Yves here. A pronouncement by Germany’s finance minster reveals the intent to operate the EU, which heretofore had strong provisions to protect the interest of smaller states, on a “some animals are more equal than others” model.
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He has a PhD from MGIMO, which is under the umbrella of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published at his website
Poland’s role is pivotal since it could either make or break these plans.
German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil recently declared that “Now is the time for a two-speed Europe. Germany, together with France and other partners, will therefore now take the lead in making Europe stronger and more independent. As the six biggest economies in Europe, we can now be the driving force.” Apart from those two, this exclusive tier will also include Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Poland. The goal is to optimize decision-making by going around the EU’s consensus requirement.
According to the Washington Post, Klingbeil also sent a letter to his counterparts from the aforesaid countries announcing his intent for them to prioritize “a savings and investment union to improve financing conditions for businesses; strengthening the euro’s role as an international currency; better cooperation on defense spending; and securing resilient supply chains for critical raw materials.” His “two-speed Europe” proposal essentially functions as the EU’s adaptation to Great Power geopolitics.
Trump returned this approach to the fore of International Relations after authorizing the capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and the seizure of a Russian-flagged tanker in the Atlantic. The resumption of Great Powers prioritizing their national interests without being concerned anymore about accusations of violating international law bodes ill for the EU’s interests. After all, the US now wants EU member Denmark’s territory of Greenland, and the EU can’t stop the US even if it really wanted to.
This newfound self-consciousness of EU powerlessness has been brewing for a while, especially since the bloc was coerced by Trump’s tariff threats into agreeing to a lopsided trade deal with the US last summer, apparently inspired its de facto German leader to finally take action to rectify it to a degree. To be sure, the EU will probably never be able to restore its “strategic autonomy” vis-à-vis the US, but it could still possibly function more cohesively for making itself more competitive on the world stage.
For that to happen, member states will have to surrender more of their sovereignty to Brussels, thus furthering Germany’s long-running goal of federalizing the EU under its de facto leadership. This goal is being pursued through multiple means, including the EU’s planned transformation into a military union and creating a bigger pool of common debt through more funding for Ukraine. The challenge is that the EU’s consensus requirement for such major decisions allows smaller states like Hungary to stop this.
Therein lies the importance of Germany assembling an exclusive tier of EU members for making such decisions amongst themselves and then coercing their smaller peers into following suit through the momentum unleashed by them creating tangible facts on the ground. The clock is ticking since Poland’s ruling liberal-globalist coalition might be replaced by a conservative-populist one after fall 2027’s next parliamentary elections, however, ergo why Germany wants to get as much done as soon as possible.
These plans could be foiled even before then if Poland’s conservative president vetoes legislation associated with it since the ruling liberal-globalist coalition lacks the two-thirds majority to overrule him. Any moves by this exclusive tier that don’t require legislative approval to advance the EU’s de facto federalization could also be challenged by Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal and Supreme Court, which are at the center of a highly partisan dispute, thus possibly delaying implementation till the next elections.
Poland’s role in this German-proposed process is pivotal. Participation and tangible progress could create facts on the ground that are difficult to reverse even if the government changes after fall 2027. Likewise, resistance through the means described above could impede the aforesaid progress and possibly avert the associated consequences. If a conservative-populist coalition comes to power in Poland, it might then assemble regional allies to collectively and thus more effectively oppose these plans.
In that scenario, the EU could bifurcate into German- and Polish-led tiers, the first representing its legacy members and the second its new ones. Just like the German-led tier plans to make decisions amongst themselves and then coerce their smaller peers into following suit, so too could the Polish-led one do the same vis-à-vis their larger peers. These dynamics could result in the EU’s de facto dissolution into two distinct blocs that only remain united through their inherited policies like freedom of movement.
It’s therefore ironic that Germany considers its “two-speed Europe” proposal to be an adaptation to Great Power geopolitics that’ll enable the EU to function more cohesively for making itself more competitive on the world stage when this proposal actually risks dealing a deathblow to the EU as it now exists. The odds are still in Germany’s favor, but they could decisively shift after fall 2027’s next parliamentary elections in Poland, which are shaping up to be consequential for the entire continent.
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Balancing half the EUs weight on Poland will crack the beam. I doubt even most of the eastern European states will go along, let alone France and Italy.
If this is what “reform” looks like, Europeans are better off with the dysfunction.
If this is real, then I can’t imagine a world where the US can’t pressure Poland to deny this. Pick between the US and Germany. The US will withdraw all military support.
And if the EU finds some excuse to delay the Polish election or ban the party it doesn’t like? Can’t picture them getting away with it but they did in Romania.
it will be a harder thing to do since the president is from the conservative populist block.
Allow me to point out that the Germans’ reputation for rationality has suffered many dings of late. This new offer described by Korybko is just one more example of German flailing. I note that the Germans want to drag their equally as rational pals, the Netherlanders (ahh yes, Mark Rutte and his pronouncements and Queen Trixie Maria recently self-inducted into the armed forces) into the exclusive club. I note that Belgium was one of the original Six, and I have a feeling that the Belgians will have an opinion about being excluded.
This will not fly: “For that to happen, member states will have to surrender more of their sovereignty to Brussels, thus furthering Germany’s long-running goal of federalizing the EU under its de facto leadership. This goal is being pursued through multiple means, including the EU’s planned transformation into a military union and creating a bigger pool of common debt through more funding for Ukraine.”
This is MarioDraghi-ism, which has already failed and keeps failing and, somehow, won’t go away. Europeans are not likely to look kindly on further concentration of power among the Commission (think of Ursula von der Leyen Unchained) plus the feeble EuroParliament, not noted for close oversight.
Further, as seen in recent negotiations in which Macron and Merz met with Starmer while keeping Meloni and Sanchez away, we are talking three tiers: France / Germany, with Netherlands and Poland operating as suburbs of Germany, plus Italy and Spain, the Excitable Latins Who Can Never Be in Charge.
And what are the other countries to do about this demotion? Some are viable countries that have done well economically and socially — Sweden, Czech Republic, Greece, Slovenia, Eire, Hungary. What have they done to deserve the second tier? Not export enough plumbers to Berlin?
Others are highly dependent countries with enough problems to keep them in the EU because they can’t leave the EU. Baltic States, Romania, Bulgaria. Austria has been retired from reality for years.
So: No. This latest proposal is a syndrome we have seen too often: Germans getting big ideas.
PS: To the German finance minister: That stress on “supply chains” means talking seriously to the Russians and Chinese. That stress on “supply chains” means addressing what happened to NordStream. Which means ending the Ukraine adventure instead of engaging in a managed slaughter in Central Europe. And then there is dealing with the Israeli government and the genocide in Palestine. Until the German government makes progress in dealing with these issues, German proposals cannot be taken seriously.
According to French historian and anthropologist Emmanuel Todd, Germany (and other German-speaking regions) is the place where a form of family structure he dubbs “stem-family” reigns supreme. It is characterized by a strict hierarchy (parents over children, elder children over younger ones, etc), inequality between siblings (as a fundamental principle one, usually the elder brother, inherits more, possibly everything, than the others), and authoritarianism (those at the top of the hierarchy decide for the others). In contrast, much of France corresponds to the “nuclear family” with egalitarian principles (f.ex. the fundamental principle is that all children, male and female, receive a strictly equal share of the inheritance).
Todd contends (and his argument is grounded on serious demographic and historical statistics) that family forms have a decisive impact on the mentalities and political attitudes of the respective countries. Hence, the advent of fascism where the “stem family” is present — Germany, Austria, Northern Italy, Northern Portugal, Northern Spain, Japan.
From that perspective, the German proposal regarding the division of the EU into various ranks of precedence, with Germany and other peers the pre-eminent countries, is not an irrational behaviour, but one that derives from a deeply anchored view of the world. Germans are taking advantage of their relative superiority within the EU to overhaul its French-inspired design based on a strict equality amongst countries (decisions based on unanimity, equivalent prerogatives in the executive, one commissioner for each country).
Ha, very helpful. Thanks. Along with DLG colorful take on the probably hierarchical fine points.
Neat – Belgium, embodies the two in an uneasy alliance, and is kicked out of the top tier. I wonder if Belgium would stand for not being in in club while also seating the EU bureaucracy.
This is reminiscent of Lakoff’s work on ‘framing’ (“Don’t think of an elephant”?), which contrasted the language and corresponding worldviews of Republicans and Democrats as the ‘Strict Father’ model vs. the ‘Nurturing Mother’ model of government’s role in society.
Very good and to the point comment.
One nuance, though, more to be pedantically fair to Todd’s theory than to question anything you said: Todd refers to traditional peasant family structures, family structures that don’t exist anymore. The changes in civil and inheritance law introduced in the last 100-150 years in (as far as I know) all Western countries have tended towards nuclear, egalitarian family structure arrangements, which are prevalent now around us. The point that he makes is that those traditional structures still live in the form of distinct political cultures, that they still inform political attitudes and shape societies today. In a way (I think that at some point he uses the expression himself), these structures are having a second, “ghost” life. And that would explain the very different, irreconcilable political cultures of the different EU Member countries.
Thank you. You are right that I should have pointed out that I was referring to traditional family structures that held for centuries in pre-industrial societies, but that continue to influence mentalities to this day.
Any idea how the Eastern European* joint family structure relates to Todd’s theory? I’m more familiar with studies in Finland were a lot of the social history** has been explained by this distinction of stem family structure in western Finland vs joint family structure in eastern Finland.
* all the way from Balkans to Sami people in Lapland.
** especially emigration, but other population movements also
One would have to look into Todd’s exposition in detail, but the summary is that the traditional “joint family” / “famille communautaire” is characterized by large groups of relatives (parents, sons with their wives, etc) living together within a structure that has both authoritarian and egalitarian traits.
Yugoslavia, Northern Greece, Russia are regions where this traditional form was dominant, and they are also those where communism took hold — as well as those parts of France and Italy where the communist party used to be very strong. As for Finland, the dichotomy you mention might also explain the tearing apart of the country during the post-WWI civil war.
Stem family was the norm in Catalonia. Not that clear in the rest of Spain (mixed). Nowadays the model tends to the nuclear.
With regards to the article, Two-speed EU? IMO, na-ga happen. There will be of course ad-hoc agreements now and then as usual between 2 or a few countries which will change with national political drift.
Germany is reverting to historical norm. It never ends well for anyone in Europe whenever that happens.
Exactly what I thought when so many people started shouting for Germany to rearm. Were they all mad or just ignorant of history?
I guess racism and prejudice also exists in the anglophone world? Maybe the Germans are genetically evil? Is that your view? And what’s history for you – 20 years that makes already a norm? How about when the US eradicated entire native nations in genocidal mania and enslaved a good part of the African continent. Is it now reverting to the historical norm under Trump? Most of Europe is going right, have you had a look at the UK Party system lately? And what’s going on with the US these days? Even in Portugal the nationalists for the first time in I don’t know are on the march. The US was not that opposed to the Nazis either and cosying up to Vichy France. It’s really cheap to mask what is currently going on with a simple “Oh Germany is at it again” – by no means I’d like to defend Merz or von der Leyen, but your analysis falls way short of what is going on in European elite power politics. And ALL of them came to power by boot licking the US. Let me also be a bit sweeping: Maybe if the “Anglos” hadn’t sabotaged the German Ostpolitik we’d now have a common security architecture with Russia and Peace in Europe.
Indeed the Anglos had an agenda, but that only reinforces mine (and David’s) point about making tragically wrong choices now that the EU is a supposedly independent actor looking to find its geopolitical relevance and weight. The EU, led by Germans in key positions, is looking to double down on what you allege is the Anglo stuff. That in turn reinforces the point made here and elsewhere many times – that the Euros were willing and enthusiastic junior partners in America’s “rules-based world order” charade by which the Western world continued to extract resources and wealth from the rest of the world. Now the US is trying to go solo and we have a situation where the EU, led by Germany, feels locked out. It’s very reminiscent of how it felt just over a century ago. The reversion to norm shows that no lessons have been learned, the grand European experiment has been a charade, and we are cursed to experience very interesting times ahead…
As a matter of fact, biological racism is an English and French invention, which was imported into Germany. Germany (speaking broadly to include Austria) is the home of Nazism, but it is also the home of Herder and Boas.
Come to think of it, if I may comment on my own comment, Nazism and Herder/Boas are related, but take things in different directions. German culture in the 1800s-first half of the 20th century is dominated by the idea of the uinqueness of Germany, understood as under threat culturally and geopolitically from the West and East. In the case of Nazism, this takes the form of a belief in Germanic biological superiority, whereas in Herder/Boas it manifests in the notion of the uniqueness and equal validity of all peoples (Herder’s “peoples are the thoughts of God.”
Any basic cultural structure can be shifted into radically different forms that still have the same assumptions.
This is nothing new, the Western elites have well known habit of cheering on Germany to take on Russia, it’s just that one would thought they would remember how it ended the last time.
Also amusing to us Celts is that, as far as we’re concerned, the Anglos are basically Germans (crypto Germans?) themselves, so … every accusation a confession, eh?
Germany’s historical norm is to be fractured into a multiplicity of principalities.
And may it return to that particular norm.
I rather think that the German proposal is the opposite of what Korybko thinks it is. From the beginning of the EEC, the Franco-German “couple” was the dominant force politically, and the smaller countries looked to the Commission, and subsequently to British membership, as a counterweight. EU expansion followed by Brexit has made Germany’s position less strong in reality, and is moving the balance of power towards consortia of smaller nations and the Commission. There was going to be an inevitable nationalist backlash (there have been signs in France for a while) and this is another symptom. Nothing in the German proposals implies that they have to be carried out within the existing mechanisms of the EU, and indeed there have always been a whole host of ad hoc arrangements between different groups of European states.
The suggestion that “For that to happen, member states will have to surrender more of their sovereignty to Brussels, thus furthering Germany’s long-running goal of federalizing the EU under its de facto leadership.” could only have been written by someone with no understanding of Brussels. The sentence contains an obvious contradiction, because a federal system is one where power is devolved to nations, and the more of their sovereignty states surrender, the less possible this would be. Smaller EU states still see the Commission and plans for “deepening” Europe as mechanisms for keeping what would have been excessive German influence under some sort of control. It looks as if the Germans are getting tired of this.
This is also exactly what I thought – there’s simply no way to do this within the existing EU and it would likely be another structure that would be brought into being. I give it zero chance of happening and it goes to negative percentages if the RN wins the presidency in France next year.
My take is similar to yours. I am surprised that Korybko has a different interpretation: perhaps “wishful thinking” or not enough practical knowledge of how EU important people work in Brussels
Would it not be nore accurate to say the EU is a confederacy, or very weak federation. Where as these plans are for a strong federation. If we look at the USA, states have a lot of power to make decisions, but a lot less than EU countries. California can’t have a separate foreign policy. And it certainly can’t go to war with another country or refuse to take part in a war the Federal government declares.
A Confederacy of Dunces
Another way to view this is money. Germany has pursued domestic austerity and budget surpluses balancing with export profits and direct investment in its Euro neighbours. This has been within the Euro, which has been held too low for the German area (hence the surpluses) and too high for the PIIGS.
Germany now wishes to reflate. What began as military Keynesianism in public has in my view become public expenditure generally. And if it hasn’t, the German politician cal class is more stupid than I thought!
There are decades of underinvestment to rectify, in infrastructure and social fabric and the integration of millions of immigrants is a cost on top. All while the stranded assets of automotive manufacturing need to be reoriented to other markets.
To fund this, Germany will want to issue Eurodebt. Socialising new issues of debt is fine is Germany’s share is disproportionally large and spent on Germany.
What puzzles me is why thrifty Netherlands or high debt France and Italy would be willing to limit their borrowing power, in new debt issuance, when Germany will crowd them out? Is there a grand bargain? Has, for example, Germany agreed to fund an expansion of France’s force de frappe with France in charge, in return for France agreeing to allow Germany to issue common Euro debt?
The sordid history of the EU is originally an organisation to control energy (coal) and war matériel production (steel production), the International authority of the Ruhr, between UK, USA, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. It evolved from High Commission into a steel and coal union (France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands). The French were the driving force behind this evolution because they wanted the restoration of German economic growth within a united (French run!) Europe. (NB: The policy was opposed by Gaullists – it was Robert Schumann, born and raised Luxembourg German, naturalised French after WW1, who pushed for accommodation with Germany).
So, is there a grand bargain, ironically recapitulating the aftermath of WW2, in which the core EU countries seek common Euro-debt reflation of German industrial might, thinking a rising tide is good for all boats, in the context of a German geopolitical re-subordination?
“the core EU countries seek common Euro-debt reflation of German industrial might, thinking a rising tide is good for all boats.” Hah, tell that to the PIGS… Weren’t the German easy loans that pauperized the Greeks (true, true, the Greek politicians and biz were only willing).
The idea of a two-speed Europe has pedigree, see Wikipedia about the Lamers-Schäuble paper on core Europe from 1994: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-speed_Europe (German source is linked in footnote 2). It caused quite a stir at the time.
I wonder if Spain and France would want to be led by Germany.
As a Romanian I wouldn’t trust a German to throw it. And it goes a looong way.
Since before 1500s, the german colonists in Transylvania tried to monopolize the trade with the other two principalities in the area, Wallachia and Moldova. Vlad the Impaler had something to say about that and gave some executive orders to prop the Wallachian merchants and trades people. For good measure cut throug a burg or two.
The propaganda unleashed by resentful burgers (The Siebenburgen) reached even Spain. And some falsified correspondence presented Vlad as making alliance with the Ottomans and through trechery ended up for 17 years in a Hungarian prison.
The German colonists accepted that there only three legal nations in Transilvania, while the Romanian majority was excluded from any legal rights.
WWI, Germans occupied Wallachia and despoiled her. Including trains and trains loaded with the black earth of Baragan. Before WWII Germany paid upfront Hungary with Romanian territory so that Hungary would join in the war against Soviets, and also allowed Soviets to occupy what is today R of Moldova so that it will force Romanians to join them in the war against the Soviet Union (same trick was done to Finns).
After WWII, in the 1970s, the 800,000 strong German community just melted away. Entire regions got depopulated because the commies would allow them to emigrate to FRG (at some cost). And the Romanian Germans were willing. Now their kids come and visit and are resentful. You don’t leave Transylvania for fucking Germany.
So no, I don’t trust the Krauts and I don’t think that they have finished to pay for their crimes. They haven’t even started paying for their past crimes.
Merz says Germans should work harder, citing Greece as a model. OMG.
https://www.tovima.com/politics/merz-urges-germans-to-work-more-cites-greece-as-model/
The problem with Europe is the nation-states. It is not possible ignoring them. An Indian ambassador, speaking in the middle of the Catalan turmoil said that disintegrating them would be a solution, he meant, not a Europe of twenty-something somewhat federated nation-states but a Europe of between one and two hundred of federated states. Yes, “erase” Germany, France, Spain, Italy, even Poland, and substitute them with their classical pre-nation-states bodies, many of them very alive today. In practice, it means to destroy an entire tier of organization, and with it, the main objector. It has two problems: there are states not “disintegrables” (Greece, Portugal, Hungary, and so on), and this view is currently absolutely impossible to put forward, since it destroys an entire network of power (the main one), that would be needed to reorganize. But, the Indian was right, as a way to cement the EU it would be definitive and irreversible.
All the six states can be dismantled in subestructures (federated states, regions, autonomous entities…). But this is not going to happen, quite on the contrary, the six states will recentralize even more (a tendency growing from Maastricht). This means even more problems, with a nucleus overtensionated and a periphery watching in panic. Even more, *all* these six states have a huge internal divide, North-South in Spain, Italy and France, East-West (more or less) in Germany and Poland, particulary in Germany the ex-GDR is a bleeding problem. This is not going to resolve a problem that the EEC/EU in its whole history (since 1958) never could fix, once again it will exacerbate it.
Just a tiny though clarifying point for sanity’s sake, knowing most readers and contributors here already know. Kidnapping and piracy are the terms to substitute when you read capture and seize.
..and national interests are presentented as popular interests.
Everything we have must be surrendered for the war we never needed