Category Archives: Real estate

Obama Pressing for a “Shock and Awe” Mortgage Mod Program, 3 Million in 6 Months

Given how well “shock and awe” worked in the Iraq war, I’d see the Administration’s use of that expression in the context of the mortgage mess as a Freudian slip.

I must confess to being surprised at the report by Shahien Nasiripour of Huffington Post, namely that the Administration is pushing for an even more aggressive-looking mortgage modification program than has been rumored. The reason I’m surprised is that this effort, even though it appears misguided on several fronts and falls far short of what is needed, represents an upping of the demands being made against banks. That is contrary to both the Obama Administration’s past behavior of making great sounding promises and walk them so far back as to wind up in a different country, and of inconveniencing the banks terribly much. But Shahien is an able reporter, so I’m sure he has the facts right.

Will Ireland Threaten to Default?

We were surprised that Ireland capitulated so quickly to pressure from its Eurozone confreres and accepted a punitive bailout of its government, when it was in fact its banks that were a mess. As we noted in November:

Note that the Irish government is still holding out for a banking-system-only bailout, even if the funds are channeled through the government. Since I am not aware of any IMF bailout being done on this format, it’s likely to be a sticking point if the Irish refuse to back down (recall that the government itself is under no immediate funding pressure; they have six months before they need to go to market, which is an eternity in crisis-land).

The other major bone of contention is Ireland’s super-low corporation tax, which served as a significant incentive for multinationals to set up shop in Ireland. The Germans and French are insistent that it be increased to balance the budget. The Irish objections here are plausible, particularly since the low rates are a cornerstone of their national strategy (do you want 12.5%, the current corporate tax rate, of a decent sized number or 25% of a vastly smaller number?). The Irish have made it clear that they are non-negotiable on this point, and as keenly as the rest of the eurozone would like to beat Ireland back into line, I doubt they’d be willing to risk negotiations failing over this issue.

Fast forward, the Irish agree to a deal, the ruling party suffers substantial losses precisely for accepting the terms demanded by the eurozone and the IMF, and the new incumbents are much less willing to play nicely with counterparties who are engaging in what amounts to “every man out for himself” behavior, no matter what spin is put on their demands.

“Anonymous” Whistleblower Charges BofA With Large Scale Force Placed Insurance Scheme With Cooperation of Servicers

Ooh, this is ugly.

The charge made in this Anonymous release (via BankofAmericaSuck) is that Bank of America, through its wholly-owned subsidiary Balboa Insurance and the help of cooperating servicers, engaged in a mortgage borrower abuse called “force placed insurance”. This is absolutely 100% not kosher. Famed subprime servicer miscreant Fairbanks in 2003 signed a consent decree with the FTC and HUD over abuses that included forced placed insurance. The industry is well aware that this sort of thing is not permissible. (Note Balboa is due to be sold to QBE of Australia; I see that the definitive agreement was entered into on February 3 but do not see a press release saying that the sale has closed)

While the focus of ire may be Bank of America, let me stress that this sort of insurance really amounts to a scheme to fatten servicer margins. If this leak is accurate, the servicers at a minimum cooperated with this scheme. If they got kickbacks, um, commissions, they are culpable and thus liable.

As we have stated repeatedly, servicers lose tons of money on portfolios with a high level of delinquencies and defaults. The example of Fairbanks, a standalone servicer who subprime portfolio got in trouble in 2002, is that servicers who are losing money start abusing customers and investors to restore profits. Fairbanks charged customers for force placed insurance and as part of its consent decree, paid large fines and fired its CEO (who was also fined).

Regardless, this release lends credence a notion too obvious to borrowers yet the banks and its co-conspirators, meaning the regulators, have long denied, that mortgage servicing and foreclosures are rife with abuses and criminality.

Gretchen Morgenson Confirms Lack of Attorney General Investigations into Foreclosure Fraud

This is the key snippet from Gretchen Morgenson’s New York Times column today, which inveighs against Iowa attorney general Tom Miller’s unseemly and peculiar haste to get a deal with miscreant banks inked:

Two people who have been briefed on the discussions, but who asked for anonymity because the deal was not final, told me last week that no witnesses had been interviewed and that the coalition had sent out just one request for documents — and it has not yet been answered.

And the official denial amounts to a confirmation:

Administration Acts on Mortgage Fraud Against Military, Yet Denies It Exists Anywhere Else

We have yet another example of media cravenness. You would assume that when official positions presented in the media contradict each other, it would represent an obvious opportunity for reporting, and an intrepid young journalist would take up the task. But since the job of US news outlets is increasingly to distribute propaganda, they manage not to notice.

We’ve had a stenography masquerading as reporting on the result of the recent Foreclosure Task Force “review” of servicer practices. When it looked at 2800 severely delinquent loans, it found only some operational shortcomings and no unjustified foreclosures. Given that all that this cross agency effort did was to have tea and cookies with the servicers while reviewing their documents, as opposed to doing any validation of their data, this means the “exam” was a garbage in, garbage out exercise.

Similarly, today the Fed made the similarly ludicrous statement that there were “no wrongful foreclosures” based on a review of a mere 500 loan files. Given that there are 14 major servicers, that means it looked at 36 files on average per servicer. Heck of a job, Brownie!

Aside from the fact that there have been numerous reports of colossal errors that should be impossible in a system with any integrity (homes with no mortgages or where the mortgage had been paid off, where borrowers had been given letters that they had been approved for permanent HAMP mods being foreclosed upon), there are also numerous accounts of servicer-driven foreclosures. As Karl Denninger noted:

Quelle Surprise! Fed Issues “See No Evil” Report Using Bogus Methodology to Defend Servicers

We commented earlier this week on bank defenses of their foreclosure practices:

I’ll spare you several paragraphs of the “but they were deadbeats and no one was hurt by robo-signing and all our foreclosures were warranted.” Well, if you normally operate as judge, jury, and executioner, and it’s too costly for borrowers to counteract predatory servicing, in your little self-referencing world, everything will look hunky-dory and challenges to your authority will be deemed to be improper and unwarranted.

As we have indicated repeatedly. lawyers fighting foreclosure estimate that 50% to 70% of the cases they represent are ones where the borrower is in foreclosure as a result of bank fee pyramiding and other improper fees (note there is sample bias here; contrary to bank spin, most borrower attorneys fight foreclosures when they think the case has merit). But they just about never argue in court on those grounds; the cost of hiring an expert witness and doing the forensics on full details of the banks’ overcharges is too costly.

But of course, the Fed is throwing its authority behind the banking industry spin that all foreclosures are warranted.

Drop in Foreclosure Filings Reveals Operational Mess at Servicers

The level of complaints about servicer screw ups in the HAMP program and more recent horror stories from borrowers not seeking loan modifications confirms something we’ve noted on this blog: that servicers fee structures aren’t set up for them to handle the workload associated with high volumes of foreclosures. Accordingly they devised processes like robosigning, […]

Moody’s on MERS in 1999: “No Material Impact on the Ability to Foreclose and Sell Foreclosed Homes”

The folks at ForeclosureFraud were kind enough to pass along an archival document that I thought readers would enjoy.

This Moody’s report illustrates what the prospect of higher fees for securitization-related ratings did to rating agencies’ quality of analysis.

BofA “Bad Bank” for Legacy Assets: Will This Eventually Be a First Use of Dodd Frank Resolution Powers?

In a move not noticed much three weeks ago, Bank of America announced that it was segregating its crappy mortgages into a “bad bank”. It got more attention today by virtue of being discussed long form in an investor conference call (see related stories at Bloomberg and Housing Wire).

The use of a “bad bank” is strongly associatied with failed institutions. Some of the big Texas banks that went bust in the 1980s (Texas Commerce Bank and First Interstate) used “good bank/bad bank” structures to hive off the dud assets to investors at the best attainable price, and preserve the value of the performing assets. The Resolution Trust Corporation, the workout vehicle in the savings and loan crisis, was effectively a really big bad bank. The FDIC is (and I presume was) able to sell branches and deposits pretty readily; the remaining bad loans and unsellable branch operations reached such a level that the FDIC was forced to go hat in hand to Congress and get funding while it worked out the dreck. A similar structure was used in in the wake of the banking crisis in Sweden in the early 1990s.

I am told by mortgage maven Rosner and others that this move is not meant as a legal separation, but a mere financial reporting measure, so that BofA can declare, “See, we do have this toxic waste over here, but we are chipping away at it and we’ll have that resolved in some not infinite time frame” (the current talk is 36 months) “and look at how the rest of the bank looks pretty good!.”

So I may be accused of being cynical, but I read more into it than that.

Tom Adams: Fraudclosure Settlement Largely Repeats 2003 FTC Servicing Settlement

By Tom Adams, an attorney and former monoline executive

Back in 2003, Fairbanks Capital billed itself as the largest servicer of subprime mortgages. It was also a stand alone servicer, in that it was not in the business of lending.

In a high profile case within the mortgage industry, the Federal Trade Commission brought an action against Fairbanks for violating the FTC Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) . Fairbanks was accused of a host of improper servicing activities that will sound remarkably familiar to anyone following the foreclosure and servicing issues in today’s mortgage markets.

Banks Beef About Fraudclosure Settlement As Stocks Rise on the News

I’ve pointed out how effective a non-negotiable posture can be, at least until the other side pulls out its ammo or threatens to walk from the deal. Most people in negotiations go on the assumption that the other side is reasonable or at least sincere (even if sincerely deluded) and will offer concessions on the assumption the other side will reciprocate.

The poster child of the usual outcome of offering concessions to a party who is non-negotiable is can be summarized in one word, as in “appeasement” circa 1939. And the ridiculous part is that the banks are being allowed to cop a ‘tude when the other side holds all the cards.

Let’s get this straight: this “settlement” should not be a negotiation. Virtually all the items in the 27 page outline of mortgage settlement terms that was leaked yesterday simply restates existing law or existing contractual obligations. If the officialdom wants to rely on mechanisms beyond the courts (since some judges are more pro-bank than others, which can produce the dreaded disease of “uncertainty”), the same results could be achieve by rulemaking without regulators or state attorneys general providing any releases from legal liability to the banks.

As banking/mortgage expert Josh Rosner said in an e-mail to clients:

Mortgage Settlement Term Sheet: Bailout as Reward for Institutionalized Fraud

American Banker posted the 27 page term sheet presented by the 50 state attorneys general and Federal banking regulators to banks with major servicing operations.

Whether they recognize it or not, this deal is a suicide pact for the attorneys general in states that are suffering serious economic damage as a result of the foreclosure crisis. Tom Miller, the Iowa attorney who is serving as lead negotiator for this travesty, is in a state whose unemployment was a mere 6.2% last December. In addition he is reportedly jockeying to become the first head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. So the AGs who are in the firing line and need a tough deal have a leader whose interests are not aligned with theirs.

Moreover, Miller’s refusal to discuss even general parameters of a deal goes well beyond what is necessary. He knows that well warranted public demands that a deal be tough will complicate his job, but it also does the AGs whose citizens have been most damaged a huge disservice. Pressure on the banks from the public at large is a negotiating lever they need that Miller has chosen not to use.

he argument defenders of the deal make are twofold: this really is a good deal (hello?) and it’s as far as the Obama Administration is willing to push the banks, so we have to put a lot of lipstick on this pig and resign ourselves to political necessities. And the reason the Obama camp is trying to declare victory and go home is that it is afraid that any serious effort to deal with the mortgage mess will reveal the insolvency of the banks.

Paul Jackson Claims It’s All About the Money

By Richard Smith, a recovering capital markets IT specialist Housing Wire’s Paul Jackson has another post up continuing his row with Yves over securitization chain of title issues. It presents itself as a rebuttal of her previous post, about an Alabama trial court decision that Jackson deems to be a significant defeat, but which Yves […]

Adam Levitin: Alabama Mortgage Ruling “doesn’t have precedential value anywhere“

Georgetown law professor and securitization expert Adam Levitin has weighed in on the ruling in an Alabama case, U.S. Bank v. Congress, in which a state court judge ruled against what we have called the New York trust theory. For readers new to this terrain, the short form is that the parties to mortgage securitizations are governed by a so-called pooling and servicing agreement. The PSA, among many other things, described how the notes (the borrower IOU) were to be conveyed to a trust that would hold them for the benefit of investors. The trust was almost without exception a New York trust. New York was chosen because its trust law is both very well settled and very rigid. New York trusts have no discretion in how they operate. Any measure undertaken that is inconsistent with explicit instructions is deemed to be a “void act”.

Now it appears that the notes were not conveyed to the trusts as stipulated in the PSAs on a widespread basis. (You can read the details here). Because the trusts are New York trusts, that means you have a really big mess. You can’t convey the notes in now, that’s not permitted because the trust had specific dates for accepting the assets that have long passed. The party that has the note (someone earlier in the securitization chain) can foreclose, but no one wants to do that. It isn’t just that this would be an admission that that parties to the agreement didn’t fulfill their contractual obligations; there is no way to get the money from the party that foreclosed to the trust and then to the investors.

Since the securitization industry has had so little good news of late, and this New York trust issue has the potential to make the chain of title problems that banks are facing in courtrooms all over the US even more acute, Paul Jackson of Housing Wire was quick to jump on this pro-bank decision as a major victory. We argued that it was probably not a significant precedent, and that some of the legal reasoning looked like a stretch, other parts were at odds with decisions in other states (meaning those states were unlikely to change course based on a lower-court decision in Alabama). But we acknowledged that parts of the decision were hard to parse and over our pay grade.

Levitin has taken an even more dismissive view of the decision

Many Foreclosures in Oregon Halted Due to Decisions Against MERS

We pointed last week to an analysis by Lynn Syzmoniak that showed that foreclosures across a number of different servicers were way down in January 2011 versus the same period in January 2010. This was admittedly a tally in only two Florida counties, but she indicated that a quick look at other counties in Florida showed a similar pattern.

We are seeing analogous developments, but the drivers appear to be state specific, as judges give adverse rulings on common practices in foreclosure land. Reader wc4d pointed to a report in the Portland Oregonian, that lenders are withdrawing cases because five court decisions have found that lenders that used MERS violated state recording laws.