Category Archives: Credit markets

State Officials Starting to Question Securitization Fail, Whether States Should Tax RMBS

This letter (hat tip Daniel Pennell) by Virginia delegate Bob Marshall is another indicator that mortgage backed securitization issues are not going away any time soon. Notice that the questions are sophisticated and show familiarity with recent litigation.

And look at question 10. I’ve been wondering when cash strapped states might look to the apparent failure of mortgage securitizations to adhere to REMIC rules as a possible trigger for tax assessments.

How Chase Ruined Lives of People Who Paid Off Their Mortgages

Matt Taibbi, in giving a well deserved thrashing to the banking industry’s Tokyo Rose, aka New York Fed director Kathryn Wylde, said:

[S]tealing is pretty much the worst thing that a bank can do — and these banks just finished the longest and most orgiastic campaign of stealing in the history of money.

Once you read the allegations in the cases included in this post, I strongly suspect you will agree that the “ruining lives” in the headline is not an exaggeration. And as important, these two cases, with very similar fact sets, also suggest that these abuses are not mere “mistakes”. These are clearly well established practices that Chase can’t be bothered to clean up, since cleaning them up costs money and letting them continue is more profitable.

On the Buffett Purchase of BofA Preferred

Bank of America’s stock is now up 11.6% on the leak that the Charlotte bank is selling $5 billion of 6% cumulative perpetual preferred and in the money warrants ($7.14 strike price), again $5 billion in total

This is an admission of weakness, not strength. Bank of America had maintained it didn’t need equity as recently as yesterday and of course before that too, then does a sweetheart deal to build confidence (FT Alphaville has a nice summary of the terms, hat tip Richard Smith).

Bombshell Admission of Failed Securitization Process in American Home Mortgage Servicing/LPS Lawsuit

Wow, Jones Day just created a huge mess for its client and banks generally if anyone is alert enough to act on it.

The lawsuit in question is American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc. v Lender Processing Services. It hasn’t gotten all that much attention (unless you are on the LPS deathwatch beat) because to most, it looks like yet another beauty contest between Cinderella’s two ugly sisters.

Auerback/Parenteau: Jackson Hole will be a Black Hole for Those Hoping for QE3

By Marshall Auerback, a portfolio strategist, hedge fund manager, and Roosevelt Institute Fellow, and Rob Parenteau, CFA, sole proprietor of MacroStrategy Edge, editor of The Richebacher Letter, and a research associate of The Levy Economics Institute. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives

Those leading the charge for “fiscal consolidation” now seem positively shocked by the violent gyrations in the stock market, as expectations rapidly seem to be shifting toward an “L” shaped recovery or worse – a possible global recession. To those of us on this blog who have consistently downplayed the prospects of global recovery in the midst of widespread private sector AND public sector retrenchment, none of this sadly comes as a surprise. We are, as Bill Mitchell noted recently, experiencing a “self-inflicted catastrophe”, largely because of dangerously destructive myths in regard to the efficacy (or lack of it) in regard to fiscal policy. But in spite of the shrill rhetoric of the fiscal austerian brigades, the markets are beginning to intuit that a nation cannot have a fiscal contraction expansion when all other spending is flat or going backwards and yet that remains the general trajectory of policy.

More on the Opacity of Bank of America’s Financial Statements

Yesterday, I made a basic point about the financial statements of banks and other financial firms, citing Steve Waldman, who said it better than I could:

Bank capital cannot be measured. Think about that until you really get it. “Large complex financial institutions” report leverage ratios and “tier one” capital and all kinds of aromatic stuff. But those numbers are meaningless. For any large complex financial institution levered at the House-proposed limit of 15×, a reasonable confidence interval surrounding its estimate of bank capital would be greater than 100% of the reported value. In English, we cannot distinguish “well capitalized” from insolvent banks, even in good times, and regardless of their formal statements.

The illustration of Steve’s point was that investors freaked out on Monday about an estimate that Bank of America might need to raise $40 to $50 billion in equity. The idea that the market would be surprised (as in not know that and simultaneously regard that figure as plausible) says a great deal about how little confidence investors have in their knowledge of big financial firms.

Should Banks Be Public Utilities?

We discuss what the role of banks should be, given how much government support they have, on Real News Network. Enjoy!

Why is Bank of America’s Stock Cratering Yet Again? It’s the Extend and Pretend Endgame

Yesterday, the S&P 500 ended flat, yet Bank of America continued its truly impressive implosion, with its stock tanking 7.89%. It is now trading at a market cap of $65 billion, versus a book value of common equity of roughly $215 billion.

Market commentators were having so much fun discussing the meltdown that FT Alphaville even dedicated a post to the “The Bank of America Explanation Game.” This was its tally, and the post includes an explanation for each:

Satyajit Das on the Botox Economy

As much as I like Satyajit Das’ books (his new offering, Extreme Money, is just out and was reviewed favorably in the Financial Times), I wish he’d get on TV more often. His being in Sydney puts him at a bit of a disadvantage.

This clip is amusing.

Mirabile Dictu! New York Times Tells Obama Administration Off, Backs Schneiderman on Mortgage Settlement

The editorial in today’s New York Times may be a sign that the tide is turning. The elites are starting to break ranks with the mortgage industrial complex.

Gretchen Morgenson reported yesterday that the Obama Administration was pressuring the New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman to drop his opposition to the so-called 50 state attorney general mortgage settlement. The short form is the banks want a “get out of liability for almost free” card, which is patently absurd. Not only have they caused a colossal economic train wreck, but sadly, they remain such central actors that they need to be involved in remediation. Letting them off cheaply would be tantamount to putting a band-aid on gangrene.

Corrupt Obama Administration Pressuring New York Attorney General to Support Mortgage Whitewash

It is high time to describe the Obama Administration by its proper name: corrupt.

Admittedly, corruption among our elites generally and in Washington in particular has become so widespread and blatant as to fall into the “dog bites man” category. But the nauseating gap between the Administration’s propaganda and the many and varied ways it sells out average Americans on behalf of its favored backers, in this case the too big to fail banks, has become so noisome that it has become impossible to ignore the fetid smell.

The Administration has now taken to pressuring parties that are not part of the machinery reporting to the President to fall in and do his bidding. We’ve gotten so used to the US attorney general being conveniently missing in action that we have forgotten that regulators and the AG are supposed to be independent. As one correspondent noted by e-mail, “When officials allegiances are to El Supremo rather than the Constitution, you walk the path to fascism.”

Michael Hudson: The State and Local Budget Crisis

By Michael Hudson, a research professor of Economics at University of Missouri, Kansas City and a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

The cost of the 2011 cutbacks in federal spending will fall most directly on consumers and retirees by scaling back Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and social spending programs. The population also will suffer indirectly, by lower federal revenue sharing with U.S. states and cities. The following chart from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA, Table 3.3) shows how federal financial aid has helped cities shift the tax burden off real estate, although the main shift has been off property taxes onto income – and onto consumption (sales) taxes.

Chinese Banks: “These Things Aren’t Banks”

This is a terrific discussion of Chinese banking by two experts who do not mince words, Carl Walter of JP Morgan and Victor Shih of Northwestern University. Both have a great sense of history and go to some length to portray how economic and monetary arrangements for these “banks” differ from what most of us would assume. The discussion includes periodic crises and the creative means used to rescue banks, the unusually high level of financial assets for an emerging economy, the sustainability of growth, and the role of banks in the political system.

Summer Rerun: Geithner Plan Smackdown Wrap

This post first appeared on February 10, 2009

I cannot recall a major US policy initiative being met with as much immediate revulsion as the so-called Geithner plan. Even the horrific TARP, which showed utter contempt for Congress and the American public was in some ways less troubling. Paulson demanded $700 billion, nearly $200 billion bigger than the Department of Defense, via a three page draft bill, nothing more that a doodle on a napkin, save that it did bother to put the Treasury secretary above the law. But high-handedness was the hallmark of the Bush Administration; it was only the scale and audacity of the TARP that was the stunner.

And the TARP initially did have some supporters (perhaps most important, among the media, who trumpeted the “Something must be done” case). Fans are much harder to find for the latest iteration of the seemingly neverending “let’s throw more money at the banks” saga.

As we, and increasingly others, have said, the Obama economic team is every bit as captive to Wall Street’s interests as the Bushies were. The differences increasingly look stylistic, not substantive.