Category Archives: Market inefficiencies

Mirabile Dictu! Central Bankers Getting Concerned About Bank Capital Levels Rather Late in the Reform Game

Something very peculiar is afoot. Well after the bank regulatory reform debate was supposedly settled, central bankers seem to be reopening that discussion. It’s puzzling because the very reason the banks won so decisively was that central bankers were not prepared to get all that tough with their charges.

I’m not clear what has led central bankers to get a bit of religion. Is it the spectacle of the Bank of England talking about breaking up the banks (they won’t get their way thanks to bank lobbyist working over the Independent Banking Commission, but no one doubted their sincerity)? Or the Swiss National Bank imposing 19% capital requirements, which as we discussed, is likely to lead to the investment banking are of UBS being domiciled elsewhere (assuming a country capable of bailing it out will have it)? Or perhaps it is central bankers being forced to recognize that their Plan A of extend and pretend and super low interest rates simply won’t lead banks getting to meaningfully higher capital levels when the staff continues to take egregious amounts out in compensation? Or have they realized how bad bank balance sheets are in the Eurozone and how tight the linkages still are among the major capital markets players, and they belatedly realize they need them to be much more shock resistant?

The bottom line is that various central bankers have taken the surprising step of insisting their banks meet more stringent requirements for the biggest banks than those originally planned to be to be included in Basel III. Per Bloomberg:

Complexity and War or How Financial Firms Wreck Economies for Fun and Profit

There’s a great post up, “Human Complexity: The Strategic Game of ? and ?,” by Richard Bookstaber, former risk manager, author of the book A Demon of Our Own Design and currently an advisor to the Financial Stability Oversight Council. As insightful as it is, Bookstaber does not draw out some obvious implications, perhaps because they might not be well received by his current clients: that the current preferred profit path for the major capital markets firms is inherently destructive.

I suggest you read the post in its entirety. Bookstaber sets out to define what sort of complexity is relevant in financial markets:

The measurement of complexity in physics, engineering, and computer science falls into one of three camps: The amount of information content, the effect of non-linearity, and the connectedness of components.

Information theory takes the concept of “entropy” as a starting point…

Do We Need Big Banks?

Yves here. I normally let VoxEU articles stand on their own, but this topic, of whether the bank PR that bigger banks are essential stands up to scrutiny, is near and dear to my heart.

Note that the authors point to a 1990s study that finds that a $25 billion in assets bank was the optimal size. There were a fair number of studies done then of bank size versus efficiency. I’m a bit surprised that this is the one that is most often cited, since it also came up with the biggest size threshold at which a negative cost curve kicked in (meaning the bank became more costly to run). One study found that the slightly negative cost curve started at $100 million in assets (!); more typical was somewhere between $1 and $5 billion. And remember, these studies were done in the days when banks returned checks, and check processing was believed to have strong scale economies (ie, if check processing was a bigger proportion of total costs then than now, it could arguably have increased scale economies).

Some academics were frustrated with these results. I recall reading a paper where the author argued that there were theoretical cost savings to being bigger (duh) and basically contended that the empirical data had to be wrong.

Guest Post: Market Ecology

→ Rajiv Sethi

The erudite and very readable RT Leuchtkafer has posted yet another comment for the Securities and Exchange Commission to digest. This one was prompted by a paper by Andrei Kirilenko, Albert Kyle, Mehrdad Samadi and Tugkan Tuzun that provides a fascinating glimpse into the kinds of trading strategies that are common in asset markets today and the manner in which they interact to determine the dynamics of asset prices.

Why the Krugman “I See No Commodities Speculation” Analysis is Flawed

Paul Krugman correctly anticipated that I would be unable to resist taking issue with him again regarding his view that the recent increase in commodities prices are warranted by the fundamentals.

Note that I am not saying in this post that “commodities prices have increased as a result of speculation.” That takes more granular analysis of conditions in various markets; we’ll be looking at some that look suspect in the coming days and weeks.

I intend to accomplish something much simpler in this post: to dispute the logic of Krugman’s overarching argument. He professes to be empirical, but as we will show, he is looking at dangerously incomplete data, so his conclusions rest on what comes close to a garbage in, garbage out analysis. And that’s been a source of frustration given his considerable reputation and reach.

Satyajit Das: Derivatives Regulation Dance

By Satyajit Das, the author of “Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives.” Cross posted from Wilmott

A question of values …

Derivative contracts are valued on a mark-to-market (“MtM”) basis. This requires valuation of the contracts based on the current market price.

OTC derivatives trade privately. Market prices for specific transactions are not directly available. This means current valuations rely on pricing models.

There are significant differences in the complexity of the models and the ability to verify and calibrate inputs. More complex products used sophisticated financial models, often derived from science or statistical methodology. There are frequently differences in choice, exact factorisation and even numerical implementation of the models. Different dealers may use different models.

Some required inputs for the models are available from markets sources. The nature of the OTC market and the limited trading in certain instruments mean that key input parameters must frequently be “estimated” or “bootstrapped” from available data. In certain products, the limited number of active dealers means that “market” prices are sometimes no more than the dealer’s own quote being fed back after being collated and “scrubbed” by an external data provider. This is referred to prosaically as “mark-to-myself”.

Debunking the Myth That Bigger Banks are More Efficient and Necessary

A very good op ed by Thomas Hoenig in the New York Times, “Too Big to Succeed” provides a solid recap of why the business of reining in the too big too fail banks is crucial. It isn’t simply that this is yet another version of “Mission Accomplished”; the bailouts actually made industry concentration worse, […]

ECB into the breach?

Various Eurosceptics are piping up this morning, and no wonder. Unfortunately some of the interesting stuff is behind the FT’s magnificently unstable subscription firewall, which, in an attack of paranoia, or megalomania, has decided today, as it occasionally does, to deny access to everything, even the free bits, subscriber or not. It is like something […]

Hands, burnt fingers, and American mortgages

Terry Guy Hands has lost his lawsuit against Citigroup, wherein he accused Citigroup of defrauding his private equity group, Terra Firma Capital Partners, by lying about the number of competing bidders during the auction of the record company EMI, for which Terra Firma paid $6.8 Billion. This was one of those top-of the market deals […]

“Summer” Rerun: Is Liquidity All That It’s Cracked Up to Be?

This post first appeared on May 6, 2008 Steve Waldman at Interfludity did me the high compliment of picking up on an issue that is important to me and running with it: Yves Smith packs a powerful insight into an unassuming sentence: Liquidity is not a virtue in and of itself unless it produces a […]

Financial Firms Hoist on ZIRP Petard

As Satyajit Das remarked, our post global financial crisis malaise has some troubling elements in common with Japan’s post bubble era. One biggie is denial of the seriousness of the hangover, which per Das lasted for five years in Japan. The bizarre aspect of the crisis response in the US was the speed and recklessness […]

Orwell Watch: “Structural Unemployment” As Excuse to Do Nothing

The spin-meisters continue to package things that ought to incite outrage in anodyne wrappers in the hope no one will look inside. “The new normal” and “structural unemployment” join the universe inhabited by such gems as “extraordinary rendition” and “pre-emptive strike”. “New normal” is particularly insidious, since it implies that we must accept current conditions, […]

Mike Konczal: The Stagnating Labor Market – What Can the Employed Tell Us About the Unemployed?

By Mike Konczal, a Roosevelt Institute fellow who posts at New Deal 2.0 Arjun Jayadev and I have another working paper out of Roosevelt Institute, this time focusing on the labor market in the current recession. The paper is: The Stagnating Labor Market (pdf). I hope you check it out; I’m going to talk about […]

Is The High Cost of US Medical Care Due To An Oversupply of Services?

The notion that excessive supply can result in overly high costs no doubt contradicts most reader’s understanding of how markets work, but the market for medical services in the US bears no resemblance to an efficient market, in which buyers and sellers possess an equally good understanding of the merits of the goods and services […]