US Revisits Georgia’s Black Sea Port as Strategic Corridors Rise

Conor here: There’s a lot of imperial propaganda embedded in the following piece, which is to be expected from RFE/RL, but it does note how the US is seeking a “reset” with Georgia.

That makes sense. Despite claims that the Georgian Dream ruling party is anti-West and anti-democratic due to it passing a foreign agent law similar to those that exist in the West, it is really a neoliberal party that would be open to Trump’s famous dealmaking.

After a sustained—and failed—pressure campaign involving sanctions, color revolution attempts, and alleged violent plots orchestrated by Ukraine war vets, it’s unclear what exactly  Washington is offering. Georgia’s trade with Russia, China, and regional partners dwarfs the economic ties with the EU and US. At the same time, the wars in Ukraine and Iran make Georgia a more attractive transit country.

If the US can successfully weasel its way into Tbilisi like it did in Yerevan it would control Black Sea access to the Middle Corridor.

It would also establish supply routes to Armenia and Azerbaijan where Washington and friends are increasingly stirring up trouble. The claim in the following piece that US military aircraft used Tbilisi for a stopover for war against Iran is a case in point.

Georgia might be looking to avoid becoming too reliant upon Moscow and Beijing. That makes sense except for the fact that the US proves repeatedly it is not a trustworthy actor.

And while, as the article notes, Trump might have little interest in Georgia, the Blob is working on a multi-year long Black Sea strategy that spans administrations and is aimed at containing Russia, destroying Iran, and establishing a launching point into Central Asia. As then-U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affair James O’Brien put it a few years ago:

“A future that is built around the access of Russia and Iran as the main participants in the security of the region, the South Caucasus, is unstable and undesirable…”

By Ulviyya Asadzade who works as a journalist in RFE/RL’s Central Newsroom. Prior to this role, she spent nearly two decades with RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, where she reported extensively on corruption, human rights, and the geopolitics of the South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Originally published at RFE/RL. 

After nearly two years of suspended engagement under a multiyear strategic partnership, the United States has resumed high-level contact with Georgia. On March 30, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a phone call with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze.

While Tbilisi has framed the outreach as a possible “reset,” many analysts say it is too early to draw such conclusions. Still, Washington appears to have reasons to re-engage.

Under President Donald Trump, US foreign policy has shown growing interest in strategic logistics corridors, and in that context Georgia’s location remains relevant, analysts say.

“It suggests that Washington may still see room to influence the political and geopolitical direction of Anaklia port before it is irreversibly anchored in a Chinese-led direction,” Vakhtang Partsvania, an economics professor at Caucasus School of Business in Tbilisi, told RFE/RL.

Relations deteriorated sharply after Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party adopted policies widely viewed in Washington as anti-democratic, including controversial legislation such as a “foreign agent” law and the use of force against protesters.

In response, in November 2024, the United States suspended its multiyear strategic partnership with Georgia.

Washington also imposed sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of Georgian Dream, along with other officials.

As Tbilisi went on to deepen its ties with China and maintain engagement with Russia, US attention increasingly shifted toward Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Anaklia Port: The Strategic Core

“I don’t think that Georgia is a very big strategic priority for the US, but there might be various things Washington wants to do in this region that would better cooperation with the Georgian government,” Joshua Kucera, a senior analyst at International Crisis Group, told RFE/RL. “That could be transit, and I think it’s reasonable to guess that’s the reason behind the visit to Anaklia and Poti,” another major port.

Positioned between Russia and Iran and bordering the Black Sea, Georgia remains a key transit hub.

Washington has long viewed the country as part of the so-called Middle Corridor — a trade route that links Europe and Asia while bypassing both Moscow and Tehran.

In the South Caucasus, the United States has backed the TRIPP project (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity), connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan through Armenia and enabling goods from Asia to reach Europe.

Georgia’s Black Sea ports would be critical to expanding that corridor and the Middle Corridor in general.

If completed, Anaklia would become Georgia’s only deep-sea port capable of handling large cargo vessels, strengthening the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Route (TITR).

Initially, a US-Georgian consortium–the Anaklia Development Consortium (ADC)–won the bid. The Georgian government canceled the contract in 2020, citing unmet obligations. The project stalled for years, and in May 2024 Tbilisi selected a Chinese–Singaporean consortium led by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) as its new private partner, though final contract details remain unclear.

Just days before the Rubio-Kobakhidze call, US State Department official Peter Andreoli visited the Anaklia port. Few details were disclosed, but Georgia’s opposition party Lelo – Strong Georgia called for the port to be named after President Donald Trump and positioned as a hub in the proposed “Trump Route.”

“Anaklia Port today is in an in-between state. The project has not been cancelled, construction activity is underway, and a Chinese consortium has been named as the preferred private investor. However, the absence of a publicly confirmed final contract means the project remains open. That is precisely why the recent US visit matters,” Partsvania told RFE/RL.

“It cannot be excluded that Anaklia may become part of a wider strategic bargaining framework. This does not necessarily imply direct pressure, but rather a combination of incentives and expectations, where deeper political and economic engagement from the United States could be linked to limiting the role of Chinese actors in strategically sensitive infrastructure,” Partsvania added.

“Washington recognizes that its policies regarding TRIPP and the South Caucasus more generally could suffer unless it has closer ties with Tbilisi,” Paul Goble, an analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, told RFE/RL.

Iran Factor: A Secondary Driver?

The war in Iran is cited as another possible reason for renewed contact.

Just a day after the Rubio-Kobakhidze call, a US military aircraft — a Boeing C-17 Globemaster III — landed in Tbilisi.

The aircraft, typically used to transport troops, equipment, or humanitarian aid, arrived from Germany and later departed southward.

Kornely Kakachia, director of the Georgian Institute of Politics, said the United States may be reassessing Georgia’s role in a shifting regional landscape.

“The refueling of jets…could be something like a minimal level of what the United States could expect from Georgia,” Kakachia told RFE/RL.

The US Embassy in Tbilisi downplayed the development, saying such flights are routine and “not related to any regional tensions.”

A Diminishing Role?

For years, Georgia’s importance for Washington was tied to unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus — particularly between Armenia and Azerbaijan — as well as its role as a transit corridor.

But as Baku and Yerevan move closer through a US-backed peace process, that leverage may be diminishing.

At the same time, new regional initiatives such as TRIPP risk sidelining Georgia from emerging trade routes.

US Vice President JD Vance notably skipped Tbilisi during his recent South Caucasus visit, underscoring the country’s reduced diplomatic priority.

What Comes Next?

Despite Georgian Dream’s framing, many in Washington remain skeptical that the Rubio call signals a genuine shift.

“It’s striking that the State Department would pick up the phone now,” said a senior Senate Democratic aide, speaking on condition of anonymity. “There’s no clarity on policy, no clear objectives, and frankly, a lot of members of Congress are scratching their heads about why this call even happened.”

Former US Ambassador Ian Kelly said the administration’s approach reflects uncertainty rather than strategy.

“The Trump administration would be ambivalent at best about Georgia,” Kelly said.

Laura Thornton, a former senior director at the McCain Institute, also questioned the significance of the outreach.

“The Trump administration is transactional. Without rare earth minerals, golden jets, or some other treasure to offer, [Georgia Dream] is unlikely to spark Trump’s interest.”

Georgia has signaled that more US visits could follow. But for now, Washington remains noncommittal.

“We have no visit to announce at this time,” the US Embassy in Tbilisi said in a written response to RFE/RL’s Georgian Service.