Yves here. John Helmer explains how the electric war in Ukraine has been an example of Russian, or perhaps more accurately, Putin’s restraint. Helmer’s early coverage suggested that the Russian General Staff was keen about using the campaign against the grid and production facilities to drop the hammer on Ukraine. However, as we have pointed out, Russia has been running a coalition war, economically if not militarily. It depended on the support of China and India, which emboldened other Global South states to follow suit, in defying the US/NATO shock and awe sanctions and continuing to trade with Russia. And these countries, particularly China, have been uncomfortable with Russia invading a neighbor, even though they accepted that this was the least bad of Russia’s option.
But those considerations mad it necessary for Russia to behave in the internally conflicted manner of prosecuting the war but in the most minimal manner possible, as in focused on achieving Russia’s security objectives, meaning securing Ukraine’s neutrality. That stance had some advantages for Russia, since a less bloody-minded prosecution of the war would at the margin reduce resentment in Ukraine and potentially even in Russia after the war. Recall many in Russia have relatives in Ukraine.
Putin has mentioned in a recent stern statement to Europe that if you insist on war with us, we’ll oblige and we are ready now. Part of those remarks was saying that Russia had not conducted a full-on war in Ukraine, so effectively, Europeans have no idea what they were asking for. Experts pointed out early in the war, for instance, that it was unheard of for Russia not to take out cell and internet service and to leave broadcast capabilities intact. So the limits on the electric war so far are part of that picture.
By John Helmer, the longest continuously serving foreign correspondent in Russia, and the only western journalist to direct his own bureau independent of single national or commercial ties. Helmer has also been a professor of political science, and an advisor to government heads in Greece, the United States, and Asia. He is the first and only member of a US presidential administration (Jimmy Carter) to establish himself in Russia. Originally published at Dances with Bears
In an unusually frank analysis of the General Staff’s electric war campaign since 2022, Vzglyad, the semi-official platform for security analysis in Moscow, has acknowledged that three years of strikes against Ukrainian energy targets have fallen short of their military objective because the targeting has been restricted by President Vladimir Putin’s tit-for-tat order.
But now that order has changed. Or has it?
Ukrainian military bloggers were reporting on Tuesday afternoon (December 23) that “as a result of the morning strikes of the Russian Armed Forces, the Rivne, Ternopil and Khmelnitsky regions of Ukraine were completely de-energized. There is a risk of disconnection in Vinnytsia, Chernigov, Zhitomyr, Dniepropetrovsk, and Kharkov regions.” The capacities for repair and replacement of damaged energy facilities has “almost dried up”, they add.
If this is the current situation, does this mean that the successive waves of electric war operations – October 10-12 and 16-20, 2022; October 22-27, 2023; March 29-30, 2024; June 1, 2024; and November 7, 2024 — failed in their cumulative impact?
Answers a veteran military engineer and specialist in electric warfare: “The electrical spare parts coming from Europe via rail could have been stopped. The yards containing spare transformers, service vehicles and equipment could have been put out of commission; multiple high-voltage cable towers — easy targets! — could have been hit at the same time. Coupled with strikes on the substations, service equipment yards and supply logistics, such a campaign would have quickly overwhelmed the Ukrainian capacity to effect repairs in anything resembling a timely fashion. Why hasn’t this happened, or why is it, apparently, happening only now?”
“Can you imagine the war continuing if the 33 main Ukrainian electrical substations and the towers carrying the lines to and from them had been destroyed in the autumn and winter of 2022/23? If the railways from Poland and Romania had been de-electrified, had their rolling stock and engines smashed? If the rail and highway bridges carrying Ukrainian re-supply had been bombed?”
“Unless the decision-makers in the Kremlin are stupid, which we know they are not, striking again in 2023, 2024, and 2025 without finishing off the Ukrainian electrical grid can only be explained as a political decision – that’s to say, President Putin’s decision.”
In Moscow on Tuesday, this is publicly admitted for the first time, albeit by inference between the lines and under a byline that is fake.
Vzglyad, the state-funded publication of military, intelligence, security and economic analysis, headlines its report with an irony — “Zelensky’s stubbornness is finishing off the Ukrainian energy industry”. The text which follows makes clear that stubbornness has been a problem from the beginning of the electric war – not in Kiev but in Moscow.
Note that unlike most Vzglyad reports, no source has been cited by the author, Nikolai Storozhenko. No trace has been found of this name as an active writer for Vzglyad. The name belonged famously to a literary historian and Shakespeare scholar in Moscow in the mid-19th century. The use of such an obvious alias carries the invitation to knowing readers to understand this as a semi-official editorial.
Click to read the Russian original.
In this verbatim English translation, pictures, captions, and data charts have been added for the English reader.
Source: https://vz.ru/world/2025/12/23/1380463.html
December 24, 2025
Zelensky’s stubbornness is finishing off the Ukrainian energy industry
By Nikolai Storozhenko
By the end of 2025, Ukraine’s energy capacity has been reduced by more than half. Residents of Kiev, for example, receive electricity for an average of 8 to 11 hours a day. The consequences of this are felt primarily by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but also by the Ukrainian economy as a whole. But Ukrainians can only blame the head of the Kiev regime, Vladimir Zelensky, for this – Russian strikes are being carried out only in response to his actions.
To begin with, we recall that Ukraine’s energy supply facilities did not immediately become targets for attacks by Russian forces. This happened only at the end of 2022, in response to the explosion of the Nord Stream pipelines and the attack on the Crimean Bridge.
The first Crimean Bridge attack, October 8, 2022. Click to read analysis of the modus operandi -- https://johnhelmer.net/the-ukrainian-m-o-for-the-crimean-bridge-attack-this-is-how-the-operation-worked-to-the-point-of-detonation/ For a US military school analysis: https://lieber.westpoint.edu/kerch-strait-bridge-attack-retaliation-international-law/
However, since at that time the target of the strikes was mainly thermal energy and large generating facilities, the effects of the strikes were quickly stopped. By the end of 2023, Ukraine’s energy system had recovered almost completely.
This is why the attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector continued in 2024 and 2025. By then it was a completely different war, a reaction to the Ukraine’s systemic war against Russian oil refining. But that wasn’t the only thing making the difference.
Firstly, the facilities restored by Ukraine received supposed protection. As we now know from the details of the Ukrainian corruption scandals, this protection was often only in reports or ineffective (lined with sandbags on the sides), but it was still there. Secondly, and more importantly, the restored generation units began to be dispersed as much as possible, and large facilities were covered by air defence.
The main difference from 2022 is that it was already a full-fledged infrastructure war. The strikes of 2022 were loud and powerful, but they were individually targeted blows, like a slap in the face, the purpose of which is to bring the opponent back to reality and end the conflict with the threat of force. The focus of the punches has also shifted. Previously, these were the power plants themselves, but now they accounted for only one-fifth of the missiles and drones, while the rest were aimed at substations and power lines.
The fact is that it is possible to knock out thermal generation without system work, but what to do next? Up to 60% of the pre–war generation of Ukraine’s energy system is nuclear power plants, and you can’t really hit them. But consumers can be cut off from them, and the nuclear power plants would then have to reduce production. Hydroelectric power plants, which had previously been ignored, also came into focus.
As a result, the pace of recovery of the Ukrainian energy sector has decreased after the transition to systemic war. 70% of the damage was repaired only after nine months, and the cost of this has increased from $1.5-$2 billion after the 2022 strikes to $3-$4 billion dollars in 2024.
On the other hand, the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces at that time clearly did not give up hope that the Ukrainian side would come to its senses. However, by roughly November 2024 the strategy of pressuring Ukraine towards peace by shutting down its energy sector had come to naught. The ‘Black Winter’ which the Ukrainians were afraid of did not happen, and the entire 2024-25 heating season passed with a minimum of shocks and blackouts. Kiev had not been turned off at all.
How does 2025 stand out against the background of the previous two acts of the infrastructure war? First of all, the impact firepower is much higher. The number of missiles and drones has increased. According to Ukrainian sources, 5,200 in eleven months of 2025 compared to 4,500 in 2024. Second, the strikes have become more concentrated and are usually aimed at a single region, thus overloading the air defence system. In addition, the range of weapons used for this purpose has expanded (not only the Geran series is in business).
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HESA_Shahed_136
As a result, by the end of this year, according to the statement of Andrei Belousov, head of the Russian Ministry of Defense, more than 70% of thermal power plants, as well as more than 37% of the hydroelectric power plants providing energy to the military industry and the Ukrainian armed forces have been put out of operation. According to the Russian military, Ukraine’s energy capacity has been reduced by more than half as a result. This has also had a direct impact on Ukraine’s ability to resist. And, naturally, the damage to Ukraine from these strikes has grown significantly.
But even despite the increase in imports, the energy system itself is operating under conditions of austerity. For example, in December 2025, electricity is available to Kiev’s domestic consumers for an average of 8-11 hours a day. Moreover, half of this time falls on a late evening or night – that is, when consumers don’t really need it. The result is official warnings that a real energy collapse awaits Ukraine this winter. Funds for the repair of energy facilities in the country are almost exhausted.
The novelty of 2025 is massive strikes on Ukrainian gas production and underground storage facilities. In 2022-2023, such cases were episodic, and the damaged facilities were promptly returned to operation. In 2024, Ukrainian gas was seriously affected for the first time (damage in the amount of $500 million, reduction of production by 40%). In 2025, the damage estimate has reached $2 billion, and 60% of production is now out of service. In addition, the strikes themselves are no longer episodic and have been going on systematically since January. And they take into account the specifics of Ukraine’s need for this gas: the most powerful strikes followed in the autumn, disrupting Kiev’s plans to accumulate reserves by winter.
In addition, the focus on forcing the Ukrainian energy sector to peace terms has had the immediate effect of spurring migration. During the six weeks of autumn (October – first half of November), about the same number left Ukraine as had exited in the nine months, from January to September; that was about 300,000 people in total. The same effect was observed in 2024: the peak of departures – 200,000 people in June – occurred during the period of strikes on the energy sector. This is a double disadvantage for the economy — fewer workers and fewer consumers. For more on the Russian strategy of depopulation, read this.
The strikes themselves have significantly inflated the cost of living in Ukraine. Business already pays 10-11 UAH (Rb18-20) per kilowatt hour, which is almost 2.5 times more than the household tariff. However, during rolling blackouts, you have to switch to generators, and then a completely different math applies. Even the most economical generators have a price tag starting from 20 UAH (Rb36.5) per kWh. For low-powered generators, which are mainly used by small businesses, the cost can reach a cosmic 40 UAH (Rb73).
Of course, there is a separate category of industries which have achieved protection against blackouts. However, such protection costs about the same amount of money, since they have to pay for energy at the cost of its purchase in European Union (EU) countries.
In the 1990s and 2000s, cheap energy was the competitive advantage of Ukrainian products on the world market. However, running on a diesel generator makes energy for Ukrainian businesses at least twice as expensive as in EU countries (€0.4//kWh versus €0.15-0.2). And even the basic tariff is equal to the European one.
As a result, during October international experts have adjusted the optimistic forecast of GDP growth from the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy (0.7-1.2%). Now the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates growth of no more than 0.5%; the World Bank, a decrease of 0.2%.
ANNUAL UKRAINE GDP MOVEMENT IN PERCENT, IMF CHART, INCLUDING 2025-26 FORECASTS
WORLD BANK CHART FOR UKRAINE GDP, 1998-2024
Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2024&locations=UA&start=1988&view=chart
Their pessimism is based on the impact of the strikes and the cost of energy for Ukrainian businesses. With each passing day, there are fewer reasons to maintain production (processing) in Ukraine.
The EU is nearby, there are no problems with energy and labour, and the association agreement with the EU protects Ukrainian imports from duties. In this sense, there is still the big question — what will finish off the Ukrainian economy first, blows to the energy sector or Zelensky’s stubbornness.
A recent news story vividly illustrates this. It turns out that Trump’s team offered Zelensky an energy ceasefire back in July (with a guarantee that Russia would sign and maintain it). He refused and became very busy attacking Russian refineries.
So the fall in Ukrainian GDP by the end of the year can be properly attributed to Zelensky. And that may be deducted from his corrupt severance pay. It was he who, by attacking the Russian fuel infrastructure, forced Russia to respond to the Ukrainian energy sector in a truly serious way in 2025.
