Western leaders and media claim that Iranians are oppressed under a tyrannical regime from which they are anxious to be liberated. That is one of the main arguments for the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran. And even those who oppose the war think it necessary to first express their repulsion toward the Iranian government system. But is that what Iranians think?
It would be difficult to answer that conclusively. Ideally, we would need to ask all Iranians, or at least a sufficiently large number of randomized individuals to achieve statistical accuracy, which is what most statistical polls cited by the media and some self-styled serious think tanks lack.
In November 2022, the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change published a paper titled “Protests and Polling Insights From the Streets of Iran: How Removal of the Hijab Became a Symbol of Regime Change” in collaboration with Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran, a Dutch polling firm, which basically stated that the overwhelming majority of Iranians are secular, if not outright atheists, who are seeking to overthrow the government.
However, GAMAAN is a polling firm with extensive links to U.S. government-funded organizations, such as United States Agency for International Development or the National Endowment for Democracy. They use online methods to acquire data, relying on U.S. government-funded VPN and anti-censorship provider Psiphon, and the resulting dataset has been questioned for its reliability and statistical validity. Furthermore, GAMAAN’s founders and directors are outspoken critics of the Iranian government.
Daniel Tavana, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University who was a Principal Investigator for Princeton University’s Iran Social Survey, says that GAMAAN and its directors are not trying to find answers; rather, they already know the answers they want and attempt to wrap them in the language of social science.
GAMAAN’s data has been widely used by media outlets such as The Wall Street Journal or The Guardian, as well as by think tanks like the Wilson Center, amongst many others. In 2023, GAMAAN claimed that 80% of respondents opposed the Islamic Republic. This seems to contradict a telephone survey conducted by Gallup in 2021, which, while acknowledging its limitations, appears more methodologically robust. Gallup reported that 59% of the population had confidence in the government. The same survey rated the approval of President Ebrahim Raisi, who conveniently died in a helicopter crash in 2024, at 72%.
These percentages are comparable to approval levels found in other nations, including Western ones. Critics argue that such results are unreliable because people might not give their honest opinions on the phone out of fear of reprisals. Even if that concern is valid, it assumes that Iranians aspire to a secular liberal society but are afraid to say so—an assumption that may not hold true for the majority.
Another set of data that is frequently cited and seems to challenge that assumption is a leaked document from a national survey conducted by the Iranian government in 2024. A chapter of the survey titled “The Fourth Wave of the National Survey of Values and Attitudes of Iranians,” conducted by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance research center, was supposedly leaked to BBC Persian. The survey had 15,906 respondents aged 18+, and it was conducted through face-to-face interviews in 31 provinces in Iran.
The BBC published it with an explosive title: “73% of the Iranian population supports the separation of religion and state.” They said that this figure was up from about 30% in 2015, which would then imply a majority opposition to the Islamic Republic. However, that particular question, or anything similar that would justify that claim, does not appear explicitly in the survey data published by the BBC. At most, it appears to be a derived interpretation, based on the aggregation of answers to other questions related to religiosity or social norms. At worst an outright lie.
That headline, coming from the BBC and supposedly being backed by internal data from the Iranian government, spread like wildfire amongst oppostion media. It is now frequently quoted as proof that the Iranian people are mostly secular and that the Islamic Republic is imposing a social model upon its population that they reject. Yet the survey results themselves do not support that conclusion.
What the data does show is public attitudes toward certain social norms and religiosity. For example, 45.2% supported mandatory hijab, while 41% opposed it, and 13.8% were neutral. Another interesting finding is that 10.1% described themselves as not religious, 23.4% as slightly religious, 23.2% as moderately religious, and 43.3% as religious or very religious. In other words, 89.9% of respondents described themselves in 2024 as religious in some form. That is quite different from the widespread claim that Iranian society is rapidly secularizing and that the Iranian government is imposing a theocratic system on an unwilling population.
Surveys and polls have many limitations, from how questions are posed to how information is collected, as well as the perceived political implications and the subjective concerns of respondents. There does appear to be a secularization process, as in most Muslim-majority countries—but perhaps not in the way Western narratives often portray it. Instead, I will use a different, less subjective indicator, and explain why. Although this approach may seem somewhat unorthodox from a social-science perspective, it can be very revealing.
The birth rate in Iran has fallen dramatically, from around 6–6.5 children per woman in 1980 to about 1.6 in recent years, according official government data. That represents roughly a 75% decline, or about five fewer children per woman over roughly four decades. Such a drop is extraordinary and must be related to broader social transformations. Although this phenomenon is not unique to Iran—it is a global trend—in the context of Iran and other Muslim-majority societies, it may have different implications.
Islamic tradition, both in the Quran and in the sayings of Prophet Muhammad, categorically states that provision (rizq)—everything a person needs to sustain life—is provided by God. This provision is understood to be independent of human concerns or calculations, and even independent of whether one believes in it. God is the ultimate provider, and provides for every being according to divine decree. Verses of the Quran related to this principle, such as 11:6, are numerous, as are statements from the Prophet and later Islamic scholars. Although there are debates about how this principle manifests in practice, the underlying belief remains that God is the provider.
The decline in Iran’s birth rate coincides with worsening economic conditions, largely linked to Western sanctions. Numerous studies show that when couples experience economic uncertainty or expect poor economic prospects, fertility rates tend to decline.
That logic makes sense in a secular or atheist society, where individuals believe they depend exclusively on social circumstances and personal effort or fortune. But in a society where most people say they believe in a God who provides sustenance, such a decline may suggest that this belief is weakening in practice. If God is the provider, then economic conditions should theoretically be less decisive in determining fertility rates—at least not to such a dramatic extent.
One could therefore argue that this trend indicates that the concept of God—and how divine providence interacts with everyday life—is being questioned. In that sense, it could be interpreted as a form of secularization, understood as a gradual separation of divine belief from social decision-making. However, this type of secularization is far more subtle and does not necessarily imply that people reject belief in God or oppose a society influenced by religious values.
That is not how Western media and politicians typically portray Iran. They often depict Iranians as aspiring secular liberals living under a theocratic tyranny. This interpretation is misleading for two main reasons.
The first is that it ignores the history of Iran and the strength of the Shia religious worldview. Iran converted to Shiism during the Safavid dynasty in the 16th century. This process was not peaceful and was strongly motivated by political considerations. However, since that period Iran has generally maintained a Shia-based political order, with only brief interruptions. This suggests that the 1979 revolution was, in part, a return to a historically familiar form of governance.
Yet the revolution also introduced a fundamental change. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the highest religious authority in Twelver Shiism—the Supreme Leader—also serves as the head of state. In principle, therefore, adherence to Twelver Shiism implies some degree of support for the system itself. This point is often overlooked when interpreting survey data showing that nearly 90% of Iranians describe themselves as religious.
The second issue is that many Western intellectuals, politicians, and media commentators treat secular liberalism as the inevitable endpoint of any society that still maintains strong religious beliefs. This overlooks the fact that secular liberalism emerged from specific social and intellectual circumstances in Europe. It is not necessarily a universal or inevitable development.
The conclusions drawn in this article must be treated with caution, as Iran is a diverse nation with multiple ethnic and religious minorities. However, it does not appear that these groups are numerically or politically strong enough to challenge the Shia majority. Moreover, many minority communities also express strong Iranian national identity.
It may therefore be more accurate to say that many Iranians support the current system of governance, while still might want reforms that reflect evolving social realities. That is very different from claiming that they want to overthrow the system entirely. Indeed, recent U.S.–Israeli attacks seem to have strengthened domestic support for the government rather than weakened it.
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Curro Jimenez: thanks for this essay. From what I have seen in Italian and U.S. media, this is on the mark: ” It may therefore be more accurate to say that many Iranians support the current system of governance, while still might want reforms that reflect evolving social realities.”
The consensus seems to be a desire for reforms, less interference by the clergy, and less corruption. So the baby Shah is no answer, but then nor is Mojtaba Khamenei — I read a reliable article that he has stashed 100 million USD in London.
Like Persian national feeling and Shia, Italy similarly is a country in which Catholicism is an emanation of Roman and Italian culture even as the Church still shapes the thinking of Italians. I have been monitoring this internal dialogue since I arrived. I’d venture that much of the Iranian population is not as religious as the polls claim, but much religion is also cultural.
In Italy, the Feast of Saint Joseph is in two weeks. Even secularists like me will eat zeppole.
Actually I was thinking of Italy while reading. But also Germany into the 1970s.
Especially many among those who never turned cozy with the 3rd Reich took their self-assurance from faith.
And that experience remained formative for them well after 1945.
Ever more striking considering the war course of the two German confessional houses today.
In fact remarkable that the offical Italian Catholic Church is way more progressive on war issues than Germany.
Actually this development is scary…
And yes: Important essay! Thanks Curro.
Yes, Iran has a corruption problem. What is the cause? Shortages caused by economic sanctions lead to the misallocation of resources, fostering state corruption. If Western countries are genuinely concerned about corruption within the Iranian government, they must first lift the sanctions.
https://sanctionsplatform.ohchr.org/record/4553
Not just sanctions, but that Iran (as well as most states under sanctions) is also facing very real security and military threats also. First, these force abnormally high allocation of resources to areas a state fully at peace would–one is tempted to call this “misallocation,” but it’s not, really. Second, the external threats and enhanced power of the bureaucracy, esp the national security kind, creates additional opportunity for corruption.
Fascinating statistics. Thanks, Curro Jimenez. I especially appreciate the way you use the questions asked to arrive at nuanced answers. Ours is a nation (USia) sorely lacking nuance, and uninterested in context.
I wonder, in turn, how many Israelis would wish to change their theocracy? It would make for an interesting comparison with Iran, assuming such numbers could be collected by a reputable source–and assuming the repressive Israeli government would even permit it.
I think that your conclusion goes in the correct direction. If they aren’t the Iranians the ones who will overthrow the Islamic Republic, will the bombs manage? This is what the Israel government wants to believe apparently.
Another typically Western narrative is that of Identity politics. If you are an Iranian Kurd you must want regime change and if you are a woman in Teheran you must want the same… but somehow differently?
In any case there is no shortage of supposed Iranian “activists” which will run with the narrative in MSM outlets for a handful of dollars. Very much like celebrities “selling their souls” for some brand.
I’ve only read the headline, but I’m jumping the queue to throw a Betteridge’s flag here.
No.
A good article.
“However, it does not appear that these groups are numerically or politically strong enough to challenge the Shia majority”.
90% of the Iranian population are Shia that includes Persians and Azeri’s and even some Kurds. About 5% of the population are Sunni and the rest are Yarsanis, Christians, Judaism, and Zoroastrians.
Iran has the largest Jewish population of any Islamic country. The Christians are mostly Armenians and the Iranian Govt has spent a lot of money on restoring various Churches.
No religious persecution in Iran indeed you could say that religious minorities actually flourish.
My understanding from this is that Iranians have no real quibble with their government per se, but rather would prefer to be able to live more as themselves and with better access to the resources that their own land provides in abundance. Basic, human, demands that can be realized through the controlled republican democracy that they already have. Perhaps reform, but basically satisfied.
Other forces, rogue entities that want to control Iranian resources and reclaim the lost fruits of colonization, just will not allow it, and are willing to throw 90 million people into chaos to preclude their autonomy.
Thank you. For a stretch now, the US has made a strong case for being the globe’s most hated nation. Unsurprisingly, ISR is their strongest competition. I figure this is a rally around the flag moment. IF (big if) Iran can neuter ISR and oust the US from the gulf states without nukes getting introduced, well won’t we all owe them a big thank you.
The idea that people are naturally inclined toward liberal secularism is a very strange Western belief that is, dare I say it, religious.
Not so much religious as a version of the Whig interpretation of history. Secular teleology.
For more on this see Herbert Butterfield’s The Whig Interpretation of History.
https://archive.org/details/whiginterpretati00butt
It is a secularized version of the radical Protestant understanding of human beings, in which the individual is seen as directly connected with God and anything standing in the way of this connection (any external force) is evil and must be removed.
Another part of radical Protestantism which is part of the deep structure of US society is the idea that people are divided into a saved and damned class, the criteria of belonging for which are material.
It’s a commonly held conviction in the states that inside every human being is a [middle class white] American trying to get out.
Shah Abbas Safavi may have entrenched Twelver Shi’ism as the state religion of Persia, but there were other Shia rulers in Mesopotamia and Iran before, like the Buyid dynasty that ruled for about a century around the turn of the last millennium. Besides theological differences with Sunni Islam, the Shia experience is qualitatively very different, much more emotionally intense and less legalistic. The martyrdom of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein, respectively nephew and son-in-law, and grandson of the prophet, left a durable mark.
> Do Iranians Really Want to Overthrow the Islamic Republic?
As you alluded to, you are not going to get the real answer from western NGOs.
Also, do not forget that pre-UK/US coup, Iran was not an Islamic Republic. That is a consequence of Western covert operations (via Wikipedia).
Do not forget that Iran has been under sanction now for decades; that the West refused to provide COVID vaccines to Iran, for example.
Anyone with half a brain in Iran will want no part of “the West” from here on out. Iran is now on the path that the EU firmly forced Russia onto – there will be no looking back.
According to this tweet (via X), a non-trivial number of the “Iranians” you see supporting the I5r43Li and the US war are Jewish Iranians.
The Jewish population in Iran is about 50,000, the largest in the ME outside Israel. They are by all accounts fully integrated in society & patriotic Iranians.
Fair, but again, the tweet was talking about a portion of Iranians living here in the US.
Jewish Iranian exiles in LA, according to the xwit, ie not even actual Iranisns.
Do the Iranian people want to overthrow the Islamic Republic? No. Do they want to see reforms made for the Islamic Republic? Yes. But when you think about it, lots of people want major, major reforms in how their country is run and especially in the United States. Doesn’t mean that Americans want to see their country bombed the crap out of or the country itslef balkanised however. Same for Iran.
One thing that we can say for certain is that no matter how much a people hate their government, they will hate the people dropping bombs on them even more.
Which is why bombing campaigns have never resulted in a populace overthrowing their own government.
A bit more thought going into the “decapitation strike’ that martyred Iran’s Supreme Leader would have been helpful. Blowback is a bitch. Interviewing expats is stupid. Look at the Cuban and Venezuelan ex-pats down in Rubio’s neck of the woods. They all hold extremely radical views about their home country, and they had the means to get here, so they are well represented. It’s like talking to former member-states of the Soviet Union about the appropriate posture toward Moscow. I think the Baltic states are the worst. They hate the oppressive government they well remember. They’re like the Irish feelings toward Great Britain, but the resentment and hatred is fresher, more raw and poignant. Shia feelings toward martyrdom and sacrifice are well known…
“They’re like the Irish feelings toward Great Britain”
You do realize that Britain still occupies a large chunk of Ireland? Comparing the Irish people, who were brutally subjugated and stripped of most human rights, to the Batistianos of Cuba is really weird. So yeah, weirdly enough, Imperialism is still widely reviled in Ireland.
Just a note: all Baltic countries turned to dictatorships between the wars, jailing socialist and communist as traitors – it was those activists from jail that became the local power after the WW2, and they had a score to settle.
After the second independence all the Baltics turned into neoliberal puppet regimes, and a lot of people have voted with their feet by emigrating to USA, EU or Russia. Instead of owning all these errors and wrongs, they just blame Russia for everything. Hysterically.
Most of the former Soviet Republics have positive relationships with Moscow. Pre-Maidan Ukraine did.
Asking people if they want to overthrow the government is one thing, asking them if they know how to do it is another. In a modern state it’s hard to imagine you will get far unless a good chunk of the security state, the police and military, shares your ideas. If so, then yes, maybe it will work. A better question would want to find out how many Iranians think the security state is willing to help them overthrow the government.
Unknown to many Americans, according to The New Arab Jan 2026, “Israel and the US are viewed as the greatest threats to Arab security,…” “The Arab Opinion Index 2024–25 reveals that 44 percent of respondents across the Arab world identified Israel as the main threat to security in the region, while 21 percent pointed to the United States. Iran ranked a distant third at six percent,…”
https://www.newarab.com/news/israel-us-seen-top-threats-arab-security-poll-shows
From Responsible Statecraft Feb 2024, 77% of Arab respondents regard the United States or Israel as constituting the biggest threat to the peace and stability of the region.
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/arab-public-gaza-war/
Asking opinions about the hijab is unfair. It merely forces Americans, certainly women, to think what would they do if the US government imposed something like this. Of course, they wouldn’t like it and probably assume Iranian women don’t like it either.
We have controversial laws too. In seven US states it is permissible for a convicted rapist, if his victim becomes pregnant and gives birth, to sue in court for custody of the child. If this were federal law, I think everybody would freak out. But overthrow the government, I doubt it.
Curro Jimenez: thank you for this, really enlightening. So much of western press fails to see Iran and Iranians as real people with a complex but deep and valuable past, violated by CIA subversion. Instead we get cartoons. And TPTB, a**holes all, know zero of Iran’s culture, language, history, any of it, nor do they even or ever want to know. Profoundly ignorant. And as RK says above,
I have to quibble with the notion that Khameini was the supreme leader of Twelver Shiism. From my understanding, Shia (at least outside Iran) are free to follow any of the Ayatollahs. This means Khameini is one authority, not The Authority–Sistani and Shirazi are others. Referring to K. As the equivalent of a pope is thus misleading. Similarly Referring to the scholars as “clerics” isnt altogether accurate either. A rough and bad analogy would be to the canon lawyers in Catholicism, though clearly the ulema have a whole lot more oomph. I don’t think that a fatwa (which is a term with a much broader meaning than “kill Rushdie” or a call to jihad–which also has a broader meaning than the way it is used by us western folk) from an Ayatollah would have the same rallying power as such a call from a Caliph may once have had. The Ottoman Sultan was considered a Caliph from 1517-1924. The Germans hoped and the Brits and French feared, the prospect of a call to jihad during world war one, but the Sultan was a puppet and Ottoman weakness lessened the caliphate authority. So like others more learned in the geopolitics I suspect Khameini is more powerful as a martyr than as an issuer of fatwa. (Forgive me for the cheap joke that follows–“if you strike me down now I shall only become more powerful–“Obi Wan Khameini.)