naked capitalism

Remember Lake Woebegone: all the women are beautiful, and all the children are above average. And all banks in robust health.

Self assessment (and undue self regard) was one of the big fallacies of the famed stress tests. The banks were asked to run scenarios on their own loan portfolios, with no independent verification of what was in them (as in no sampling of loan files, for instance). And on the trading side, the tests were run using the banks’ own risk models, which as we all know did a wonderful job in the run-up to the crisis.

Not everyone is convinced. The Financial Stability Board, a group of international regulators tasked with developing new international banking standards, ascertained that many of the 20 biggest banks are too optimistic about their health and warned against letting them exit close government supervision too soon. From Bloomberg:

“Some banks became dependent on this assistance and don’t seem to be able to detach themselves from the public support,” FSB Chairman Mario Draghi told reporters today after a G-20 meeting in St. Andrews, Scotland. “Some jurisdictions may continue to support unsustainable business models.”…

“While firms indicated that they had either fully or partially compiled with the most recommendations, the Senior Supervisors Group members found that these assessments were, in the aggregate, too positive,” said the FSB. “Much stronger ongoing management commitment to risk control” will be required to close the gap.’’….

Finance ministries should be wary of institutions wanting to exit the programs too quickly, the FSB said.

“Authorities may want to delay exit in order to preserve their freedom of action in case conditions again worsen,” the report said. “A terminated program that subsequently needs to be reinstated could undermine the broader credibility of the official sectors’ policy response.”

As readers probably know, the health care reform bill passed the House tonight, by a thin margin and with the Democrats offering a large concession by limiting reimbursements on abortions.

Thomas Frank has a good piece in the New York Times tonight, in which he argues that health care reform might lead more doctors to be salaried rather than in an entrepreneurial format in a system that is piecework and therefore rewards more procedures, and therefore encourages doctors to run tests and procedures, adding to healthcare costs.

If you don’t think this happens, I have a bridge I’d like to sell you. I had had a very good doctor before I went overseas for two years, but when I came back, he was no longer practicing (he had taken an job with a small drug company). I had surprising trouble finding a doctor I liked remotely as much as him (and I found doctors I liked in Syndey pretty readily, so I don’t believe I am unduly fussy). I also have a a good insurance policy, it allows me to see anyone with a 20% copay. I can go directly to a specialist, no gatekeeper nonsense. But a 20% copay is also enough to make me sensitive to overtesting.

One doctor I was referred to had his own townhouse. Bad sign. Decorated like that of a plastic surgeon. Second bad sign. He interviewed patients (by then in a gown) in a surprisingly cavernous office for a townhouse behind a large desk that I swear reminded me of Nazi Gemany (and I am a WASP and therefore not inclined to that line of thought). It read to me as an effort to intimidate, and he confirmed that by looking at my file and sneering, “XXX [my address] That’s a rental, isn’t it?”

Even though I am basically healthy, he proceeded to order $2000 worth of bloodwork and have me take an highly sensitive echocardiogram in his office (a $1300 test). Now mind you, my last doctor, a board certified cardiologist, said, “You would be immortal based on your heart.” There was not reason to run a costly test on my heart, but I didn’t know it was costly until I got the bill. I did have an idea what the damage on the bloodwork would be, though, and refused to have that done.

I also had an incident earlier where an orthopedic surgeon was particularly eager to operate on my knee despite a pretty ambivalent radiologist’s report on an MRI. Even though the report said, “possible false positive” his reaction was, “Oh, I’ll just go in, have a look, clean whatever I find up, you’ll be in on a Friday and walking by Monday. ” A second opinion (by a team of radiologists on the same MRI) found my knee was “perfectly normal.”

I hate to give personal anecdotes, but if as a pretty healthy person who does not see doctors often, I have had two clear experiences of doctors pushing to overtreat (and a few borderline cases too), how often does this happen to the average Joe, who might not be in as good general health and less of a constitutional skeptic than me?

Most patients are not able or wiling to buck their doctors if they order unnecessary tests or procedures. Frank describes the general case:

Most doctors undoubtedly recommend only those tests and procedures that they sincerely believe to be in their patients’ best interests. Yet those interests are seldom completely clear. And when doctors know that their incomes will be higher if they recommend additional procedures, many may tilt in that direction.

Physicians, like everyone else, are also subject to herd behavior. If some doctors in a given city begin prescribing additional procedures, others may feel pressure to follow suit — not just because patients expect it, but also to keep pace with colleagues’ incomes.

Yves here. There are most decidedly national as well as regional differences in practice. I noticed when I was in Australia, doctors were up on the current research, but were not inclined to swallow it hook, line and sinker. They were, far more than US doctors, very cognizant of the limits of recent studies (for instance, if it was a small sample size, or was a particular population, and thus not necessarily generalizable). And they were much less eager to operate and prescribe drugs.

Frank does point out that some approaches to cutting the test-happiness of US medicine have yielded positive outcomes:

In an article in The New Yorker, for example, Atul Gawande described an entrepreneurial medical subculture in McAllen, Tex., in which doctors prescribe roughly half again as many tests and procedures as those in otherwise similar Texas communities. McAllen, he argued, is where American health care is heading.

Current reform bills do little to curtail such spending, and all include subsidies to help meet insurance mandates, which would shift substantial existing health spending onto the federal budget. So enacting one of these bills would intensify pressure to cut costs.

The good news is that Dr. Gawande also identifies at least some health plans, like that of the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, that have sidestepped the incentive problem by putting doctors on salary and operating their own hospitals. Such plans, which provide superb care and high patient satisfaction at significantly lower cost than conventional fee-for-service plans, would become more attractive under the proposed legislation.

But Frank asks the obvious question, and provides his own answer:

But that raises a puzzling question: If the Mayo model is better and cheaper, why hasn’t it swept the market like wildfire?

Part of the answer lies in the so-called adverse selection problem, a market failure that explains why so many Americans remain uninsured. When the decision to buy insurance is left to individuals, the young and healthy often opt out, thinking — generally correctly — that their premiums are likely to far exceed any reimbursement they will get.

But that means that the remaining members of the insured pool, on average, are significantly less healthy, so premiums must rise further. This puts pressure on the healthiest remaining members to drop out, causing still further increases in premiums, and so on…

But adverse selection can’t explain why the Mayo model hasn’t gained ground faster in the employer-provided health insurance market. That market doesn’t suffer from adverse selection, because insurance is tax deductible only if insurers accept all employees on equal terms.

Dr. Gawande reports that Mayo has recently opened a clinic that serves employers in the high-cost Florida market. But given how bitterly businesses complain about rising health care costs, we might have expected much more movement.

One explanation may be residual prejudice against the for-profit H.M.O. wave of the 1990s, which entailed a conflict of interest of a different sort. Patients paid a fixed annual fee, which meant that H.M.O.’s made more money each time they avoided prescribing a procedure. Because clinics like Mayo’s are nonprofits, they may avoid this conflict.

Another factor militating against quick expansion of the Mayo model is that many current doctors chose their profession hoping to earn lucrative pay, which they might not be able to do in a nonprofit clinic. But across the economy, we see talented professionals whose career choices are driven by concerns far broader than pay. Many top graduates from elite law schools, for example, turn down lucrative positions in corporate law to work for public-interest groups paying a third as much.

I suspect Frank is right on the pay issue, but for the wrong reasons. I am always staggered when I hear of law school and business school graduates being in debt to the tune of $100,000, even $200,000. I have no idea what the level for MDs is, but I imagine it is even worse.

And you cannot discharge student debt in a bankruptcy. You have no choice but to pay it (or I suppose flee the US or go underground, there are always extreme options). So the fee for service model may remain intact despite the fact that it produces poor outcomes for society as a whole because the current generation of doctors needs high incomes to so they can service their debts.

David Einhorn, who enjoys his considerable reputation for hard-fought battles against firms with shaky finances and dubious accounting (Allied Capital and Lehman), has taken aim at a new and equally deserving target: credit default swaps.

In an interesting bit of synchronicity, Einhorn’s comments in a letter to investors overlap to a considerable degree with a post we wrote yesterday on why a clearinghouse for derivatives wasn’t a solution to the dangers posed by credit default swaps (and note the Orwellian branding, the reforms are about “derivatives” which include benign ones, names simple interest rate and currency swaps, yet the bill has loopholes that will let many, indeed probably most, credit default swaps escape).

Credit default swaps have no redeeming social value. They are a fee machine for Wall Street and their supposed value is considerably overstated (the world pre credit default swaps functioned perfectly well) and their costs, which are considerable, are not given the attention they warrant. And I don’t mean the failure of AIG, either.

Even though Einhorn gave a stinging, wide-ranging indictment, he missed one of the issues I find troubling, which is that credit default swaps result in information loss, which in turn lowers the quality of credit decisions. In other words, the product is inherently destructive.

In the world of old-fashioned fixed income investing, creditors would evaluate a borrower to make sure it had good odds of meeting its obligations. The lender could and usually did make inquiries about the borrower’s income, and its other commitments. If it was a business, the bank might also want to assess information that would help it evaluate the stability of the borrowers income (for instance, learning who its main customers were to determine how diverse and solid they were).

Just as with securitiztion, credit default swaps lower the incentive to do borrower due diligence. Why bother, when the CDS spreads on the reference entity tells you what the market thinks and you can use CDS to reduce or lay off the credit risk? But the original lender is in a privileged position; he is able to gather data from the borrower that it non-public and thus will not be incorporated in a market price. Thus giving creditors an incentive not to do that work systematically lower the quality of credit decisions.

But that reason is a bit abstract, although the costs are real. Einhorn focused on more tangible types of damage wrought by CDS, as summarized by the Financial Times. First, CDS are a means of extortion:

“I think that trying to make safer credit default swaps is like trying to make safer asbestos,” he writes in a recent letter to investors, adding that CDSs create “large, correlated and asymmetrical risks” having “scared the authorities into spending hundreds of billions of taxpayer money to prevent speculators who made bad bets from having to pay”.

Second, CDS speculators win if companies die. Given that the volume of CDS outstanding is a significant multiple of the amount of bonds outstanding, they are not used primarily for hedging, but for creating “synthetic” exposures. And those on the short side have compelling reasons to influence outcomes. When a company gets in trouble, the best outcome is often an out-of-court restructuring of debt before it gets even further in trouble. As much as the Chapter 11 process has certain advantages, it is also costly and risky. A CDS holder (one with a significant short position) can buy some bonds (now at a cheap price) of a struggling company to assure it has a seat at the table in negotiations so it can block a renegotiation of the debt and force a bankruptcy filing so it can assure its payoff on the CDS. From the Financial Times:

CDSs are “anti-social”, he goes on, because those who buy credit insurance often have an incentive to see companies fail. Rather than merely hedging their risks, they are actively hoping to profit from the demise of a target company. This strategy became prevalent in recent years and remains so, as holders of these so-called “basis packages” buy both the debt itself and protection on that debt through CDSs, meaning they receive compensation if the company defaults or restructures. These investors “have an incentive to use their position as bondholders to force bankruptcy, triggering payments on their CDS rather than negotiate out of court restructurings or covenant amendments with their creditors”

Einhorn also agrees with our contention, that a credit default swaps clearinghouse is not a viable solution. As we said yesterday in comments:

CDS are not economic if adequately margined. Adequate allowance for jump to default risk makes it very unattractive on a ROE basis. The way around that pre-crisis was making AIG and the monolines the bagholders. That game is over, but the Street is hooked on the revenues…..

….in invoking AIG, I am saying that an undercapitalized clearinghouse is a concentrated point of failure and a very big one too, a systemic risk all of its own.

Einhorn’s views:

“The reform proposal to create a CDS clearing house does nothing more than maintain private profits and socialised risk by moving the counterparty risk from the private sector to a newly created too big to fail entity,” he notes.

That’s because it is almost impossible to adequately capitalise against such developments. “There is no way a clearing house could demand enough collateral,” he says. “The market can be so big and discontinuous that it is very hard to figure out the correct amount of collateral.”

I think you need more people recognizing that CDS serve the interests of the financial sector at the expense of the real economy, and calling for the product to be banned. Only then might you see radical enough action taken.

However, as much as I hate CDS, I have reluctantly concluded that they cannot be taken out overnight. They have become sufficiently enmeshed in our financial infrastructure that eliminating them is like disarming a web of nuclear weapons. If you make a mistake on any one, they all go boom. One (and this is far from the only) problem is that the big banks not only have large CDS exposures, but they have other hedges related to them (such as interest rate swaps). So simply putting CDS into runoff mode could lead to dislocations in other markets.

I prefer regulating them very intrusively (like insurance, to make sure the counterparties are adequately capitalized), limiting new CDS writing to hedging existing positions (that would need to be tightly defined and monitored) and limiting CDS writing to end users (which would include proprietary trading desks) to where the investor had an insurable interest, as in owned the bonds, and only up to his exposure. That plus increasing capital requirement over, say, a three year period, to reflect the true default risk of the product should shrink the market enough to allow regulators to then ascertain whether it could then be put in runoff mode. But the intent of policy should be loud and clear: to strangle CDS, with the hope of killing them.

And for those who hope netting might do the trick, reader Richard Smith disabuses us of that notion:

Another point is about the struggle to keep up with ‘financial innovation’ in the OTC market. A problem for clients and regulators alike. CDS are probably the nastiest of these. They are so polymorphous – part of a basis trade, or a directional bet, or a sort-of-legit hedge, or a synthetic, depending on context; and no cap on speculation a la Gambling Act; and then vaguely like derivatives, or insurance, or short bond positions, or a prediction market.

But you couldn’t rule out the possibility that equally nasty new products could be developed by some smart aleck. Maybe there should be a charge on the inventors to cover the cost of regulatory catch up. Or something equivalent to airworthiness regulations, which even libertarians accept without demur, as far as I understand. That would slow the innovators down a bit – proving the ‘wings’ aren’t going to come off their new financial products and kill all the passengers.

Another observation I’d been meaning to make on ‘CDS trade compression’: the 20-40% that some commentators are so pleased about. I worked on an app like this for a large IB (recently unpopular in the guise of an mollusc) at the turn of the millennium. They had half a million daily NASDAQ trades at that time and their settlement IT guy in NY was freaking out as his mighty mainframe began to wilt under the volumes. Even with quite a conservative approach to compression (there are choices about how aggressively you net the trades – we thought we could get it down to 25,000 trades per day if we really went for it) we got 80% compression straight away, so, 100,000 netted trades per day. Of course those are highly standardized trades. The aggregation was something like stock, side, settlement date, counterparty, trade flags. NASDAQ is often characterized as an OTC market so it is really the product standardization that matters, rather than the nature of the venue perhaps. I think it went to 90% within a month or two as we got bolder but I may be confabulating; it’s a while ago.

If they can only get 40% trade compression out of CDS, after a year, there must be an awful lot of detritus left over (especially when IIRC most of the counterparties are TBTFs). So things like contract clauses, reference entity, duration of cover must be all over the place in what remains. Difficult to hedge or lay off I should think. And some unconfirmed trades too no doubt. A total mess.

Ignoring all the other shortcomings of CDS the natural thing would be to standardize the product:: that’s happened so many times before, but IBs hate standardization of course for the margin erosion it brings, and anyway now we get this cartel-like protection of the margins, under the guise of support for ‘finanical innovation’.

The implication is that what is on the banks’ books now is a bit hairier to manage than they are ‘fessing up. As other experts who similarly hate the product, like Satyajit Das have observed, simply banning new protection writing would probably lead to hugely disfunctional behavior prior to the date and also lead to problems (as in big time losses, which in a worst case scenario could result in another bailout) as positions that were in runoff mode would be essentially frozen and could not be managed.

But if we can get agreement on aims, which is the product should be killed, then it becomes possible to debate the best (least painful and costly) means.

By Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns

The Obama Administration is captured. To understand why it has acted as it has, one doesn’t have to take the view that its efforts to save the banking industry were a deliberate attempt to line bankers’ pockets by transferring money from taxpayers to the banking industry. One need merely read the last post I wrote on this topic.

In their wildly optimistic view, the banking industry is solvent and always has been. All that was needed to ‘solve’ than banking crisis was a lot of liquidity, government backstops and, most importantly, time. This blinkered view sees a looting of taxpayer money to bailout the banking industry as necessary to save banks whose credit is the ‘lifeblood of our economy.’

They are wrong. The banks did not need to bailed out. The banking industry industry needed to made solvent again. There is a big difference between those two sentences (banks versus banking industry and liquidity versus solvency) that goes to the core of the captured and politically damaging world view we have seen on display by the Obama Administration.

Change you can believe in

Think back some 18 months when Senator Obama was in a horse race with Hillary Clinton to see who would go up against John McCain in the Presidential election. If you asked any reasonable individual who had the least experience and the thinnest political resume of the three, he or she would have said Barack Obama. If Americans wanted someone long on inside-the-beltway experience, they would have chosen John McCain – or, at a minimum, Hillary Clinton, not Barack Obama.

So, Barack Obama did not best both Hillary Clinton and John McCain and get to the White House because Americans felt him more qualified for the job.  Rather, Americans believed the U.S. was on the wrong path and wanted a qualified person to lead the country who would also change course. They believed that person was Barack Obama.

And when it came to the economy, the presence of two men, Paul Volcker and Warren Buffett, born some 80 years ago, gave one the sense that, despite Barack Obama’s perceived relative youth or inexperience, he had the ablest of wise old men who would be his and our counsel in resolving this crisis.

Bailing out the banks

So when Barack Obama took office, it came as a rude awakening for many that he chose to bail out the too big to fail institutions with little or no strings attached, allowing them to later make record profits and pay record bonuses, while the economy was in a deep slump and ordinary Americans were being bankrupted and losing their jobs and homes at record rates. This was not change you can believe in.

What could or should the Obama Administration have done?

If you had listened to the chatter inside the beltway early this year, you would realize that Obama’s team believed it was not politically feasible to ‘nationalize’ Citigroup or Bank of America and force top executives to resign as was done at RBS, Bradford and Bingley or Northern Rock in the UK. This was a blinkered view which can only be described as captured (if not outright disingenuous).  We need look no further than Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to see that nationalization was an option.

But this is not the kind of solution we needed.  What we needed was a solution by the Administration to take prompt corrective action in seizing bankrupt institutions, dismissing management, punishing any misdeeds and setting up a timetable to sell off the institution’s assets. That is change you can believe in.

I laid this out fairly comprehensively in February in my post “America needs a pre-privatization plan.” So I am not going to cover that ground here except to quote the key relevant passage in that post:

To my mind, there are three ways to deal with an insolvent financial institution:

• Bankruptcy. Allow the  institution to collapse (like Lehman Brothers)
• Nationalization. Seize the assets of that institution and nationalize it (like Northern Rock, AIG, or Fannie Mae)
• Bailout. Inject capital into the institution in order to allow it breathing room until it can meet capital adequacy levels.

As you can see, governments have tried all three solutions.  However, there are vast differences between the three.

The bailout solution is the most ‘anti-free market’ choice and seems to be the favored solution of governments everywhere.  It props up organizations, giving them an unfair advantage at the expense of other more prudent institutions.  It also acts as a subsidy, which favors domestic institutions over foreign rivals.  Bailouts increase moral hazard by rewarding risky and reckless lending practices.  And they are often the result of crony capitalism due to the power of the financial services lobby. There are many other problems with bailouts. All around, bailouts are a poor solution.

So what we have here is a case of crony capitalism and kleptocracy, plain and simple – whether by design or not is immaterial. And the American people are on to this. That is why people are resistant to other changes this Administration has put forth.

Don’t let the media’s spin fool you: Washington insiders are on to this too. Politicians in Congress realize that Obama’s bailouts have cost him political capital  and they are challenging his policy agenda as a result. This is why the health care bill, which Obama wanted passed before the summer recess, may not see the light of day before year’s end.

Are we home safe?

I would advise the Obama Administration not to run any victory laps about having slayed the beast. The lingering effects of crisis are still there. The Fed’s liquidity is still liquid. Impaired assets are still impaired. And zombie banks are still zombies. As I indicated in my depression piece:

In reality, the problems of high debt levels in the private sector and an undercapitalized financial system are still lurking, waiting for the government to withdraw its economic support to become realized.

Since I covered this ground in that article, I will leave you to read my further thoughts there. What I want to turn to now is the ‘why.’

The Cheney-Rumsfeld replay

Now, I am not writing off Barack Obama’s presidency. I do worry he still could see a recessionary relapse which would cause him to seem more Herbert Hoover than Franklin Roosevelt.  But, despite his Nobel Prize, it is much to early to know what his legacy will be.

Nonetheless, I believe he has wasted a lot of political capital and this will make ushering through a meaningful legislative agenda very difficult.

Why did Obama throw it all away?

Here’s my answer: I call it the Cheney-Rumsfeld replay.

When historians look back at the Bush 42 presidency, it will be defined by 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  While George W. Bush was politically pre-disposed to the Neo-con world view, it was really advice from Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld which made Afghanistan and Iraq possible. George W. Bush was famously not well-versed in foreign affairs, having almost never travelled abroad.  He was completely dependent on Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld to make foreign policy (although he could have listened more to Colin Powell, his actual Secretary of State; again it goes to predisposition).

So, I see George W. Bush’s presidency as having been defined by foreign policy and the War on Terror and, by extension, on Rumsfeld and Cheney.

Fast-forward to Barack Obama’s presidency and you have an almost identical situation, this time with the economy instead of foreign policy and Tim Geithner and Larry Summers instead of Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney.

But, as with George W. Bush, it goes to pre-disposition. Paul Volcker was a critical member of the Obama 2008 campaign. He also was a key member of Obama’s economic policy team. But, he has been speaking a very discordant message that is not in sync with team Obama. So, as with Bush and his marginalization of Powell, one has to believe Barack Obama has chosen to side with Geithner and Summers over Volcker.

The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that Barack Obama shares the blinkered and captured view of his policy makers and that this is why he has decided to go down this chosen path. And when it comes to Obama’s other ‘change’ decisions on the Guantanamo closure, torture, rendition, state secrets, and health care, the same logic also applies.

Is this change we can believe in? I will leave that for you to decide.

As Gillian Tett points out in the Financial Times today, clearing derivatives centrally has come to be viewed in policy circles as a magical solution. As a result, it has not gotten the scrutiny it deserves.

The reason for the enthusiasm is that, in theory, a clearinghouse would make sure all agreements were adequately backstopped, so that if customer defaulted, it would not produce cascading counterparty defaults. The clearinghouse would have enough margin and capital to absorb the loss. And observers take great comfort from the fact that no significant exchange (which also has central clearing) has failed in a very long time.

But that view is based on precedents that have limited relevance for credit default swaps, which is the product that is the biggest source of risk. First, the CDS market is dominated by a comparatively small number of very large counterparties. So the failure of any one would be a vastly more serious blow than any modern exchange has suffered.

Second, the cheery view of the safety of exchanges is based on the airbrushing out of a near failure. In the 1987 stockmarket crash, a large counterparty of the Chicago Merc had failed to make a large payment by settlement date, leaving the exchange $400 million short. Its president, Leo Melamed, called its bank, Continental Illinois, to plead for the bank to guarantee the balance, which was well in excess of its credit lines. The officer in charge said no,. It was only because the chairman walked in and authorized the backstop only three minutes before the exchange was due to open that the Merc kept going.

Melamed has said repeatedly that if the Merc did not open that morning, it would not have opened again, and the head of the NYSE has said if the Merc did not open that morning, the NYSE would not have either, and it might never have repoened either.

Remember that. One decision with three minutes to spare kept the two biggest exchanges in the US from collapsing in the 1987 crash. See Donald MacKenzie’s An Engine Not A Camera for details.

Third, a clearinghouse for credit default swaps is certain to be undercapitalized. That means it is an AIG, a concentrated point of failure. The reason is that the contracts will be undermargined. CDS are not true derivatives, but are the economic equivalent of credit insurance. When a “reference entity” has a “credit event” meaning a bankruptcy or default, CDS prices jump to default. That means they shoot up massively because a payout on the CDS is certain, the only item in question is the precise amount.

A large enough initial margin to allow for jump to default risk will make CDS uneconomic (that’s an outcome I welcome, but that is contrary to the motives for the clearinghouse). So dealers and counterparties will fight for a lower margin, meaning the exchange will be undercapitalized relative to the risks it faces.

Tett has some overlapping concerns:

And yet, as so often in the current regulatory debate, there is a crucial catch: most notably, that a clearing house can only offer that all-important sense of reassurance to investors, if it is always perceived to be absolutely rock solid – no matter what. And what is notable about the reform debate so far this year, is that there has been remarkably little public discussion among politicians – or even among regulators – about how to guarantee that any future clearing house will indeed be strong enough to withstand any future shocks….

I suspect the silence may also reflect delicate political sensibilities. If politicians were to demand that a clearing house should be so utterly rock solid that it could withstand even financial Armageddon, the future members of any clearing platform would have to make massive financial commitments. That would necessarily limit membership, to a small cabal of ultra-powerful banks – not something that most politicians wish to encourage.

However, if a clearing house is made more accessible to a wider pool of members, then it will only carry real credibility if it is ultimately backstopped by the government itself, to ensure that trades are always settled, no matter what. And most politicians are not keen to highlight that option either, given the wider sense of public anger about the degree to which the government is bailing out the financial world.

Nevertheless, a few lone voices are now trying to stir up more debate, Gerry Corrigan, the former governor of the New York Fed, for example, recently declared that any future clearing house be placed under the supervision of central banks. More controversially, he also demanded that any clearing house for credit derivatives should have enough resources to withstand the failure of two large members on the same day and still keep trading. “I believe that the operational and financial integrity of such counterparty clearing facilities must be virtually failsafe,” he sternly declared*.

These strike me as sensible suggestions. And behind the scenes, some policy makers strongly support what Corrigan has demanded. Yet, thus far, it is still unclear whether such tough standards will be imposed – even though some clearing houses are now emerging. And that is precisely why men such as Corrigan are growing uneasy.

After all, one lesson that financial history shows is that the issues which blow up the financial system are not usually those which caused the last crisis. Instead, the biggest threats tend to come from the areas swathed in a lazy consensus, or where there is a strong political impetus to clutch at easy solutions. That might yet apply to the clearing houses. In theory, I still believe that clearing houses could – and should – make the derivatives world safer. In practice, though, they could also end up creating new dangers if they are not put on a sound footing, particularly if the fact that no clearing house has ever failed before creates a false sense of complacency

Clearinghouses are the wrong remedy for CDS, but that horse has left the barn and is already in the next county. And I must confess, they sound deceptively appealing (I was a proponent early on) until you dig further into how they would work for CDS. They need to be regulated intrusively, with the intent of shrinking the market considerably over time, and like insurance, with tough capital requirements and frequent examinations of the capital adequacy and claims-paying ability of the sponsor. But the real need is to cut off the air supply to CDS to reduce the size of the market so the product itself no longer represents a systemic threat.

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By Richard Alford, a former economist at the New York Fed. Since them, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

A number of economists, economic policymakers, regulators, and central bankers have attempted to explain away their failure to both foresee and mitigate the current financial crisis by asserting that no one saw it coming. The inference is that they cannot be held accountable for something so unusual, so extraordinary, and so unforecastable that that no one saw it coming. Robert Shiller, in a November 1, 2008 NYT OP-ED, noted the following example:

Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, acknowledged in a Congressional hearing last month that he had made an “error” in assuming that the markets would properly regulate themselves, and added that he had no idea a financial disaster was in the making. What’s more, he said the Fed’s own computer models and economic experts simply “did not forecast” the current financial crisis.

However, the Fed and other policymaking agencies cannot honestly claim that no one saw it coming. There is ample evidence that:

• Economist and commentators “saw it coming”; and

• Economists and others repeatedly brought their observations to the attention of the authorities including the Fed, but were ignored.

In fact, the Fed increasingly exhibited a willingness ignoring critics and criticism. The existence of this pattern at the Fed can be illustrated by looking at two presentations by Kohn. The first is from 2003 and the second is from 2005. But first, a return to Shiller’s OP-ED piece:

Mr. Greenspan’s comments may have left the impression that no one in the world could have predicted the crisis. Yet it is clear that well before home prices started falling in 2006, lots of people were worried about the housing boom and its potential for creating economic disaster. It’s just that the Fed did not take them very seriously.

Schiller blamed self-censorship and group think. Shiller reports that while he was a member of the economic advisory panel of FRBNY, he felt the need to use self-restraint and stated that he only gently warned about bubbles in the housing markets.

It is one thing for someone to practice self-censorship. It is another thing all together for an institution charged with a public responsibility to allow and foster an atmosphere in which someone well respected enough to be asked to sit on an advisory board feels as though he or she must temper their statements or pull punches. What was the role of the advisory board, if the members did not feel free to raise and discuss competing views or alternative policy paths? In the context of the dynamics of globalization and financial innovation, why was conformity to a static consensus tolerated and even encouraged?

Furthermore, while the Fed had a responsibility to promote economic and financial stability, Shiller did not. Once well respected economists and analysts highlighted the possible risks the Fed had an obligation to assess those risks. Shiller also reported that the group-think that ignored signs of the impending financial crisis extended well beyond the halls of the Fed:

I gave talks in 2005 at both the Office the Comptroller of the Currency and at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. I argued that we were in the middle of a dangerous housing bubble. I urged these mortgage regulators to impose suitability requirements on mortgage lenders, to assure that the loans were appropriate for the people taking them.

The reaction to this suggestion was roughly this: yes, some staff members had expressed such concerns, and yes, officials knew about the possibility that there was a bubble, but they weren’t taking any of us seriously.

Returning to the Fed, a speech by Kohn in February 2003 indicates that while Shiller was self-censoring, other commentators had been pointed enough in expressing their concerns to merit a response:

In particular, a number of commentators have raised the specter that imbalances are being created in the markets for consumer durable goods and houses–unsustainably high prices or activity–that will produce macroeconomic strains when, inevitably, they correct. These concerns obviously echo those expressed by some observers that monetary policy allowed run-ups in equity prices and capital spending in the 1990s that ultimately proved to be destabilizing.

In a footnote, Kohn went on to say:

Another possibility is that the buildup of debt associated with the strength in household investment will feedback adversely on financial conditions, especially as the boom unwinds. Such consequences could occur even in the absence of a “bubble” in housing prices if households were overextended and lenders had not taken adequate precautions against even a measured drop in collateral values… Moreover, loan-to-value ratios on mortgages have been about flat, leaving ample cushion for moderate housing price declines, should they occur. These observations suggest that widespread credit difficulties with important macroeconomic effects are unlikely when interest rates rise.

Kohn not only acknowledged the existence of the commentators and their concerns and took them seriously enough to present evidence that he thought should lay to rest those concerns to rest. He also suggests that the likely short-lived nature of the interest rate -driven increases in housing prices and real estate investment implied that any resulting macroeconomic or financial problem would be of a manageable scale:

Judging from this analysis, and bearing in mind its inherently tentative–if not speculative–character, it seems likely that as the economy strengthens and interest rates rise in response, household investment and prices are likely to soften some relative to recent trends, but not to break precipitously. Houses and cars would not be providing the impetus to economic activity they often have in past recoveries…

At the Jackson Hole Conference of 2005, a speech by Rajan, the then Chief Economist at the International Monetary Fund, “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” and a response by Kohn allows us to get a read on Fed policymakers reactions to warnings about possible economic or financial dislocations two years later. In the opening paragraphs, Rajan argued that the transformation of the financial sector had made it more efficient, but at the expense of increased risk:

The expansion in a variety of intermediates and financial transactions has major benefits,…However, it has potential downsides, which I will explore ..

… the incentive structures of investment mangers today differs from the incentive structures of bank managers in the past in two important ways. First,… managers have a greater incentive to take risk. Second, their performance relative to other managers matters.

The knowledge that managers are being evaluated against other managers can induce superior performance, but also perverse behavior.

One is the incentive to take risk that is concealed from investors—since risk and return are related , the manger then looks as if he outperforms peers,,, typically the kind risks that can be concealed most easily… are known as tail risks.

Both behaviors can reinforce each other during an asset price boom…An environment of low interest rates flowing a period of high rates is particularly problematic, for not only does the incentive of some participants to “search for yield” go up, but asst prices are given the initial impetus which can lead to an upward spiral, creating conditions for a sharp messy realignment…..

…the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if tail risk does materialize, financial positions can be unwound and….the real consequences to the real economy minimized.”

The balance of the Rajan paper was a development of these ideas along with the presentation of considerable amount of supporting evidence. He referenced over 50 plus scholarly papers. Rajan never forecasted or predicted the crises which were to follow relatively quickly. However, he concluded:

a risk management approach to financial regulation will be important to attempt to stave off such states through the judicious operation of monetary policy and through macro-prudential measures. I argue some thought also should be given to attempting to influence incentives of financial institutions mangers lightly, but directly.

Kohn was a Discussant, but his response was not so much a discussion or rebuttal of the Rajan theses as it was simply a restatement of his and presumably the Fed’s belief that the greater dispersion of financial risk away from banks necessarily implied lower levels of systemic risk. There was no discussion of the implication of the changes in incentive structures or herding behavior. Kohn dismissed concerns about tail risk citing reduced volatility of output and inflation over the previous twenty years. However, who believes that tail risk has to either manifest itself in a twenty year period, or be non-existent. Furthermore, the factors cited by Rajan had come to dominate the financial sector only during the prior ten years.

No mention was made of LTCM or the Tech bubble. Concerns that low interest rates may contribute to increased risk in the financial system were dismissed on the grounds that those policies contributed to greater stability in output and inflation. Kohn never addressed the point that the shift away from bank-center finance might leave the system short of liquidity should risks materialize.

In short, Kohn’s response to Rajan’s theses was nothing more than a curt dismissal when compared to his detailed response to the specter of imbalanced -induced concerns voiced by the unnamed commentators in 2003. It appears that the perceived need to respond, even if only in words, to well researched warnings by prominent economists had disappeared.

Furthermore, Kohn on this occasion and presumably others, never publicly revisited (to my knowledge) the contingencies which were in part the basis of his rejection of the warnings in 2003. Interest rates had risen very slowly amidst a jobless recovery and a failure of investment spending to propel the economy. Ten year Treasury yields were only about 25 bps higher and monetary policy remained accommodative. Loan to value ratios had started to erode as had lending standards. If Kohn had re-checked the reasons he cited in his in 2003 rejection of warnings he would have found that the conditions he had cited for being sanguine no longer obtained.

In summary, numerous people, including well respected economists and officials saw the grounds for economic and financial crises being laid. Furthermore, these warnings were brought to the attention of US policymakers. Assuming the two presentations cites above are representative, the warnings were at first treated as worthy of a serious response. However, even as evidence of serious imbalances and bubbles grew, the responses to warnings became perfunctory and devoid of serious analysis.

Houston, we have a problem.

The efforts to try to burnish the image of bankers have gone from being unconvincing to ridiculous. I am certain we will see Jon Stewart comment on the latest twist, of trying to claim that God wants banks (and therefore bankers) to make a lot of money.

Since Calvinism is the de facto religion of America, equating wealth with virtue would normally make perfect sense. But one of my colleagues, who is thinking about writing a book on Christianity and capitalism, points out that God as depicted in the Bible is not a very good steward of the planet. He regularly uses brimstone, floods, earthquakes, plagues, and whatnot. And there aren’t offsetting scenes of acts of nature conservancy. So if man was created in God’s image, and God seems to have a bit of an appetite for destruction, perhaps the God-invokers are barking up the wrong tree. They might instead consider passing themselves off as mere vessels of Divine will in helping make bad things happen, that the people are who are suffering, in good Calvinist logic, clearly must be sinners somehow, even if it is not obvious what they did wrong.

But the defenses we get instead are more than a bit twisted, at least as reported in Bloomberg:

Barclays Plc Chief Executive Officer John Varley stood at the wooden lectern in St. Martin-in-the- Fields on London’s Trafalgar Square last night and told the packed pews of the church that “profit is not satanic.”

The 53-year-old head of Britain’s second-biggest bank said banks are the “backbone” of the economy. Rewarding high- performing bankers with more pay doesn’t conflict with Christian values, he said. Varley was paid 1.08 million pounds ($1.77 million) and no bonus in 2008….

“Is Christianity and banking compatible? Yes,” he said in an interview after the speech in the 283-year-old church. “And is Christianity and fair reward compatible? Yes.”

Yves here. Whoa! I will agree that banking is probably not Satanic, but not being on a first name basis with him, I could be wrong here. “Satanic” leads to images of ritual sacrifice of babies, and I don’t think the banking industry is into that,. However, many readers were put off by the idea of securitizing life settlements. That occurs when the holder of a life insurance policy is bought out by a third party who continues paying the premiums, speculating that they will die on some sort of actuarially-determined timetable. Of course, if the investor is proven wrong, and the people whose lives he is now insuring live longer than expected, he makes less money and has reason to want them to die, and could resort to trying to speed up the inevitable.

And regardless of your views of Satanic practice, saying something is “not Satanic” is far from saying it is not sinful, or simply morally dubious. I thought that the Seven Deadly Sins were part of the Catholic canon. Seems to me modern bankers practice every one except for sloth.

As I dimly recall (I must confess I received no religious instruction growing up, but you can’t avoid picking up snippets here and there), Jesus did say, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.” Bankers don’t have to become rich, that it not inherent to banking, but it does seem to be the point of the exercise and is occurring much more frequently than it used to. However, I have also been told that the Eye of the Needle was the smallest gate into Jerusalem, and a camel could go through it, but only if it crawled on its knees, which is difficult for them. Either way, this argument about “compatibility” is awfully strained.

Saying that banks are the “backbone” of the economy is also not persuasive. Banks should be a support function; the backbone metaphor, even if true, says the structure of the economy is not sound. And the statement implies that God wants a strong economy. My impression is that the Bible is pretty silent on that topic.

Of course, you could also turn this argument on its head. If God really did want banks to make money, they have been really really bad at it! How many years of earnings were torched in the crisis? Certainly everything since 2003. And then the banks should properly be charged for all the losses their messes created in the real economy. So the people who ran those banks should not expect to be well treated on Judgement Day, no matter how you look at their divine mission.

Then we have this doozy:

“The injunction of Jesus to love others as ourselves is an endorsement of self-interest,” Goldman’s [Brian] Griffiths said Oct. 20, his voice echoing around the gold-mosaic walls of St. Paul’s Cathedral, whose 365-feet-high dome towers over the City, London’s financial district. “We have to tolerate the inequality as a way to achieving greater prosperity and opportunity for all.”

Yves again. This is the most brazen example of Newspeak I have ever seen. The remark Griffith cited is against self-interest, it’s a clear and well known instruction to put other people’s interest on the same footing as your own, to be at least fair, if not to go out of your way to be fair. But all Griffiths pays attention to is the self love part, ignores the rest, and acts as if he can brazen his way into getting others to buy his obviously warped reading.

I think they must put something in the water at Goldman these days. The firm seems to be incapable of reasoning any more, and instead reverts increasingly to patent examples of self-serving, intelligence-insulting palaver, which to anyone with an operating brain cell looks narcissistic. Not only is the only thing that matters is what is good for Goldman, but the people at the firm are so deeply inculcated that they assume that the rest of the world recognizes their superiority and privileged claim on everything, so they no longer even bother indulging the idea that other people might have rights too.

Although JP Morgan (so far) has not invoked God to defend its conduct, by any standards it is pretty dubious. It was still trying to extract blood from a turnip in Jefferson County, Alabama, by trying to extract $647 million in termination fees on interest rate swaps. Those swaps were subordinate to $3.2 billion in bonds that the county clearly cannot pay. But did JP Morgan fold up its tent and go home? No, it had been litigating, and it was only an SEC suit that led the bank to relent, and not only drop its claims but pay a total of $75 million in penalities to local government entities. That is cold comfort for Jefferson County, since it is still on the hook for the bonds that were part of the deal that JP Morgan helped structure.

But as reader Marshall Auerback reminds us, Shakespeare was onto the bankers long ago. From the Merchant of Venice:

Mark you this, Bassanio,
The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.
An evil soul producing holy witness
Is like a villain with a smiling cheek,
A goodly apple rotten at the heart:
O, what a goodly outside falsehood hath!

OK, I have heard all the explanations, spreads are wider because there are fewer market makers, asset prices are rallying (market making firms are structurally long; it’s difficult and costly to go net short on that big a balance sheet), Goldman is currently the trading kingpin.

But I still find these factoids remarkable: Goldman lost money trading only one day last quarter and only two days the prior quarter.

Now maybe I am just hopelessly out of touch, or perhaps more accurately, the Fed has created such a ridiculously favorable environment for banks and traders that if you are moderately competent, making money is like shooting fish in a barrel. But a winning streak this consistent looks like a rigged game. Is this just, ahem, “information advantages”? Greater ease in pushing markets around that have fewer players? Just a function of those monstrously wide bid-asked spreads? I’m curious for a sanity check from people closer to the action.

The party line comes in the Financial Times:

The performance – revealed on Wednesday in a regulatory filing – compares with two losing trading days in the previous quarter and confirms that the authorities’ drive to revive markets after the crisis is yielding huge windfalls for some banks.

Before the crisis, banks regularly recorded trading losses on several days in a quarter.

Goldman made more than $100m in profits on 36 of the 65 days in the three months to September and recorded more than $50m in profit on more than eight out of 10 trading days, the filing shows.

These figures were down from the second quarter, when Goldman reported record trading revenues and had 46 days with $100m-plus in profits. The smaller number of days with $100m-plus profits in the third quarter partly reflects the bank’s decision to rein in risk-taking in areas such as interest rates and equities.

There is a suggestion here that banks like Goldman might be taking advantage of the Fed and Treasury (although that might be by design, yet another hidden subsidy), as has been intimated elsewhere:

Dealers say banks have made big profits by the timing of Fed purchases of government debt and subsequent Treasury debt sales, and by betting that the relationship between Treasury bonds and other fixed-income securities would normalise.

Submitted by Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns

I am posting this in the interest of widening the discussion at Naked Capitalism to include some topics in Europe.

Fitch, the credit rating agency, has just downgraded the sovereign debt ratings for the Republic of Ireland from AA+ to AA-.  That is two notches and is proof-positive that the ratings agencies are worried about the hole in Dublin’s finances.

If you read the Irish press this morning, it is all doom and gloom and has a lot to do with the banks and budget deficit.  It is not just about the ratings downgrades.

The EU has just released figures putting in doubt Ireland’s rosy scenario for cutting budget deficits.

The Irish Independent says:

Next month’s Budget may set the economy back further, but without it the country’s national debt could reach 100pc of output (GDP) by 2011, the EU Commission has said in a new analysis.

The Commission is forecasting a decline of 1.4pc in Irish GDP next year. But Brussels is not taking the impact of next month’s Budget into account, because the details are not yet known.

“Depending on the specific measures that are eventually implemented, a dampening effect on consumer demand cannot be excluded,” the Commission says in its autumn economic forecast.

Correction

On the other hand, it says that faster correction of the economy’s problems might give more support to consumption and investment by helping confidence.

The Government’s plans include a correction of 4.3pc of GDP — around €8bn — in the Budgets for 2010 and 2011.

Unless there is a compensating boost from confidence, this could also reduce the modest 2.6pc growth forecast for 2011.

These forecasts are higher than those in the Commission’s estimates last May, but it warns of the struggle facing the Irish economy in trying to return to strong growth.

Another top headline in the Irish Independent has the OECD warning that the Irish government should not rule out nationalising banks in addition to its bad bank programme, NAMA.

The Government shouldn’t rule out temporarily nationalising the country’s banks as they may require more capital to cushion against surging bad debts, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development said.

The Government is setting up the so-called bad bank that will buy €77bn of property loans from banks at a discount of 30pc. Losses on those assets may leave the lenders needing extra capital.

“Further recapitalisation may be necessary as assets are being purchased below book value,” the Paris-based OECD said in a report today. “Temporary nationalisation would have a number of drawbacks, but it should not be ruled out altogether.”

The Government has already guaranteed all deposits at banks and some of their debts, pumped €7bn into Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland and seized Anglo Irish Bank.

“Substantial” banking losses are likely to be met by the taxpayer and nationalisation should only be undertaken with the “utmost reluctance,” the OECD said.

The FT’s Stacy-Marie Ishmael has a piece out doubting the maths used in NAMA, which bolsters the OECD view that the bad bank may not be enough.

So you have a trifecta of bad news coming out of Ireland: a two-notch downgrade by a major ratings agency, a warning from the EU that the economy will be weak for sometime to come and that deficits targets will not be met, and another warning from the OECD that the banking situation in Ireland is still very grave.

Quite frankly, it is not looking good for an Irish recovery at this time without the help of the IMF. This all brings me back to my question one year ago: Is Ireland the next Iceland? They will be if the EU, IMF and Irish government do not take today’s bad news seriously and take drastic action to bolster the Irish banks, economy, and government finances.

Who said the financial crisis was over? It is not.

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog

Many people – including former analyst for the U.S. Treasury Richard Cook – argue that credit is too important a function to be left to the private banks.

Indeed, even after taxpayers have given trillions in bailouts, backstops, guarantees, and other gifts, the giant banks are still not lending out much credit to individuals or small businesses.

The talking heads say that real reform of this nature is not “politically feasible”. But not politically feasible doesn’t actually mean anything except that the powers-that-be don’t want it.

We have been throwing ourselves against a brick wall trying to force the giant banks into doing the right thing, but as Buckminster Fuller said:

You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.

A Better Model

So what is a better model?

Gold advocates argue for a return to a gold-backed standard. This would, in fact, be a vast improvement over the fiat currency system we have now, as it would help to stabilize the currency, add discipline and consistency, and reign in the funding of unnecessary wars and other imperial mischief which are funded by the unlimited printing of new fiat dollars.

But Ellen Brown argues that a gold standard restricts credit for the little guy, not just Uncle Sam. If Brown is right – and given that the too big to fails are refusing to lend to most little guys – public banking might be the only way to restore a healthy economy and ease the pain for the average American. (Brown also argues that it was actually the bankers – and not the populists – who forced the adoption of a gold standard in the 1890s, and that the true meaning of the “Cross of Gold” speech has been forgotten).

National Public Bank

AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka told Congress last week:

If the Federal Reserve were made a fully public body, it would be an acceptable alternative.

The American Monetary Institute proposes the following alternative:

Incorporate the Federal Reserve System into the U.S. Treasury where all new money would be created by government as money, not interest-bearing debt; and be spent into circulation to promote the general welfare. The monetary system would be monitored to be neither inflationary nor deflationary.
Second, halt the bank’s privilege to create money by ending the fractional reserve system in a gentle and elegant way.

All the past monetized private credit would be converted into U.S. government money. Banks would then act as intermediaries accepting savings deposits and loaning them out to borrowers. They would do what people think they do now. This Act nationalizes the money system, not the banking system.

Bloomberg News columnist Matthew Lynn writes:

The U.K. government needs to start thinking about what it will do with all the banks it now owns. The answer is simple: Hand them to the people…

Instead of selling the stakes it acquired in the financial system to other banks, or listing the shares on the stock market, it could create mutually owned societies. Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc could be a people’s bank, owned by everyone.That would ensure more diversity, competition and stability, all goals just as worthy as getting back the money Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s government spent on bank rescues…

Sovereign nations such as the U.S. and England have the power to create credit and money (and see this, this and this). Taking the credit-creation power away from the banks and giving it back to the nation would ensure that credit is freed up for people’s use, and the stranglehold over the economy is taken away from the too big to fails.

State Public Banks

Many people argue that – given its actions – people don’t trust the federal government to create money.

Fair enough. Why not let the states do it?

Michael Moore recommends that the American people demand:

Each of the 50 states must create a state-owned public bank like they have in North Dakota. Then congress MUST reinstate all the strict pre-Reagan regulations on all commercial banks, investment firms, insurance companies — and all the other industries that have been savaged by deregulation: Airlines, the food industry, pharmaceutical companies — you name it. If a company’s primary motive to exist is to make a profit, then it needs a set of stringent rules to live by — and the first rule is “Do no harm.” The second rule: The question must always be asked — “Is this for the common good?” (Click here for some info about the state-owned Bank of North Dakota.)

As Moore notes, the state of North Dakota already has such a bank, and – because of that – North Dakota is just about the only state which is not running a huge deficit.

PhD economist and candidate for Florida governor Farid Khavari wants to create a Bank of the State of Florida, to create credit without burdening the state and its citizens with high interest charges by private banks.

See this for details.

Local Public Banks

An alternative to federal or state public banking is local public banks, as proposed by Edward Kellogg and others.

As summarized by Adrian Kuzminski:

During this time of financial and economic crisis, it is worth recalling that credible alternatives to our current financial system exist, if largely unrecognized, and deserve serious consideration…

The now-neglected 19th-century American proto-populist, Edward Kellogg … was a kind of godfather to the later populist movement on monetary issues. Perhaps the most profound of American writers on monetary issues, Kellogg advocated a decentralized but nationally regulated monetary system based on non-usurious, low-interest public loans to individuals. His vision inspired 19th-century century mutualists, greenbackers, populists, and others who sought to restructure the monetary system to redistribute wealth.

In our own day, when usurious credit in the form of private finance capital remains the dominant force in economic life, and is largely taken for granted even by educated people, the alternative Kellogg offers is more important than ever. Indeed, I suggest that Kellogg’s theory of money is the best monetary alternative we have to the baleful system under which we suffer…

Edward Kellogg (1790-1858) was a New York City businessman whose losses in the crash of 1837 led him to examine the business cycle, monetary policy, and debt. In a series of writings, Kellogg developed the idea of … having the government provide very-low-interest loans to the general public. These loans would have a uniform, fixed interest rate, established by law. They would be issued locally through a system of public credit banks he called the Safety Fund. Once issued, these low-interest loan notes would circulate as currency, replacing the privately issued banking notes of his day (which today take the form of Federal Reserve Notes)…

In his day Kellogg seems to have influenced even Abraham Lincoln who, according to historian Mark A. Lause, ” . . . had his own copy of Kellogg’s book, Labor and Capital [sic] advocating the government issuance of paper currency as a just means of redistributing wealth, and he corresponded with the author’s son-in-law.” Kellogg’s public currency was intended to end the monopoly over the discretionary issuance of money at interest, which was held then (and now) by the private banking and investment system…

Kellogg proposed to establish local public credit banks, and we might imagine one in each community. These local public credit banks would be part of the Safety Fund. Instead of money being issued (as it is now) through a privatized and centralized money-management system on a top-down basis, primarily as loans at increasing rates of interest from a central bank to major commercial banks, and then to regional and local banks, and then to the public, money in his system would be issued by local federal banks as loans directly to citizens at nominal interest on the basis of their economic prospects. Once lent out, Kellogg’s public credit notes would flow into circulation, providing the basis for a new currency backed by the assets of individual borrowers…

A centralized national currency would be replaced, in Kellogg’s system, by a locally issued currency. But that currency would everywhere be subject to common national standards, ensuring that each local public credit bank reliably issued equivalent units of currency. A dollar issued by one local public credit bank of the Safety Fund, Kellogg intended, would be worth the same as, and be freely interchangeable with, one issued by any other. The independence of local branches would be guaranteed by the discretionary power reserved to them as a local monopoly actually to loan money; the compatibility of their monies would be ensured under federal law by fixing the value of the dollar by law at 1.1 percent/year – that is, by lending money everywhere to citizens at that rate…

The goal is to establish and preserve economic decentralization. Amounts of money lent in Kellogg’s system would vary considerably from place to place, with some areas needing and creating more currency than others. The solvency of local federal public credit banks would be guaranteed by collateral put up by borrowers, and the money supply would be stabilized by repayment of loans as they came due. The interchangeability of public credit bank notes would ensure a wide circulation for the new money…

To achieve a stable currency, Kellogg insisted that this rate be fixed by law; perhaps today it would take a constitutional amendment.

What’s the Best Option?

People of good faith debate whether the gold standard, or national, state or local public banking is the best solution.

But they agree that the current fiat currency system where the creation of credit is controlled by the private banks has pushed us into an economic crisis and a credit crunch, with little hope of stability for the future.

Changing to a public banking system would clearly be a large change. But remember – as Buckminster Fuller pointed out – building a new model is often easier than fighting the existing one.

The time is right for a new model.

Afterword:  Is a Gold Standard Incompatible with Public Banking?

Many people assume that a gold standard is incompatible with public banking.   But that might not necessarily be true.

An analysis of ways in which a gold standard might possibly complement public banking is beyond the scope of this essay, and I have not yet even thought it through myself.   But before ruling out the possibility, I invite financial experts to brainstorm on this issue to see if we can have the best of both worlds.

After all, when currency speculation is removed from the equation, money simply acts as  a yardstick to measure the exchange of goods and services so that barter is not necessary.  People may be able to create a money system which has the stability and discipline created by a gold backed system. with the credit availability of a public banking system.

Admittedly, the gold standard may at first blush be seen as more conservative than public banking, as the former limits money expansion while the latter encourages it. But as with all liberal-conservative dichotomies, it is important to get beyond labels and to determine what is actually best.  Indeed, public banking – especially if it is on the state or local level – would not create easy credit for the government to launch new imperial adventures.