naked capitalism

Submitted by Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns

I am posting this in the interest of widening the discussion at Naked Capitalism to include some topics in Europe.

Fitch, the credit rating agency, has just downgraded the sovereign debt ratings for the Republic of Ireland from AA+ to AA-.  That is two notches and is proof-positive that the ratings agencies are worried about the hole in Dublin’s finances.

If you read the Irish press this morning, it is all doom and gloom and has a lot to do with the banks and budget deficit.  It is not just about the ratings downgrades.

The EU has just released figures putting in doubt Ireland’s rosy scenario for cutting budget deficits.

The Irish Independent says:

Next month’s Budget may set the economy back further, but without it the country’s national debt could reach 100pc of output (GDP) by 2011, the EU Commission has said in a new analysis.

The Commission is forecasting a decline of 1.4pc in Irish GDP next year. But Brussels is not taking the impact of next month’s Budget into account, because the details are not yet known.

“Depending on the specific measures that are eventually implemented, a dampening effect on consumer demand cannot be excluded,” the Commission says in its autumn economic forecast.

Correction

On the other hand, it says that faster correction of the economy’s problems might give more support to consumption and investment by helping confidence.

The Government’s plans include a correction of 4.3pc of GDP — around €8bn — in the Budgets for 2010 and 2011.

Unless there is a compensating boost from confidence, this could also reduce the modest 2.6pc growth forecast for 2011.

These forecasts are higher than those in the Commission’s estimates last May, but it warns of the struggle facing the Irish economy in trying to return to strong growth.

Another top headline in the Irish Independent has the OECD warning that the Irish government should not rule out nationalising banks in addition to its bad bank programme, NAMA.

The Government shouldn’t rule out temporarily nationalising the country’s banks as they may require more capital to cushion against surging bad debts, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development said.

The Government is setting up the so-called bad bank that will buy €77bn of property loans from banks at a discount of 30pc. Losses on those assets may leave the lenders needing extra capital.

“Further recapitalisation may be necessary as assets are being purchased below book value,” the Paris-based OECD said in a report today. “Temporary nationalisation would have a number of drawbacks, but it should not be ruled out altogether.”

The Government has already guaranteed all deposits at banks and some of their debts, pumped €7bn into Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland and seized Anglo Irish Bank.

“Substantial” banking losses are likely to be met by the taxpayer and nationalisation should only be undertaken with the “utmost reluctance,” the OECD said.

The FT’s Stacy-Marie Ishmael has a piece out doubting the maths used in NAMA, which bolsters the OECD view that the bad bank may not be enough.

So you have a trifecta of bad news coming out of Ireland: a two-notch downgrade by a major ratings agency, a warning from the EU that the economy will be weak for sometime to come and that deficits targets will not be met, and another warning from the OECD that the banking situation in Ireland is still very grave.

Quite frankly, it is not looking good for an Irish recovery at this time without the help of the IMF. This all brings me back to my question one year ago: Is Ireland the next Iceland? They will be if the EU, IMF and Irish government do not take today’s bad news seriously and take drastic action to bolster the Irish banks, economy, and government finances.

Who said the financial crisis was over? It is not.

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog

Many people – including former analyst for the U.S. Treasury Richard Cook – argue that credit is too important a function to be left to the private banks.

Indeed, even after taxpayers have given trillions in bailouts, backstops, guarantees, and other gifts, the giant banks are still not lending out much credit to individuals or small businesses.

The talking heads say that real reform of this nature is not “politically feasible”. But not politically feasible doesn’t actually mean anything except that the powers-that-be don’t want it.

We have been throwing ourselves against a brick wall trying to force the giant banks into doing the right thing, but as Buckminster Fuller said:

You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.

A Better Model

So what is a better model?

Gold advocates argue for a return to a gold-backed standard. This would, in fact, be a vast improvement over the fiat currency system we have now, as it would help to stabilize the currency, add discipline and consistency, and reign in the funding of unnecessary wars and other imperial mischief which are funded by the unlimited printing of new fiat dollars.

But Ellen Brown argues that a gold standard restricts credit for the little guy, not just Uncle Sam. If Brown is right – and given that the too big to fails are refusing to lend to most little guys – public banking might be the only way to restore a healthy economy and ease the pain for the average American. (Brown also argues that it was actually the bankers – and not the populists – who forced the adoption of a gold standard in the 1890s, and that the true meaning of the “Cross of Gold” speech has been forgotten).

National Public Bank

AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka told Congress last week:

If the Federal Reserve were made a fully public body, it would be an acceptable alternative.

The American Monetary Institute proposes the following alternative:

Incorporate the Federal Reserve System into the U.S. Treasury where all new money would be created by government as money, not interest-bearing debt; and be spent into circulation to promote the general welfare. The monetary system would be monitored to be neither inflationary nor deflationary.
Second, halt the bank’s privilege to create money by ending the fractional reserve system in a gentle and elegant way.

All the past monetized private credit would be converted into U.S. government money. Banks would then act as intermediaries accepting savings deposits and loaning them out to borrowers. They would do what people think they do now. This Act nationalizes the money system, not the banking system.

Bloomberg News columnist Matthew Lynn writes:

The U.K. government needs to start thinking about what it will do with all the banks it now owns. The answer is simple: Hand them to the people…

Instead of selling the stakes it acquired in the financial system to other banks, or listing the shares on the stock market, it could create mutually owned societies. Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc could be a people’s bank, owned by everyone.That would ensure more diversity, competition and stability, all goals just as worthy as getting back the money Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s government spent on bank rescues…

Sovereign nations such as the U.S. and England have the power to create credit and money (and see this, this and this). Taking the credit-creation power away from the banks and giving it back to the nation would ensure that credit is freed up for people’s use, and the stranglehold over the economy is taken away from the too big to fails.

State Public Banks

Many people argue that – given its actions – people don’t trust the federal government to create money.

Fair enough. Why not let the states do it?

Michael Moore recommends that the American people demand:

Each of the 50 states must create a state-owned public bank like they have in North Dakota. Then congress MUST reinstate all the strict pre-Reagan regulations on all commercial banks, investment firms, insurance companies — and all the other industries that have been savaged by deregulation: Airlines, the food industry, pharmaceutical companies — you name it. If a company’s primary motive to exist is to make a profit, then it needs a set of stringent rules to live by — and the first rule is “Do no harm.” The second rule: The question must always be asked — “Is this for the common good?” (Click here for some info about the state-owned Bank of North Dakota.)

As Moore notes, the state of North Dakota already has such a bank, and – because of that – North Dakota is just about the only state which is not running a huge deficit.

PhD economist and candidate for Florida governor Farid Khavari wants to create a Bank of the State of Florida, to create credit without burdening the state and its citizens with high interest charges by private banks.

See this for details.

Local Public Banks

An alternative to federal or state public banking is local public banks, as proposed by Edward Kellogg and others.

As summarized by Adrian Kuzminski:

During this time of financial and economic crisis, it is worth recalling that credible alternatives to our current financial system exist, if largely unrecognized, and deserve serious consideration…

The now-neglected 19th-century American proto-populist, Edward Kellogg … was a kind of godfather to the later populist movement on monetary issues. Perhaps the most profound of American writers on monetary issues, Kellogg advocated a decentralized but nationally regulated monetary system based on non-usurious, low-interest public loans to individuals. His vision inspired 19th-century century mutualists, greenbackers, populists, and others who sought to restructure the monetary system to redistribute wealth.

In our own day, when usurious credit in the form of private finance capital remains the dominant force in economic life, and is largely taken for granted even by educated people, the alternative Kellogg offers is more important than ever. Indeed, I suggest that Kellogg’s theory of money is the best monetary alternative we have to the baleful system under which we suffer…

Edward Kellogg (1790-1858) was a New York City businessman whose losses in the crash of 1837 led him to examine the business cycle, monetary policy, and debt. In a series of writings, Kellogg developed the idea of … having the government provide very-low-interest loans to the general public. These loans would have a uniform, fixed interest rate, established by law. They would be issued locally through a system of public credit banks he called the Safety Fund. Once issued, these low-interest loan notes would circulate as currency, replacing the privately issued banking notes of his day (which today take the form of Federal Reserve Notes)…

In his day Kellogg seems to have influenced even Abraham Lincoln who, according to historian Mark A. Lause, ” . . . had his own copy of Kellogg’s book, Labor and Capital [sic] advocating the government issuance of paper currency as a just means of redistributing wealth, and he corresponded with the author’s son-in-law.” Kellogg’s public currency was intended to end the monopoly over the discretionary issuance of money at interest, which was held then (and now) by the private banking and investment system…

Kellogg proposed to establish local public credit banks, and we might imagine one in each community. These local public credit banks would be part of the Safety Fund. Instead of money being issued (as it is now) through a privatized and centralized money-management system on a top-down basis, primarily as loans at increasing rates of interest from a central bank to major commercial banks, and then to regional and local banks, and then to the public, money in his system would be issued by local federal banks as loans directly to citizens at nominal interest on the basis of their economic prospects. Once lent out, Kellogg’s public credit notes would flow into circulation, providing the basis for a new currency backed by the assets of individual borrowers…

A centralized national currency would be replaced, in Kellogg’s system, by a locally issued currency. But that currency would everywhere be subject to common national standards, ensuring that each local public credit bank reliably issued equivalent units of currency. A dollar issued by one local public credit bank of the Safety Fund, Kellogg intended, would be worth the same as, and be freely interchangeable with, one issued by any other. The independence of local branches would be guaranteed by the discretionary power reserved to them as a local monopoly actually to loan money; the compatibility of their monies would be ensured under federal law by fixing the value of the dollar by law at 1.1 percent/year – that is, by lending money everywhere to citizens at that rate…

The goal is to establish and preserve economic decentralization. Amounts of money lent in Kellogg’s system would vary considerably from place to place, with some areas needing and creating more currency than others. The solvency of local federal public credit banks would be guaranteed by collateral put up by borrowers, and the money supply would be stabilized by repayment of loans as they came due. The interchangeability of public credit bank notes would ensure a wide circulation for the new money…

To achieve a stable currency, Kellogg insisted that this rate be fixed by law; perhaps today it would take a constitutional amendment.

What’s the Best Option?

People of good faith debate whether the gold standard, or national, state or local public banking is the best solution.

But they agree that the current fiat currency system where the creation of credit is controlled by the private banks has pushed us into an economic crisis and a credit crunch, with little hope of stability for the future.

Changing to a public banking system would clearly be a large change. But remember – as Buckminster Fuller pointed out – building a new model is often easier than fighting the existing one.

The time is right for a new model.

Afterword:  Is a Gold Standard Incompatible with Public Banking?

Many people assume that a gold standard is incompatible with public banking.   But that might not necessarily be true.

An analysis of ways in which a gold standard might possibly complement public banking is beyond the scope of this essay, and I have not yet even thought it through myself.   But before ruling out the possibility, I invite financial experts to brainstorm on this issue to see if we can have the best of both worlds.

After all, when currency speculation is removed from the equation, money simply acts as  a yardstick to measure the exchange of goods and services so that barter is not necessary.  People may be able to create a money system which has the stability and discipline created by a gold backed system. with the credit availability of a public banking system.

Admittedly, the gold standard may at first blush be seen as more conservative than public banking, as the former limits money expansion while the latter encourages it. But as with all liberal-conservative dichotomies, it is important to get beyond labels and to determine what is actually best.  Indeed, public banking – especially if it is on the state or local level – would not create easy credit for the government to launch new imperial adventures.

By Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns

If you have been wondering whether a statistical recovery is at hand, today’s ISM manufacturing report should be the clincher.  The report was definitely bullish with the ISM index rising to 55.7 and sub-components supporting the understanding that the manufacturing sector is expanding. This is quite a contrast to last month’s weak data and demonstrates that last month was a one-month aberration in what should now be seen as a full-blown technical recovery.

I want to talk about this recovery briefly in the context of the signs that came before it, my own forecasting psychology and what the future holds.

The ISM data

The key data points to see as evidence of a fairly broad-based expansion in manufacturing come from new orders, production and inventories.  The production number came in at an incredibly bullish 63.3, marking the fifth consecutive month of increase. New orders slipped slightly, but were also in striking distance of the 60 range. (50 represents the demarcation between expansion and contraction).

But, from my perspective, it is inventories which are the most bullish data points. The inventories data show that inventories in the manufacturing sector were still being purged in October even while production is increasing.  That means that inventories are likely to make a huge contribution to GDP going forward in Q1 and Q2 of 2010. GDP could again surprise to the upside.

My mea culpa on forecast herding

All of this suggests the economy has been growing since the beginning of Summer. In the early Spring, I indicated that jobless claims were peaking (which added to my stock market bullishness at the time). This call turns out to have been accurate. However, at the time, this post produced very negative sentiments, albeit more from readers on Naked Capitalism than Credit Writedowns – in my opinion because most people erroneously extrapolate a current trend into the future (see my reaction to this from a post weeks later, “Through a glass darkly: the economy and confirmation bias in the econoblogosphere”)

Nevertheless, a piece from NBER guru Robert Gordon that I reported demonstrated to me that I was not alone in seeing the trend reversal in jobless claims. Eventually, in May I indicated that the jobless claims data were pointing to an imminent recovery and remarked that the data had usually been fairly accurate in the past.

And for the record, I have said I see a recovery happening probably in Q4 2009 or Q1 2010 (see my post “The Fake Recovery”).

The real question is how robust a recovery are we going to have and this is directly related to why the jobless claims series has been sending a false signal.  Now, initial claims has been sending a recovery signal since January. Yet, continuing claims continued to rise more quickly until last week.  In the past, one had seen these two series as harbingers of imminent recovery.  But, I am talking Q4 here.  Why? Deleveraging.

In the end, consumers are going to be forced to reduce debt and save more in this more cautious financial environment.  Team Obama does seem intent on re-kindling animal spirits but the personal savings rate has gone up nonetheless.  This will be a drag on GDP growth going forward and means that the economy’s rebound will be more tenuous and slower to develop.  In my view, this means recovery will be delayed and once it gets going it will be weak.  The potential for a double dip is very high.

So, to be clear, first derivatives are starting to turn up and since recession is a first derivative event, we are probably going to see an end to this recession soon enough.  But, with structural problems still remaining, the U.S. economy will be weak for a long time to come.

Why do I bring this up?  Because, despite the data pointing to recovery, I decided the start of the recovery process would be delayed until this quarter or Q1 2010 by consumers repairing their balance sheets – and, in retrospect, in part due to a desire to avoid being too far out of step with the consensus.

I must admit to falling prey to forecast herding, something I talked about in June (admittedly without mentioning my own culpability which I should have done). At the time, I said:

No one wants to go out on a limb with a bold call only to see this prediction proved wrong.  If one fails, it is better to fail conventionally.  The necessary corollary of that statement is this: market forecasters and analysts play it safe by making sure their forecasts are not often far from the consensus forecast.  Think of the consensus forecast as an anchor which restricts the outlook of any individual forecaster afraid of failing unconventionally.

In Roubini’s case – and this logic also applies to media darlings like Meredith Whitney – it does NOT pay to up the ante.  What Faber is saying is that they have already benefitted from the bold and unconventional contrarian market call they initially made.  There is little payoff and much risk from continuing on that path.  A bearish analyst who misses the turn gets the stick.  Just ask the original Dr. Doom, Henry Kaufman.

Roubini is not running with the herd

The one thing that makes me think about my error in tweaking my bullishness has to do with Nouriel Roubini. In the quote above, I said he has little incentive to double down on a bearish forecast at this point in time.  Both he and Meredith Whitney, two voices of caution leading into crisis, have been much more upbeat of late. Are they hedging as I did?  Hard to say.

But, with Nouriel Roubini’s recent FT Op-Ed, this is over. Roubini decried the easy money policy he believes is leading to a dollar carry trade and an increase of risk appetite across a wide variety of asset classes. He believes this experiment will not end well. I share his view.

Roubini, in going public in this way, is officially departing from a more hedged nuanced position he has been using over the last few months as the recovery has taken hold. Yves Smith says:

Nouriel Roubini has officially left the “hedging your bets on the economy” camp.

I applaud him for coming out with this piece and suggest you read it because it may come to be seen as the make or break call in determining his reputation as economic soothsayer.

Recovery is happening, but watch asset prices

For my part, I will look to avoid a repeat of the ‘jobless claims incident.’ Hopefully, I have done by writing my depression post at the beginning of last month, which outlines my view that we are in a cyclical recovery in the middle of a longer-term depression.

I would like to make some amendments to my thinking at the time though. First and foremost, I have come to doubt whether we are seeing a balance sheet recession right now. One reason I am writing this post is because the ISM manufacturing data turned up in May at precisely the same time that the credit revulsion-induced savings rate turned down. Translation: there is no balance sheet recession in the U.S., at least not yet. (see my post “Americans are not increasing savings”). This means the recovery could surprise to the upside. Moreover, the ISM data point to potential upside surprises from inventories, leading to an even more robust outlook.

What I believe is happening has much to do with Nouriel Roubini’s comments. U.S. economic policy is geared toward reproducing the status quo ante via reflation of asset prices (something Bill Gross thinks is the right policy and even Dilbert has made fun of). The policy has been wildly successful so far, with asset prices bubbling over globally. I have called this the fake recovery, but as recently as September I was on the fence about how much uptick we were to get. I never dreamed the recovery process could be so robust given the headwinds we faced.

However, reflation has also given investors a license to take risk. Look at the return of John Meriwether as a telltale sign.  Reflation policies are inflating assets far and wide: European high yield, American high yield, Swedish house prices, London house prices, Chinese property prices, and inducing reckless lending. The list is endless. Even Bill Gross’ piece pointed to inflated prices, a view shared by Jeremy Grantham.

The long and short is we are seeing another asset bubble inflating courtesy of easy money. While Morgan Stanley worries easy money will lead to inflation, former Morgan Stanley economist Andy Xie fears this will end in a double dip. To make matters worse, there is a dollar carry trade now spreading a liquidity seeking return dynamic abroad. This is the additional risk of which Roubini writes, believing it could precipitate another crunch or crash. Ironically, a strong recovery is not necessarily bullish.

Is a double dip or crash a baseline scenario? No, not necessarily – but it is increasingly likely. So, as bullish as I believe the data are, I am more worried about a bad outcome, not less.

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

Keynesians argue that we must increase fiscal stimulus to prevent a full-scale depression.

They argue that “deficit hawks” are wrong when they say that we can’t afford any more stimulus, and that worrying about debt in a crisis of this size is penny wise and pound foolish, given the bleak unemployment figures and other fundamentals. They also point out that America’s debt as a percentage of GDP is far less than Japan’s.

On the other hand, those worried about the giant debt overhang argue that massive debt and the failure to write down worthless assets and “purge malinvestments” from the system are the main problems.

Many also argue that the 1930s Keynesian stimulus programs did not work, and that the Depression did not end until World War II. And they also argue that every dollar in additional debt incurred now is another burden added to our childrens’ shoulders.

Who is right?

Before deciding, you might want to look at two pieces of data.

Different Bangs for the Buck

Initially, many Keynesian academics argue that it doesn’t matter where the stimulus money is spent, just as long as it is spent on something. However, this is untrue. For example, it should be obvious that spending in some areas will have more and quicker turnover (increasing money velocity) as compared to others. And, in fact, economists have documented that some types of stimulus spending have more bang for the buck than others.

So it is idiotic to talk about “fiscal spending” in the abstract. Without a cost-benefit analysis as to each category of proposed spending, any analysis is hollow.

Aggressive Fiscal Stimulus Only Buys Two Quarters

Moreover, as former chief IMF economist and MIT professor Simon Johnson points out:

Perhaps the best analysis regarding the impact of fiscal policy on recessions was done by the IMF. In their retrospective study of financial crises across countries, they found that nations with “aggressive fiscal stimulus” policies tended to get out of recessions 2 quarters earlier than those without aggressive policies. This is a striking conclusion – should we (or anyone) really increase our deficit further and build up more debt (domestic and foreign) in order to avoid 2 extra quarters of contraction?

Indeed, many experts say that continuing to cover-up the fraud which led to the financial crisis will extend the crisis for many years. In other words, failure to investigate and prosecute those responsible for bringing about the crisis may extend the crisis longer than any failure to spend more on stimulus.

(And investigations and prosecutions for fraud – unlike stimulus spending – would not increase America’s debt or tax burden.)

A real debate about whether we should spend more on stimulus – and if so, what types of stimulus – cannot even begin unless and until the aforementioned data is considered.

Note: Others have calculated bang for the buck from stimulus packages. For example, here are the Congressional Budget Office’s estimates (look for “Estimated Policy Multiplier”):

By DoctoRx, who writes at EconBlog Review:Introduction

A few days ago, Naked Capitalism kicked off a series of posts on government deficits with a first-of-two posts by me. My Debate on Deficits, was followed by posts by Marshall Auerback, Rob Parenteau and Dr. Edward Harrison. My initial post was itself a response to Dr. Harrison’s comprehensive essay from a few weeks earlier on broad economic matters; in it, he recommended that the government increase its borrowing in response to his belief that: “The real problem is the debt – specifically an overly indebted private sector”. He pointed prominently to the financial sector balances model to explain his call for more government debt.

IA.

In Dr. Harrison’s essay, the concept of a financial sector balances model was described, per his quote from Mr. Auerback, was that: “the domestic private sector cannot increase savings unless and until foreign or government sectors increase deficits.” (From here on, for simplicity we will exclude foreign flows.)

Being a fan of William of Ockham’s logical razor, I suggested in response that an alternative path was for the private sector to settle its debts within itself. My specific point was in fact simply that there were alternatives that were not covered by the model. Specifically, this model deals with financial dealings between the private and public sector. Ergo, by definition it excluded financial dealings within the private sector.

As there was no attempt to refute that point of mine by any of the three responders, I’m moving on. The model he used was a flow of funds between; mine was debt simplification without any inter-sector flows (earning one’s way out of debt of course being superior to default or principal reduction).

IB.

In trying to understand the apparent illogic of the idea that the government needs to go more in debt for the private sector to go more in surplus, I had an aha! moment. This came when I realized that for obscure reasons, Federal Reserve notes are technically debt obligations of the Treasury. However, their only practical use is transactional. As I have no expertise in this matter, comments are solicited on how this fact may or may not affect the financial sector balances model.

A commenter to one of the above posts pointed out that Canada’s paper money is transactional only and not a governmental debt obligation. In most people’s minds, greater wealth in the private sector can be reflected in more money in circulation to reflect that wealth and productivity. If, however, economists must count that cash as Federal debt, that could explain some of the points of disagreement. Once again, expert commentary would be appreciated.

IIA.

Yours truly is a medical doctor, with a specialty in internal medicine, a subspecialty in cardiovascular diseases, and an overriding interest in disease prevention. I also have extensive experience in the pharmaceutical and financial fields, have filed over 60 U. S. patent applications, and have had 6 books published. I began posting on the Net late last year largely from outrage that the incoming Obama administration was signaling continuity with the Big Finance bailout policies of the Bush team.

Because treating real people has the potential to kill them in more ways than you can imagine, the doctor is admonished thusly: primum non nocere. First, do no harm. In other words, God, fate or nature (take your pick) has given the person a health problem. The physician’s first responsibility is to not make it worse and to not create a new problem. I believe that government needs to be as thoughtful on behalf of its citizens as physicians are supposed to be on behalf of their patients. I also believe that finance has lost its moorings regarding professional standards of prudence, and that it is its responsibility to make its failings up to society by rationalizing the debts it created with borrowers who borrowed not wisely but too well. I and other investors have suffered enough collateral damage from the fallout of the global financial crisis. More debt to be incurred by the people? No way. Let the stock- and bond-holders of the financial companies take all the hits first, till they hit zero if it comes to that (which I doubt will happen on the bond side).

The ramifications of the financial insanity of the past decade and more (it is almost 13 years since Chairman Greenspan’s “irrational exuberance” statement) will not be solved by government pushing a “Send” button to create more “money”. Creation of real wealth- the tangible and human kinds- has little to do with the quantity of money. After all, money has a velocity, and that velocity can very markedly.

In a sense, there is no “economy”. There are only human needs and desires that are satisfied by mutual consent via commercial means when self-help and private, non-commercial means do not suffice. The elevation of GDP as the measure of the nation’s well being is bizarre. When a country has achieved as much material wealth as America and has, in the current Great Recession-ary state, disposable personal income of about $30,000 per capita, then other factors beyond accumulation of material goods are indeed important. Yet the powers that be continue to support in a very large way industries that make the quintessential debt-financed products- homes and autos. All for finance.

IIB, Prescriptions for a healthy American economy

a. The Merchants of Debt and the Merchants of (mostly empty) Calories have had a parallel rise. Debt and junk food are both addictive but are easily marketed to addicts or prospects. Just as America would be better off breaking the addiction the Merchants of Debt have caused, so would it be better off eating less. Less debt would mean smaller houses that could actually be paid for, and fewer cars that harm the atmosphere and deplete natural resources. Less food production would mean less obesity, and less processing of food would mean less of the modern toxins of salt and refined sugar in our diets. This would then mean vastly less cardiovascular disease, fewer medical expenditures, and a smaller economy. And more walking in general, and more bike-riding to work where practical, would also mean a “smaller” economy. But we’d all be better off. Quelle paradox!

We must not equate a higher GDP with improvement in anything important. What is made, how it is made, for whom it is made, how it is paid for, what the effect on the environment is, and the like are some of the factors that matter.

b. Back to finance.

My blog’s motto is “In equity, veritas”. (The term “equity” relates both to ownership rather than debt; and to fairness rather than, for example, crony capitalism.) Thus, I sympathize with Dr. Harrison’s and Mr. Parenteau’s arguments that private debt is core to our current financial and economic problems.

Yet I disagree strenuously with that viewpoint.

I believe that this country has become “over-financialized”, and that debt is just part of the inappropriate recent primacy of finance over the production of useful, real goods and services. This primacy manifests itself in such ways as:

i. Wasteful merger and acquisition effort, given that the average deal does not meet its stated goals;
ii. The cult of the publicly-owned stock even though the companies are run for the benefit of insiders;
iii. The existence of interest rate swaps reportedly in the hundreds of trillions of dollars of notional value;
iv. The whole credit default swaps mess;
v. The overtrading of vital commodities such as oil, a barrel of which reportedly changes hands over 20 times before anything useful is done to it; and
vi. The entire concept that corporations and government can really promise important retirement benefits, given that the future is unknowable. All new pension obligations should be variable.
vii. Most importantly, strategists should consider that the quantity of new government debt was consciously decided upon to outweigh retiring private debt. Thus the debt-GDP ratio continues to rise, into cloud-cuckoo land. If you liked the last debt cycle, you will love the next one!

My medical-financial view is that global growth became manic this decade due to excessive use of stimulants provided by central banks and Big Finance. Now that the seemingly inevitable crash occurred, the patient has become partially resistant to the same stimulants. If the patient had been allowed to go through withdrawal, the addiction could be prevented from returning. In other words, too much frantic economic and financial activity occured that did not arise from real human needs. People, and therefore the economy, need to rest. That’s a rough medical analogy. Plus, Dr. Bernanke was the doctor in charge well before the crisis. He was guilty of malpractice due to failure to diagnose. Initially he failed to treat with a statin and high blood pressure medicine (continuing the patient’s former doctor’s negligence). Then when the patient had chest pains in 2008, he failed to perform an angiogram. Finally a messive myocardial infarction ensured. Only then, he brought in specialists and all the big guns when the patient was on a respirator, but the patient lived but has suffered permanent harm. In medicine, this us actionable malpractice.

On the other hand, parts of the world such as India that did not get whipped by artificial stimulants are, one notes, normal economically.

c. Depository banks probably should not be publicly traded. (Nassim Taleb believes they should be nationalized.) In any case, they should never have runs due to a falling stock price, but their loans and capital assets should be very plain vanilla. Clearly, depository banks fulfill such a critically important function that FDR’s war against bank holding companies should be revived. Separate them from investment banks. Then, divide investment banks into separate companies. One company would engage in principal trading. The other would service clients. The inherent conflicts inside a Goldman Sachs that engages in both these functions cannot be reliably overcome without that separation.

d. FDIC insurance should be reduced ASAP to limits that protect only the financially needy. There is no societal interest in guaranteeing the loans millionaires make to financial companies (i. e. savings deposits). Perhaps $10,000 per family is an appropriate total amongst all banks, not per bank. If anyone wants more government-provided coverage, that person or entity can simply buy a Treasury. Until a year ago, Australian banks had no deposit insurance– and no bank failures. I would also suggest that if ordinary citizens can rule on life and death matters in trials, they can work along with, or oversee, bank regulators. It’s our capital. We should know how it is being handled.

e. Depository institutions should not hold “Level 3″ assets. Even Level 2 assets are dicey.

g. If lenders want to obtain insurance on a big loan, then let CDS’s be regulated as standard insurance products with reserves, etc. And make it as illegal for the insurer to resell them as it is for them to resell any insurance product. No holder of a CDS should ever be in a position to profit from the failure of the debt.

h. Most interest rate swaps are little more than line extensions as well, take advantage of the borrower, and serve no business need that is worth the cost of purchasing the swap and the ongoing attention it requires.

i. The “G30″ that is so influential in financial and governmental circles has (had) Jacob Frenkel, an AIG VP, as its CEO. I pay no attention to anything it says. Everything it says is for the greater good of Big Finance.

j. Problems with Dr. Harrison’s and Mr. Auerback’s calls for more government debt include:

i. Just as we should be cautious about taking on debt as individuals and on the corporate level, government should if anything be our better angels and be even more cautious. Borrowing more and more from hard-working Chinese et. al for routine expenditures such as those on the elderly is, to put it mildly, a bad idea. Either raise taxes or cut expenditures. I’m not arguing for one path or the other, rather to just be honest about it. Government can print money but should be restrained in doing so.

ii. No matter how many people try to define Federal debt strictly as current obligations, here is Wikipedia on the subject: “The U.S. government is committed under current law to mandatory payments for programs such as Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security. . . The present value of these deficits or unfunded obligations is an estimated $41 trillion. This is the amount that would have to be set aside during 2008 such that the principal and interest would pay for the unfunded commitments through 2082.” What’s enshrined in the law is, indeed, the law. Where is the gold in the vault to meet these commitments?

Dr. Harrison, in his response to my post, wrote: “The governments unfunded liabilities for social security and healthcare are akin to General Motors’ unfunded pension liabilities. GM’s unfunded liabilities are germane to a credit crisis only to the degree they flow through the income statement and, thus, require credit financing in real time.”

But . . . GM had to pay a higher price than Toyota when purchasing credit in part because every lender to GM raised the price of said credit in part because of said unfunded liabilities. GM might not have gone bankrupt had it not been for those unfunded obligations. As I read it, Dr. Harrison is supporting my point.

The same Wikipedia entry has a nice summary of the government’s obligations regarding Fannie and Freddie and the other bailout costs. I would expect that the surging low quality FHA debt should then be added to that amount.

The truth is that the net Federal obligations are extremely high, and all-in debt obligations relative to GDP are at all-time record levels for this country. The Ockham’s razor solution involves simplification of our obligations to one another and to foreigners at as many levels as possible. This solution is therefore opposite to one involving creation of more government debt obligations. If my favored solution entails 1% economic growth instead of 2% is irrelevant. Things are now getting like the emperor who had another set of “clothes” made that were just as see-through as the first set. Let’s get this mess cleaned up and move on. Government’s been “stimulating” this recession using debt financing since Q2 2008, when it was only a mild recession.

k. In contrast to all the environmentally unfriendly economic activities that count as good things in the sanctified GDP print, and all the corporate-friendly, person-unfriendly efforts that go on in this economy, there are insufficient efforts on truly useful activities. These include the fields of medical technology, public health, pro-environment activity and research, education at all levels, specific literacy efforts, vocational retraining, urban renewal, food production close to where people live, etc. If America made more of an effort to press its advantage in biotech and medical devices (etc.), and made a “First to the Moon” type race on alternative energy (more intensive than what has been enacted to date), it could regain world leadership in economic sectors of the future and develop an export economy with good jobs at home. In turn, this economy could lead the world toward a healthier and cleaner tomorrow while leading to an intrinsically strong dollar.

Conclusion:

In the waning months of the Clinton Presidency, I lunched with a friend and his friend (call the friend of a friend “DC”). The two of them were discussing a business venture they controlled that tied into some governmental telecoms license arrangement. DC, as it happens, was the 3rd generation scion of a very tied-in Washington family. His daughter sat next to Chelsea at Sidwell Friends at the time. With sadness in his voice and demeanor, he mentioned that he and his family had never seen Washington so “for sale” as then, with the true bipartisan spirit having taken hold in that respect. Worse than the Watergate era? Yes, for sure.

Does anyone think things are cleaner lately?

A government that is “for sale” will want to expand its power. That is ultimately why in real time I oppose that phenomenon.

In gargantuan America, smaller and simpler is, for me, today and tomorrow, beautiful.

Copyright (C) Long Lake LLC 2009

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

As I have repeatedly written, the largest U.S. banks have repeatedly gone bankrupt due to wild speculation which was blessed by the Fed, and then the government covered up their bankruptcy.

Indeed, the New York Times writes today about one of the too big to fails:

Over the past 80 years, the United States government has engineered not one, not two, not three, but at least four rescues of the institution now known as Citigroup.

But prominent economist James Galbraith recently told Bill Moyers:

JAMES GALBRAITH: The overwhelming emphasis, in the administration’s program, I think, has been to return things to a condition of normalcy, to use a 1920s word, that prevailed five and ten years ago. That is to say, we’re back to a world in which Wall Street and the major banks are leading, and setting the path–

BILL MOYERS: To restore what was.

JAMES GALBRAITH: To restore what was–

BILL MOYERS: Instead of reform what is.

JAMES GALBRAITH: And I don’t think what was can be restored.

BILL MOYERS: And you say that’s the objective of the administration’s policies? Geithner, Bernanke, Summers, the President himself?

JAMES GALBRAITH: To the extent that there’s a defined objective, that’s it, yes. I think in the immediate day-to-day work, they’ve largely been preoccupied with keeping the existing system from collapsing. And the government is powerful. It has substantially succeeded at that, but you really have to think about, do you want to have a financial sector dominated by a small number of very large institutions, very difficult to manage, practically impossible to regulate, and ruled by, essentially, the same people and the same culture that caused the crisis in the first place.

In other words – as I have repeatedly written – the administration’s talk of reform is just talk … the boys are just trying to restore the status quo.

Galbraith also pointed out – as many other experts have – that confidence in the system cannot be restored unless the fraud which led to the crash is investigated:

JAMES GALBRAITH: That’s the point about the crisis, is that it could have been prevented. The people in authority two, three, five years ago, knew how to prevent it. They chose not to act, because they were getting a political and an economic benefit out of the speculative explosion that was occurring.

BILL MOYERS: You mean, the people who could have prevented the dam from breaking were too busy fishing above it, and reaping big rewards to want to fix the crack in it?

JAMES GALBRAITH: Sure. The Federal Reserve, in particular, knew that the dam was cracking. Alan Greenspan, I think, almost surely knew this, and chose to wait until it had washed away.

BILL MOYERS: Why?

JAMES GALBRAITH: They let all of this run, because they were getting a superficially stronger economy out of it. The ownership society, all that was a scam, basically, designed to lure people who could never afford these mortgages into accepting them. And yes, I think they, any rational person, certainly people in the industry, knew that this was not going to last. There was a little industry code, I’ve learned, IBGYBG. “I’ll be gone. You’ll be gone.”

BILL MOYERS: Really?

JAMES GALBRAITH: Yeah.

BILL MOYERS: The industry being the securities industry?

JAMES GALBRAITH: Well, and the mortgage originators and the bankers, generally.

BILL MOYERS: But that’s criminal fraud.

JAMES GALBRAITH: Oh sure. There was a huge amount of it. The Bush administration did not actively investigate the fraud that they knew, that the FBI knew was occurring, from 2004 onward. And there will have to be full-scale investigation and cleaning up of the residue of that, before you can have, I think, a return of confidence in the financial sector. And that’s a process which needs to get underway.

As the New York Times article notes, the lack of transparency is ongoing, even as between different branches of government:

Representative Lloyd Doggett, a Texas Democrat on the House Ways and Means Committee, recently registered unease about the government’s guarantee of $300 billion in Citigroup assets and how effectively the Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, was monitoring the bank.

“We cannot know the full scope of the taxpayers’ potential cost from these hasty guarantees,” Mr. Doggett said last week in an e-mail message. “Inexplicably, Secretary Geithner appears unwilling to commit to conduct an analysis, despite my specific request to him in March. A critical and transparent examination of the response to the financial crisis is essential not only to learn from past mistakes, but also to prevent further erosion of the public’s trust in government.”

Mario Seccareccia – editor of the International Journal of Political Economy – points out:

The Great Crash of 1929 taught us that a modern monetary market economy is governed by confidence. As John Maynard Keynes put it, monetary relations and, more precisely, asset values, are held up by one’s belief in the future. Without it, the whole credit-driven economic system comes to a halt and economic agents scramble for cover by seeking to acquire liquidity.

While in a non commodity-based monetary system a central bank can quite easily supply liquidity in its role as lender of last resort, a central bank cannot single-handedly instill confidence in the future. When confidence is lost, monetary policy is impotent in building up asset values, which can only be sustained if people believe in future revenue arising from future production. The economy remains trapped in a state of paralysis in which everyone is seeking to remain liquid. History tells the tale: Excessive optimism prior to the Great Crash turned to hopelessness during the early 1930s.

Without a thorough investigation like the Pecora Commission, and without prosecuting those who are guilty, confidence and hope in the future will not be restored, consumer confidence will remain depressed, and we will remain in an economic slump.

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

When a liberal labor leader and a conservative financial policy analyst unite against something, you know that something is really bad (actually, I don’t believe in the whole false left-right dichotomy; I think its Americans versus those trying to steal our wallets and our rights, but that’s another story).

Today, AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka has slammed the Fed and the proposed “Tarp on steroids” legislation in his testimony to Congress today. Here are the must-read parts of Trumka’s prepared remarks to the House Financial Services Committee:

We are deeply concerned that the Committee’s work thus far on the fundamental issues of regulating shadow financial markets and institutions will allow the very practices that led to the financial crisis to continue. The loopholes in the derivatives bill and the failure to require any public disclosures by hedge funds and private equity funds fundamentally will leave the shadow markets in the shadows. We urge the Committee to work with the leadership to strengthen these bills before they come to the House floor.

However, these powers must be given to a fully public body, and one that is able to
benefit from the information and perspective of the routine regulators of the financial system. We believe a new agency, with a board made up of a mixture of the heads of the routine regulators and direct Presidential appointees would be the best structure. However, if the Federal Reserve were made a fully public body, it would be an acceptable alternative.

But we cannot support the discussion draft made public earlier this week because it gives dramatic new powers to the Federal Reserve without reforming its governance so that the banks themselves are removed from the governance of the Federal Reserve System. Even more alarmingly, the discussion draft would appear to give power to the Federal Reserve to preempt a wide range of rules regulating the capital markets—power which could be used to gut investor and consumer protections. If this Committee wishes to give more power to the Federal Reserve, it must make clear this power is only to strengthen safety and soundness regulation and it must simultaneously reform the Federal Reserve’s governance. Reform cannot be put off until another day.

The Federal Reserve currently is the regulator for bank holding companies. In that
capacity, it was responsible throughout the period of the bubble for regulating the parent companies of the nation’s largest banks. While regulatory authority rests in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in Washington, routine responsibility for regulatory oversight has been delegated by the Board of Governors to the regional Federal Reserve Banks. The Federal Reserve System’s regulatory expertise resides in these regional banks.

The problem is that these regional Federal Reserve Banks are actually controlled by their member banks—the very banks whose holding companies the Fed regulates. The member banks control the selection of the majority of the regional bank boards, and the boards pick the regional bank presidents, who are effectively the CEO’s of the regulatory staff.

These arrangements may explain why the Federal Reserve has never given any account of how it allowed bank holding companies like Citigroup and Bank of America to arrive at a point where they required tens of billions of dollars of direct equity infusions from the public purse to avoid bankruptcy.

Giving the Federal Reserve with its current governance control over which financial
institutions are bailed out in a crisis is effectively giving the banks the ability to raid the Treasury for their own benefit.

We are also deeply troubled by provisions in the discussion draft that would allow the Federal Reserve to use taxpayer funds to rescue failing banks, and then bill other nonfailing banks for the costs. The incentive structure created by this system seems likely to increase systemic risk.

We believe it would be more appropriate to require financial institutions to pay into an insurance fund on an ongoing basis. Financial institutions should be subject to progressively higher fee assessments, and stricter capital requirements, as they get larger. This would be a way of actually discouraging “too big to fail.”

In addition, language in the draft that appears to limit taxpayer bailouts of bank
stockholders actually does no such thing, rather it simply ensures that when stockholders are rescued with public funds, bondholders and other creditors are rescued with them…

Finally, and not least, the discussion draft appears to envision a process for identifying and regulating systemically significant institutions, and for resolving failing institutions, that is secretive and optional—in other words, the Federal Reserve could choose to take no steps to strengthen the safety and soundness regulation of systemically significant institutions. In these respects, the discussion draft appears to take the most problematic and unpopular aspects of the TARP and makes them the model for permanent legislation.

Instead of repeating and deepening the mistakes associated with the bank bailout,
Congress should be looking to create transparent, fully publicly accountable mechanisms for regulating systemic risk and for acting to protect our economy in any future financial crises.

Conservative Peter Wallison – financial policy study analyst at the American Enterprise Institute – largely agrees. In his prepared remarks to Congress, Wallison says:

The Discussion Draft of October 27 contains an extremely troubling set of proposals which, if adopted, will bring economic growth in this country to a standstill, essentially turn over the control of the financial system to the government, and seriously impair competition in all areas of finance.

Rather than ending too big to fail, the Draft makes it national policy. By designating certain companies for special prudential regulation, the Draft would signal to the markets that these companies are too big to fail, creating Fannies and Freddies in every sector of the economy where they are designated. This will impair competition by giving large companies funding and other advantages over small ones.

The idea that the designation of these companies will be kept secret is, with all due respect, absurd; securities laws alone will require them to disclose their special status; simple truthfulness will do the rest…

If this legislation is passed, every industry will be in Washington, asking for special treatment or exemption. Competition in the market will become competition before this committee or in the halls of the Fed, lobbyist-to-lobbyist and lawyer-to-lawyer…

This will not only create uncertainty and moral hazard, but it will give the large and powerful companies special advantages over small ones. Those that seem likely to be taken over by the government will have easier access to credit, at lower rates, than those likely to be sent to bankruptcy.

In other words, the Draft proposes nothing more or less than a permanent TARP, using government money to bail out the large or politically favored companies, and then taxes the remaining healthy companies to reimburse the government for its costs of competing with them…

The [proposed bill] would take control of the financial industry in the United States, stifle risk-taking and initiative, and change competitive conditions in every sector of the economy so that they favor large, government-backed, too big to fail enterprises…

The Draft … would now give the Fed authority to regulate any financial company that the Council determines should be subject to “heightened prudential standards,” even if there is no insured bank in the group…

The result is that the question becomes one of political clout, with industries fighting in Congress for the competitive result they want. Some industries want to invade others’ turf; the invaded industry uses the law to fend off the competition; consumers are the losers. Congress becomes the battleground. It’s not just unseemly; it’s a frightening example of what happens when the government starts picking winners…

Congress will be injecting itself into competitive fights between firms and industries, further politicizing what should be economic or financial decisions…

The Designated Companies are under the complete control of the Fed. They will not be able to initiate new activities without the Fed’s approval, or enter new competitive fields, or perhaps even open new offices in new places. This is a degree of political control of business that has never been attempted before. Not only will it place the dead hand of government on the activities of financial companies, but it will almost certainly drive many financial companies out of the United States before they submit to these restrictions.

The effect of these restrictions for the U.S. economy will be dire. First, Designated Companies will clearly have been labeled as too big to fail. In effect, the government has notified the capital markets that these firms will not be allowed to go into bankruptcy—they will be rescued in the ways I will describe below. This means they will be less risky borrowers than smaller companies that are not going to be controlled in the same way. As less risky borrowers, the Designated Companies will have lower costs of funding and will be able to drive smaller competitors from the markets they enter. Sound familiar? Yes, it’s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac all over again. The existence of these Designated Companies will impair competition in every market they are allowed to enter, and will force the consolidation of competitors so that markets become dominated by government-backed giants like themselves….

[The bill assumes that] our entire financial system must be subjected, today, to far-reaching control by the Federal Reserve Board. With all due respect, this is absurd, and certainly disastrous for economic growth in the future.

The Draft also contains language that suggest some of the problems of identifying Designated Companies in advance—and thus creating the Fannie/Freddie too big to fail problem—can be avoided if the designation of these companies is not disclosed to the public. This, too, with all due respect, is absurd…

In addition, there is very little incentive for the government not to rescue failing Designated Companies, because the Draft provides that the surviving members of the financial industry larger than $10 billion in assets—whether Designated Companies or not—will be taxed to reimburse the government for its costs in the bailout…

As in the GM and Chrysler bailouts, preferences are going to go to favored groups, and disfavored groups will suffer disproportionate losses. It will be a political free for all, with important legislators pressing the FDIC to treat their constituents better than someone else’s constituents.

What we know is that no losses will be taken immediately by creditors. This is because the objective of the resolution authority is to prevent a “disorderly” failure, which actually means a failure in which creditors suffer immediate losses…

The proposals in the Draft reflect very bad policy—far more likely to be destructive of the financial system and damaging to the economy than an improvement on what exists today.

By Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns.

DoctoRx, Rob Parenteau and Marshall Auerback have each written articles here to bring clarity to some issues I first raised at the beginning of the month in my post, “The recession is over but the depression has just begun.”

As I see it, the issue we are debating has to do with how the government responds when large debts in the private sector constrain demand for credit in the face of a severe economic shock and fall in aggregate demand. In short, if private sector debt levels are so high that a recession precipitates private sector credit revulsion, how should government respond?

Frankly, this question is as much philosophical and political as it is economic.  So I want to wait to answer it and first frame the monetary system in a way which reveals the political nature of the question. Afterwards, I hope it is apparent that there is no one answer to this question and that any society’s answer depends on and reveals its priorities as a people. I will try to make some concluding marks about government debts and taxes in a fiat currency system given the analysis Marshall’s post.

Money and the sectors of the economy

Money is a tool, a medium of exchange, which derives its value from its utility in allowing individuals in an economy to trade goods and services. It eliminates the need to barter and make direct exchanges of goods and services in order to trade. Think of any economy as a collection of individuals or groups which trade goods and services with each other and with the outside world in exchange for a money-value of those goods and services. Each transaction is an exchange of a good or service for a equivalent value amount of money.

So, in any country, the flow of goods and services should be a one for one mirror image of the money flows. Now, if you break an economy down into sectors like the government sector, the private sector, and the foreign sector, the same is also true. Two accounting identities flow from this.

• In any particular time period, the changes in both money value of goods and the changes in the financial balances must sum to zero.  As Rob, illustrated: Household FB + Business FB + Government FB + Foreign FB = 0
• One sector’s deficit is another sector’s surplus. Think of it this way, if you and I are the only ones in the economy. If I spend more than I earn in, say, one particular month to buy your goods and services, you must have spent less than you earned in that same month to buy my goods and services.

If you take Rob’s formula and combine the two sectors of households and businesses into one sector, the private sector, you are left with Private FB + Government FB + Foreign FB = 0. What this means is that in any given time period, the private sector financial balance is offset by the government and foreign sectors’ balance such that they all sum to zero.

Private sector debts and credit revulsion

Given the framework above, it should be clear that when the private sector has a net surplus, the government and foreign sectors must have a combined net deficit.

So what happens when the economy lapses into recession because of a financial crisis caused in large part by excessive leverage and debt?

The answer is credit revulsion, also known as deleveraging. And this is what we have just seen in the U.S. economy.  Credit revulsion means that the private sector (businesses and households) reduce or are forced to reduce their debt burdens. This change in behavior induces a net surplus in the private sector; the private sector increases savings.

I’m sure you know where this is going. If the private sector moves to a net surplus, the combined government/foreign sectors must axiomatically move to a deficit.

A foreign sector deficit means that we are net exporting i.e. foreigners are buying more stuff from us than we are from them. We are talking money flows here not goods and service: more money coming in than going out (FB deficit) means fewer goods coming in than going out (current account surplus). Since the U.S. is not going to run a current account surplus, I am going to leave this out of the discussion to focus on the real issue: Government.

We can try and reduce private sector savings

So, the result for the U.S. of a private sector which is net saving is government deficits – this what naturally flows from a credit-revulsion induced private sector deleveraging. By saying this, I am stating fact, I am not making a political argument for or against deficit spending.

However, this is where the political/philosophical discussion starts. Two questions come to mind.

• Do we want the private sector to net save at this point in time?
• If so, do we want this savings to occur in an environment of more aggregate demand or less?

Policymakers today have answered no to the first question. They have said, “we do not like credit revulsion and our preferred policy choice is to work against it by reducing private-sector savings.” How do they do this? They lower interest rates in such a way that there is less incentive to save. Policymakers are in effect voting to continue the asset-based economic model.

But, there are several problems with this policy decision: it rewards debtors over savers, it prevents deleveraging from occurring, it creates asset bubbles, it keeps zombie companies and overcapacity alive, and it misallocates resources by artificially lengthening time preferences for money. In short, it is poor policy and it will end poorly as well.

Or we can maintain it and decide to either increase or decrease aggregate demand?

If you reject this policy path, you then have two options. In one, aggregate demand is reduced. In the other aggregate demand is increased.  Which option we choose, again, depends on politics.

In a July post, I outlined the choices. (Note the labels ‘surplus’ and ‘deficit’ should really be labeled ‘financial balance.’ For simplification the foreign sector isn’t depicted but one could assume it is aggregated with the government sector.):

In the Minsky world, the increase in net savings in the private sector and reduction of the current account deficit is axiomatic when the government is increasing deficits.  The point is that the private sector net saving and current account deficit must equal the government deficit.  So, when the combined private savings and current account deficit increases, the government’s financial balance must become more negative.

What this implies is this (diagram from Paul Krugman’s post with the unfortunate title “Deficits saved the world”):

To make the graph easier to follow we start with sector balances at zero i.e. where sector surplus/deficit equals zero for both the private sector including the current account deficit and for the government sector. And just to be clear, points above the line show private sector savings or public sector deficit.

1. We start where the red circle is.
2. When an economic shock hits which precipitates a massive deleveraging, the entire demand curve shifts to the left to a new lower GDP level, everything else being equal. Thus, deleveraging equals recession. And we now see the private sector curve hitting the public sector curve where the blue circle is. The private sector is now saving and the public sector is in deficit. That is where we are today.
3. However, to bring things back to neutral i.e. where sector surplus/deficit equals zero for both sectors, one could cut government spending dramatically.  That shifts the entire government curve to the red line on the left, leaving us where the green circle is: in a deep, deep depression. Krugman calls this the Great Depression outcome.

The cult of zero imbalances

In the depression post which kicked off this debate, I said “I must admit to having a preternatural disaffection for large deficits and big government which is what Koo and Minsky advise respectively.” Consider me a card-carrying member of the cult of zero imbalances. My preference is to see a neutral state where the sectors are balanced as the average long-term outcome. We may deviate from a zero imbalance state over the short-term, but we should be working toward it over the longer-term.

However, in the interim, what we want is to get back to that red circle in the chart and higher GDP and stay away from the green circle and lower GDP – also known as depression.  The difference between these two is government deficit spending.

Depressions are downward economic spirals. And when I invoke the term spiral, you should not be thinking of some stable equilibrium like the Great Moderation, Goldilocks economy, Nash equilibrium or some other close facsimile of economic Nirvana. You should be thinking war, famine and pestilence because those are the events which are historically associated with periods of high deflation and depression.

For me, the choice is clear.

The key is liquidation of overcapacity

While the picture I presented above represents a single point in time, what we want to know is how we get back to the green circle over time. In the depressionary example, we contract immediately and violently as aggregate demand is reduced in both the public and private sectors. The result is a liquidation of overcapacity and a depression. In the pro-growth example, aggregate demand is boosted by government spending whilst the private sector deleverages. In this scenario, liquidation of overcapacity also occurs if the government allows it to do so.

And this is the key: to the degree that government deficit spending is used as a vehicle for channeling funds to so-called systemically important businesses to prevent them from failing, we are merely kicking the can down the road. With the deleveraging, malinvestment must be purged for the economy to right itself on a sustainable growth path.

Government’s hidden debt?

That brings me to the last point: government debt. The first issue I want to address is unfunded liabilities.  This is something of great concern to many (including myself).  However, when we are talking about debt and credit, it is not particularly relevant. I mention this because of my statement in the original post:

The government plays a crucial role here because of the huge private sector indebtedness.  In the U.S. and the U.K., the public sector is not nearly as indebted.

A lot of people want to bolt the unfunded liabilities onto government debt to make the government’s debts appear larger than they actually are.  But when talking about the credit system, we have to be careful and distinguish between obligations and actual debt – related but different terms.

In a period of credit revulsion, the key issue is the overall credit in the system. At issue is a debtor’s inability to meet large existing obligations such that the debtor defaults, the obligation is written down, and the overall credit in the system contracts by the amount of capital that has been allocated to that writedown. The issue is credit writedowns and how they suck capital out of the system, reducing credit and leading to a potential deflationary spiral. It has absolutely nothing to do with unfunded obligations.

The governments unfunded liabilities for social security and healthcare are akin to General Motors’ unfunded pension liabilities. GM’s unfunded liabilities are germane to a credit crisis only to the degree they flow through the income statement and, thus, require credit financing in real time.

Government and its money

The difference between GM and the federal government is vast, however. General Motors is a private organization which must fund its obligations by selling products.  To quote Ben Bernanke’s now infamous words:

the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost.

The U.S. government has monopoly control of the currency and no other entity can print money as a medium of exchange in the United States (see my post “The origin of the U.S. dollar as legal tender and its link to Depression” for how this came to be.)  When anyone else attempts to print money, it is called counterfeiting. In saying this, I am stating fact, I am not making a political argument for or against legal tender laws.

This is a problem for states – which cannot print their own money – and for Eurozone countries – which also cannot print their own money (as I laid out in my post, “Depressionary bust in Ireland is echoed in California”) – but it is not a problem for the U.S. government. If the U.S. government so chooses, it can ‘fund’ any purchase with additional money it prints. It is not constrained in the same way private sector actors or even states and local municipalities are.

It is disingenuous for economic pundits like Marc Faber to suggest the U.S. is going to go bust. The United States will not literally be declared insolvent as long as it issues debt in its own currency. Countries that have gone bust, Russia, Mexico, and Argentina were borrowing in foreign currency because of interest rate differentials. No sovereign nation which prints and issues debt in its own fiat currency can ever involuntarily be made insolvent.

Inflation is another issue altogether.  When the economy is operating at potential, money printing leads to consumer price inflation. But this is not the case right now, there is an enormous output gap that is not going to be closed anytime soon.  So the government can print all the money it wants and buy all the Treasuries it wants; none of this will lead to consumer price inflation in the short run except via dollar depreciation and import prices. Again, I have to remind you that in saying this, I am stating fact, I am not making a political argument for or against quantitative easing.

I should point out that the output gap is why money printing is leading to an asset price bubble both in the U.S. and globally and one reason we should reject QE even in the absence of consumer price inflation (this line was added because the initial comments suggested readers thought I am advocating quantitative easing when I am not).

I hope this post adds to the debate Marshall, Rob, and DoctoRx have taken on.

By Marshall Auerback, an investment strategist and analyst who writes for New Deal 2.0.

A major shortcoming in an otherwise thoughtful post by DoctoRX on deficit spending is a traditional mistake in which analysts seek to analogise the expenditures of government with that of a private household or business. The government is sovereign. This fact gives to government authority that households and firms do not have. In particular, government has the power to tax and to issue money. The power to tax means that government does not need to sell products, and the power to issue currency means that it can make purchases by emitting IOUs. No private firm can require that markets buy its products or its debt. Indeed taxation creates a demand for public spending, in order to make available the currency required to pay the taxes. No private firm can generate demand for its output in this way. Neither of these statements is controversial; both are matters of fact. Nor should they be construed to imply that government should raise taxes or spend without limit. However, they do imply that federal budgeting is different from private budgeting, and should be considered in its proper, public context.

It simply means that the government does not “need” money to “fund” its operations. It seems counter-intuitive, but the public actually needs the government’s money to pay its taxes rather than the government needing taxes to pay for highways, bridge repairs, schools, national defense, etc. For the household, paying back debt means they have to sacrifice current consumption (spending). For the government, no such financial constraint is imposed. Its ability to spend now is independent of how much debt it holds and what is spending was yesterday. That situation can never apply to a household or business firm.

Because the government is the only entity that gets to create money, it can “buy” whatever is for sale in terms of its money merely by providing that money to the public, which opens up a huge range of policy options. Putting this in concrete terms, the government–‘buys’ a new highway or a new aircraft carrier, as long as the construction materials and workers’ wages can be paid for in its own currency.

Where does the government get the money? The government creates this money by crediting bank accounts. It creates money with the stroke of a computer keyboard. New money is an entry on a spreadsheet, nothing more.

To put this in everyday terms, the dollars the government creates function something like tickets to the Super Bowl. As you go into the stadium, you hand the man a ticket worth $1000, and then he tears it up and throws it away. Why? Because the ticket has served its function: it has enabled you to gain entry to the event in question; similarly, a tax is paid to extinguish a state liability, but as soon as the tax is paid, it has no further value to the government. The tax receipt can be sent to the shredder. Tax payments (which discharge a liability to the state) then “drain” the money we call legal tender (otherwise known as “fiat currency”), which can be pictured as a movement of funds away from the private sector and “down the drain” as the money is literally burned, or simply wiped off the liability side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet.

How does the government taking your tax money and throwing it in a shredder pay for anything? The answer is that it doesn’t.

Taxes function to reduce aggregate demand, also known as spending power, and not to collect what the government needs to spend on something else.

As a matter of conceptual clarity, it makes no sense to say that a government ever “builds up a store of savings” that allows for higher spending capacity in the future. The government neither has or doesn’t have any dollars; it simply makes computer entries on a bank’s balance sheet, as Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke described in the “60 Minutes” interview above.

It spends by changing numbers upwards in our bank accounts. Think of this like a football game. Awarding 6 points for a touchdown doesn’t “use up” some stock of points held by the stadium. It is “electronically credited” via the scoreboard. Nobody asks that the 6 points be “repaid” somehow.

You don’t “save” what you have the option of creating or not creating (i.e. fiat currency). Not spending, not “creating currency” via crediting bank accounts, simply means less present day economic output.

We all learned this as the paradox of thrift.

There is nothing to “save”. The government is never revenue constrained.

This is in contradistinction to the way users of the currency, versus the issuer of a currency, such as a household functions.

For them, spending is constrained by income. Their checks will bounce if there is no money in their accounts. And for users of the currency monetary savings can be stored to permit higher consumption in the future. And households don’t have an electronic printing press in their basements which would eliminate that constraint. As Rob Parenteau has already noted, this is called “counterfeiting” and it’s a jailable offence.

True, if a government spends too much after getting us to a state of full employment and higher economic growth, excessive government spending can create inflationary pressures. So to that extent, there is a limit. But acknowledging that unconstrained government spending can create inflation is not the same as arguing that it is in any way operationally constrained. Contrary to conventional “gold standard” thinking, where it is said that every DOLLAR SPENT HAS TO BE ‘FINANCED’ BY AN OUNCE OF GOLD ALREADY IN EXISTENCE, our government can afford anything that it is for sale in its own currency.

The debate therefore should not be focussed on “affordability” but on what our the national priorities of our government? The political process, not a non-existent gold standard, determines that if we want more killing toys then the national government can always meet those expectations in a fiscal sense, unless we run out of real resources. Likewise if we desire universal health care, in a manner where the government provides this as a national right, rather than foisting it on business as a marginal cost of production (remember, businesses are constrained in a way that governments are not).
Further, if there is a problem with excessive private indebtedness and overspending, then the mirror image of that has been the excessive fiscal drag that the national government inflicted on the USA between 1996 and 2007. If you want the economy to grow and produce the saving capacity (via income growth) to allow the private sector to repair their precarious balance sheets then the last thing you would want to do is run “tight Budgets … for a long time into the future”.

What is needed when the economy has been driven by private spending funded by ever-increasing levels of debt (and a contracting public sector as a proportion of total output) then what is required is a change in the composition of final expenditure – from private to public – unless you want to “scorch the earth” and deliberately contract the economy.

The consequences of overspending might be inflation or a falling currency, but never bounced checks a government creating its own currency can never go broke. Government spending limits ought to be set by our policy makers by considering what we, as a society, want, like universal healthcare, full employment, a well-functioning economy and our ability to accomplish this—not out of some preconceived notion of what is “affordable”.

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

I have repeatedly pointed out that big banks are not more efficient than smaller banks.

For example, I previously noted that an article in Fortune concluded:

The largest banks often don’t show the greatest efficiency. This now seems unsurprising given the deep problems that the biggest institutions have faced over the past year.

“They actually experience diseconomies of scale,” [Celent analyst Bart] Narter wrote of the biggest banks. “There are so many large autonomous divisions of the bank that the complexity of connecting them overwhelms the advantage of size.”

Now, James Kwak has done some sleuthing and discovered that even Fed economists don’t buy the bigger-is-more-efficient argument. Kwak points out that New York Fed economist Kevin J. Stiroh found that most of the increase in efficiency during part of the time in which banks were consolidating was due to the increased use of information technologies:

His main explanation for the productivity growth is not consolidation, but information technology: “The finding of steady productivity growth, in particular, is important since it is consistent with the idea that the massive investment in new technology is working to improve the performance of the banking industry.” This is not proven in this paper, but Stiroh went on to write a bunch of other papers on the link between information technology and productivity. For example, this paper (on the entire economy, not just banking) concludes:

“IT-producing and IT-using industries account for virtually all of the productivity revival that is attributable to the direct contributions from specific industries, while industries that are relatively isolated from the IT revolution essentially made no contribution to the U.S. productivity revival. Thus, the U.S. productivity revival seems to be fundamentally linked to IT.”

Stiroh also wrote a paper on banks in Switzerland, concluding:

“We find evidence of economies of scale for small and mid-size banks, but little evidence that significant scale economies remain for the very largest banks. Finally, evidence on scope economies is weak for the largest banks that are involved in a wide variety of activities. These results suggest few obvious benefits from the trend toward larger universal banks.”

The kicker is that Stiroh is the main source cited by those claiming that bigger banks produce greater efficiencies.

The bottom line is that there is absolutely no reason not to break up the too big to fails.