New Zealand company New Image Group is the supplier of the bogus fuel economy product behind Australia’s biggest stock fraud. And New Image is still selling it!
Read more...Georgetown law professor and securitization expert Adam Levitin has come upon a real doozy in terms of how banking regulators aren’t even bothering to mount a serious pretense that their much-touted efforts to rein in mortgage abuses are anything more than a coverup for the banks. And he is suitable irate.
Read more...On the Real News Network, Michael Hudson discusses some possible ideas for reforming finance to deal with the concerns raised by the OccupyWallStreet movement. I’ve noticed both here and on some news stories I heard in passing on MSNBC on Friday that the OccupyWallStreet movement has already succeeded in expanding the space of what is now being discussed as remedies.
Read more...Dave Dayen saw this one coming. When Kamala Harris said she was not willing to participate in the so called “50 state” attorney general mortgage negotiations, he recognized Harris’ refusal to join the New York attorney general Schneiderman’s group as a bad sign. Note that the state of the talks is persistently misreported in the MSM as being only Schneiderman, when Delaware, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Nevada, and Minnesota are also out of the talks.
It is a safe bet that the Democratic party has been muscling Harris since her defection last week.
Read more...Despite the efforts of some liberal pundits and organizers (and by extension, the Democratic party hackocracy) to lay claim to OccupyWallStreet, the nascent movement is having none of it. Participants are critical of the President’s bank-coddling ways and Obama gave a remarkably bald-face confirmation of their dim views.
As Dave Dayen recounts, Obama was cornered into explaining why his Administration has been soft of bank malfeasance. His defense amounted to “They’re savvy businessmen”: “Banks are in the business of making money, and they find loopholes.”
Read more...One of the things that has been intriguing about the handwringing among European policy-makers has been the general refusal to consider the idea that one of the countries being wrung dry by doomed-to-fail austerity programs might just pack up and quit the Eurozone. The assumptions have been three fold. One is a knee-jerk assumption that the costs of exiting are prohibitive (this argument comes from Serious Economists in Europe, but they never compare it to the hard costs of austerity and the less readily measured but no less real cost of loss of sovereignity). Second is that an exit would come via a country being expelled, since the Eurozone treaties prohibit unilateral departure. Third is that it would be too much of an operational mess to revive a defunct currency.
A very good piece by Floyd Norris in the New York Times fills this gap by describing that Greece has the motivation and the means to leave.
Read more...We were far from alone in criticizing the servicer consent orders issued earlier this year. They were yet another whitewash masquerading as regulatory action, orchestrated by the banking industry toady, the OCC. As we wrote:
Read more...The current end run is apparently led by the Ministry of Bank Boosterism more generally known as the OCC and comes via consent decrees that were issued Wednesday (we’ve made that inference given the fact that John Walsh of the OCC presented the findings of the so-called Foreclosure Task Force, an 8 week son-of-stress-test exercise designed to give the banks a pretty clean bill of health, as well as media reports that the OCC was not participating in the joint state-Federal settlement effort).
This initiative is regulatory theater, a new variant of the ongoing coddle the banks strategy. It has become a bit more difficult for the officialdom to finesse that, given the extent and visibility of bank abuses. Accordingly, the final consent decrees are more sternly worded and more detailed than the drafts we saw last week, and also talk about imposing fines. But reading them reveals that there is much less here than meets the eye.
My last pop at New Zealand’s regulatory set-up mentioned New Image International, the company that uses multi-level marketing techniques to sell Colostrum as a miracle cure. The New Image product pitch is a generic hoax, as explained last time out:
…major warning signs include:
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Finra (the successor to the NASD plus the enforcement arm of the NYSE) suffered a major blow in a ruling on what should have been a routine matter: an enforcement action against a penny stock operator, Fiero Brothers. In 2000, the NASD charged Fiero with breaking federal fraud laws. Not only did the then NASD expel Fiero and its owner John Fiero from the organization, but it also fined it $1 million. John Fiero refused to pay, and Finra went to court to collect the money.
The ruling is astonishing and guts one of Finra’s disciplinary tools.
Read more...Sometimes, when you’ve dug yourself a really, really deep hole, the only option is to keep digging in the hope you’ll somehow come out the other side.
We’ve been perplexed for months with the persistent PR push to pretend that the formerly “50 state” attorney general mortgage settlement negotiations were going anywhere. And bizarrely, in true zombie fashion, the press push continues unabated even as the talks are effectively dead.
Read more...It’s becoming increasingly obvious to Mr. Market that the officialdom in Europe is not on a path to resolving its burgeoning sovereign/bank crisis. It is insisting on imposing austerity on debt burdened countries, which will only shrink their GDPs, making their debt hangovers even worse.
And Germany wants to have its cake and eat it too
Read more...Yves here. This is as concise, accessible, and not surprisingly, not at all encouraging assessment of the latest Eurorescue ruse mechanism.
By Satyajit Das, the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk
If as Albert Einstein observed insanity is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results”, then the latest proposal for resolving the Euro-zone debt crisis requires psychiatric rather than financial assessment.
Read more...As readers know all too well, the very short story of the financial crisis was consumers and banks went on big borrowing party and it all ended really badly, except for the banks.
However, banks built their businesses with the expectation that consumers would continue to rack up debt. But consumers aren’t too keen about that any more. Moreover, banks have also gotten a bit of religion and are more careful with extending loans. Since they aren’t making as much money on consumer lending, their natural impulse is to find other ways to fleece obtain more revenue from consumers.
We’ve been saying for months that the 50 state attorney general settlement was not going to happen. Despite the vigorous efforts by people on the side of the Federal regulators involved in the negotiations and Tom Miller’s (the AG leading the negotiations’) office to make it seem as if the deal was moving forward, the content of the reports showed otherwise. There was a huge gap between the positions of the banks and even the bank friendly position of the state AGs at the table and the banking regulators. Like the Vietnam War, where negotiations of two fundamentally opposed dragged on till one side capitulated, there was not going to be a settlement that was anything other than an abject sellout with a 11 figure payoff to mask that fact. And there were too many attorneys general who were already troubled by the terms of the deal that Miller had put forward for that to happen.
Now that Kamal aHarris, the California state attorney general, has officially abandoned the talks, they don’t mean much, at least from the state side. The departure of such a big state, in population, foreclosure exposure, and Electoral college terms, along with other states (New York, Delaware, Nevada, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Minnesota, likely Arizona) means any settlement has limited practical meaning from the state side and even less credibility.
Read more...We said at the time it was inexcusable for the Treasury to allow banks to repay the TARP as early as they did (US banks are still below the capital levels many experts consider to be desirable; Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England has made a well-substantiated case that higher capital levels cannot remedy the problem, since the social costs of a major bank blow up are so great, and you therefore need very tough restrictions on their activities).
And why were the bank so eager slip the TARP leash? To escape some pretty minor restrictions on executive compensation. This had NOTHING to do with the health of the enterprise and everything to do with executive greed. And not surprisingly, Treasury indulged it.
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