans launched an offensive along the entire front line. The Soviet government, therefore, had to request the renewal of negotiations, and peace was finally signed on March 3rd, but now under even more difficult conditions than those rejected by Trotsky. Specifically, with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Soviet Russia renounced Poland, Lithuania, and Courland (the western regions of Livland/Latvia), and recognized the independence of Ukraine, Estonia, Livland/Latvia, and Finland. These areas had to be evacuated immediately. Russia had to hand over Ardahan, Kars, and Batumi to the Ottoman Empire. German and Austro-Hungarian troops also occupied part of Russian territory beyond the border stipulated by the peace treaty (along with Ukraine) as far as Rostov-on-Don in the south and Narva in the north. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was short-lived, as Germany capitulated on November 11th, and the Soviet government annulled the treaty two days later. However, the signing of this treaty initiated the Russian Civil War, as the Bolsheviks were declared traitors and German agents by the tsarist reactionaries.
The Russian Civil War, which lasted from 1918 to the end of 1920, divided the country into supporters of the Bolshevik revolution and their government and their opponents, who supported the former tsarist regime. After the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Entente forces entered Russia to prevent the Germans from occupying key centers. After the German capitulation in November 1918, Allied troops remained in Russia to help the Whites fight the burden of the civil war. Lenin used this for propaganda purposes to present the Soviet government as fighting against foreign occupation and for Russian independence. The Bolsheviks, who had disbanded the tsarist army, given land to the peasants, and demanded a separate peace, had to quickly create their new military force to oppose the Whites and the Allies. Thus was created the Bolshevik Red Army, for which Trotsky was the most deserving. The Red Army soldiers had to fight with the “Greens” (anarchists), Poles, and dissidents throughout Russia from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok. In the Russian Far East, they fought against the American and Japanese invasions.
During the Russian Civil War, the Bolsheviks on July 17th, 1918 executed all members of the Romanov tsarist dynasty for political and security reasons. At the end of the civil war, the Bolsheviks with their Red Army won.
The New Post-Revolutionary Soviet Russia
After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the end of the Civil War, Bolshevik Soviet Russia had to be satisfied with a smaller territory than the old Russian Empire. The borderlands in the west – Finland, Estonia, Livland/Latvia, Lithuania, parts of Belarus and Ukraine, Poland, and Bessarabia/Moldova – were lost, at least for a time. However, in the three independent Transcaucasian republics – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – the path to power was open for the Bolsheviks after the evacuation of the British from Transcaucasia in December 1919. Thanks to the intervention of the Red Army, Transcaucasia returned to the borders of Russia in April 1921.
The first major problem that the new Soviet government had to face after the victory in the civil war was the famine that raged during the winter of 1921/1922 and claimed about 5 million lives. It was also the main reason for the collapse of the Russian economy in 1921. By the end of 1920, the White Guards were completely defeated, and the Allies withdrew from Russia. The seven years of war from 1914 to the end of 1920 brought Russia into a state of true chaos. The people’s dissatisfaction was caused by inflation, food and fuel shortages, but also by the increasingly harsh autocratic measures of the new Soviet authorities, which were introduced to overcome the internal and external threats that threatened the young Soviet state.
In 1921, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) to encourage economic recovery but also to appease the peasants, thus allowing a limited market economy and freer production. The NEP period was also a period of significant freedom, which was also expressed in the arts.
The problem of the succession of Lenin remained. Lenin himself favored Trotsky as his successor, but in the end, Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) proved to be the most capable politician to seize power after Lenin’s death in 1924, following an illness in 1922. A triumvirate was then formed to rule the country: Zinoviev (1883–1936), Kamenev (1883–1936), and Stalin. Lenin did not trust Stalin, whose main rival for power was Trotsky. Through skillful political maneuvering and control of the party machinery, Stalin managed to eliminate Trotsky, take over leadership of both the party and the state, and finally establish a personal dictatorship and a cult of personality. The period of the second half of the 1930s was the time of Stalin’s political purges when the October/November Revolution ate its children except Stalin.
© Vladislav B. Sotirovic 2025


Thanks for this! For a fairly detailed and very readable history of the revolutions, I really liked China Mievilles 1917. John Reed’s 10 days that shook the world is a very good eyewitness account of the October revolution
I strongly second your recommendations.
Third!
Mike Duncan’s Revolutions podcast is great as well. But I did enjoy very much Mieville’s book as well.
David Shub’s (who knew him) biography of Lenin is good, clear, short, and easy to read.
Also, Guido Preparata’s “Conjuring Hitler” has much to say about this history.
More on USA involvement in the Russian Revolution.
“The American Expeditionary Force, North Russia (AEF in North Russia) (also known as the Polar Bear Expedition) was a contingent of about 5,000 United States Army troops that landed in Arkhangelsk, Russia as part of the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War. It fought the Red Army in the surrounding region during the period of September 1918 through to July 1919.”
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Expeditionary_Force,_North_Russia
Note, these US soldiers were effectively commanded by the British.
One of the oddest part of the British expedition was that when Finns tried to take over Petsamo in April-July 1918, they actually fought a collection of British marines (from HMS Cochrane), White Russian infantry and Finnish communist!
The (almost comical) Finnish expedition was beaten back so totally that it took another two years until Finns were ready to try again, this time with more success. Just like before, the locals first hid from the Finns, but the situation cleared, many returned and among them so many communists, that the White Finns had to allow them to form a Red Guard (again). As the members of the Finnish expedition started to sympathize with the Red Guards, the leader decided to withdraw 30 from the Petsamo fjord. When the Bolsheviks from Arkhangelsk finally landed on the Petsamo fjord, the Finnish expedition had to escape trough Norway (causing an international scandal) due to part of the men switching sides.
tldr; even on this remotest of places the Russian “Civil War” certainly had more sides than two, and sometimes the allegiances and loyalties were quite fluid.
The first thing that comes to mind is the author’s failure to refer to the Social Revolutionary Party. The author implies that Marxist politics were exclusively industrial in orientation, and only opportunistically open to agrarian reform. In fact, the SRs were an agrarian socialist organization that incorporated Marxist concepts in its program.
The relationship between the Bolsheviks and the SRs eventually foundered, but the extent to which this was determined by the adamantly workerist mentality the author attributes to the Bolsheviks is just not clear to me, given how much their relationship was strained by questions surrounding the conduct of the war. The Bolsheviks took a consistently defeatist position, while the SRs eventually split, with the Left SRs supporting defeatism and the right SRs strongly “patriotic.” The Brest-Litovsk treaty caused tremendous strain and, further, the eventual necessity of carrying on coercive grain confiscation during the civil war led to SR elements reverting back to their pre-revolutionary tactics of assassination, this time against the Bolsheviks, including Lenin in August of 1918.
That political-military overlay was politically and theoretically poisonous as far as working out an agrarian-industrial rapprochement. Nonetheless, over the course of the 20s Bukharin emerged to assert agrarian interests, His program to involve the peasantry in a less coercive socialist program was finally scotched by Stalin in 1929 in favor of forced collectivization.
Why does the author carry out this erasure? My hunch, informed by my admittedly casual reading of current official Russian attitudes towards the Bolshevik legacy, attitudes he seems to share, is that they wish to portray Marxism as programmatically coercive and alien to Russian culture. In the process they suppress how much the “Soviet experiment” in the formulation of an agrarian socialist policy was a path-dependent nightmare.
“The Bolsheviks, for purely political reasons, but not ideological ones, implemented an agrarian reform, i.e., a new land policy, which they adopted from the social revolutionaries, given that the revolution had to be defended at all costs. Of course, based on Marxist program principles, the land was nationalized and collectivized (state farms and collective farms) shortly after the successful defense revolution during the civil war, so that in the end, the peasants were cheated. However, in the revolutionary year of 1917 and in the following years of the civil war, the peasants considered the acquired land their own.”
Thank you! One could write one hundred pages and still need to leave out relevant information.
I’ve found Maurice Brinton’s The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control – The State and Counter-Revolution 1970, to be informative. Brinton (aka Chris Pallas) was a self described anarchist, so that colors his account.
On January 15th, 1918, with the final German peace demand at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky is said to have questioned if the Russian people would accept its extremely harsh terms. On that same day the Constituent Assembly convened for its first and only session, shut down by the Bolsheviks (who had gained only 25% of the delegates). I have always wondered how he would have known.
The harshness of the German plan was turned against them at Versailles with its own harsh (if only slightly less so) terms.
Fanny Kaplan is said to have shot Lenin on August 30, 1918 due to the Assembly’s suppression. It will never be known if the bullet which remained lodged in him until shortly before his relatively early demise five years later was the main contributing factor.
Thanks for the history although I’ve always found the shifting politics of this period confusing. Warren Beatty no less even tried to make a movie about it–Reds–spotlighting John Reed. It’s a noble if flawed effort.
There’s an alternate history floating around saying that the UK actually engineered the war to prevent the McKinder fear of a unified Germany/Russia dominating Europe (Wilhelm and Nicholas were related via Victoria). By this theory England helped the Whites but not enough that they would actually win. More confusion if only speculation.
Whatever the reality for much of the 20th the Soviets kept socialism in the forefront while discrediting its advocates via association with Stalin’s ruthlessness. We still need that forefront –perhaps more than ever.
Russia’s withdrawal from the war meant that it did not receive a share of the Ottoman Empire and the West Asian oilfields. The West then had something to gain from the revolution’s success.
I’m questioning the account of Trotsky as a favored successor, as I’m reading letter after letter of Lenin eviscerating Trotsky and his decisions repeatedly.
Trotsky had a very strange career as a socialist. He was antagonistic towards the Bolsheviks for years favoring the reformist Menshiviks. Lenin was quite displeased but Trotsky eventually conceeded.
I also believe Trotsky wanted to continue the conflict against Germany, potentially to provoke revolution there. Lenin wrote scathing critiques against him for that, as that violated the promise for peace leaving Russia vulnerable to more horrific invasion and hunger.
If socialism is ever to have a chance in America, the many heartbreaking mistakes of earlier movements must not be repeated.
You can find letter after letter from Lenin eviscerating, at one point or another. every Bolshevik leader not named Lenin.
Tony Cliff has an account of Trotsky’s maneuvering at the talks that accords with what I’ve read. Trotsky tried to follow a middle ground between capitulation and pursuing a “revolutionary war” along the lines favored by the SRs and some prominent Bolsheviks. Trotsky did not think a revolutionary war was possible; like Lenin, he believed the army was in disarray, desertions were high. He hoped to drag out the negotiations and use them as a propaganda platform while antiwar sentiment in Germany grew. Lenin was more inclined to surrender.
The Czechoslovak Legion (Czech: Československé legie; Slovak: Československé légie) were volunteer armed forces consisting predominantly of Czechs and Slovaks fighting on the side of the Entente powers during World War I and the White Army during the Russian Civil War until November 1919. Their goal was to win the support of the Allied Powers for the independence of Lands of the Bohemian Crown from the Austrian Empire and of Upper Hungary from the Kingdom of Hungary, which were then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With the help of émigré intellectuals and politicians such as the Czech Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and the Slovak Milan Rastislav Štefánik, they grew into a force of over 100,000 troops.
In Russia, they took part in several victorious battles of the war, including the Zborov and Bakhmach against the Central Powers, and were heavily involved in the Russian Civil War fighting Bolsheviks, at times controlling the entire Trans-Siberian railway and several major cities in Siberia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovak_Legion
Since I live down the road from the 27th Infantry Regiment’s remaining battalions, I’ve been interested in their service in Russia where they received the name “Wolfhounds”, and inspiration for their mascot “Kolchak”.
There is a curious side story: in early 1920s, with Japan occupying the Maritime Province and parts of Siberia, Bolsheviks sought to counter them by sponsoring Korean independence fighters of whom there were some tens of thousands in Manchuria. Some were Bolshevik-friendly, others were not (heck, a lot of them armed themselves by buying arms from the Czechoslovak Legion when they were leaving Russia). But, in 1922, after Japanese agreed to leave, they were ordered to be disarmed: the Bolshevik aligned ones obeyed and they were settled in Central Asia (a couple of decades before the Koreans from the Maritime joined them.) Those who were not Bolshevik friendly to begin with tried to resist and were forcibly disarmed and were sent to gulags from which many did not return. This is one of many not so well known episodes that shaped distrust between SK and anyone communist…
1) Michael Jabara Carley:
Revolution and Intervention: The French Government and the Russian Civil
War 1917-1919
pdf
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333037039_Revolution_and_Intervention_The_French_Government_and_the_Russian_Civil_War_1917-1919
2) and some more – see related papers
“One Hundred Years Ago: the Triumph of the February Revolution 1917”
https://www.academia.edu/31684590/_One_Hundred_Years_Ago_the_Triumph_of_the_February_Revolution_1917_
3) MONTHLY REVIEW had a special ed. on 1917 in 2017:
https://monthlyreview.org/9980069032017/
content:
Volume 69, Number 3 Contents
“July-August 2017 (Volume 69, Number 3)” by The Editors
Article: “Revolution and Counterrevolution, 1917–2017” by John Bellamy Foster
Article: “The October Revolution and the Survival of Capitalism” by Prabhat Patnaik
Article: “One Hundred Years, One Hundred Messages” by Tamás Krausz
Article: “The Great Struggle to Escape Capitalism” by Bernard D’Mello
Article: “As the World Turned Upside Down: Left Intellectuals in Yugoslavia, 1988–90” by Helena Sheehan
Article: “The Western Left and the Russian Revolution” by Diana Johnstone
Article: “Bertrand Russell and the Socialism That Wasn’t” by Jean Bricmont and Normand Baillargeon
Article: “Fake News on Russia and Other Official Enemies: The ‘New York Times’, 1917–2017” by Edward S. Herman
Article: “Revolution from North to South” by Samir Amin
Fabulous!!!
Progress in the discussion about communism would already be the realization that communism is not a program that one can vote for and that is then implemented (be it by Lenin, Stalin or Trotsky, not to mention Mamdani).
The October Revolution was the product of a specific historical situation that enabled the Bolsheviks to seize power (with their slogan of immediate peace and land reform).
What the Communist Party then accomplished was a forced industrialization and partial modernization of the country, which secured them a sufficient base to remain in power, before it broke down due to its internal contradictions (the attempt to continue to centrally organize a valorization process while at the same time confronting increasingly centrifugal particular interests).
Left-wing theorists described this as a vicarious dictatorship of the proletariat, state capitalism, or as a transitional phase. But however one wants to describe this system, it was never meant to usher in communism.
Anyone interested in a genuine transformation of social relations should begin by freeing themselves from the nightmare of a past that can only teach us that a communist movement, which needs an avant-garde, is doomed to failure from the outset.
For a view through a wider lens, I recommend “Wall Street and the Russian Revolution 1905 to 1925” by Richard B. Spence. A sample:
“In the view of historian G.L. Owen, in the decade prior to WWI, Russia was under nothing less than a persistent, multi-pronged “economic assault” by American commercial and financial interests aimed at penetrating its markets and gaining control of its resources. The assault failed because the Tsarist Government proved itself more resistant and more resilient than anticipated. The solution, therefore, rested not on diplomacy but on regime change…Russia’s revolutionary upheavals between 1905 and 1917 were not isolated cases. Very similar disturbances occurred in Persia (Iran), Turkey, Mexico and China. In each case, foreign interests, including American, funded or encouraged the revolutionary movements. The natural resources and economic assets of these countries came up for grabs, and grabbed they were.” – p25
LOL
LOLWUT?