Category Archives: Credit markets

Libor Scandal Apologist Avinash Persaud Displays Inability to Do Math

Nothing like putting your foot in mouth in public and chewing.

SIFMA Fires Shot, Excludes Mortgages in Localities that Adopt Condemnation From To-Be-Announced Market

On Monday, the financial services industry association (aka lobbying group) SIFMA said that it would exclude mortgages in localities that had condemned mortgages from the to-be-announced market, which is an important source of liquidity for new Fannie and Freddie loans. The promoters of the program, Mortgage Resolution Partners, issued a wounded-sounding response.

So what does this all mean? The short answer is that on the surface, this looks like a clever bit of banker thuggery.

Spain Slides

By Delusional Economics, a regular blogger at MacroBusiness and a consulting editor at the Macro Investor newsletter. He is horrified at the state of economic commentary in Australia and is determined to cleanse the daily flow of vested interests propaganda to produce a balanced counterpoint

It was an all round horrible night for Spain, starting with a bond auction that went a little wrong:

Quelle Surprise! New York Times’ “Deal Professor” Ignores Facts and Law to Defend Citi Employee Stoker in SEC Toxic CDO Case Rakoff Highlighted

While the New York Times’ DealBook section generally hews to a financial-services-industry-friendly line, presumably as a Faustian bargain for being a preferred leakee, there’s not even a weak defense for the article by the New York Times’ so called “Deal Professor” Steven Davidoff, “If Little Else, Banker’s Trial May Show Wall St. Foolishness.” It’s yet another brazen effort to diminish the seriousness of rampant fraud by arguing it was just carelessness. But to make his case, Davidoff misrepresents both the facts of the situation as well as the law. Since Davidoff’s lawyer union card is an explicit part of his brand at the Times, this story amounts to another credentialed effort to run the “nothing to see here, it’s too hard to get these guys” line that has become the Administration’s pet excuse for not going after one of its biggest sources of campaign funds.

Philip Pilkington: The New Monetarism Part III – Critique of Economic Reason

By Philip Pilkington, a writer and journalist based in Dublin, Ireland. You can follow him on Twitter at @pilkingtonphil

During the Great Depression and the war years monetary policy in Britain had proved largely ineffective. In the meantime it was shown that government spending could cure economic depressions and return the economy to full or even super-full employment. After the war most political parties in Britain were thus interested in using fiscal policy to generate full employment rather than rely on the vagaries of monetary policy. (This, it should be said, is the polar opposite of our rather more desperate situation today).

Wily conservatives, however, recognised that such policies would mean the expansion of government – which they didn’t like at all. So they tried to resurrect monetary policy as the government’s tool of choice.

Chris Cook: Libor and Oil Market Manipulation – Rage Against the Dying of the Light

By Chris Cook, former compliance and market supervision director of the International Petroleum Exchange

A generation of markets is dying and the era of the Middleman is coming to an end. The ‘Bezzle’ – as J K Galbraith described financial misbehaviour in a boom, revealed by a bust – is now coming to light.

Philip Pilkington: The New Monetarism Part II – Holes in the Theory

By Philip Pilkington, a writer and journalist based in Dublin, Ireland. You can follow him on Twitter at @pilkingtonphil

In the first part of this piece we looked at the Thatcher government’s monetarist experiment in the early 1980s. It did not end well. So we must ask: did the Thatcher government and the monetarists believe in what they were doing or were they cynically using monetarist policy as a device to destroy large parts of British industry in order to destroy the trade union movement?

Yanis Varoufakis: It is Now Official – The Eurozone’s Monetary Transmission System is Broken

By Yanis Varoufakis, Professor of Economics at the University of Athens. Cross posted from his blog

Under normal conditions, the interest rates that you and I must pay on a home loan, a car loan, our credit card, a business loan are pegged onto two crucial rates. One is the rate that banks charge one another in order to borrow from each other. The other is the Central Bank’s overnight rate. Alas, neither of these interest rates matter during this Crisis. While such ‘official’ rates are tending to zero (as Central Banks try to squeeze the costs of borrowing to nothing), the interest rates people and firms pay are much, much higher and track indices of fear and subjective estimates of the Eurozone’s disintegration.

Philip Pilkington: The New Monetarism Part I – The British Experience

By Philip Pilkington, a writer and journalist based in Dublin, Ireland. You can follow him on Twitter at @pilkingtonphil

While there are pretty stark dissimilarities between the current quantitative easing (QE) policies of many governments and the old monetarism that prevailed in the late-70s and early-80s, the reason that these both policies were ineffective is because they were based on the same flawed ideas. The key difference between the two is that where monetarism was implemented as a deflationary and contractionary policy, QE is currently being implemented as an inflationary and expansionary policy. As a result, examining the failure of monetarist policies thirty years ago provides important lessons considering QE and its offshoots.

Before looking at the similarities between these two doctrines, we will explore the actual historical trial of monetarism.

Sheila Bair on Bill Moyers: “Libor Always Troubled Me”

Bill Moyers starts with the Libor scandal as a way to get Sheila Bair’s perspective on the failure to get meaningful bank reforms. It’s refreshing to see how direct she is in saying the fixes aren’t hard, the problem is lack of will. She also discusses the death of moderate Republicans, and “free for all markets”.

Will the Libor Scandal Lead to Prosecutions? Some Hidden History and Current Prospects

We have a video double header, with both clips addressing the question of what action officials might take as a result of the escalating Libor scandal.

Marshall Auerback: The Pain in Spain

By Marshall Auerback, a hedge fund manager and portfolio strategist. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives.

Just when you think that things can get no worse in Spain, they do. Take a look at this chart, courtesy of Credit Suisse via FT’s Alphaville

So How Much Did the Banksters Make on Libor-Related Ill-Gotten Gains?

Commentators and analysts have been starting to estimate what the costs to banks for their Libor manipulation might be. We’ve pointed to an estimate by the Economist that says the damages for municipal/transit authority swaps due to Libor suppression (during the crisis and afterwards) could be as high as $40 billion. Cut that down by 75% and you still have a pretty hefty number. Other observers (CFO Magazine) have argued that the losers were mainly other banks, and since banks are pretty much certain not to sue each other, the implication is the consternation is overdone. But these markets were so huge ($564 trillion was the 2011 trading volume in one contract, the CME Eurodollar contract, which uses dollar Libor as its reference rate) that even a little leakage to end customers still adds up to a lot of exposure.