Category Archives: Regulations and regulators

Josh Rosner and Your Humble Blogger Discuss the Roots of the Financial Crisis on Radio Free Dylan

In addition to his weekday television show, MSNBC host Dylan Ratigan also has a regular radio/podcast. He interviewed Josh Rosner and yours truly on the origins of the financial crisis, which we both agreed started well before the housing bubble.

You can read the transcript at the site, but it has quite a few errors, and I’d recommending listening instead. Rosner is an emphatic, almost theatrical speaker, so I think you will enjoy the conversation.

Get the podcast here: http://www.dylanratigan.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/RFD-Ep-25-Rosner-Smith.mp3

A Whole Bunch of Prominent Economists Backs the Use of Capital Controls

A letter signed by over 250 economists opposing restrictions on capital controls is more of a shot across the bow than it might appear to be. The letter with signatories appears here, and it includes highly respected trade and development economists like Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, Joe Stiglitz, and Arvind Subramanian; we are reproducing the text below:

Satyajit Das: Derivatives Regulation Dance

By Satyajit Das, the author of “Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives.” Cross posted from Wilmott

A question of values …

Derivative contracts are valued on a mark-to-market (“MtM”) basis. This requires valuation of the contracts based on the current market price.

OTC derivatives trade privately. Market prices for specific transactions are not directly available. This means current valuations rely on pricing models.

There are significant differences in the complexity of the models and the ability to verify and calibrate inputs. More complex products used sophisticated financial models, often derived from science or statistical methodology. There are frequently differences in choice, exact factorisation and even numerical implementation of the models. Different dealers may use different models.

Some required inputs for the models are available from markets sources. The nature of the OTC market and the limited trading in certain instruments mean that key input parameters must frequently be “estimated” or “bootstrapped” from available data. In certain products, the limited number of active dealers means that “market” prices are sometimes no more than the dealer’s own quote being fed back after being collated and “scrubbed” by an external data provider. This is referred to prosaically as “mark-to-myself”.

FCIC Report Misses Central Issue: Why Was There Demand for Bad Mortgage Loans?

By Tom Adams, an attorney and former monoline executive, and Yves Smith

In common with other accounts of the financial crisis, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report notes that mortgage underwriting standards were abandoned, allowing many more loans to be made. It blames the regulators for not standing pat while this occurred. However, the report fails to ask, let alone answer, why standards were abandoned.

In our view, blaming the regulators is a weak argument.

A much more sensible explanation can be found by asking: what were the financial incentives for such poorly underwritten loans? Why would “the market” want bad loans?

All the report offers as explanation is that the “machine” drove it or “investors” wanted these loans. This is lazy and fails to illuminate anything, particularly when there are other red flags in the report, such as numerous mortgage market participants pointing to growing problems starting as early as 2003. Signs of recklessness were more visible in 2004 and 2005, to the point were Sabeth Siddique of the Federal Reserve Board, who conducted a survey of mortgage loan quality in late 2005, found the results to be “very alarming”.

So why, with the trouble obvious in the 2005 time frame, did the market create even worse loans in late 2005 through the beginning of the meltdown, in mid 2007, even as demand for better mortgage loans was waning?

How Banks Influence People in High Places

This e-mail to Congressional staffers speaks for itself. I am probably being far too nice by omitting the RSVP details. However, I must note the ethics rules for Congress are more lax than those of some private sector companies. I had one client, a Fortune 25 company, that forbade all employees from taking gifts or entertainment of any kind from vendors, down to a cup of coffee. And that’s not as nuts as it sounds. Research by social psychologist Robert Cialdini verifies that a gift as small as a can of soda predisposes the recipient to a sales pitch.

From: The Financial Services Roundtable

New York Times’ Joe Nocera Blames Crisis on “Mania”, Meaning Victims

I often enjoy Joe Nocera’s take on Wall Street, but like some other well known financial writers, he has become overly close to his subjects. No where is this more evident than in a stunning little aside in an otherwise not bad piece on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commision’s report, which points out that it is long on potentially helpful detail, short on analysis.

Here is the offending section:

But I wonder. Had there been a Dutch Tulip Inquiry Commission nearly four centuries ago, it would no doubt have found tulip salesmen who fraudulently persuaded people to borrow money they could never pay back to buy tulips.

Daniel Pennell: Mortgage Shenanigans in Virginia (The Wall Street – Washington – Richmond Axes)

By Daniel Pennell, a systems expert who has testified before the Virginia House of Representatives on MERS

This week demonstrated how financial special interests have created an obscene and incestuous relationship with the leadership in the state legislature and the Governor’s office in Virginia. This cabal managed to kill off a bill (HB-1506) proposed by Delegate Bob Marshall, a bill designed to protect the integrity of the county property records and preserve the integrity of home owner’s title to their property. Simultaneously they attempted to alter the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) with HB-1718, such that any “record” (the previous version said document) signed or unsigned by a person they claim owed a debt would be good enough for the banks to win a legal judgment against a person. In other words a spreadsheet from a bank would be good enough to take someone’s home or report someone to a credit bureau.

FCIC Insider: “I Can’t Believe They Suborned Brooksley Born”

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission released its report yesterday and went into PR overdrive. Journalists and the public are still digesting the weighty document, and various tidbits, like the report that Goldman did indeed profit from the AIG rescue, are touted as news when the basic facts were already in the public domain.

What is troubling about the report is the manner in which it hews to conventional wisdom. Its ten major findings are hardly controversial, yet they are still insufficient to explain why the financial system seized up and appeared close to failure. And telling a familiar-sounding story assures that the status quo will remain unchallenged, and serves to validate the inadequate reforms now underway. After all, they are premised on the very same superficial beliefs.

I participated in a blogger conference call with FCIC commissioners Phil Angelides and Brooksley Born. I’m clearly not cut out for public life. It was disconcerting to hear them thumping their talking points.

But the stunning part were Angelides’ and Born’s answers to my questions.

Ian Fraser: Is the House of Lords’ Crisis Inquiry Putting the FCIC to Shame?

Yves here. Although this post deals with a specific aspect of the House of Lords inquiry, note how it focuses on mechanisms that led to bank insolvency, in this case, how dubious accounting produced exaggerated profit reports, and along with it, looting (as in paying out funds to insiders to a degree that put the survival of the firm at risk).

By Ian Fraser, a financial journalist who blogs at his web site and at qfinance.

The many inquiries into the financial crisis have turned over plenty of stones but have failed to find any smoking guns. But the House of Lords economic affairs committee’s inquiry “Auditors: market concentration and their role” is making strides in identifying and maybe rooting out the accounting shenanigans that lay at the heart of the crisis.

At a recent session of the HoL inquiry, UK-based investors said that IFRS (international financial reporting standards) had encouraged imprudent, reckless and even illegal behavior by UK and Irish banks, enabling them to deceive investors, boost executive bonuses and ultimately destroy their institutions at taxpayers’ expense.

Quelle Surprise! Goldman Profited From AIG Bailout Via Abacus Trades (You Read It Here First)

Shahien Narisipour at Huffington Post revealed that the FCIC report, due to be released officially tomorrow, shows that contrary to its pious assertions to the contrary, Goldman received funds for its own account from the AIG bailout, to the tune of $2.9 billion.

Why is this significant? Because Goldman maintained that the monies it received from the rescue were for customer trades, not for its own account.

And while this may seem to be news, it isn’t, except for putting a firm dollar value on what Goldman received for its own account. We posted on Goldman’s AIG exposures both as principal and agent on February 7, 2010, and specifically flagged that the Abacus trades that Goldman insured with AIG were principal positions, not client trades. We caught some flack for it by the time from various commentators who seemed more persuaded by Goldman’s PR that the extensive work done by Tom Adams, which we presented in a series of posts in early 2010 (see here, here and here for some examples).

From the February 2010 post:

State Banks, or, If You Can’t Regulate TBTF Banks, Why Not Compete Instead?

Once in a while, you’ll see stories pop up about state governments looking into setting up a state bank, Washington being the latest sighting, along the lines of the only state bank in the US, the Bank of North Dakota. And there’s good reason. The Bank of North Dakota has an enviable track record, having remained profitable during the credit crisis. Moreover, in the ten years prior, the bank returned roughly half its profits, or roughly a third of a billion dollars, to the state government. That is a substantial amount in a state with only 600,000 people. The bank was also able to pay a special dividend to the state the last time it was on the verge of having a budget deficit, during the dot-bomb era, thus keeping state finances in the black.

But the good financial performance is simply an important side benefit. The bank’s real raison d’etre is to assist the local economy. And it has done so for a very long time. It was established in 1919 as part of a multi-pronged effort by farmers to wield more power against entrenched interests in the East.

And the most important potential use of this type of bank in our era could again be to level the playing field with powerful interests, in this case, the TBTF banks.

Bill Black: Why our Fundamental Approach to Banking Regulation is Inherently Unsound

Our current approach to banking regulation exposes us to recurrent, intensifying financial crises. The good news is that because we reached an all time low in Basel II, Basel III almost has to be an improvement. The bad news is that Basel III has not reexamined the fundamental assumptions underlying the Basel process. As a result, Basel III will be a variant on the common ineffective theme of banking regulation designed by economists and the industry.

The Basel process is built upon three flawed assumptions.

1. Capital requirements are the ideal form of banking regulation.
2. Capital requirements can be set without establishing sound accounting.
3. Accounting control fraud is not a serious concern.

Capital requirements are the ideal form of banking regulation under conventional economic wisdom. The attraction of capital requirements to neoclassical economists is elegance. Their theory is that while private market discipline ensures that normal corporations are inherently safe, private market discipline poses an inherent dilemma for banks.