Category Archives: Macroeconomic policy

European summits in ivory towers

By Paul de Grauwe, Professor of international economics, University of Leuven, member of the Group of Economic Policy Analysis, advising the EU Commission President Manuel Barroso, and former member of the Belgian parliament. Cross-posted from VoxEU.

The Eurozone crisis plays on to a familiar tune. Finance ministers meet on the weekend only for markets to dismiss their efforts the following Monday. This column argues that Europe’s leaders have lost touch, that the ECB has the firepower but is not prepared to use it, and that the outcome of all this is depressingly clear: Defeat by the financial markets.

On political dysfunction in Europe

Cross-posted from Credit Writedowns Today is the big European summit. Expectations are low because European politics have become messy. At the beginning of September I wrote about European political dysfunction: Clearly, [Former ECB Chief Economist Juergen] Stark sees the monetisation path the ECB is on as not at all compatible with the ECB’s mandate. Separately, […]

Turning Japanese is a Boon

By Rumplestatskin, a professional economist with a broad range of interests and a diverse background in property development, environmental economics research and economic regulation. Cross posted from MacroBusiness.

What few seem to appreciate, either inside or outside of Japan, is just how strong the resulting Japanese recovery from 2002-2008 was. It was the longest unbroken recovery of Japan’s postwar history, and, while not as strong as pre-bubble Japanese performance, was in fact stronger than the growth in comparable economies even when fuelled by their own bubbles.

How on Earth did Japan manage that with their ageing population and zero population growth?

Marshall Auerback and Rob Parenteau: The Myth of Greek Profligacy & the Faith Based Economics of the ‘Troika’

By Marshall Auerback, a portfolio strategist and hedge fund manager, and Rob Parenteau, CFA, sole proprietor of MacroStrategy Edge and a research associate of The Levy Economics Institute

Historically, Greeks have been very good at constructing myths. The rest of the world? Not so great, if the current burst of commentary on the country is anything to go by. Reading the press, one gets the impression of a bunch of lazy Mediterranean scroungers, enjoying one of the highest standards of living in Europe while making the frugal Germans pick up the tab. This is a nonsensical propaganda. As if Greece is the only country ever to cook its books in the European Union! Rather, the heart of the problem is in the antiquated revenue system that supports that state, which results in a budget shortfall consistently about 10% of GDP. The top 20% of the income distribution in Greece pay virtually no taxes at all, the product of a corrupt bargain reached during the days of the junta between the military and Greece’s wealthiest plutocrats. No wonder there is a fiscal crisis!

So it’s not a problem of Greek profligates, or an overly generous welfare state, both of which suggest that the standard IMF style remedies being proposed here are bound to fail, as they are doing right now. In fact, given the non-stop austerity being imposed on Athens (which simply has the effect of deflating the economy further and thereby reducing the ability of the Greeks to hit the fiscal targets imposed on them), the Greeks really are getting close to the point where they may well default and shift the problem back to those imposing the austerity.

Philip Pilkington: My European Nightmare – An Infernal Hurricane Gathers?

By Philip Pilkington, a journalist and writer living in Dublin, Ireland

The infernal hurricane that never rests
Hurtles the spirits onward in its rapine;
Whirling them round, and smiting, it molests them.

– Dante, The Divine Comedy

Every now and then a terrible thought enters my mind. It runs like this: what if the theatre of the Eurocrisis is really and truly a political power-game being cynically played by politicians from the core while the periphery burns?

Yes, of course, we can engage in polemic and say that such is the case. But in doing so we are trying to stoke emotion and generally allowing our rhetorical flourish to carry the argument. At least, that is what I thought. I had heard this rhetoric; I had engaged in it to some extent myself; but I had never really believed it. Only once or twice, in my nightmares, I had thought that, maybe, just maybe, it might have some truth.

And then the Financial Times published this ‘strictly confidential’ document leaked to them from within the Eurostructure. That is when my nightmare started becoming increasingly real.

The Verboten Story of Argentina’s Post-Default Economic Success

Even notice nothing is ever said in the mainstream media about Argentina’s economy, save that it had a big default? You’d never know the following about Argentina:

Credit Revulsion in Belgium, France and Austria

Look at these charts that Win Thin has crafted on sovereign bond spreads. Yes, the periphery looks bad. But look at Belgium, Austria and France. That’s the euro zone core. As I predicted in August and reiterated most recently last week when I saw Belgium’s CDS indicating a one in four chance of default: we […]

The Data That the Economy is Not So Hot is Getting Harder to Ignore

The propagandistic exhortation that we all need to need to learn to love or at least accept the crappy economy known as “the new normal” is starting to wear a bit thin. One of the things that has allowed the punditocracy to pretend that “the new normal” really isn’t all that bad are various myths that they get investors and sometimes the broader public to believe in succession or better yet simultaneously:

Will internal devaluation work?

Edward here again. I was talking to my friend Rob Parenteau about internal devaluation. He doesn’t think it will work. His argument against it is similar to the one I have been making about the origins of this crisis. Here’s what I said. I do not believe this private sector balance sheet recession can be […]

Satyajit Das: Economic Dystopia – The “Stick Shaker Moment”

Yves here. Note I beg to differ with Das in his comments on government debt levels for countries that control their own currency. As we’ve noted, a country can always repay debts in its own currency, and the funding of federal deficits by borrowing is a political constraint and a holdover from the gold standard era. Moreover, there is a great deal of evidence that the solution implicit in that view, of cutting government spending in the aftermath of a demand-depressing, private balance sheet wrecking global financial crisis only makes matters worse. This is a case where you need to steer into the skid to get the car back on course. But this section is not core to Das’s discussion.

By Satyajit Das, the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk

Powered flight requires air to flow smoothly over the wing at a certain speed. Erratic or slow air flow can cause a plane to stall. Most modern aircraft are fitted with a “stick shaker” – a mechanical device that rapidly and noisily vibrates the control yoke or “stick” of an aircraft to warn the pilot of an imminent stall.

The global economy too needs air flow -smooth, steady and strong growth. Unfortunately, the global economy’s stick shaker is vibrating violently.

Bernanke Scraps Bold Congress Testimony for Lukewarm Version

By Gal Noir, an undercover investigator of hijacked economic truths and an occasional blogger at New Economic Perspectives

In his Congressional testimony on October 4th, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke uncharacteristically praised the benefits of fiscal policy, calling it “of critical importance” and conveying concerns with the looming deficit reductions. He cautioned: “an important objective is to avoid fiscal actions that could impede the ongoing economic recovery.”

Many economists expressed worry that such advocacy of fiscal policy will erode America’s (already) wavering confidence in the Fed and will further weaken their support for austerity measures. More troubling still, the economists said, was the possibility that the public may follow suit and start demanding from Congress bolder government action on the jobs front.

A few dissenting scholars thought that it was high time for Bernanke to put his money where his mouth was, so to speak.

One Third of Americans One Paycheck Away From Homelessness

This stunning factoid was reported in DS News last week and appears not to have gotten the attention it deserves. A mid-September survey ascertained that a full one third of Americans were living paycheck to paycheck, and if they lost their job, they would not be able to make their next rent or mortgage payment. And the article stresses this was not a function of being in or near the poverty line (hat tip reader May S):

Europe Must Choose

By Delusional Economics, who is unhappy with the current dumbed-down vested interest economic reporting the Australian public is force fed on a daily basis, and takes pleasure in re-reporting the news with “bad” parts removed, and a bit of contrarian balance thrown in. Cross posted from MacroBusiness

The big news from Europe last night was the “surprising” PMI numbers. But as usual the news also goes behind the headline.

How markets interpreted the Fed’s Operation Twist as a sign of double dip

Edward here again. I just posted this up on Credit Writedowns. I am not in the right frame of mind here to give this topic the well-developed attention it requires, but, with things unravelling in global stock markets, I feel that I have to take it on. By the way, feel free to ping me […]

Richard Alford: The (Re)Education of Ben Bernanke and the FOMC

By Richard Alford, a former New York Fed economist. Since then, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

When you compare Bernanke’s “Deflation: Making Sure It Doesn’t Happen Here” speech of 2002 with his recent Jackson Hole speech, you cannot help but notice changes in his view of the economy and the financial system as well as a significant decline in his confidence in the ability of monetary policy to insure full employment,. The changes between the speeches and the possible explanations for the changes have implication for the course of Fed policy in the near and medium terms as well as the long-run health of the US economy. They suggest that the FOMC sees less upside to further stimulative policy actions and at the same time sees possible downsides where it had not seen them before. This, in turn, suggests that the FOMC will be more tentative in adopting further nonconventional stimulative measures than past behavior would indicate.