Yves here. I must confess to not being up on the fine points of EU energy policy, so feel free to correct me if my assumptions are wrong. However, this article seems to exhibit considerable cognitive capture or self censorship. It talks at best obliquely about the days of yore when gas was cheap because it came from Russia. The authors act as if having a major supplier put Europe in a vulnerable position when Russia made clear again and again it would honor its contracts. The only kinda-sorta exception resulted from a gas turbine having been impermissibly repaired in the Banderite stronghold of Canada, and Russia not getting documentation as to the repairs (upon reflection, it occurs to me that the risks included the possibility that the globe-trotting device could have served to introduce a Stuxnet-type virus). And of course, the apparently unsolvable mystery of who blew up the Nordstream pipeline.
In addition, it neglects to mention that Gazprom had complex contacts with most EU states which resulted in quasi set prices so that it would have more certainty over revenues, which would allow for better planning of investment and expenditures. The article weirdly does not emphasize that central issue (it does mention it but almost in passing), that the EU’s current fix is due to having to buy LNG at spot prices when most LNG buyers similarly contract under long-term, more-or-less fixed price arrangements.
Finally, it blathers on about the need for renewables. Again while generally true, Europe is poorly situated for solar and wind is also not reliable. The base load solutions are nuclear or fossil fuels. Pick your poison.
By Marzia Sesini, Research Team Leader – Molecules&Materials, European University Institute and James Kneebone, Doctoral Researcher (D-MTEC), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. Originally published at The Conversation
Gas prices in Europe have risen again following disruptions to LNG supply chains linked to tensions in the Middle East.
This comes as the European Union enters the final phase of its plan to phase out Russian gas. The scale of the physical disruption is limited when compared with the loss of Russian pipeline flows in 2021 and 2022, yet the price response has been disproportionately large.
This contrast points to a change in how risk is transmitted in the European gas system. In moving away from Russian gas, the EU has reduced exposure to physical supply interruption, but it has not removed exposure to price shocks.
The disruption of Russian gas supplies in 2021 and 2022 exposed risks associated with dependence on a single supplier and on inflexible pipeline infrastructure.
The EU response set out first in the REPowerEU Plan and then developed further in the 2025 roadmap, rests on two pillars: lower gas demand and supply diversification – principally through pivoting toward LNG. This has strengthened the resilience of physical gas supply, but arguably left the EU more exposed to price volatility in global markets.
Russian gas imports declined sharply after the 2022 energy crisis, with Russia’s share of EU gas demand falling from 39% in 2021 to 12% in 2023. In 2024, the EU still imported around 52 billion cubic metres of Russian gas, which reflects both the scale of the transformation and the difficulty of fully eliminating such a large supplier. As a result, the framework for completing the phaseout has become more stringent, with a binding phased prohibition on imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG by November 2027.
The Commission’s updated implementation guidance, issued after the 2026 Middle East disruption, also clarifies that the phaseout now has to be managed under conditions of tight LNG supply and intensified competition for cargoes.
This point matters because the present system differs from the one that existed before 2022. Less than 10% of EU gas supply is linked to flows through the Strait of Hormuz, yet TTF prices have risen to around €60/MWh, more than double pre-crisis levels. By contrast, the Russian energy crisis involved the loss or threatened loss of around 45% of EU consumption, but average prices between the period spanning October 1 2021 – October 31 2023 were around €90/MWh, roughly triple pre-crisis levels. The difference suggests that price responses are not proportional to the scale of physical disruption.
What’s the Outlook for EU Energy Independence?
It remains to be seen whether the Middle East crisis will be as extreme or as long as the Russian energy crisis, but this simple comparison suggests that in a global LNG market, relatively modest supply risks can produce large price effects even when aggregate supply remains sufficient. In this sense, diversification has reduced bilateral dependence and risks of acute physical disruptions without eliminating price exposure.
EU Issues Simplified Gas Rules Ahead of the Russian Ban
The Commission’s March 2026 guidance on implementing REPowerEU reflects this shift. It advises Member States to minimise administrative barriers to non-Russian LNG imports and accelerate authorisation procedures to avoid worsening price pressures in a period of tight supply. The same document acknowledges that the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has created significant shortages on the world LNG market and intense competition for cargoes. Those adjustments do not change the direction of the Russian phaseout. They show, rather, that even in a more diversified system, disruptions continue to be felt through prices instead of physical shortfall.
The timing of the current disruption is also relevant. The EU is entering its annual storage filling season, with storage levels currently at five-year lows and operators required to reach 90% capacity ahead of winter.
These obligations increase demand for spot cargoes (on-demand shipping) and strengthen the bargaining position of global suppliers. This does not imply a risk of physical shortage, but it will likely amplify price effects.
On March 26, EU lawmakers approved the EU-US trade Turnberry trade deal while attaching a set of conditions to the agreement, after previously deeming it “unbalanced.” The EU’s weak bargaining position is further evident in the context of its binding trade agreement to purchase $750 billion worth of US energy by 2028.
With Middle Eastern energy supplies shown to be vulnerable to disruption, the EU is increasingly reliant on the US. In turn, the US is using this position to seek more favourable trade conditions in other sectors.
At the same time, it has pushed for changes to EU Methane Regulations and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, arguing that compliance costs will affect export competitiveness.
This places pressure on the EU to reconcile its environmental and social objectives with the price and security of its energy supply.
The phaseout of Russian gas has altered the shape rather than the existence of vulnerability in the European gas system.
Exposure to a single supplier has been reduced, and the resilience of physical supply has improved. At the same time, reliance on global LNG markets has left the EU exposed to concentrated supply, transport disruptions, and market speculation.
Renewables to Power EU Independence
The central question is no longer only how to replace Russian gas, but how a system increasingly organised around global LNG markets transmits shocks into European prices and, through them, into industrial competitiveness, inflation, and the wider economy.
At the heart of the original REPowerEU plan was the long-term mission to transform Europe’s energy system to one based on clean, competitive, and secure local renewables.
Four years later, the 2026 Middle East energy crisis has only strengthened the case for the legitimacy and urgency of this pathway.
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The cognitive dissonance so obvious in this “analysis” can be explained noticing that this comes from a academic outlet which is part of the European Union institutional constructs since 1976 (or so). This is more political than academic. “The central question is no longer how to replace Russian gas” etc.
It bothers me that after the attacks in NG installations in Iran and Qatar and Hormuz strait closure she is talking about “modest supply risks”. This is a major event with Middle East supplying much or world’s LNG. Iran 4th producer and Qatar 5th in 2024 (total NG,not only LNG).
Sesini also fails to acknowledge the newly built dependence on a single supplier: the US.
How stoopid and expensive is to decouple from Russia which is precisely the reason Europe is now more vulnerable to NG price shocks than before 2021 because we voluntarily remove a major (and cheaper) supplier. It is possible to argue that the EU, contrary to its declared objectives, is making sure its citizens are now more vulnerable to NG price shocks. The union that makes us weaker?
US also has history of suspending fossil fuel exports when domestic inflation becomes an issue. I’m not going to be surprised if US stops exporting LNG when economy looks bad before November (which will almost definitely happen.)
If you asked me I would say that almost certainly Russia was more reliable than the US as a NG supplier (and cheaper besides). Because stuff, like what you wrote, happens.
Our dear EU-misleaders are so hapless and/or systematically evil that they wouldn’t be able to sell themselves a bottle of water at midday in the desert. They can screw up anything. And do.
While RePowerEU was a direct response to the Ukraine war, the general EU policy to diversify gas supplies had been in place for more than a decade, in particular the aim to expand LNG capacity as a balance to pipeline gas. Long before the war, it had been realised that a combination of pipeline vulnerability and the long term decline of gas from the North Sea was a strategic threat. The problem had been that nobody wanted to invest in LNG terminals for ‘strategic’ reasons when pipeline gas was cheaper. The other long term issue is that industry (manufacturing and electricity generation) has long favoured natural gas as a fuel as it requires significantly less up front capital investment (for the most part). This led to the infamous 1990’s ‘dash for gas’ which is the core of many current problems. It appeared to be a relatively cheap and easy way to address the aging stock of coal and nuclear plants that had dominated European electricity and energy. The failure of frack gas in Europe was also a confounding issue (its forgotten now, but there had been very high hopes in Eastern Europe for the exploitation of Polish shale beds – but geology had other ideas).
For all the doom mongering, the EU’s focus on renewables has by any objective measure been a spectacular success (compared to the many forecasts from the first decade or so of the century and in comparison to other major blocks). It is now a larger contributor to electricity generation in the EU than fossil fuels or nuclear, and is still growing at an exceptionally high pace and the electrification of a range of other uses is rising rapidly (now around 22% compared to 18% a decade ago). The core issue is that a transition at this scale takes decades, and the worlds energy situation is changing much faster than this. Add to this the rapid run-down of older coal and nuclear plant and there was always going to be deep problems, even before the wars. Its little or nothing to do with baseline load (which is, a questionable concept for modern grids). Its simply a matter of reconciling existing grids and infrastructure and non-electric power uses with the reality of a constantly shifting economic and political context. Trying to impose a consistent policy over the vast array of national and regional policies within Europe is always going to be exceptionally difficult. Unfortunately, gas has for several decades been promoted as the ‘easy’ answer to difficult questions and Europe, along with many other countries and regions, are finding this out the hard way.