Jon Corzine’s evasive testimony before the Senate Agriculture Committee was scripted so as to lay foundations for his defense against customer and possibly shareholder suits and reduce the already very low odds of an indictment.
Although I’ll touch on other interesting elements shortly, the key item from his presentation was one that the New York Times’ Dealbook noted:
Read more...The Financial Times reports that the Chinese sovereign wealth fund Huijin will buy shares in the four biggest banks in a move to goose the flagging stock market, which is at its lowest point since early 2009. This is the first time the fund has mad this sort of intervention since the onset of the crisis.
Read more...By L. Randall Wray, a Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas City and Senior Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Cross posted from EconoMonitor
Sorry, this is a day late (but hopefully not a dollar short).
Back in fall of 2008 I wrote a piece examining what was then the biggest bubble in human history: http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/ppb_96.pdf.
Say what? You thought that was tulip bulb mania? Or, maybe the NASDAQ hi-tech hysteria?
No, folks, those were child’s play. From 2004 to 2008 we experienced the biggest commodities bubble the world had ever seen. If you looked to the top 25 traded commodities, you found prices had doubled over the period. For the top 8, the price inflation was much more spectacular.
Read more...Reader Valissa pointed to an article at Bloomberg which looks like an effort at hagiography gone flat. Titled “Central Bankers Worldwide Race to Save Growth in 72 Hours of Policymaking,” it tries to perpetuate the myth of the overlords of the money system as all powerful, concerned with the public good, and competent. But as we know, they are increasingly politicized, hostage to ideology, unduly concerned with the pet wishes of banks, and tend to deny the existence of problems until they are acute.
Look at this impressive list of actions:
Read more...Wellie, nothing like a lack of leadership to turn an ugly market day into an utter rout. But in another sense, the fake leadership in lieu of real leadership (as in taking a tough stand now and again and bringing the public around) is what set up conditions for a spectacular market unwind in the first place.
It’s one thing to do the equivalent of put the financial system on life support to deal with a crisis, quite another to leave the patient on life support and pretend you’ve returned to status quo ante.
The downdraft continues.
Read more...Tolstoy said that happy families are all alike, and it may be true of businesses as well. But while Tolstoy no doubt had an an image of settled domesticity in mind, the 21st century corporate version of happiness is much less appealing.
I thought US-based readers would find this extract from a recent post in the Australian blog MacroBusiness terribly familiar. While America’s extortionate class par none is the too big to fail financial firms, in Australia they have enough of a tradition of regulation that the banks are merely coddled as opposed to completely spoiled (they also never had the opportunity to engage in the wreck-the-economy-for-fun-and-profit exercise we had here that put them firmly in control).
Down under, the cohort that is now at the top of the economic pecking order is the miners. Notice the similarities to behavior we’ve seen over and over again here
Read more...William Rees is one of the pioneers of ecological economics and is the originator and co-developer of ‘ecological footprint analysis’. This video contains some basic facts about current consumption levels in advanced economies that are attention-grabbing. I’d normally say “Enjoy” but this is not that sort of video.
Read more...By Philip Pilkington, a journalist and writer based in Dublin, Ireland
Watch out, I have a large, very large fur, with which I could cover you up entirely, and I have a mind to catch you in it as in a net.
– Leopold von Sacher-Masoch
Many aspects of contemporary economic theory certainly seem to have their origins in the mythic and the moral rather than in the realm of the rational. But while this seems to be an accurate description of the system as a whole, it does not seem quite able to account for certain aspects of this system which appear to be rather obsessive in the minds of its adherents.
These obsessions, or ‘fetishes’, can be explained in like terms, that is: compared to certain primitive rituals and superstitions. To do so we will first have to form a better understanding of the fetish itself; an Enlightenment concept that has a long and interesting history.
The specific fetishes we will explore will be the most important today: the government, inflation and gold. All these phenomena are interconnected in neoclassical economic theory (yes, even gold, or at least the ghost thereof), however, they tend to lead their own individual existence outside of the Grand Neoclassical System itself. In and of themselves they are, for economists and economic commentators, fetishes that can be worshipped in dark rooms away from the great hall. They are like fragments of the main theory that adherents smuggle out of the temple and obsess over in their own private shrines.
Read more...The warnings of successful shorts like Jim Chanos, old Asia hands like Frank Verneroso, and economists like Victor Shih and Michael Pettis have failed to curb enthusiasm for the belief that the rise of China is inevitable and unstoppable. As someone who was deeply involved with Japan when it was seen as destined to replace the sclerotic US, I’ve learned to regard more or less straight line growth projections with considerable skepticism.
China has accomplished the impressive feat of bringing literally hundreds of millions out of poverty in a comparatively short time frame. It has also studied the Japanese playbook and managed to avoid some of its pitfalls (of course, it has the advantage of not being a military protectorate of the US), in particular refusing to liberalize its financial markets (some accounts of the Japanese bubble and burst give considerable weight to overly rapid deregulation and the growth of what was then called zaitech, or financial speculation). is also hostile to neoclassical economists.
China escaped much of the impact of the global financial crisis by ramping up investment even higher than its pre-crisis level. It now has investment approaching 50% of GDP, an unheard of level on a sustained basis. A big chunk of that is housing related (housing is an estimated 13.5% of GDP), and prices have long been considerably out of line with incomes, a telltale sign of a bubble. In Beijing, admittedly one of the hottest markets, an average priced new apartment was equal to 57 years of average worker savings (and if you tried to pay for it with a super-long dated mortgage, you’d be in hock even longer, since you would also need to cover the interest charges).
Another warning sign is inventory overhang; the Wall Street Journal reports tonight that Standard Chartered forecasts that level of unsold apartments in secondary cities will amounts to roughly 20 months of sales by year end (and that’s before considering that many of the apartments are being acquired as investments rather than for use).
The Journal story tonight provides evidence that the Chinese housing market is going into reverse
Read more...Kevin Hall of McClatchy wrote about Wikileaks releases showing that the Saudis were concerned about oil market speculation leading to unduly high prices in 2007 and 2008. In 2008, we wrote that the Saudis said they did not see tightness in the market, and they also warned that prices were excessive. The Wikileaks thus confirm that these statements were not just PR, to shift blame from them as the historical swing producer, but were consistent with their private communications.
Paul Jay of the Real News Network interviewed Kevin Hall (hat tip reader Philip Pilkington):
Read more...By Kevin Tsui, Assistant Professor in the John E. Walker Department of Economics, Clemson University. Cross posted from VoxEU.
It has been widely argued that natural-resource wealth is a curse that leads to corrupt politicians, closed and illiberal societies, and defunct economies. This column presents new evidence on the political impacts of oil wealth. It argues that the effects depend on geology and history, shedding light on the recent uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa.
Read more...We’ve been sayin’ the commodities runup and the fixation on inflation looked like a rerun of spring 2008: a liquidity-fueled hunt for inflation hedges when the deflationary undertow was stronger. That observation is now looking to be accurate.
But what may prove different this time is the speed of the reversal. With investors acting as if Uncle Ben would ever and always protect their backs, markets moved into the widely discussed “risk on-risk off” trade, a degree of investment synchronization never before seen. All correlations moving to one historically was the sign of a market downdraft, not speculative froth. And as we are seeing, that means the correlation will likely be similarly high in what would normally be a reversal, and that in turn increases the odds that it can amplify quickly into something more serious.
Read more...In an article in the Telegraph, “How the Fed triggered the Arab Spring uprisings in two easy graphs,” Andrew Lilco argues that ” the Fed seems very clearly to have achieved more in the Arab world in six months than the Pentagon achieved in decades.” (hat tip Richard Smith):
Read more...As much as it may sound barmy to stockpile commodities to obtain better terms on financing, Michael Pettis claims that’s one of the factors behind what looks to be unduly aggressive purchases of copper by the Chinese. An excerpt from his latest newsletter, courtesy Michael Shedlock:
Read more...UBS strategist George Magnus helped popularize economist Hyman Minsky’s thinking in the runup to the financial crisis by warning of the likelihood of a “Minsky moment.” For those not familiar with Minsky’s work, a short overview from ECONNED:
Hyman Minsky, an economist at Washington University, observed [that] periods of stability actually produce instability. Economic growth and low defaults lead to greater confidence and, with it, lax lending.
In early stages of the economic cycle, thanks to fresh memories of tough times and defaults, lenders are stringent. Most borrowers can pay interest and repay the loan balance (principal) when it comes due. But even in those times, some debtors are what Minsky calls “speculative units” who cannot repay principal. They need to borrow again when their current loan matures, which makes
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them hostage to market conditions when they need to roll their obligation. Minsky created a third category, “Ponzi units,” which can’t even cover the interest, but keep things going by selling assets and/or borrowing more and using the proceeds to pay the initial lender. Minsky’s observation:
