Yves here. This article puts the US-Iran impasse over control of the Strait of Hormuz in the broader context of what passes for maritime law and the notion that the US helps make the world safe(r) for commercial shipping. Experts like to complain that Iran’s assertion of control over the Strait becaues lies within Iran’s and Oman’s territorial waters is invalid under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Per the UN:
What does international law say?
The legal framework for all maritime activities is set out in a multilateral treaty known as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Key principles
- Ships have the right of “transit passage” through international straits
- Coastal States must not block or disrupt navigation
In plain terms, the strait must remain open to international shipping.
There is one major caveat, however. Iran is not a Party to UNCLOS, but the transit passage system is generally considered part of international customary law.
And not only is Iran not a signatory….neither is the US!
On top of that, commercial shipping expert Sal Mercogliano, who is clearly Not Happy about the closure of the Strati, has nevertheless also pointed out that not only is maritime law not well codified, but also that it assumes peaceful conditions. Mercogliano didn’t say so explicitly, but he implied that during conflicts, halting, boarding, and even seizing ships could be justified for national protection. Mercogliano however, regards the Iran toll booth as outside the pale, arguing that the levies charged for Panama and Suez Canal transits are in connection with the provision of services.
A new article in Tasnim News, Iran: Hormuz Security Steps in Line with Int’l Law amid Aggression, presents Iran’s position:
Iran, as a littoral state of the Strait of Hormuz, has adopted measures in accordance with international law to safeguard its security and national interests in the face of US and Israeli aggression, Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said.
Special envoy for South Korea’s foreign minister, Chung Byung-ha, who is visiting Tehran for consultations with Iranian officials, held a meeting with Foreign Minister Araqchi on Wednesday evening.
During the meeting, Araqchi elaborated on the crimes committed by the United States and the Zionist regime during a 40-day military aggression against Iran, stressing the need for countries to adopt a clear and firm stance in condemning the acts of aggression and atrocities against the Iranian people.
Referring to the military actions by the US and the Israeli regime as the root cause of insecurity in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, Araqchi stated that Iran, as a coastal state of the strategic waterway, has taken measures in accordance with international law and its domestic regulations to protect its security and national interests against threats and aggression.
He added that responsibility for the consequences arising from the situation lies with the aggressor parties.
By John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022. Follow him on X @john_ruehl. Produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute
With the United States and Iran escalating confrontations along the Strait of Hormuz—including seizure of ships—the waterway has become “pivotal to negotiations” between the two countries.
Washington escalated to direct interdiction of Iranian-linked shipping near the strait on April 19, with U.S. forces boarding and seizing an Iran-bound container ship, as part of the blockade imposed by it. Meanwhile, on April 22, Iranian forces seized two ships, casting doubt on Trump’s earlier declaration that the strait is “open for business.”
Weeks of joint U.S.-Israeli strikes, backed by Gulf partners, have failed to decisively degrade Iranian military capabilities or critically destabilize its government, while Iran has also been unable to force an American retreat. The crisis has caused traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to plummet. The waterway is one of the most “critical oil transit chokepoints,” with roughly 25 percent of the world’s seaborne oil and about 20 percent of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) passing through it.
Even for crews willing to transit the narrow strait, soaring insurance costs have also held back trade. Despite Washington establishing a $40 billion maritime insurance fund to encourage and secure maritime trade, contradictory signals from the U.S. and Iranian sides, including inconsistencies fromtheir official channels, have added to the uncertainty, preventing traffic from recovering. Commodity prices and financial markets initially reacted sharply, but have become less sensitive to sensationalist political rhetoric.
The crisis has been compared to attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war. The U.S. Navy escorted tankers through the strait and allowed foreign vessels to reflag as American, retaliating when its forces were targeted, and pushing both Baghdad and Tehran to scale back attacks. The affair effectively cemented Washington’s role as the global guarantor of maritime trade, an assumption now being tested once again by renewed U.S. intervention.
While Washington continues to seek to keep the strait open, there appears to be a growing willingness to tolerate disruption, consistent with the Trump administration’s “America First” orientation, especially with U.S. energy imports having diversified away from the Middle Eastern dependence, which is complemented by increasing domestic production. With Iran suffering from a blockade, the disruption to traditional resource flows and elevated oil prices has also benefited U.S. producers and exporters.
Forcing the strait open is also not straightforward, with U.S. Naval Forces now exposed to Iran’s arsenal of low-cost drones and ballistic missiles. Securing it by force risks human and material losses high enough to make a standoff approach more attractive. It would be far more beneficial to hold naval ships at a distance while managing economic pressure to sustain traffic through the strait. While Operation Epic Fury, which aimed to dismantle Iran’s security infrastructure, marks a show of strength for U.S. forces, its constraints show a new operating reality in the age of mass drones and ballistic missiles rather than a return to uncontested military control.
What the ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz also reveals is how ambiguous and unevenly enforced maritime law remains, a reality long masked by U.S. hegemony. Neither Iran nor the U.S. has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and few international bodies or countries are able to provide neutral mediation. Both operate on competing national interpretations of legal rights and obligations in the strait that have compounded obstacles to wider negotiations.
Mounting Strains
Rather than reacting to crises, Washington’s approach to the Strait of Hormuz reflects an effort to anticipate and exploit disruption, shaped by a series of tests to its maritime order in recent years. Since 2023, Houthi rebel drone and missile attacks on shipping in the Red Sea have kept tanker traffic below pre-crisis levels, even after U.S.-led military intervention and a 2025 ceasefire. That agreement now appears fragile amid Houthi threats to resume attacks and Iran’s push to them “to prepare for a renewed campaign against Red Sea shipping if the U.S. escalates its military actions against Iran, according to European officials,” stated to Bloomberg News.
Simultaneously with the Houthis’ Red Sea campaign, nearby Somali piracy has also rebounded. Driven in part by foreign fishing and toxic waste dumping in Somali waters, piracy grew rapidly off the country’s coast in the late 2000s and early 2010s before a sustained international effort led by the U.S., NATO, and the EU brought it under control. Its resurgence is indicative of the weakening of international maritime security cooperation and the limits of U.S. enforcement capacity.
There has also been a state-to-state maritime disruption before the Hormuz crisis. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, war efforts have significantly reduced Black Sea traffic and undermined internationally-brokered agreements, turning much of it into a “no-man’s land.” Russian access to the Black Sea and the Danish straits has also been restricted by Western enforcement measures.
However, the global Western enforcement architecture that has helped support American maritime dominance for decades is itself coming under strain amid tensions within the transatlantic alliance. The Trump administration’s renewed interest in Greenland, in particular, has raised tensions with Denmark and other EU members, exposing cracks in Western unity that complicate collective action at sea even before the current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.
The Trump administration’s focus on expanding U.S. power in the Americas also entails countering China’s extensive global trade influence, seen most visibly in the current competition over the Panama Canal.
Built between 1903 and 1914, the U.S. began gradually transferring control of the canal to Panama during the 1970s. The U.S., however, invaded Panama in 1989 in part to secure the canal and to depose Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. Full control was transferred to Panama in 1999, by which time Hong Kong-based CK Hutchinson had already secured concessions to operate major container terminals on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides.
At the Panama Canal and elsewhere, “by securing ownership stakes and operational leases in port infrastructure, Chinese firms can streamline global operations and grow their influence over supply chains while providing greater market access and reduced shipping costs for other Chinese companies,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. Formal and informal advantages in scheduling and berths add to these gains, giving China an edge in major shipping routes.
Panama now faces renewed U.S. pressure to reassert influence and limit China’s role. In early 2026, Panama’s Supreme Court ruled that aspects of the agreement with CK Hutchinson were unconstitutional, triggering a state review and plans to rebid operating rights. A consortium of American companies led by BlackRock is now positioned to gain this critical logistics hub, drawing heavy criticism from Beijing.
“The canal is a critical component of global infrastructure, facilitating the transit of more than 5–6 percent of the world’s maritime trade. … the agreement with BlackRock, granting the American financial consortium access to port infrastructure, was a pivotal point in Panama’s strategic reorientation. This move not only curtailed China’s economic maneuvering space but also prompted a reconsideration of the control architecture over supply chains in the Central American region,” statedan article in the Transatlantic Dialogue Center.
The saga appears to be a costly but partial win, reflecting the Trump administration’s efforts to counter China’s global port network. Several Trump administration officials have also singled out China’s involvement in Peru’s Chancay port, while U.S. Ambassador to Greece Kimberly Guilfoyle suggestedthat China sell its control over Greece’s Piraeus port, a major gateway into Europe. The Biden administration likewise backed efforts to offset China’s reach, including a $553 million agreement with Sri Lanka in 2023 to compete with Chinese trade infrastructure there.
That deal ultimately fell through in 2024, highlighting Washington’s difficulty in sustaining even limited foreign port developments. From 2000 to 2025, China directed $24 billion into 168 ports across 90 countries, building out logistics and networks and integrating them with a rapidly growing fleet that far exceeds that of the U.S. Over time, the U.S. Navy’s role in securing global shipping lanes for its own economic interests has also protected China’s trade, allowing Beijing to expand its global network without bearing the cost of keeping those routes open.
Uncertain Transition
However, as the U.S. Naval Institute has openly noted, “China’s dependence on extended overseas supply lines makes it politically and economically vulnerable. This is a critical vulnerability that, in the event of conflict, could be targeted. And U.S. Marines could help.” Despite the expansion of overland trade routes, most Chinese commerce still moves by sea. Changes to the status quo at chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and Panama Canal, therefore, carry major security implications, as even China’s large and rapidly expanding navy lacks the global force projection and operational experience to reliably secure its maritime trade network.
China’s exposure is shared by most countries, including close European and other U.S.-allied economies. On April 1, the Financial Times reported that Trump threatened to halt weapons shipments to Ukraine until European countries sent forces to open the Strait of Hormuz. Whether accurate or not, Britain and France announced a commitment weeks later to lead an international mission to help restore trade. However, the hesitation and ambiguity of the commitment, alongside Trump’s reaction asking European nations to “stay away,” have shown the limited capacity of other major powers to ensure the flow of international trade.
Washington’s introduction of a more transactional approach to maritime security raises global risks. National and regional fragmentation would weaken legal clarity, and contested control over chokepoints and disputed transit zones may fuel arms races and similarly push up trade costs.
Disruptions to international trade by Houthi militants and Somali pirates, meanwhile, demonstrate how non-state actors can use relatively low-cost technologies to challenge state forces and create de facto no-go zones. These challenges to shipping have helped drive demand for the growing private maritime security industry, which itself faces significant oversight and regulatory challenges.
A rapid resolution to the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz could avoid a major shock to the current maritime order. But it has been devolving for years, and Washington appears to be considering trading its global maritime “safety premium” for a narrower, concession-based presence. Forfeiting control over major chokepoints and transit zones would weaken dollar-dominated commerce and generally reduce its geopolitical standing. It would also force China to divert resources and reflects Washington’s prioritization amid great power competition and new technologies that have eroded traditional deterrence measures.
With no clear successor system, selective U.S. enforcement is likely to be met by parallel Chinese initiatives and more fragmented regional blocs. While U.S. primacy at sea was never absolute, its stability benefited many countries, including its largest rival. Letting that system dissolve without a credible alternative would be a major blow to international stability and cooperation.


I think that the author needs to update some of his views here. The US Navy was once a force to secure world trade lines but now is operating more as a pirate force the past few years by seizing ships from various nations and often sending them back to the US to resell that ship and its cargo. Arghhh! And people like Sal Mercogliano may have heartburn that there is a toll booth on the Strait of Hormuz but it is there solely because of intransigence. At the very least Iran will need $20 billion for reconstruction costs – and it can be argued for compensation for ongoing sanctions by most of the international community. Who is going to pay that? Israel? The US? Both countries would rather convert to Islam than pay Iran any money in compensation. And Congress will never allow the money that they have stolen from Iran nearly half a century ago to ever go back to Iran. The only way that that money would go back would be if a Iranian hacker managed to transfer that money via a backdoor. And to put this all into context, the US wants to take over all ports & passageways throughout the world that China have invested money into and take it over for themselves whether you are talking about the Panama Canal, Peru, Greece or Australia. Blind Freddy can see that as the US cannot ever compete with China economically, that they will destroy their international trade network to isolate China instead. So much for the US Navy securing world trade routes. We are in a time of world reconfiguration of major powers so better buckle up. We are in for a rough ride.
We (the Westeners) cannot avoid using double standards. Can we? Closing passage through Hormuz is violation of United Nations Law of Sea (UNCLOS) while seizing ships passing from Baltic sea to North sea isn’t? To my knowledge the concept of “shadow fleet” does not appear in any of UNCLOS articles. The author forgot to mention how the Pirates of the Caribbean, oh, the US Navy is practising unlawful naval blockades (yes plural) in there against the countries they choose, and this including the sinking of civil ships in the name of some kind of “judicial right” that the US has arrogated to itself in international waters no matter such international power isn’t there in any UNCLOS paragraph. I regret to say that not mentioning these very recent events in this article which supposedly reviews UNCLOS violations makes this analysis excessively biased. Invalid it is if it forgets such recent events.
Yes, UNCLOS is a treaty which only works under the premises of peaceful times. Lots of talk in there about “innocent passage” through straits or territorial waters which looses meaning in wartime. The unprovoked war which was initiated by the US and Israel against Iran makes UNCLOS inapplicable in the region. Innocent navigation or passage does not apply there any more for most of commercial vessels when all countries there are involved one way or the other in the conflict. If only because many of them are home for US air bases used to attack Iran. It could apply innocent navigation for passenger and fishing ships though better not assuming risks in wartime.
UNCLOS is a Convention, not a Treaty that is why the “C” there in UNCLOS. Written in 1982 in loose terms (after many years of negotiations basically with West European countries pushing for it after WWII) with the objective to have the most ample international support possible and enforced in 1994 for the countries that had approved it at that time.
This seems to have some bearing on ‘shadow fleets’, though the term isn’t used:
Article 92
Status of ships
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in
exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this
Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.
A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save
in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them
according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question
with respect to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without
nationality.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
The real definition of a ship from the ‘shadow fleet’ is a ship not insured in London. That is literally it.
You’re probably right, but:
A shadow fleet, also referred to as a dark fleet, is a ship or group of such shadow ships, “…that uses concealing tactics to smuggle sanctioned goods”.[1]: 311 Shadow fleets are a direct response to international or unilateral economic sanctions. The term therefore more broadly refers to practices of sanction-busting in the maritime domain through the use of unregistered or fraudulent vessels.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shadow_fleet
The key term here is economic sanctions. Those imposed by a UN ratified vote are one thing. Unilateral sanctions by the US or the EU are another.
The law of the sea is determined by the biggest guns in the vicinity. That said big ships fear land-based attack, so US Navy in tight spot west of Gulf of Oman.
US Navy ($300 plus billion a year) is running a pirate operation.
We should also be mindful of our betters, the oligarchs, and their expectation that our taxes and our blood will be spent to guarantee nonstop passage of anything they need to keep moving.
I can’t take such talk seriously when the US & France, Britain and the Baltics interfere with global shipping in international waters.
From Article 92:
6. A State which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction
and control with respect to a ship have not been exercised may report the facts
to the flag State. Upon receiving such a report, the flag State shall investigate
the matter and, if appropriate, take any action necessary to remedy the
situation.
It’s up to the country whose flag the ship sails under, to investigate and remedy. Not France or Britain or anybody else in International water.
I understand that war turns the “law of the sea” temporarily inoperative and subject to war-related decisions by the relevant actors. This is more obvious to “national” waterways such as the Bosphorus or Suez Canal but it definitely applies to all war situations one way or another: you can’t really guarantee free passage of commercial ships when they could be supplying the enemy or interfere with military operations.
To state the obvious, UNCLOS is a peacetime Convention (ie not binding on non-signatories) which does not and cannot apply during situations of conflict. In the pre-1945 days when wars were actually declared, rules existed to cover commerce at sea. Now they don’t. These days, the law of Armed Conflict applies, but only in geographical areas where the level of violence is such that an armed conflict can be said to be in progress. Unfortunately, the Law of Armed Conflict doesn’t help in such situations: indeed, it is nearly useless in regulating modern warfare as a whole, because it assumes conflict of a completely different kind. As far as I can see, this is all taking place in a legal vacuum.