Looking to Türkiye For Clues About What’s Coming in Western Asia

Reuters recently ran quite the splashy headline. “Türkiye’s gas shift threatens Russia and Iran’s last big European market,” it read. That sounds like big news. It was a letdown by the end of the lede:

Türkiye could meet more than half of its gas needs by the end of 2028 by ramping up production and increasing U.S. imports, in a shift that threatens to shrink the last major European market for Russian and Iranian suppliers.

Why would Türkiye do such a thing? Because, according to Reuters, Trump told them to, and it would somehow “strengthen Türkiye’s energy security” by relying more on LNG.

The US has been pressuring Ankara for years dating back even before the war in Ukraine to cut energy ties with Russia. It hasn’t happened yet, and there’s no reason to believe it is going to anytime soon.

Türkiye has been increasing LNG imports, as well as bringing in oil and gas via pipelines from Azerbaijan and Iraq, and it has plans for more as it works to become an energy hub, but that will include Russian energy—which makes up more than 40 percent of Türkiye’s natural gas imports— for the foreseeable future.

Türkiye’s state energy company, BOTAS, did sign a 20-year U.S. LNG supply agreement with Mercuria in September, but it’s for a total 70 billion cubic meters (bcm) over that period, far from the earth-shattering deal it’s being made out to be.

Perhaps this is all the American supremacists at so-called think tanks like the Atlantic Council wanted as they have gone from issuing warnings to Türkiye on the issue (“Türkiye can become an energy hub—but not by going all-in on Russian gas”– Dec. 2022) to simply pretending their orders are being obeyed (“How energy and trade are redefining US–Türkiye regional cooperation” – Oct. 2025). Meanwhile, the reality of the situation has changed little.

A more sober analysis of the situation is offered by InstituDE. Here are some key points:

• Domestic gas production currently covers only 4% of consumption, necessitating continued reliance on imports.
• Russian gas accounted for 39.5 percent of Türkiye’s total gas imports in 2022, 42.27 percent in 2023, and 41.3 percent in 2024.
• Türkiye’s own energy demand continues to grow steadily, driven by industrial expansion, power generation, and projected increases in vehicle use.
• Türkiye’s energy hub project remains more of a political narrative than a commercial reality. A more realistic path lies in improving domestic energy resilience: diversifying supply sources, expanding LNG capacity, and increasing storage.

As the following charts show, an LNG deal for 4 bcm per year isn’t going to change much. Unless Türkiye wants to derail its industrial growth and wider economy at a time it can least afford it.

If one wants to get imaginative, it could help soften the blow of a loss of the 14 percent of imports that Türkiye currently receives from Iran. Should that go offline for some reason…can we think of one? So while a cut off of Russian gas is a dead end for now, perhaps to Türkiye’s southeast is the direction we should be looking.

Trump-Erdogan Nothingburger?

Did anything else come out of the Erdogan-Trump meeting on September 25?

Perhaps the biggest immediate news was made by a reporter. Remarks by Hüseyin Günay, NTV’s Washington correspondent, were captured by an Associated Press camera outside the White House and caused quite the stir online in Türkiye.

In the clip Gunay says Türkiye got nothing from the meeting. He focuses, like most of the media, on the F-35s, saying that they were “talked about but conditional” that Türkiye stop buying Russian gas and slashing trade with China. (Türkiye was removed from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in 2019 over its purchase of a Russian air defense system.)

Yet the focus on the F-35 obscures give-and-take in other areas, as well as ongoing US-Türkiye cooperation in the Caucasus, Iran, and with Israel.

Any common goals aside, Washington has Erdogan over the barrel somewhat due to the state of the Turkish economy, which has been in crisis for years now. Here’s political economist Umit Akcay with a comparison to Argentina, which is getting bailed out by the US:

Between 2021 and 2023, Ankara pursued a unorthodox monetary experiment that cut interest rates despite soaring inflation and was backed by parts of business groups. The policy bought short-term growth and helped the government win elections. But like Argentina, Türkiye’s experiment collapsed under the weight of inflation and depleted reserves. Since 2023, Ankara has returned to orthodoxy under Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek.

Both Argentina and Türkiye show how class coalitions can briefly expand policy space, but without structural transformation these tactical gains evaporate. In both cases, dependency on volatile capital flows and the dollar system has forced governments back into orthodoxy and deeper external subordination. Looking into Argentina’s mirror, Türkiye and the wider Global South can see their own reflection. Stability under dependent financialization is never permanent. It is at best the postponement of the next crisis, achieved at the cost of deeper social hardship and renewed dependency.

Back to the Trump-Erdogan meeting. Other developments have taken shape since the sit down that show Türkiye and the US (and Israel) largely on the same page in the Caucasus and potentially against Iran. Both aim to get something out of this cooperation. Are they likely to be successful? Depends on who you ask. But it’s too soon to say the meeting (allegedly paid for by Erdogan’s command that Turkish Airlines buy up to 225 Boeing aircraft) was for naught.

On October 1, Türkiye announced it was freezing the assets of dozens of individuals and entities tied to Iran’s uranium enrichment and nuclear activities, moving in lockstep with the renewed US-led West’s pressure campaign targeting Tehran.

The move received sharp criticism in Iran. Iran’s Foreign Ministry has so far remained silent, and while many of the listed entities are not active in Türkiye, some Iranian experts warn the move is likely to hurt trust and trade between the two neighbors, particularly in energy and finance.

On the same day Türkiye announced it was joining the sanctions campaign against Tehran, Bloomberg broke the news that Ankara and Washington are nearing a settlement in the case against Turkish state lender Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS. Halk Bank was indicted in 2019 for allegedly participating in a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade sanctions on Iran, and it faced US charges of fraud, money laundering and sanctions violations.

As Bloomberg reports, “A resolution to Halkbank’s nearly decade-long saga would mark a significant boost to US-Türkiye relations.” The bank is expected to get off with a cost-of-doing-business fine, which would allow it to avoid a longer legal battle that could’ve meant heavy financial damage, as well as losing access to the US financial system.

Bloomberg also reports that Türkiye is in talks with the US over developing its vast rare earth reserves in central Anatolia. Türkiye and China signed a memorandum of understanding on the same project two years ago, but talks hit a dead end over Beijing’s insistence on refining in China, and a refusal on technology transfer.  We’ll see if those with Washington go any further. There are certainly some items in the news that would provide all the incentive necessary.

And at a meeting of Trump and Arab and Muslim nation leaders on the sidelines of the UN there was Erdogan sitting right-hand man to Donald. It seemed fitting as the US was putting a bow on the genocide in Gaza.

Türkiye, with extra effort to conceal its actions, continued shipping Azerbaijani oil to Israel to fuel its genocide of Palestinians right up until the latest “ceasefire.”

Türkiye was also pressuring Hamas to accept Trump’s deal that would see Hamas expelled from Gaza and the strip—and its offshore gas—exploited by international investors. As we have argued here at NC, despite mainstream and other coverage of a potential battle between Greater Israel and Greater Türkiye, that day that may well come is a long way off. For now, the two remain on parallel tracks leading to Tehran.

Turkish intelligence (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı or MIT), Mossad, and CIA are tight, and these “kinds of people who feel most at home on the dark side of a one-way mirror” are largely running the show these days. We got another reminder of MIT’s closeness to the Israeli and Americans in details of the Gaza ceasefire:

Gershon Baskin notes how Türkiye’s spy chief @ibrahimKALIN helped get Hamas over the finish line. https://t.co/6inAFPZl3y pic.twitter.com/2ZesqQvDxl

— Amberin Zaman (@amberinzaman) October 10, 2025

Türkiye will continue to play a central role in the Zionist plans for Gaza. As a recent cooperation deal between Turkiye and UNRWA shows Türkiye is being prepped to accept Palestinians from Gaza. Here’s The Cradle:

Trump and Netanyahu are preparing for every outcome. They seem to have chosen Turkiye to provide Hamas with an exit route – and Erdogan appears to have accepted this task as part of his recent White House dealings.

Back in February 2025, Erdogan declared, “The proposals put forward by the new American administration regarding Gaza with the pressure of the Zionist lobby have nothing worth considering or discussing from our perspective.”

That stance now seems to have changed after his Washington visit.

What changed it? In a transactional relationship, that part of the story remains unclear.

What Does Washington Have to Offer?

There are plenty of possibilities:

• Sanctions relief. Perhaps moreso than readmission to the F-35 program, Türkiye is eager to get out from under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) that were applied in 2020 following Ankara’s acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system in 2019. The sanctions slow particular imports like semiconductors and microchips, hurting hurt the country’s defense industry ambitions, which include its own air defense project and domestically-produced fighter jets.
• Ankara is looking for access to the EU’s new $170 billion defense fund. Some EU officials are also talking about how they need Türkiye’s help to “rearm.”
• Help advance Turkish objectives in Syria.
• Spoils from the imagined conquest of Iran. CIA and MIT spooks have no doubt exchanged notes.
• Türkiye reportedly wants a role in post-war Gaza. Was that promised? Would it be worth the paper it was written on?
• Lastly, assuming Türkiye gained nothing ignores the big gift Türkiye received prior to the meeting. Ankara stands to be among the bigger winners in the TRIPP scheme. (Note: it stands to win in the CIA-MIT vision, not necessarily in reality).

What is that vision? Let’s look at what we know and offer a few educated guesses based on past behavior.

Türkiye and Iran battle for influence in the Caucasus, the Levant, and Central Asia. With TRIPP in the Caucasus and the fall of Assad in Syria, Ankara sees itself as ascendant and aims to complete the trifecta by weakening Iran’s reach in Central Asia while expanding its own.

TRIPP can play a minor role there, but Iran remains in the way of Turkish nationalist—and American supremacist— dreams. From Amwaj:

Ankara wants Central Asian states to be less dependent on Russia and China and more deeply tied to Türkiye and Azerbaijan. “They want them to be independent actors insomuch as it strengthens their sovereignty and territorial integrity, so that they can work more effectively with the Turkish government in promoting Türkiye’s interests in that region,” said [Bruce Pannier, a Turan Research Center fellow and board member of the Washington-based Caspian Policy Center].

In contrast, Iran aligns with China and Russia in seeking to limit western influence in Central Asia. Tehran sees NATO member Türkiye’s growing presence as a proxy for American power, stoking fears of geopolitical encroachment. The Donald Trump administration’s quest to draw Central Asian countries into the Abraham Accords have exacerbated such anxieties.

And not just in Iran. Here’s a concerned Russian perspective on the growing bond between countries in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

For now Türkiye manages tensions and works with Iran on issues like energy and trade routes. Both are struggling to  maintain and enhance their relevance to the rapidly shifting Eurasian geopolitical developments as China, Russia and India play the principle roles with the West looking to crash the party and burn the joint to the ground if they don’t get to play emcee.

Both would like to ascend to the same level of the big Eurasian players. The Central Asian states, meanwhile, look to play balancing acts with all sides while remaining on good terms with Iran to make sure they have access to the Gulf and Indian Ocean. 

But as the above-linked Russian piece on the OTS shows, there is a fear that the ultimate aim of the organization is to create an EU-like structure to more successfully balance the states against the major Eurasian players. Figures at the helm of the OTS are known for dreaming big:

Here is a closer look at that map:

Why not slice off a little more of a balkanized Iran in order to ensure the Turkic states are connected by land? This map might seem, how shall we say, far fetched? But it is a very real long-term goal among a powerful group of Turkish expansionists.

Lighting the Fuse

If we view TRIPP and developments in Syria and Iraq as part of a wider preparation for some form of conflict with Iran, we see more pieces sliding into place.

What do we have happening on the Western side of Iran?

In Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the government under Al Qaeda statesman Ahmad al-Sharaa recently came to a ceasefire, and the SDF now says integration into Al Qaeda state military is “imminent.” Israel and Syria are moving toward a “security agreement” that could that would bring Damascus into the Gulf-American alliance. Already Israel, probably via an  agreement with al-Sharaa, occupies parts of southern Syria, but in any agreement it wants an air corridor to the Syria-Iraq border.

This means the US-Israel, which has backed the SDF, is reportedly advancing the so-called “David’s Corridor”:

From the Zangezur to David’s Corridor: The Silent Redrawing of Global Trade and the Road to War with Iran

In the shifting chessboard of global geopolitics, few developments are as consequential and as underreported as the emergence of two corridors: the Zangezur Corridor and… pic.twitter.com/EY8JfSA9f8

— Ibrahim Majed (@ibrahimtmajed) July 25, 2025

Why is this so important? Strikes on Iran, as evidenced by the 12-Day War, are not going to work, and will only do more damage to Israel. The only feasible way for a successful regime collapse in Tehran would be “boots on the ground” with Takfiri boots in place of any US-led coalition of the willing.

Iran’s intelligence minister recently revealed that during the 12-Day War, the US-Israel sought to destabilize the country by inciting Daesh terrorists and other Takfiri groups in Syria and sending them toward Iran to carry out assassinations, sabotage, and other acts of terror. It didn’t work, and the next time, the element of surprise will be gone, but that is no guarantee that it won’t be tried again—potentially in larger numbers. Iran is not Syria, however, and most reports are that the 12-Day War only increased support of the government. The US-Israel look to be betting that ongoing AI influence campaigns in Iran can change that.

The exact number of takfiri fighters in and around Syria is unclear. Some estimates say that in Syria and Türkiye it could be in the millions ready to pour into Lebanon, Iraq, and/or Iran. Reports have recently noted a buildup near the Syria-Lebanon border. And let’s not forget the Kurdish forces who are likely being prepped to move against Iran-backed groups in Iraq. Ankara, for its part, denied allegations of Mossad infiltration of Iran through its border (it made no mention of other fighters).

Should Iraq become a battleground, it could very well spill over into Iran. According to reports, Iran’s borders stretching from northern Iraq to the Caspian Sea are very porous,

Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, reacted to the recent Gaza ceasefire agreement, suggesting that the developments could signal conflicts about to be ramped up elsewhere:

“The beginning of the ceasefire in Gaza may be behind the scenes of the end of the ceasefire elsewhere,” he wrote on X on Thursday using the hashtags #Iraq, #Yemen, and #Lebanon.

Add it all up, and what do we have? Something along the following lines looks like a decent bet:

To Sunni brothers and sisters

Soon there will be a “Sunni Shia” war

Syrian regime with Erdogan and Netanyahu backing will attack #Iraq, (and help of others)

Remember this is not a “Sunni Shia” war, it is a Zionist fitna against all of us, but the resistance in Iraq is…

— Soureh 🇮🇷🇵🇸 (@Soureh_design2) July 10, 2025