It’s interesting to see that the Biden Administration is planning to take the private equity industry down a peg or two by going after some of its strategies to gain market power by engaging in consolidation plays, also known as roll-ups. The Department of Justice intends to lodge more anti-trust challenges, as Jonathan Kanter, head of that unit, told the Financial Times.
We’ll turn to what Kanter said shortly, but the article was not as clear as it could have been on how consolidations increase the profits of the merged companies at the expense of consumers. Some methods are legal or at least don’t run afoul of anti-trust laws. Cutting costs, lowering headcount, or reducing product quality are all kosher unless the expense reduction came about via some sort of collusion or bid-rigging with other buyers (think the Silicon Valley wage-fixing case). But rollups don’t produce benefits only on the outlay side of the ledger. They can also produce pricing power. We’ve seen many examples of this, such as private equity coming to dominate certain kinds of veterinary products and supplies and jacking up their prices.
The Federal government has been asleep at the switch in antitrust enforcement for years, so it’s not clear how well this effort to implement new and more creative enforcement strategies will go. When an agency is trying to cut new ground, sometimes due to changes in commercial practices or technology, the courts can be slow to catch up. And lawyers often have to lose a few cases before they figure out the strategies and arguments that have the best shot at prevailing.
So a cynic might say that even though the private equity industry could get mighty offended by being called bad names by the Biden Administration (the firms take umbrage at mere slights)
So there’s a second question here: whether the DoJ has the support of the Administration, as well as a long enough runway, to start to make progress. 2024 is a long way away, but the odds of Team Dem hanging on to the White House do not look good. So private equity firms may simply need to wage a war of delay (not hard since big cases tend not to move quickly) since they may be bailed out by regime change.
Another issue is that antitrust case have historically revolved around measures of industry concentration, with a lot of fighting about what the boundaries of the industry actually are. Kanter’s ideas sound awfully far afield. But perhaps he is hoping to surmount summary judgement/motion to dismiss and then root around in acquirers’ files. I am sure there are lots of damning admission, both in marketing materials to investors and in analyses presented to lenders, about profit improvement strategies that depend on what the law would deem to be price fixing and/or market manipulation.
Key sections from the Financial Times piece:
“Sometimes [the motive of a private equity firm is] designed to hollow out or roll up an industry and essentially cash out,” Jonathan Kanter, head of the DoJ’s antitrust unit said in an interview with the Financial Times. “That business model is often very much at odds with the law and very much at odds with the competition we’re trying to protect.”
Let’s stop here. Kanter seems to be objecting to leveraged buyouts as well as consolidation plays. Sadly mere asset-stripping is not illegal, even though it’s a common approach. At a 50,000 foot level, the larger deals, which consume the majority of capital commitments, are leveraged buyouts, in which the investor returns come mainly from the use of leverage, cost reduction (even to the point of damaging the franchise), selective asset sales, and other financial engineering. At the other end of the spectrum, private equity firms buy smaller companies and profess to add value in helping them grow faster, say by giving them capital or access to other resources so they can expand (think a regional product going national).
However, industry contacts say that the apparent success of smaller company growth plays comes less from the private equity buyer improving the operation of the company, and more from them simply being good at buying “growth-y” companies. Financial Times reader Heavy Hearted American provided confirmation:
I do work on many P/E deals. P/E firms are nothing more than an intermediary between actual owners. In 15 years, I’ve never seen a P/E firm take an underperforming company and make it profitable again. That’s just a fantasy. Most P/E targets already have strong cash flows and low debt. Plus most “finance guys” have no idea how to run the operations of a real business.
Generally, I see P/E firms take out large debt with a balloon payment, usually 5 years out. The added interest and goodwill amortization costs makes all of them unprofitable from a GAAP accounting standpoint. Even rarer is to see cost cutting and efficiency gains offset the added interest burden. Any free cash flow, which is usually very little, is sucked up in management fees and distributions. The hope is that in 5 years when the bills come due from the bank, their is a deeper pocked buyer waiting in the wings. with a higher valuation in mind.
A later section from the story:
In one of his first speeches following his appointment, Kanter warned the DoJ would seek to block more anti-competitive deals rather than pursue complex settlements and lamented a “dearth” of lawsuits addressing monopolistic behaviour, counting a 20-year gap between big cases….
One area of focus for the agency is “interlocking directorates”, where executives from a buyout group sit on the boards of multiple, competing companies they own or control. Such governance arrangements could violate a section of the 1914 Clayton Antitrust Act, Kanter said, adding: “We’re going to enforce that.”
He also said the DoJ would pay closer attention to private equity’s role as a buyer of assets when the agency orders companies that are merging to divest assets in order to preserve competition. Kanter has said such a solution is often less effective than blocking the deal outright…
Antitrust agencies are looking for ways to increase scrutiny of private equity. For instance, the DoJ and the FTC are in the process of changing pre-merger notification forms to toughen up disclosure requirements. “[We’re] making sure that we get more information upfront to help us understand . . . the full competitive picture,” Kanter said.
Despite my skepticism, these ideas have merit. Moderately sizeable deals and bigger are subject to Hart Scott Rodino pre-merger filings, and the FTC can object to or oppose deals it view as anti-competitive. The normal remedy for a deal that has HSR problem is usually the divestiture of an offending bit or two, but the new sheriffs are inclined to be less accommodating. So this approach could make a difference. The Clayton Act angle could also give private equity firms heartburn.
However, here is where a new DoJ/FTC approach could fall short:
Experts said applying existing antitrust laws to private equity could be challenging given they are largely tailored to bilateral tie-ups. That is often incompatible with the private equity model, which involves building portfolios with a string of companies that relate to each other in a multitude of ways.
If the Feds block a merger based on an argument of coordinated activities and a private equity firm sues, the Feds would be asking a court to make new law. That’s the concern I expressed above, that it often takes several attempts to perfect a legal argument and also find a good fact set. And agencies can lose their nerve if they suffer a high-profile early defeat. We saw this in the financial crisis where the SEC and DoJ chickened out when their first big case, against the managers of two Bear Stearns subprime hedge funds that imploded, went splat. First, they failed to understand that these funds were victims, basically stuffees of bad subprime paper, and not perps. Second, they tried to force fit the prosecution into what the SEC knew how to do, insider trading cases. Yes, the senior guys did sell their own stakes down at various points when the market was unraveling. But there were other days when they were more confident about their sector coming back. To a jury, their actions looked more like trader panic than an effort to defraud their investors.
Of course, the other reason to harbor doubts is the private equity industry already spends enormous amounts on legal fees and has ready access to the best partners at the toniest firms. Their weight of money means they can bury an opponent in motions practice. However, one slight offset is that antitrust has been so dead as a practice area for so long that it’s not as if there’s a deep bench of private sector attorneys to engage.
So even though any fight against private equity is a big uphill battle, this one might make a bit of headway. Keep your fingers crossed.
As I’ve learned about the private equity business model over the past decade or so, mainly here at NC and via links found here, it seems it can be most pithily be summed up by channeling Joseph Schumpeter:
Private Equity = Uncreative Destruction.
I seem to remember Michael Milken, aka pardoned felon , spent a stint in prison in the 1980s, not that this is relevant to our modern world or this topic. ahem. / ;)
That’s when we had regulators like Bill Black who took their jobs seriously.
(Milken served time in the 1990’s, his crimes were perpetrated in the 1980’s.)
They better figure it out soon. I think I could see “supply chain” focused funds as the new vanguard shortly. One or a few key pieces of an industry wrapped up to gouge out every customer eyeballs, and then if we let them, their vitals too. Kind of like ambulances or anesthesia services, it will require legislation since it is more “hostage taking” an entire industry than it is monopoly.
It’s possible PE has a surprising future. “…(anti-trust laws are) often incompatible with the PE model which involves building a portfolio with a string of companies that relate to each other in a multitude of ways.” Wellie then, this could be the matrix of something useful. Just like Denmark has been doodling around, designing the best way to use up resources efficiently between companies and making recycling doable by designing it into the product to begin with, Private Equity might be in a good position to redeem itself. Not by their old mindset of “How can we continue to externalize our costs and write off losses and use financial leverage to do it all?” But instead, “How can we continue to function as constructive modern industrial players by coordinating all of our companies to streamline the highest efficiency, good science, environmental cleanup and recycling?” This can only apply to industries which are not social utilities; it won’t work on health care because it will always be odious and criminal to profit from things like disease and deprivation. That’s why it is so absurd and shameful for PE to even attempt to make its profits in health care. Let them keep their intricate “string of companies” and coordinate them into environmentally clean and efficient enterprises. But prevent them from preying on society.
Republicans mewl a bit about anti-trust as well, usually at their enemies. I’m not sure how serious they really are, but I could see the desire to reduce corporate power persist beyond a Biden administration. At least something is happening to change the approach. If nothing else, Kanter is slowly steering the bureaucracy in a new direction. Maybe losses pile up early, but something is learned or something truly damaging from a PR point (if not from a legal point) comes out in a case that gooses Congress to take action.
If you want to root out a cockroach, shine a very bright light on it. If nothing else, it sounds like that’s starting to happen. Private Equity and Hedge Funds are some pretty big cockroaches.
Great write up on this issue—clear and tight and up your alley. Thanks
‘Taibbi in his book The Divide has an illustrative narrative of how those Jerks at Bear with their astute Legal Whores sidestepped any semblance of Justice and walked away rewarded even.
Made me want to puke because it happens and happens and happens.
Sobering to realize how ‘Formulaic’ it is.
Formulaic like so many PE plays have become.
With Results that are Formulaic too.
And We The People got nothing to push back with after all this time?
Nothing that says—“Y’all got twisted Morals and distorted Values that are not making the world a better place—so you can’t do that”.
DoJ maybe needs a Populist—as in Ross Perot—PR department. Simple, and with charts that throw lots of Shade without overstepping.
And lots of names the ride the legal line of Libel. Some Legal Eagle would find that rewarding I bet.
IMO, this is same rubbish clotting the road to any Radical Conservation abetting our way, way bigger Problem—the Terminal One.
And it’s time for zealous practice clearing Rubbish out of the way.
The major failing is the complicity of institutions: public regulators, academia, and especially the judiciary to put up with it all. All are ideologically captured, by a moral code which glorifies general rapine.