Well, we are clearly in crisis mode. We are back to weekends being a period when you need to watch the news in a serious way.
And in another bit of deja vu all over again, the powers that be in Europe are readying yet another bailout plan, this one supposedly big enough to do the trick once and for all.
Read more...Mr. Market so far is not at all impressed with the announcement today that the Fed will be changing the composition of its portfolio by selling $400 billion of near-dated Treasuries and buying the same amount of longer maturity Treasuries. Since the Fed will maintain the same Fed funds target rate, the Fed’s intent is to keep short term rates low and also reduce longer term rates.
The fallacy with the Fed approach, as our Marshall Auerback has pointed out repeatedly, is that targeting a quantity means the central bank has no idea what result it will achieve.
Read more...Edward here. Economists are telling us that the economy is decelerating rather quickly. What does that mean for stocks, in either a recession or no-recession scenario? Jim Bianco was on Bloomberg Television yesterday with some insightful comments about stock valuations and economic cycles. Bianco told Bloomberg that he believes the likelihood of recession in the […]
Read more...By Marshall Auerback and Edward Harrison Marshall here. That was an impressive rally into the close in New York. Stocks ended up across the board. Yves Smith, who was off the grid today, asked “was there any news driving” the rally into the close or was it just tape painting. Here’s what I wrote: No, […]
Read more...It is remotely possible that the EU officialdom will temporarily reverse the train wreck that started last Friday with the resignation of Jurgen Stark from the ECB. That was seen as a sign that Germany has adopted bailout fatigue as official policy. That in turn would mean that Greece will not get any more money lifelines (which as commentators predicted some time ago, means a likely banking crisis, which was the reason for them not to exit the Eurozone).
Mr. Market is giving a big vote of no confidence in European leadership, although the FTSE has reversed some of its early-session losses.
Read more...By Marshall Auerback, a portfolio strategist, hedge fund manager, and Roosevelt Institute Fellow, and Rob Parenteau, CFA, sole proprietor of MacroStrategy Edge, editor of The Richebacher Letter, and a research associate of The Levy Economics Institute. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives
Those leading the charge for “fiscal consolidation” now seem positively shocked by the violent gyrations in the stock market, as expectations rapidly seem to be shifting toward an “L” shaped recovery or worse – a possible global recession. To those of us on this blog who have consistently downplayed the prospects of global recovery in the midst of widespread private sector AND public sector retrenchment, none of this sadly comes as a surprise. We are, as Bill Mitchell noted recently, experiencing a “self-inflicted catastrophe”, largely because of dangerously destructive myths in regard to the efficacy (or lack of it) in regard to fiscal policy. But in spite of the shrill rhetoric of the fiscal austerian brigades, the markets are beginning to intuit that a nation cannot have a fiscal contraction expansion when all other spending is flat or going backwards and yet that remains the general trajectory of policy.
Read more...Yesterday, I made a basic point about the financial statements of banks and other financial firms, citing Steve Waldman, who said it better than I could:
Bank capital cannot be measured. Think about that until you really get it. “Large complex financial institutions” report leverage ratios and “tier one” capital and all kinds of aromatic stuff. But those numbers are meaningless. For any large complex financial institution levered at the House-proposed limit of 15×, a reasonable confidence interval surrounding its estimate of bank capital would be greater than 100% of the reported value. In English, we cannot distinguish “well capitalized” from insolvent banks, even in good times, and regardless of their formal statements.
The illustration of Steve’s point was that investors freaked out on Monday about an estimate that Bank of America might need to raise $40 to $50 billion in equity. The idea that the market would be surprised (as in not know that and simultaneously regard that figure as plausible) says a great deal about how little confidence investors have in their knowledge of big financial firms.
Read more...Yesterday, the S&P 500 ended flat, yet Bank of America continued its truly impressive implosion, with its stock tanking 7.89%. It is now trading at a market cap of $65 billion, versus a book value of common equity of roughly $215 billion.
Market commentators were having so much fun discussing the meltdown that FT Alphaville even dedicated a post to the “The Bank of America Explanation Game.” This was its tally, and the post includes an explanation for each:
Read more...As much as I like Satyajit Das’ books (his new offering, Extreme Money, is just out and was reviewed favorably in the Financial Times), I wish he’d get on TV more often. His being in Sydney puts him at a bit of a disadvantage.
This clip is amusing.
Read more...By Sell on News, a macro equities analyst. Cross posted from MacroBusiness
I have been reliably informed by Houses & Holes that we are “all going to die”, and rather sooner than we all imagined. Something to do with the economic meltdown in Europe and America, I believe. While I have no reason to doubt such potent insight — after all, death is the best one way bet available — I think it could do with a little refining. What is dying is the industrial era in the developed world, a trend that is obscured by the fact that the developing world is industrialising at an accelerating pace.
Read more...The European markets had a bad day Thursday and the gloomy data releases in the US (terrible Philly Fed manufacturing numbers and an unexpected fall in existing home sales due to contract cancellations) led to a second day of sharp falls in equity prices overseas. . Asia didn’t fare too well either. The Nikkei closed down 1.9% and the Hang Seng was off 3.0%. The yen is back in nosebleed territory at 76.4. S&P futures are off 19 points.
Read more...By Marshall Auerback, a hedge fund manager, portfolio strategist, and Roosevelt Institute fellow. A version of this post appeared at New Economic Perspectives.
Forget about the S&P downgrade, which has had ZERO impact on the global equity markets. The downgrade was supposed to mean that it would be more likely that the US government would not be able to pay its debt than previously assumed. IF the markets took this warning seriously, then they would have attached a higher risk premium to US government bonds. Of course, the opposite occurred. US bonds soared in price. In other words, investors, both here and abroad, voted with money as loudly as possible that they view the US government debt as a very safe haven in a time of financial turmoil
So if it wasn’t the S&P downgrade which caused this downward cascade in the global equity markets, then what was it? By far, the most important factor currently driving the market’s bear trends is Europe or, more specifically, the future of the euro and the European Monetary Union. Systemic risk has migrated across the Atlantic to the euro zone.
Read more...You know things are not normal when a 4%-5% movement in equity markets looks routine.
I’ve been a bit surprised that it has taken investors this long to get the memo that the prospects for the economy (both domestically and internationally) are lousy. The stunning US GDP revisions of last month should have been a wake-up call, but they seemed to be swamped by the deficit ceiling/S&P downgrade theatrics.
Read more...As much as the dot com era conditioned US individual investors to focus on stock market movements, credit markets are where the real action lies. Deterioration in the bond markets almost without exception precedes stock market declines (although debt instruments can also send out false positives). In the stone ages of my youth, the rule of thumb was a four-month lag. In 2007, that guide was not at all bad. The bond market turn began in June 2007 (yours truly took note of it then, see here for the critical development, but was not convinced it was the Big One until corroborating data came in in July). The stock market obligingly peaked in October 2007.
Now given the extraordinary degree of government interventions, turns are not as obvious, market upheavals have repeatedly been beaten back, and relationships between stock and bond market price movements are likely to be less reliable than in the past. But one thing that is a clear danger signal is liquidity leaving the banking system. It’s like the preternatural calm when the water leaves the beach, revealing much more shore than usual, before the tsunami rolls in.
Read more...Bank of America’s actions continue to betray its words. CEO Brian Moynihan bravely maintained in an investor conference call last week that the beleaguered bank would be around for the next 230 years and did not need more new capital. He nixed selling equity at its current price levels, because it would be highly dilutive.
Yet we and others have raised the issue that the bank is in a corner in dealing with its not so hot balance sheet.
Read more...