Former regional Fed president William Poole argues forcefully in a New York Times op-ed today that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not only unnecessary but also distort the financial markets and should be wound down. This program would also be consistent with a strategy of minimizing risk and cost to taxpayers.
Probably due to space limitations, Poole did not include some arguments against the GSE’s role. For instance, the US already has the most extensive subsidies to the housing industry of any advanced economy, the most important of which is the tax deductability of mortgage interest. Eliminating the GSEs is actually a step in the right direction of lessening subsidies to a sector that does not aid in American competitiveness.
In addition, the GSE’s size alone makes them perilous. As we have noted earlier, the hedging of their interest rate exposures is pro-cyclical. Back in 2002, Greenspan was concerned that Freddie and Fannie were creating systemic risk. The 2003 accounting scandals put a brake on their growth and took the hedging concern off the front burner. But now that many sectors of the credit markets are moribund and the GSEs are the far and away the biggest game in town as far as mortgage securitization is concerned, they again have the potential to be a destabilizing force in more ways than one.
The selection below skips over Poole’s criticism of Congress’s failure to rein in Fannie and Freddie (“Congressional inaction over the last 15 years contributed to the bailout”) and focuses on his recommendations. I’ve taken the liberty of highlighting the money quote.
From the New York Times:
Because the government cannot permit Fannie and Freddie to default, their obligations are part and parcel of the full-faith-and-credit obligations of the United States. Thus, the national debt, usually viewed as the $5 trillion held by the public, is really $10 trillion….
For now, the Congressional Budget Office has entered a “place holder” of $25 billion to cover the bailout costs over the next two years but recognizes that this is a guess. The important issue is not the 2009 outlay, but the total that will be required eventually….
Given this faith on the part of the marketplace, there will be no immediate catastrophe that would force the federal government to provide additional capital to Fannie and Freddie. The situation is similar to the one in the 1980s, when many savings and loans were technically insolvent yet had no difficulty attracting deposits, as they were covered by federal deposit insurance. So the federal government has the option of delaying any ultimate resolution of the Fannie-Freddie mess, as it did with the savings and loans 20 years ago, in hopes that the two giants can dig themselves out of the hole. Still, it seems more likely that — again, just as in the 1980s — the longer we delay, the higher the eventual taxpayer cost will be.
Freddie Mac, according to its own fair-value accounts for the end of March, is technically insolvent — the estimated market value of its liabilities is greater than the estimated market value of its assets. Fannie Mae has a small positive net worth. In coming quarters, these figures may deteriorate because of accounting adjustments (some of the assets are questionable) and continuing defaults on mortgages. The eventual losses could run to several hundred billion dollars.
Whatever the amount of the bailout, even if “only” $25 billion, the real question is not immediate survival of the loan giants but their long-term future. Instead of being regarded as too big to fail, we should look at them as too big to liquidate quickly.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not essential to the mortgage market; if they were put out of business in an orderly fashion over 5 to 10 years, the market would pick up the business they abandon. Fannie and Freddie exist to provide guarantees for mortgage-backed securities trading in the market. The business is simply insurance.
There are lots of insurance businesses around: property, auto, life and many others. These markets work fine without any government-sponsored enterprises. They are not highly concentrated into a small number of dominant players whose failure would threaten the entire economy; rather, lots of companies compete and spread the risk. Indeed, there are well-established firms in mortgage insurance, but their growth has been stunted by the special advantages Fannie and Freddie enjoy.
In fact, there has already been a test case for how the mortgage market would function without Fannie and Freddie. After an accounting scandal in 2005, regulators severely constrained their activities. The nation’s total residential mortgage debt outstanding rose by $1.176 trillion in that year, even though Fannie’s and Freddie’s stakes rose by only $169 billion, just 14.4 percent of the total. In essence, the market barely noticed that the two agencies’ private competitors were providing 85 percent of the increase in mortgage debt in 2005.
There are more general economic reasons for liquidating Fannie and Freddie, the biggest being that it is very dangerous to maintain such a large role in any market for only two operators. Markets work best when numerous firms compete against each other.
And then there is moral hazard. Knowing they had a federal backstop, Fannie and Freddie held too little capital and the market financed their activities at interest rates very close to those enjoyed by the government. Now we are living through the result. Does it make sense to reconstitute them so that they can engage in a repeat performance?
Some believe that tighter regulation is the answer. I am skeptical of that because I know the extent to which the regulatory system is tied up in Fannie’s and Freddie’s political activities. I find it deeply troubling that Fannie and Freddie, essentially in receivership to the secretary of the Treasury today, continue to employ lobbyists and hand out campaign contributions to influence the legislative debate over their own futures. Fannie and Freddie paid out more than $170 million to lobbyists over the last decade — more than General Electric spent. Government departments cannot hire lobbyists or give money to campaigns — why should Fannie and Freddie, now wards of the government, be permitted to do so?
The long-term health of the mortgage market is too important to be left to only two firms. If Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can survive as vigorous competitors without the special government privileges they’ve long enjoyed, fine. But if they insist on coming back to life as public-private hybrids with all sorts of unfair federal advantages, we’ll only be setting ourselves up for more disasters. The wisest move, in the end, is to carefully let them wither away.