Iran War: Iran Rumored to Be Readying Big Attacks as Trump Vows More Escalation and Rubio Disses Talks; Brent Rises to $94 a Barrel as Hormuz Transits Fall, Ships Turn Away from Bab el-Mandeb; Hegseth Fried in Iran Hearings

[Today’s Iran war post fired before finished. Please return at 8:00 AM EDT or refresh this page then for the completed version]

Even though we have yet to hit the five month point of the Iran war, the mode of media reporting, such as Grounghog-Day-type tropes like “tit for tat” strikes, underplay the seriousness of the current escalation as well as the damage inflicted on the US.

Yesterday, we discussed how otherwise formidable analysts and commentators either stick to their silo or are not sufficiently expert in/attentive to the other realms of the conflict. That leads them to underestimate the propensity for pressure and shocks in one area not merely to produce dislocations there but to propagate into other focal points. For instance, the UK lost in the Suez crisis of 1956 not because its invasion failed but because a sterling crisis was spinning out of control. That necessitated an IMF intervention, where the need for US backing for an action of the required scale gave the US the leverage to demand the immediate withdrawal of British and French forces.

We will stick our neck out further today. As we read the evidence, the US is losing the war with Iran militarily and at a pretty fast pace. Many observers still seem unable to process that Iran can flat out beat the US in West Asia. Some may be anchored in the early-in-war perspective, that all Iran needed to do to “win” was to play the insurgency game: hold out long enough so that even if the objective costs to the defender were higher than of the imperial power, the attacker could in the end not accept the costs in blood and treasure to win decisively, which would take a mass invasion and occupation.

But some credible experts have depicted Iran’s war aims as much higher than that. They rejected mere survival as a goal; that would expose them to periodic “mowing the lawn” actions by the US and Israel intended to keep Iran weak, not just militarily but also on an economic and social/political basis. Iran’s objective has been to inflict such a decisive defeat on the US and Israel that they will not hazard attacking Iran in any meaningful manner for a very long time. The Iran media strategy, of repeatedly framing US actions and statements so as to humiliate the Trump Administration, is contrary to reaching a negotiated settlement but completely consistent with achieving a punitive victory.

Just look at the big picture elements of where the conflict is now. The US has greatly narrowed its war aims to the mere re-opening the Strait of Hormuz from a large list of initial objective that amounted to the subjugation of Iran. And no one who is knowledgeable and not closely connected to the Administration expect the US to achieve that either. Iran is succeeding in getting the US to retreat from its bases in the Gulf to Jordan. As war-watchers know, Iran is now pounding US operation in Jordan hard. Iran intends to force a further fallback to Israel, which will then become the focus of attack.

Iran is destroying the many layers of defense that the US created in the Persian Gulf and Jordan to protect the Zionist regime from Iranian missiles and drones. Iran will wait for Netanyahu to strike first, as it enjoys the growing political crisis inside the Zionist regime. https://t.co/vzTagGcUCd

— Seyed Mohammad Marandi (@s_m_marandi) July 21, 2026

Iran has also warned that it is prepared to extend its campaign into Europe if the US tries to operate against Iran from a further remove.¹

Moreover, US capabilities are not only inadequate to the mission but also are clearly weakening. Professor Robert Pape has made a career of studying bombing campaigns. He has found they never win wars alone; ground forces are what secure victories. In a new talk with Chris Hedges, John Mearsheimer pointed out that the US 50,000 troops in theater translates into about 8,000 combat forces, and how that is effectively zero when talking about a country of 93 million with forbidding terrain, even before getting to the size, armaments and determination of Iran’s military. Daniel Davis has repeatedly and in great detail explained how insane it would be to try to launch a ground war in Iran, that it would easily take over 2 million men and even then not have good odds of success. Contrast that with an army of about 460,000 active duty members across the world.

And even in air war terms, the US is losing. We are running low on precision weapons and have no hope of producing enough to sustain even a low level of ongoing offensive and defensive use (and that is before getting to the further reduction in output due to China withholding rare earth supplies). We are too risk and aircraft-loss averse to send planes into Iran to use dumber bombs. By contrast, Iran not only had extremely large stockpiles of missiles and drones, but Iran sources claim that Iran has increased its inventories over the course of the war. In addition, Iran deliberately used its oldest, least sophisticated weapons early in the war so as to deplete US/Gulf state air defenses at somewhat lower cost. Iran repeatedly claimed it has more potent and sophisticated missiles it had yet to deploy and it seems to be starting to use them.

Skeptics should consider this section from a fresh DropSite talk with Murtaza Hussain:

From Hussian in a lightly edited machine transcript:

This is a tremendous waste of of resources. And you know, it all reminds me there was a very obscure article I read many years ago right after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani by a US army officer and he kind of had written it as a personal reflection.

But he said that the day that I realized that US empire in the Middle East was over in his analysis was the day after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani. Because what happened the day after was that Iran had fired these precise ballistic missile attacks against a US military base in Iraq and they calibrated the attack not to kill anybody but just to give a demonstration effect. I think they thought the message of that demonstration effect would be very clear but I don’t think that the Trump administration really got it. But this army officer said the message is very clear which is that all our basing network around the region is no longer safe because Iranians now have highly precise strike capabilities.

So he’s like, “Well, we can’t have any of these bases anymore because if they can do that, they can do that anywhere.” And his he kind of went on and on a bit about it, but he said that if you game this all out, we’re going to have to leave the region because it’s not safe for us to be there.

And the entire premise of us being there has now been undermined critically.

And only now, 6 years later, are we seeing the full fruition of that because I don’t think many of these bases will be rebuilt. And it’s really a question about the Gulf Arab states if they’re going to continue doubling down on a relationship which manifestly has failed to protect them has put them in now in great existential danger. But I still think that even if they were to try to in entice the US back, even the US mil military leadership is not going to want to rebuild these bases because they’re basically proved themselves to be worthless during a war.

Scott Ritter more recently has repeatedly and in detail described how particular Iran attacks on Israel were clearly intended to serve as demonstrations of Iranian prowess, but again, the US refused to get the message. One example from a 2024 post:

Israel air defenses again failed. This is a bigger re-run of what happened in April, when Iran agreed to what Israel and its allies thought would be Potemkin retaliation for Israel striking the Iran embassy compound in Damascus. Even with Israel having ideal circumstances, targets agreed in advance, having support from the US, UK and France, Iran sending slow-moving drones with a six hour flight time first and even broadcasting the launch on state TV, Iran hit every target with great accuracy. And the cost of the strikes was $90 million-ish for Iran, while the defense cost for Israel was IIRC $1.35 billion, and another $1 billion for Israel’s allies.¹

Iran fired 200 to 400 missiles. The Navy said it downed only about a dozen missiles.² We had this tweet in Links but it’s worth highlighting:

🇮🇱🇮🇷 15 minutes Iranian missiles hitting Israel … supercut pic.twitter.com/OABH2cWfb4

— Lord Bebo (@MyLordBebo) October 1, 2024

The level of damage is not clear and in any event, Iran may have been more interested in a show of force. Pathologically, pro-Israel sources are treating the lack of any deaths as proof that Iran was still showing restraint and trying to avoid casualties. Iran reportedly hit three airbases, Nevidim, Telnov, and Hatserim, and also struck close to the Mossad Unit 8200 building.

Mind you, the facts above are not controversial. But the conclusion that the US is faring as poorly as it is seems to be. Consider how Andreas Kreig, who positions himself in this talk with Brandon Weichert as the teller of unpleasant truths, as least in my view is falling short in his candor in light of the outline above (in fairness, this assessment is due to some remarks by Kreig later and not just the extract below):

From a lightly edited machine transcript:

When you actually look behind the narrative and you look at the satellite imagery, you see what’s been hit and the precision with which the Iranians have hit US bases across the region. It’s quite impressive and very sad at the same time because you see that the that the Iranians are able to strike US bases not just in the GCC, not just in the Gulf States, but going all the way from Oman in the east or southeast all the way up to Iraq in the in the northwest.

So, we’re looking at like, I don’t know, 2,000 miles worth of a front line where the Iranians are striking and they’re hitting targets with a lot of a lot more precision than anything that we’ve ever seen before. you know, taking out vehicles, taking out um drones, taking out hangers, taking out radar stations.

And basically, if you look at the US network that they’ve built, this reconnaissance intelligence and surveillance network that they’ve built across the region for decades, it’s been basically degraded now. Uh where all the different nodes, all these radar station, early warning uh stations have all been destroyed or incapacitated to an extent where the Americans are going increasingly blind. So, in many ways against an insurgency force, quote unquote, like the IRGC, um it it’s not looking too good for America.

Some stray observations: US officials have taken to making much of the Iran precision attacks, trying to say, “No fair, China and/or Russia must have helped.” Aside from the fact that this protest is utterly lame, it also looks offbase. First, the precision of the attack right after Solemanoi’s death says otherwise. So while Russian and Chinese targeting assistance may have enabled Iran to improve its game, Iran was already operating at a high level. Second, the US has been hitting US bases. They are highly visible on commercial satellite images. It is not as if barracks or weapons depots can grow legs and move. Iran also like has pretty good HUMINT on many of these operations.

Simplicius’ latest post describes Western consternation at finally having to confront Iran’s effectiveness. From US Establishment Shell Shocked by Rapid and Paradoxical Advancement of Iran’s “Lethality”:²

The US press commentariat continues to show great astoundment at Iran’s paradoxically growing capabilities:

Summary of the piece for those not wanting to read it in full:

Iranian missiles are becoming faster and more sophisticated, despite attacks by the US and Israel – The Wall Street Journal.

Despite airstrikes by the US and Israel targeting military infrastructure, storage facilities, and factories, Iran has retained a significant portion of its ballistic arsenal (estimated to be in the thousands of units) and the ability to continue developing and producing new weapons.

The publication emphasizes that over time, Iran has shifted its focus from slow-moving drones and outdated missiles to fast-acting, solid-fuel ballistic missiles with high accuracy. The new missile modifications are quicker to prepare for launch and have maneuverable warheads, which significantly complicates their interception.

For Israel and US forces, intercepting massive ballistic strikes requires the constant expenditure of expensive anti-missile systems (such as Arrow 3, THAAD, and Patriot), the stockpiles of which are limited. The WSJ notes that Iran has learned to exploit vulnerabilities in multi-layered missile defense systems by overwhelming them with dozens of fast-moving targets simultaneously.

It begins with the opener:

After nearly five months of war, Iran’s missile capabilities remain lethal. At least two U.S. servicemembers were killed in Jordan on Saturday following an Iranian attack of ballistic missiles and drones.

No one can quite seem to figure out how it’s possible that under such “unprecedented” US bombardment, said to be “degrading” Iran beyond recognition, the country can continue to increase the lethality of its strikes.

The article notes the US is even trying to identify “additional remains” at the same Jordan airbase where American servicemen were just killed, which means early rumors of even more casualties being buried under the rubble are likely true…

But getting back, WSJ’s chief question arises:

It goes on to highlight Trump’s claims from early June that Iran’s military had been “totally destroyed”, contrasting that with the paradoxical realization that Iran’s ballistic missiles are only getting “faster” and “more maneuverable”, which reflects a military that is “adapting, not necessarily crumbling.”…

But from the standpoint of Iran’s own advancements, the key change has been the utter attrition of the US air defense network Iran was able to effect in the region….

The US has lost much of its eyes and ears, and the few remaining aerial assets are forced to pull increasingly farther back for fear of being hit on the ground.

With the diminution of these critical US assets, Iran has also increased its own ISR capabilities in the region. For instance, there were unverified reports of Iranian Ababil-3 recon drones overflying Kuwait, though some have claimed to debunk them.

It has been theorized for a while now, that Iran has held back its most advanced missiles for this very point….Now that radar coverage and interceptor stocks have been attrited, Iran has begun rolling out increasingly more expensive multi-stage missiles—like the Sejjil-2—with far better accuracy.

Now to the immediate state of play. Mediators have proposed a ceasefire which is certain not to get off the ground. Trump, having demanded capitulation, erm negotiation, this week or else Iran will get yet another very very bad spanking, still looks to be on his escalation path:

⚡️🚨 A US official tells Axios that Washington has developed two options: pursuing a new 10-day ceasefire to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, or launching a massive joint military campaign with Israel. (Rasd Akhbar Shehaba, citing Axios)

— Middle East Observer (@ME_Observer_) July 21, 2026

Similarly, from Antiwar.com in Trump Suggests He Could Restart Yemen Bombing Campaign in Response to Red Sea Blockade:

President Trump on Tuesday suggested he could restart a bombing campaign in Yemen in response to the Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, enforcing a blockade on the Red Sea…

Reuters reported that two oil tankers loaded with Saudi crude bound for China and India made U-turns in the Red Sea, heading for the Suez Canal instead of attempting to cross the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Yemeni media reported that a total of six ships turned around following the warning

For his part, Trump downplayed the blockade, claiming it hasn’t started yet. “So far, it hasn’t happened, might happen, but we take care of things,” Trump told reporters while meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in the Oval Office.

The US is rejecting negotiations while pretending otherwise:

"Begging"? On July 16 — six days ago — Iran said ON RECORD: "We have NO plans for negotiations. We are focused on defence." On July 19 Iran formally suspended the MOU YOU violated. Araghchi: "We never asked for a ceasefire or talks — you attacked us MID-negotiation, twice." The… https://t.co/YvZ5TG3aTu

— Qurux Wanaag (@Fartun333) July 22, 2026

"Their behavior has to change"? We bombed their leadership, launched strikes, and tried to force an unfair deal down their throats—and Rubio acts surprised they won't comply.

You don't get to escalate a conflict, demand absolute surrender under the guise of "negotiation," and… https://t.co/fkSOerwk3e

— OneOfManyVets (@OneOfManyVets) July 20, 2026

On the Iran side,

As an aside, the military commentators who posit that the war could go on at a low level for quite a while ignore not just that Iran continues to force the US further back as operations continue and that critical US weapons supplies are getting might low but also Trump’s desperate need to dominate. He will mount pointless attacks, like his latest round of strikes, which per Trita Parsi look purely punitive and not at all strategic, to try to look as if he is driving events. That will diminish US armaments even faster.

And some additional tidbit. We have not tried to game out what happens if the economy or markets crash and Trump attempts an even more desperate escalation to try to reassert his manhood. However, we said even before the war that Trump might be checked by a soft military coup, such as the armed forces refusing to implement an executive order seeking to implement martial low. Some are speculating a harder-form coup is not out of the picture:

🤔 I remain inclined to believe that, were the order given to nuke Iran, there is a non-trivial possibility it would trigger an attempted coup d'etat in the United States.

I think it is that serious.

Whether the coup attempt would be successful or not is a separate question. https://t.co/TvqLrXF1NG

— Will Schryver (@imetatronink) July 22, 2026

_____

¹ Turkiye retained much more operational control over Incirlik than other NATO members have of their air bases. And since Israel officials have brazenly stated that Turkiye is next on the Greater Israel expansion plan, I doubt that Erdogan will be receptive to assisting Israel via enabling attempts at escalation against Iran. But UK base in Cyprus is another matter.

² This includes a very good and well-warranted rant on how the US is minimizing traumatic brain injuries by calling them “minor concussions.” US football (the kind with very big men in shoulder pads repeatedly crash into each other) has been dying as a sport due to the recognition that more than 3 concussions (on the level that induces unconsciousness) greatly increases the risk of early dementia.