The most important change in modern warfare is not the proliferation of drones or missiles, but the collapse in the cost of precision guidance. Weapons no longer need to be highly sophisticated to be accurate. They only need to be good enough, and “good enough” is now cheap. For decades, precision strike was treated as a premium capability of a few powerful nations. Guided munitions were expensive, technologically complex, and limited in supply. Precision was used sparingly against high-value targets by actors who could afford it. The ability to place a munition within a few meters of a target represented a convergence of advanced engineering, high industrial capacity, and large financial resources. That model no longer holds. The cost of achieving operationally sufficient accuracy has declined consistently, driven by advances in sensors, navigation, and software. Precision is no longer scarce; it is becoming a baseline capability.
Every strike system operates within an implicit constraint: how much error can be tolerated while still achieving the desired effect. Large fixed targets can be disabled even with significant miss distance, while smaller or mobile targets demand tighter accuracy. In each case, the mission defines a maximum allowable error—an accuracy budget that cannot be exceeded. This article explains how this accuracy budget has become affordable to a much larger set of military powers. The evolution of three technologies described in this article is driving this transformation: satellite navigation, inertial guidance, and terminal homing.
Satellite Navigation (GNSS)
Global satellite navigation systems such as the U.S. GPS and Russian GLONASS determine position by measuring the time delay of signals transmitted from multiple satellites. By comparing signals from at least four satellites, a receiver can calculate its three-dimensional geographic position with meter-level accuracy under favorable conditions. Accuracy depends on signal quality, satellite geometry, and environmental factors, but even degraded signals can provide a useful positional fix.
In practical terms, GPS provides geographic location points during a weapon’s flight. This information can be used alone to guide a weapon or it can supplement other guidance systems to correct accumulated errors. Continuous reception is not strictly required; intermittent updates are often sufficient to maintain accuracy within an operational error budget. Historically, this capability was expensive and restricted. Military-grade receivers were specialized devices with anti-jam features, and high-accuracy positioning often required additional infrastructure. Civilian access was also intentionally degraded for many years.
The technical and economic constraints that once limited GPS-based guidance have largely disappeared. Inexpensive GPS receivers are now embedded in billions of consumer devices, including smartphones, vehicles, and industrial systems. Multi-constellation receivers (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou) and augmentation techniques further improve robustness and accuracy. The economic shift is decisive: a capability once limited to specialized military systems is now a low-cost, mass-produced component. The marginal cost of adding precise positioning has effectively approached zero.
Waveshare L76K Multi-GNSS Module – cost: $13
Inertial Navigation Systems (INS)
Inertial navigation systems estimate position by measuring acceleration and rotation using gyroscopes and accelerometers. These measurements are integrated over time to produce a continuous estimate of velocity and position. Because INS does not rely on external signals, it is inherently resistant to jamming, spoofing, or signal loss.
The limitation of inertial navigation is drift. Small errors in sensor measurements accumulate over time, causing the estimated position to gradually diverge from the true position. The longer the system operates without correction, the greater this error becomes. As a result, inertial systems are typically paired with external references such as GPS to periodically reset accumulated drift. Historically, reducing drift required extremely precise sensors, including mechanical, ring laser, or fiber optic gyroscopes. These systems were expensive, often costing tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars per unit, and were limited to high-end military and aerospace platforms.
The introduction of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) sensors transformed this landscape. MEMS devices are fabricated using semiconductor manufacturing processes and produced at massive scale for consumer electronics, automotive systems, and industrial applications. Although MEMS sensors are less precise than traditional high-end systems, their cost is orders of magnitude lower and their performance continues to improve.
For many strike scenarios, particularly over short to medium ranges, MEMS-based inertial systems provide sufficient accuracy when initialized or periodically corrected by satellite navigation. The design problem has shifted from achieving near-perfect precision to maintaining acceptable accuracy at low cost.
Haoyu GY-521 MEMS inertial guidance module – cost $2
Terminal Homing and Target Recognition
Terminal guidance systems refine accuracy during the final phase of flight by directly sensing the target or its surroundings. Increasingly, this role is being performed by optical and infrared (IR) systems rather than traditional radar or laser designation. Electro-optical sensors capture visual imagery, while infrared seekers detect heat signatures, allowing systems to identify targets based on their physical characteristics rather than pre-programmed coordinates.
These approaches are particularly effective against fixed or semi-fixed targets whose visual or thermal signatures are known in advance. A system can be provided with reference imagery—satellite photos, reconnaissance images, or stored templates—and use onboard sensors to match what it detects during terminal approach against that reference. This process, known as scene matching or image correlation, enables accurate targeting even when navigation errors have accumulated.
Historically, such capabilities required specialized sensors and significant onboard processing power, limiting their use to high-end munitions. That constraint is rapidly eroding. Advances in commercial imaging technology and embedded processing—driven by smartphones, autonomous vehicles, and AI applications—have made high-resolution cameras and powerful processors inexpensive and widely available.
This enables a new class of systems that combine optical or infrared sensing with machine vision algorithms. Rather than simply navigating to coordinates, these systems can identify, classify, and home in on targets based on learned features. While still constrained by environmental conditions and countermeasures, the trajectory is clear. Terminal guidance is shifting from specialized hardware toward software-driven image recognition. As with other components of the precision ecosystem, the key change is economic. Implementation of image-based target recognition and homing is no longer confined to bespoke military systems. It can increasingly be accomplished with mass-produced components, extending high-precision guidance to lower-cost platforms.
Teledyne Lepton thermal imager – cost: $109
The components illustrated above are representative commercially available commodity items and not uniquely available from the identified manufacturers.
Strategic Consequences
Taken together, these shifts illustrate the central dynamic of the precision revolution. Each component has transitioned from specialized, high-cost systems to mass-produced technologies. Precision guidance no longer depends on costly rare capabilities; it depends on combining inexpensive ones. The result is not perfect accuracy, but sufficient accuracy at scale. The shift from precision guidance as a costly technological achievement to a widely accessible capability has direct strategic consequences.
Defense against precision weapons becomes more difficult in this environment. Electronic warfare can degrade navigation, but it rarely eliminates it. Interception systems are expensive and limited, while hardening and dispersal can only reduce, not eliminate, vulnerability. This creates a cost asymmetry: missile offense becomes cheaper and more scalable, while missile defense becomes more complex and expensive.
The proliferation of low-cost precision strike systems has significant implications for expeditionary warfare. As an attacking force projects power into a contested environment, it must operate within the defender’s strike envelope. Historically, this favored the attacker, which could rely on superior precision and stand-off capabilities. That advantage is eroding. When relatively inexpensive systems can deliver sufficient precision at short to medium ranges, the defender’s accuracy budget becomes easier to satisfy as distance closes. Forward bases, logistics hubs, airfields, and staging areas become increasingly vulnerable to repeated, low-cost strikes. The attacker must either remain at greater distance, relying on expensive long-range systems with limited inventory, or accept exposure to a growing volume of cheaper defender weapons. In an extended campaign, this dynamic imposes a cost and sustainability burden that favors defenders able to regenerate strike capacity.
The current Middle East war provides a clear illustration of this shift. Iranian and proxy forces have employed large volumes of relatively inexpensive drones and missiles, forcing defenders to expend costly interceptors and aircraft sorties. Even when most incoming systems are intercepted, residual leakage, combined with economic asymmetry, imposes sustained pressure on defensive systems. The use of saturation tactics further increases the cost of defense relative to attack.
The result is a form of distributed, economically driven deterrence: the defender does not need to defeat the attacker outright, but only to impose continuous attrition risk within the attacker’s operational envelope. For expeditionary forces, closing distance now increases exposure to accurate, low-cost defender strikes that can disrupt an offensive campaign. This shift may force a reconsideration of how, and at what cost, military power can be projected.
Conclusion
The central fact of the precision revolution is economic. The components required to meet many accuracy budgets are now produced at global scale for civilian markets, driving continuous improvement while reducing cost. This lowers the barrier to entry and enables mass production and proliferation. Precision strike capability is no longer restricted to advanced industrial powers and can now be deployed widely in quantity. Precision weaponry is no longer engineered at great expense; it is assembled from inexpensive parts. That, more than any individual weapon or platform, is what is changing the character of modern warfare.







“Increasingly, this role is being performed by optical and infrared (IR) systems rather than traditional radar or laser designation.”
Terminal guidance via sound is missing from that list. Acoustic homed torpedoes have been a thing for ages. This is all the more relevant since we are just entering the age of USV and UUV as offensive weapons (witness the attacks against the Russian fleet during the on-going Russo-Ukrainian war).
> This shift may force a reconsideration of how, and at what cost, military power can be projected.
We seem likely to get a lesson in this in the near future.
Regarding inexpensive terminal guidance, the discussion here seems to focus on “autonomous terminal guidance”. Ted Postol has argued that human terminal guidance could be cheaply integrated to low-cost drones such as Iranian Shahed drones.
This discussion at Glen Diesen’s channel
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbQI_IYz6uM
starting about 13:35, Prof Postol discusses the coverage of the Iridium satellite system and the concept of using Iridium transceivers (illustrated at 16:00) with low-cost imagers to convert Shahed or other low-cost drones into long-range FPV drones.
Can anyone explain the deal with Iridium Corp? Afaik, it seems to be an American company, but everyone seems to be able to access its satelites.
It is one that seemed missing from the list. One disadvantage is that it requires a signal that can be jammed. It is probably also safe to say that the increasing use of mass satellite guidance for cheap munitions increases the likelihood of military action against satellites. As an example in a war between the USA and China, at some point it would become cheaper to destroy the opponents satellite system than try and intercept every cheap munition. And if that happens you can guarantee both sides would do the same and the whole satellite guidance network that has been built up is no longer useable, including for the mass of civilian uses it currently is.
Those with the industrial capacity to mass produce the stuff are the emerging or remerging superpowers. Ho, ho, ho, neoliberalism cooked the Western industrial goose.
Never mind the warfare applications, what about neighbourhood disputes? We are moving into Mad Max territory.
So firstly, great piece by HH. Plaudits. Secondly ….
Fred S: what about neighbourhood disputes? We are moving into Mad Max territory.
We’re already there, it’s just unevenly distributed, to paraphrase W. Gibson. Smartphone chips circa 2008 level with GPS ( or whatever) work fine for most drone’s brains and people have been doing that since at least 2008-10, AFAIK.
So, one way of thinking about such drones is as shanzai drones. As in shanzai war. Meaning, regular folks hacking together cheap, do-it-yourself versions of weapon systems they’ve seen the big boys using on the internet.
Shanzai began as a Chinese term for pirated or imitations goods and electronics. Then people started seeing rebels in the Middle East turning pick-up trucks into armored rocket-launchers and repurposing consumer electronics to hack into their enemies’ guidance systems.
So while it started in the Middle East, it’s been raised several levels by the Ukraine war. The blowback from that is going to hit Europe over the next few years, since most of the Russian mafias I’ve heard about in the West turned out to be Ukrainians.
does this mean that the arms caterers will no longer have a market for their expensive war equipment?
Only slightly off topic… Here in the Mojave Desert near the China Lake AirNav Base, short of actual targeting, the local meshtastic ad-hoc network demonstates all of this. Adding targeting capability with off-the-shelf drones would not take much.
Encrypted short haul radio communications along with wifi and bluetooth connectivity, GNSS (with mapping), and 3-axis inertia sensors under solar power for less than $40.00 per device with basic “maker” skills. And no licensing required.
Here we have over 50 networked systems on line at any one time.
We live in a new world.
Isn’t it a great humanitarian advance that kamikaze attacks are now carried out by drones instead of people?
When Sam Colt began selling the first practical revolver, it was soon referred to as “The Great Equalizer.” In short, it produced a social revolution of sorts. The mere size and strength of a person was no longer the ultimate arbiter of social disputes. Pocket pistols made lone women no longer ‘rape bait’ but safer and more self-assured, especially in public places.
This revolution in ‘precision’ targeting of cheap weapons seems fit to perform the same social shift for smaller groups and communities. Are we seeing the reintroduction of City States?
Mr. Lee’s Greater Hong Kong, here we come.
Per Inside business china, mass production allows sales of hypersonic missiles 1300 km range for under $100k.
https://kdwalmsley.substack.com/p/on-sale-now-china-is-mass-producing
One relatively inexpensive method (read: not AI) to correct INS errors and for terminal guidance is DSMAC. It has been around for decades and requires only pre-processed satellite imagery.
Gee whillikers!
I hope the peasants don’t get no idees about the 2nd Amendment ….
Another important aspect of cheap technology is communication, along side cheap surveillance and analysis. The US military’s traditional strength was its ability to organize and execute a large-scale strike quickly, achieving its objectives before the enemy had the chance to realize what has happening and then reorganize and react.
Think about the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down), foiled because the Somalis used satellite phones and a well-organized but de-centralized system of spotters and unit commanders. The Iranians probably have a excellent network of human spotters and spies across the Middle East, in addition to satellite data. Not only does this provide them with good GPS coordinates for their missiles, it also helps them mitigate US/Israeli air strikes. Tankers are ambushed over Iraq, F-35’s ambushed by small AA assets hidden in the mountains, and missile launchers kept hidden in bunkers when a raid is incoming.
Yves tells a story about how she used to business analysis by hand, crunching the numbers and writing everything out on a physical spreadsheet. Then the spreadsheet software came and analysts started doing quick and dirty write-ups, glossing over bad data, errors, and shoddy assumptions, but confident in their predictions because they had a mountain of cheap data to back it up. Listening to Scott Ritter, I imagine something similar has crept into the legion of staff officers that run the US Military: data has replaced human intelligence and judgement, errors are rife because there is no feedback with reality, no engagement with fudged numbers or blind assumptions. Area experts have become yes-men, and no one knows what’s actually going on on the ground.
Staff officers, with their years of professional training and billions of dollars in equipment, used to be the key strength of the US military, but now the IRGC can do just as well with a few satellite phones and laptops.
Excellent article HH! I spent good parts of my career working on navigation systems – traditional systems using multiple gyros, to stabilized inertial nav, to strapdown inertial nav systems. I can remember when Crossbow came out with the very first MEMS rate gyros back on the 90’s and thinking this is gonna change the world:
Crossbow Technology https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crossbow_Technology
I’m not going to go into details other than to quickly say that there are significant differences between those little inexpensive MEMS inertial guidance systems and the much more expensive systems used by the military – big bucks are spent to reduce drift.
But those sat nav systems sorta nullify what use to be a big difference.