Satyajit Das: President Trump’s Spat With the Federal Reserve Is Not About Central Bank Independence

Yves here. Satyajit Das provides a compact overview of why central bank stewardship of the economy is not all that it is cracked up to be. Among the reasons are that the Fed and its ilk are asked to do too many things, some at odds with each other, with no clear priorities. Their economists suffer from groupthink and rely on dodgy models. And the Fed punted when it mattered, as in post-financial-crisis reforms (to its credit, the Bank of England was more bloody minded but lost that war to Treasury).

Das points out that Trump’s fixation with bludgeoning the Federal Reserve into line is in only part about financial repression, as in using low rates to keep the stock market bubbly and to lower the cost of continuing Federal deficits. But is it also about the Federal Reserve’s status as a power center, not in the traditional sense of “independent monetary policy” but as an institution that Trump has yet to dominate. Although Federal Reserve defenders take pains to wrap themselves in the mantle of central bank independence, the resistance is also to try to hold ground against a President who is determined to flatten all obstacles to his exercise of power, and resorting to brute force methods, from threats of prosecution to jackbootery.

Satyajit Das, a former banker and author of numerous technical works on derivatives and several general titles: Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives (2006 and 2010), Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk (2011) and A Banquet of Consequence – Reloaded (2016 and 2021). His latest book is on ecotourism – Wild Quests: Journeys into Ecotourism and the Future for Animals (2024). This is an expanded version of a piece first published on 22 December 2025 in the New Indian Express print edition

The spat between the White House and Fed Reserve Chairperson Jerome Powell, a President Trump appointment, is hardly unusual. Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon bullied the central bank to lower interest rates.

Central banks function as the government’s banker, issue currency, maintain the payment system and manage the nation’s currency reserves. They safeguard financial stability acting as a lender of last resort to banks although separate bodies sometimes regulate the financial system. The contentious part of their mandate is controlling money supply and setting interest rates.

Central bank independence is recent. In 1990, New Zealand legislated inflation targeting which was adopted by other nations. The concept was that an independent institution would determine monetary policy and maintain price stability minimising opportunities for politicians to use interest rates to boost economic activity especially around elections. The context was the high inflation era of the 1970s and 1980s. It was convenient to transfer painful choices to central bankers allowing governments to blame others or claim credit depending on outcomes.

The case for independence is unclear. The objectives, such as relative price stability, growth, and employment, are frequently contradictory. It is unclear which of multiple measures of price levels is to be prioritised. The 2 to 3 percent inflation objective is arbitrary. Empirical studies suggest that fear of deflation may be unwarranted. There are differences on what constitutes full employment. Data, rarely timely, has methodological problems. The representativeness of items used to measure inflation is contested. Unpaid work, zero-hour agreements and contracting complicates labour statistics. Resource scarcity or sustainability are ignored.

Central banks have limited tools – interest rates, regulating money supply through open market operations, quantitative easing (buying government debt) and forward guidance (open mouth operations or jawboning). Budgets, the currency, international capital flows, and geo-politics (sanctions, trade restrictions) are outside its control.

The underlying economic models focus on NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) or the Phillips Curve, a simplistic trade-off between unemployment and inflation. In practice, these relationships are unreliable. Cause and effect are difficult to differentiate. There is no agreement on a neutral (not contractionary or expansionary) interest rate. Central bankers constantly validate Laurence J. Peter’s judgement: “an economist is an expert who will know tomorrow why the things he predicted yesterday didn’t happen today.”

The problems are compounded by training and backgrounds which lend themselves to groupthink. Central bankers are economists, usually trained at the same universities, who spend their working life around the institution, government or academe and limited commercial experience. Central banks are run by economists providing employment for their tribe. Independent members rarely second guess staff recommendations, even if they have the expertise and information.

Originally reticent, central banks, following the lead of former Fed Chairperson Alan ‘Maestro’ Greenspan, have embraced celebrity. Inscrutable invisibility has given way to volubility, X handles, and Delphic oratory. They play to financial markets with an excessive focus on asset prices which do not uniformly benefit all citizens. Politicians, never happy to share the limelight, increasingly resent the power and public profile of these unelected technocrats. They begrudge having to seek approbation for their policies. US Presidents found themselves forced to kowtow to the all-powerful Greenspan. They increasingly are wary of the threat to their position and re-election that central banks may pose.

Central banks’ records are unconvincing. The Great Moderation of the 1990s and early 2000s, for which central bankers unashamedly claimed credit, was driven by lower rates, the result of Paul Volcker using punitive rates with high human cost to bring down inflation, as well as the entry of China, India and Russia into the global trading system and the growth of information technology. After the shocks of 2000 and 2008, hubristic central bankers used public money to rescue the system without addressing root causes. After 2020, they grossly misread price pressures regarding them as supposedly ‘transitory’. They have persistently ignored the side-effects of their policies such as asset price inflation, rising debt levels, capital allocation distortions, financing governments and social issues like inequality and housing affordability.

The current environment is different, characterised by low growth, slackening trade, challenges to free capital flows and geopolitical uncertainty. Interest rates are less effective in boosting economic activity. Inflation is less responsive to slack in the economy. Government borrowing in the aftermath of the crashes and the pandemic have created unsustainably high public debt and ongoing interest expenses which is unlikely to abate given aging populations, rising welfare costs and tax cuts. The increasingly populist political environment favours low interest rates, high growth, and jobs.

This is allied to suspicion of powerful elite central bankers insensitive to ordinary people’s concerns combined with an internationalist bent which favours globalisation. Vice-chairman of the US House of Representatives financial services committee Patrick McHenry questioned the right of then Fed Chair Janet Yellen to negotiate financial stability rules with “global bureaucrats in foreign lands without . . . the authority to do so.”

Given his sharp political instincts, President Trump senses an opportunity to undermine central bank authority if only by appointing voting Fed governors who favour his desire for short-term rates as low as 1 percent. Rather than institutional reform, the motivation is furtherance of financial repression to disguise sovereign insolvency and maintain artificially high stock and property prices.

Lower rates would allow continuation of profligate governments, with tax cuts and higher spending in sectors like defence and national security which favour the government’s business constituents. Negative real rates and self-fulfilling expectations of inflation are designed to allow the government to inflate away its rising debts and devalue the currency to improve competitiveness. The policy entails transferring wealth from domestic and overseas savers to borrowers. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant has suggested that the US will de facto use foreign wealth to rebuild American industry and employment through policies forcing foreigners to invest in US industries as directed by the Administration while at the same time reduce the value of overseas investors holdings by weakening the dollar or worse.

Interestingly, the President’s modus operandi for government policy is similar to that he used in his business. Trump enterprises sought growth at all costs. They borrowed big and defaulted if things did not work out.

Framed by the Administration’s critics around central bank independence, the opposition to Trump’s agenda has little to do with the subject. The governing classes’ concern is around the realisation that the Federal Reserve is now one of the few remaining institutions that offers any check on Presidential power given the weakening of Congress, the public sector, and the judiciary.

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