naked capitalism

By Richard Alford, a former economist at the New York Fed. Since them, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

A number of economists, economic policymakers, regulators, and central bankers have attempted to explain away their failure to both foresee and mitigate the current financial crisis by asserting that no one saw it coming. The inference is that they cannot be held accountable for something so unusual, so extraordinary, and so unforecastable that that no one saw it coming. Robert Shiller, in a November 1, 2008 NYT OP-ED, noted the following example:

Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, acknowledged in a Congressional hearing last month that he had made an “error” in assuming that the markets would properly regulate themselves, and added that he had no idea a financial disaster was in the making. What’s more, he said the Fed’s own computer models and economic experts simply “did not forecast” the current financial crisis.

However, the Fed and other policymaking agencies cannot honestly claim that no one saw it coming. There is ample evidence that:

• Economist and commentators “saw it coming”; and

• Economists and others repeatedly brought their observations to the attention of the authorities including the Fed, but were ignored.

In fact, the Fed increasingly exhibited a willingness ignoring critics and criticism. The existence of this pattern at the Fed can be illustrated by looking at two presentations by Kohn. The first is from 2003 and the second is from 2005. But first, a return to Shiller’s OP-ED piece:

Mr. Greenspan’s comments may have left the impression that no one in the world could have predicted the crisis. Yet it is clear that well before home prices started falling in 2006, lots of people were worried about the housing boom and its potential for creating economic disaster. It’s just that the Fed did not take them very seriously.

Schiller blamed self-censorship and group think. Shiller reports that while he was a member of the economic advisory panel of FRBNY, he felt the need to use self-restraint and stated that he only gently warned about bubbles in the housing markets.

It is one thing for someone to practice self-censorship. It is another thing all together for an institution charged with a public responsibility to allow and foster an atmosphere in which someone well respected enough to be asked to sit on an advisory board feels as though he or she must temper their statements or pull punches. What was the role of the advisory board, if the members did not feel free to raise and discuss competing views or alternative policy paths? In the context of the dynamics of globalization and financial innovation, why was conformity to a static consensus tolerated and even encouraged?

Furthermore, while the Fed had a responsibility to promote economic and financial stability, Shiller did not. Once well respected economists and analysts highlighted the possible risks the Fed had an obligation to assess those risks. Shiller also reported that the group-think that ignored signs of the impending financial crisis extended well beyond the halls of the Fed:

I gave talks in 2005 at both the Office the Comptroller of the Currency and at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. I argued that we were in the middle of a dangerous housing bubble. I urged these mortgage regulators to impose suitability requirements on mortgage lenders, to assure that the loans were appropriate for the people taking them.

The reaction to this suggestion was roughly this: yes, some staff members had expressed such concerns, and yes, officials knew about the possibility that there was a bubble, but they weren’t taking any of us seriously.

Returning to the Fed, a speech by Kohn in February 2003 indicates that while Shiller was self-censoring, other commentators had been pointed enough in expressing their concerns to merit a response:

In particular, a number of commentators have raised the specter that imbalances are being created in the markets for consumer durable goods and houses–unsustainably high prices or activity–that will produce macroeconomic strains when, inevitably, they correct. These concerns obviously echo those expressed by some observers that monetary policy allowed run-ups in equity prices and capital spending in the 1990s that ultimately proved to be destabilizing.

In a footnote, Kohn went on to say:

Another possibility is that the buildup of debt associated with the strength in household investment will feedback adversely on financial conditions, especially as the boom unwinds. Such consequences could occur even in the absence of a “bubble” in housing prices if households were overextended and lenders had not taken adequate precautions against even a measured drop in collateral values… Moreover, loan-to-value ratios on mortgages have been about flat, leaving ample cushion for moderate housing price declines, should they occur. These observations suggest that widespread credit difficulties with important macroeconomic effects are unlikely when interest rates rise.

Kohn not only acknowledged the existence of the commentators and their concerns and took them seriously enough to present evidence that he thought should lay to rest those concerns to rest. He also suggests that the likely short-lived nature of the interest rate -driven increases in housing prices and real estate investment implied that any resulting macroeconomic or financial problem would be of a manageable scale:

Judging from this analysis, and bearing in mind its inherently tentative–if not speculative–character, it seems likely that as the economy strengthens and interest rates rise in response, household investment and prices are likely to soften some relative to recent trends, but not to break precipitously. Houses and cars would not be providing the impetus to economic activity they often have in past recoveries…

At the Jackson Hole Conference of 2005, a speech by Rajan, the then Chief Economist at the International Monetary Fund, “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” and a response by Kohn allows us to get a read on Fed policymakers reactions to warnings about possible economic or financial dislocations two years later. In the opening paragraphs, Rajan argued that the transformation of the financial sector had made it more efficient, but at the expense of increased risk:

The expansion in a variety of intermediates and financial transactions has major benefits,…However, it has potential downsides, which I will explore ..

… the incentive structures of investment mangers today differs from the incentive structures of bank managers in the past in two important ways. First,… managers have a greater incentive to take risk. Second, their performance relative to other managers matters.

The knowledge that managers are being evaluated against other managers can induce superior performance, but also perverse behavior.

One is the incentive to take risk that is concealed from investors—since risk and return are related , the manger then looks as if he outperforms peers,,, typically the kind risks that can be concealed most easily… are known as tail risks.

Both behaviors can reinforce each other during an asset price boom…An environment of low interest rates flowing a period of high rates is particularly problematic, for not only does the incentive of some participants to “search for yield” go up, but asst prices are given the initial impetus which can lead to an upward spiral, creating conditions for a sharp messy realignment…..

…the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if tail risk does materialize, financial positions can be unwound and….the real consequences to the real economy minimized.”

The balance of the Rajan paper was a development of these ideas along with the presentation of considerable amount of supporting evidence. He referenced over 50 plus scholarly papers. Rajan never forecasted or predicted the crises which were to follow relatively quickly. However, he concluded:

a risk management approach to financial regulation will be important to attempt to stave off such states through the judicious operation of monetary policy and through macro-prudential measures. I argue some thought also should be given to attempting to influence incentives of financial institutions mangers lightly, but directly.

Kohn was a Discussant, but his response was not so much a discussion or rebuttal of the Rajan theses as it was simply a restatement of his and presumably the Fed’s belief that the greater dispersion of financial risk away from banks necessarily implied lower levels of systemic risk. There was no discussion of the implication of the changes in incentive structures or herding behavior. Kohn dismissed concerns about tail risk citing reduced volatility of output and inflation over the previous twenty years. However, who believes that tail risk has to either manifest itself in a twenty year period, or be non-existent. Furthermore, the factors cited by Rajan had come to dominate the financial sector only during the prior ten years.

No mention was made of LTCM or the Tech bubble. Concerns that low interest rates may contribute to increased risk in the financial system were dismissed on the grounds that those policies contributed to greater stability in output and inflation. Kohn never addressed the point that the shift away from bank-center finance might leave the system short of liquidity should risks materialize.

In short, Kohn’s response to Rajan’s theses was nothing more than a curt dismissal when compared to his detailed response to the specter of imbalanced -induced concerns voiced by the unnamed commentators in 2003. It appears that the perceived need to respond, even if only in words, to well researched warnings by prominent economists had disappeared.

Furthermore, Kohn on this occasion and presumably others, never publicly revisited (to my knowledge) the contingencies which were in part the basis of his rejection of the warnings in 2003. Interest rates had risen very slowly amidst a jobless recovery and a failure of investment spending to propel the economy. Ten year Treasury yields were only about 25 bps higher and monetary policy remained accommodative. Loan to value ratios had started to erode as had lending standards. If Kohn had re-checked the reasons he cited in his in 2003 rejection of warnings he would have found that the conditions he had cited for being sanguine no longer obtained.

In summary, numerous people, including well respected economists and officials saw the grounds for economic and financial crises being laid. Furthermore, these warnings were brought to the attention of US policymakers. Assuming the two presentations cites above are representative, the warnings were at first treated as worthy of a serious response. However, even as evidence of serious imbalances and bubbles grew, the responses to warnings became perfunctory and devoid of serious analysis.

Houston, we have a problem.

OK, I have heard all the explanations, spreads are wider because there are fewer market makers, asset prices are rallying (market making firms are structurally long; it’s difficult and costly to go net short on that big a balance sheet), Goldman is currently the trading kingpin.

But I still find these factoids remarkable: Goldman lost money trading only one day last quarter and only two days the prior quarter.

Now maybe I am just hopelessly out of touch, or perhaps more accurately, the Fed has created such a ridiculously favorable environment for banks and traders that if you are moderately competent, making money is like shooting fish in a barrel. But a winning streak this consistent looks like a rigged game. Is this just, ahem, “information advantages”? Greater ease in pushing markets around that have fewer players? Just a function of those monstrously wide bid-asked spreads? I’m curious for a sanity check from people closer to the action.

The party line comes in the Financial Times:

The performance – revealed on Wednesday in a regulatory filing – compares with two losing trading days in the previous quarter and confirms that the authorities’ drive to revive markets after the crisis is yielding huge windfalls for some banks.

Before the crisis, banks regularly recorded trading losses on several days in a quarter.

Goldman made more than $100m in profits on 36 of the 65 days in the three months to September and recorded more than $50m in profit on more than eight out of 10 trading days, the filing shows.

These figures were down from the second quarter, when Goldman reported record trading revenues and had 46 days with $100m-plus in profits. The smaller number of days with $100m-plus profits in the third quarter partly reflects the bank’s decision to rein in risk-taking in areas such as interest rates and equities.

There is a suggestion here that banks like Goldman might be taking advantage of the Fed and Treasury (although that might be by design, yet another hidden subsidy), as has been intimated elsewhere:

Dealers say banks have made big profits by the timing of Fed purchases of government debt and subsequent Treasury debt sales, and by betting that the relationship between Treasury bonds and other fixed-income securities would normalise.

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

The Wall Street Journal admits this week that economists blew it:

The pain of the financial crisis has economists striving to understand precisely why it happened and how to prevent a repeat…

The crisis exposed the inadequacy of economists’ traditional tool kit, forcing them to revisit questions many had long thought answered, such as how to tame disruptive boom-and-bust cycles…
“We could be looking at a paradigm shift,” says Frederic Mishkin, a former Federal Reserve governor now at Columbia University.

That shift could change the way central bankers do their job, possibly leading them to wade more deeply into markets. They could, for example, place greater emphasis on the amount of borrowing in the economy, rather than just the interest rates at which borrowing is done. In boom times, that could lead them to restrict how much money various players, ranging from hedge funds to home buyers, can borrow

I have repeatedly pointed out the flaws in mainstream economics. See this, this, this, this and this.

But the Journal makes it sound like the policy-makers and economists who deployed faulty models were innocently ignorant of any larger truths:

The models “were not able to draw up the red flags,” says Tim Besley, a professor at the London School of Economics who served on the Bank of England’s policy-making committee until recently.

Barry Ritholtz has an excellent criticism of the article, pointing out:

There are many areas I would have liked to see the [journal's] article explore: The lack of Scientific Method, the mostly awful performance of economists, its misunderstanding of the value of modeling, the bias inherent in Wall Street variant of economics, and lastly, the corruption of economics by politics...

Let’s start with the basics. Hard “science” — Physics, Biology, Chemistry, and all variants thereto — begins humbly. They try to describe the universe around us by creating theories, and then testing them. These theorems are always preliminary. Even when testing validates them, Science is always prepared — even eager — to replace them with newer theories that are proven to be even more valid.

The humility of science begins with an admission: We know nothing. We seek to learn through experiment and logic, and constantly evolve more and more accurate explanations. Scientific belief evolves gradually over time. Nothing is assumed, presumed, or hypothesized as true. Indeed, research is a presumption that current theories are inadequate or incomplete. The practice of science is a an ongoing search for better explanations, more proof, further verification — for Truth.

Science is the ultimate “show me” state.

Economics has a somewhat, shall we call it, less rigorous approach. Indeed, the arrogance of economics is that it is the polar opposite of Science. It begins with a few basic assumptions, many of which are obviously untrue; some are demonstrably false.

No, Mankind is not a rational, profit maximizing actor. No, markets are not perfectly, or even nearly, efficient. No, prices do not reflect the sum total of all that is known about a given market, sector or stock. Those of you who pretend otherwise are fools who deserve to have your 401ks cut in half. That is called just desserts. The problem is that your foolishness helped cut nearly everyone else’s 401ks in half. That is called criminal incompetence.

Where was I? Ahhh, our sad tale of the practitioners of the dismal arts.

Starting from a false premise that fails to understand the most basic behaviors of the Human animal, economics proceeds to build an edifice of cards on a foundation of sand. (How could that possibly go astray?) Like a moonshot off by a few inches at launch, by the time the we reach further into time and space, the trajectory is off by millions of miles . . .

Economics … creates an illusion of precision where none exists. The belief in their models led to all manner of mischief, from subprime to derivatives to risk management…

The Behaviorists have been fighting the mainstream for decades now, trying to correct the errors of the basic building blocks of the dismal science.

But I would go further in my criticism of the economic profession by arguing that the decisions to use faulty models was an economic and political choice, because it benefited the economists and those who hired them.

For example, the elites get wealthy during booms and they get wealthy during busts. Therefore, the boom-and-bust cycle benefits them enormously, as they can trade both ways.

Specifically, as Simon Johnson, William K. Black and others point out, the big boys make bucketloads of money during the booms using fraudulent schemes and knowing that many borrowers will default. Then, during the bust, they know the government will bail them out, and they will be able to buy up competitors for cheap and consolidate power. They may also bet against the same products they are selling during the boom (more here), knowing that they’ll make a killing when it busts.

But economists have pretended there is no such thing as a bubble. Indeed, BIS slammed the Fed and other central banks for blowing bubbles and then using “gimmicks and palliatives” afterwards.

It is not like economists weren’t warning about booms and busts. Nobel prize winner Hayek and others were, but were ignored because it was “inconvenient” to discuss this “impolite” issue.

Likewise, the entire Federal Reserve model is faulty, benefiting the banks themselves but not the public.

However, as Huffington Post notes:

The Federal Reserve, through its extensive network of consultants, visiting scholars, alumni and staff economists, so thoroughly dominates the field of economics that real criticism of the central bank has become a career liability for members of the profession, an investigation by the Huffington Post has found.

This dominance helps explain how, even after the Fed failed to foresee the greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression, the central bank has largely escaped criticism from academic economists. In the Fed’s thrall, the economists missed it, too.

“The Fed has a lock on the economics world,” says Joshua Rosner, a Wall Street analyst who correctly called the meltdown. “There is no room for other views, which I guess is why economists got it so wrong.”

The problems of a massive debt overhang were also thoroughly documented by Minsky, but mainstream economists pretended that debt doesn’t matter.

And – even now – mainstream economists are STILL willfully ignoring things like massive leverage, hoping that the economy can be pumped back up to super-leveraged house-of-cards levels.

As the Wall Street Journal article notes:

As they did in the two revolutions in economic thought of the past century, economists are rediscovering relevant work.

It is only “rediscovered” because it was out of favor, and it was only out of favor because it was seen as unnecessarily crimping profits by, for example, arguing for more moderation during boom times.

The powers-that-be do not like economists who say “Boys, if you don’t slow down, that bubble is going to get too big and pop right in your face”. They don’t want to hear that they can’t make endless money using crazy levels of leverage and 30-to-1 levels of fractional reserve banking, and credit derivatives. And of course, they don’t want to hear that the Federal Reserve is a big part of the problem.

Indeed, the Journal and the economists it quotes seem to be in no hurry whatsoever to change things:

The quest is bringing financial economists — long viewed by some as a curiosity mostly relevant to Wall Street — together with macroeconomists. Some believe a viable solution will emerge within a couple of years; others say it could take decades.

Note: I am not necessarily saying that mainstream economists were intentionally wrong, or that they lied because it led to promotions or pleased their Wall Street, Fed or academic bosses.

But it is harder to fight the current and swim upstream then to go with the flow, and with so many rewards for doing so, there is a strong unconscious bias towards believing the prevailing myths. Just like regulators who are too close to their wards often come to adopt their views, many economists suffered “intellectual capture” by being too closely allied with Wall Street and the Fed.

As Upton Sinclair said:

It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.

By Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns

Yves is tied up in the never-ending ordeal that is writing a book, so I will fill in a few gaps by posting on NC today. Let’s wish Yves well in getting this thing sorted.

The power grab at the Federal Reserve is a topic I first broached back in February when the Federal Reserve was creating its alphabet soup of liquidity programs to pull us back from the brink of financial disaster. I was troubled about Fed policy then and I am still troubled today.

I am equally disturbed by what is happening in shift in the balance of power to the executive branch. The Obama Administration seems to be following in the footsteps of the Bush Administration and making its own power grab and Congress has only just begun to wake up to this and start to push back.

At the risk of making this post overly broad, I want to make a few general comments about how executive power in government operates before I take on the specifics of the cases at hand. Everyone who has studied political science is aware that dictators and oligarchies use crises to invoke fear that allows them to usurp power using the cloak of ‘national security’ as a Trojan horse to consolidate power.

I would argue, this is what has just happened in the U.S. post-9/11 and again after the Panic of 2008. I see these developments undermining Americans’ faith in the political process and I hope an appropriate restoration of the checks and balances laid out in the Constitution can be restored. Having made my editorial statement, let me move to the specifics.

Executive Branch power grab

In September, after Lehman Brothers failed, US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson asked for and received a blank check to disburse $700 billion to former colleagues and rivals in the financial services industry as he and his staff saw fit. In a brilliant act of cunning, Paulson had gotten approval to do anything he wanted from a gutless Congress more interested in loading the bill with sweeteners. This bill was not unlike the Patriot Act, passed after the 9/11 attacks, in that it increased the executive branch’s ability to intervene in the economy as they saw fit. I called it the Economic Patriot Act.

Originally, the Economic Patriot Act was about marking to market. However, once Gordon Brown started recapitalising Britain, Paulson made an about-face and proceeded to dispense the money in a similar fashion (albeit with much fewer strings attached than in the UK).

When the Obama Administration came to town, the modus operandi were not much different. Other support programs were forthcoming and bailouts at Citi and BofA ensued.

With the economy and banks on sounder footing and much of the money returned to taxpayers, the Obama Administration has turned to regulatory reform – and, what do you know – they are looking for a blank check again to do as they please in resolving too big to fail institutions that run into trouble. Again, as with Bush in 2002, if Congress gives the executive branch any blanket authority, it will be used and Congress will be cut out of the process. This is NOT how the American system of government is supposed to be run.

The Fed is grasping for the brass ring too

Enter the Federal Reserve. The Fed has been engaged in a policy of acting in concert with the Executive Branch in a non-arms length fashion since this crisis began. All of the liquidity programs and backstops the Fed has implemented are not just about liquidity, they are subsidies that lower the cost of capital and increase profits in the banking sector. As such, these subsidies are actually a part of America’s fiscal policy – stimulus, if you will. It is a clear no-no for the Federal Reserve to inject itself into fiscal matters. And to top it off, the Fed is refusing to be transparent about the process. Why would we make it the Systemic Risk Regulator?

Willem Buiter says it best so I will just quote him verbatim from his article, “Should central banks be quasi-fiscal actors?”:

Any action going beyond that, such as the recapitalisation of insolvent banks through quasi-fiscal subsidies, ought to be funded by the Treasury.  The central bank should be involved only as an agent of the Treasury – an expert assistant.  It should not put its own conventional or comprehensive balance sheet at risk.

The two arguments against the central bank acting as a quasi-fiscal agent are, first, that acting as a quasi-fiscal agent may impair the central bank’s ability to fulfil its macroeconomic stability mandate and, second, that it obscures responsibility and impedes accountability for what are in substance fiscal transfers.  In the US such actions subvert the Constitution, which clearly states in Section 8, Clause 1, that the power to tax and spend rests with the Congress: “The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”.

If, as happened in the USA on a vast scale, the central bank allows itself to be used as an off-budget and off-balance-sheet special purpose vehicle of the Treasury, and refuses to provide to the Congress some of the information essential for the quantification of the fiscal transfers it has made, the central bank not only subverts the constitution.  By attempting to hide contingent commitments and to disguise de-facto subsidies by not divulging relevant information on the terms on which the central bank has offered financial assistance, it undermines its own independence and legitimacy and impairs political accountability for the use of public funds – ‘tax payers’ money’.  It is surprising that a country whose creation folklore attributes considerable significance to the principle of ‘no taxation without representation’ would have condoned without much outcry such a blatant violation of the equally important principle of ‘no use of public funds without accountability’.  This indeed amounts to a quiet usurpation of the power of the legislature by the central bank.

Qualitative easing, or whatever you call it, must end.  With the FOMC starting its two-day meeting tomorrow, and with the Reserve Bank of Australia having already hiked twice, it will be interesting to see if the Fed retracts its “extended period” language as many of us expect. While I think it premature in regards to the robustness of the economy, the Fed needs to show it is an independent actor.

Once lost, independence will not be easily restored.

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog

Many people – including former analyst for the U.S. Treasury Richard Cook – argue that credit is too important a function to be left to the private banks.

Indeed, even after taxpayers have given trillions in bailouts, backstops, guarantees, and other gifts, the giant banks are still not lending out much credit to individuals or small businesses.

The talking heads say that real reform of this nature is not “politically feasible”. But not politically feasible doesn’t actually mean anything except that the powers-that-be don’t want it.

We have been throwing ourselves against a brick wall trying to force the giant banks into doing the right thing, but as Buckminster Fuller said:

You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.

A Better Model

So what is a better model?

Gold advocates argue for a return to a gold-backed standard. This would, in fact, be a vast improvement over the fiat currency system we have now, as it would help to stabilize the currency, add discipline and consistency, and reign in the funding of unnecessary wars and other imperial mischief which are funded by the unlimited printing of new fiat dollars.

But Ellen Brown argues that a gold standard restricts credit for the little guy, not just Uncle Sam. If Brown is right – and given that the too big to fails are refusing to lend to most little guys – public banking might be the only way to restore a healthy economy and ease the pain for the average American. (Brown also argues that it was actually the bankers – and not the populists – who forced the adoption of a gold standard in the 1890s, and that the true meaning of the “Cross of Gold” speech has been forgotten).

National Public Bank

AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka told Congress last week:

If the Federal Reserve were made a fully public body, it would be an acceptable alternative.

The American Monetary Institute proposes the following alternative:

Incorporate the Federal Reserve System into the U.S. Treasury where all new money would be created by government as money, not interest-bearing debt; and be spent into circulation to promote the general welfare. The monetary system would be monitored to be neither inflationary nor deflationary.
Second, halt the bank’s privilege to create money by ending the fractional reserve system in a gentle and elegant way.

All the past monetized private credit would be converted into U.S. government money. Banks would then act as intermediaries accepting savings deposits and loaning them out to borrowers. They would do what people think they do now. This Act nationalizes the money system, not the banking system.

Bloomberg News columnist Matthew Lynn writes:

The U.K. government needs to start thinking about what it will do with all the banks it now owns. The answer is simple: Hand them to the people…

Instead of selling the stakes it acquired in the financial system to other banks, or listing the shares on the stock market, it could create mutually owned societies. Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc could be a people’s bank, owned by everyone.That would ensure more diversity, competition and stability, all goals just as worthy as getting back the money Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s government spent on bank rescues…

Sovereign nations such as the U.S. and England have the power to create credit and money (and see this, this and this). Taking the credit-creation power away from the banks and giving it back to the nation would ensure that credit is freed up for people’s use, and the stranglehold over the economy is taken away from the too big to fails.

State Public Banks

Many people argue that – given its actions – people don’t trust the federal government to create money.

Fair enough. Why not let the states do it?

Michael Moore recommends that the American people demand:

Each of the 50 states must create a state-owned public bank like they have in North Dakota. Then congress MUST reinstate all the strict pre-Reagan regulations on all commercial banks, investment firms, insurance companies — and all the other industries that have been savaged by deregulation: Airlines, the food industry, pharmaceutical companies — you name it. If a company’s primary motive to exist is to make a profit, then it needs a set of stringent rules to live by — and the first rule is “Do no harm.” The second rule: The question must always be asked — “Is this for the common good?” (Click here for some info about the state-owned Bank of North Dakota.)

As Moore notes, the state of North Dakota already has such a bank, and – because of that – North Dakota is just about the only state which is not running a huge deficit.

PhD economist and candidate for Florida governor Farid Khavari wants to create a Bank of the State of Florida, to create credit without burdening the state and its citizens with high interest charges by private banks.

See this for details.

Local Public Banks

An alternative to federal or state public banking is local public banks, as proposed by Edward Kellogg and others.

As summarized by Adrian Kuzminski:

During this time of financial and economic crisis, it is worth recalling that credible alternatives to our current financial system exist, if largely unrecognized, and deserve serious consideration…

The now-neglected 19th-century American proto-populist, Edward Kellogg … was a kind of godfather to the later populist movement on monetary issues. Perhaps the most profound of American writers on monetary issues, Kellogg advocated a decentralized but nationally regulated monetary system based on non-usurious, low-interest public loans to individuals. His vision inspired 19th-century century mutualists, greenbackers, populists, and others who sought to restructure the monetary system to redistribute wealth.

In our own day, when usurious credit in the form of private finance capital remains the dominant force in economic life, and is largely taken for granted even by educated people, the alternative Kellogg offers is more important than ever. Indeed, I suggest that Kellogg’s theory of money is the best monetary alternative we have to the baleful system under which we suffer…

Edward Kellogg (1790-1858) was a New York City businessman whose losses in the crash of 1837 led him to examine the business cycle, monetary policy, and debt. In a series of writings, Kellogg developed the idea of … having the government provide very-low-interest loans to the general public. These loans would have a uniform, fixed interest rate, established by law. They would be issued locally through a system of public credit banks he called the Safety Fund. Once issued, these low-interest loan notes would circulate as currency, replacing the privately issued banking notes of his day (which today take the form of Federal Reserve Notes)…

In his day Kellogg seems to have influenced even Abraham Lincoln who, according to historian Mark A. Lause, ” . . . had his own copy of Kellogg’s book, Labor and Capital [sic] advocating the government issuance of paper currency as a just means of redistributing wealth, and he corresponded with the author’s son-in-law.” Kellogg’s public currency was intended to end the monopoly over the discretionary issuance of money at interest, which was held then (and now) by the private banking and investment system…

Kellogg proposed to establish local public credit banks, and we might imagine one in each community. These local public credit banks would be part of the Safety Fund. Instead of money being issued (as it is now) through a privatized and centralized money-management system on a top-down basis, primarily as loans at increasing rates of interest from a central bank to major commercial banks, and then to regional and local banks, and then to the public, money in his system would be issued by local federal banks as loans directly to citizens at nominal interest on the basis of their economic prospects. Once lent out, Kellogg’s public credit notes would flow into circulation, providing the basis for a new currency backed by the assets of individual borrowers…

A centralized national currency would be replaced, in Kellogg’s system, by a locally issued currency. But that currency would everywhere be subject to common national standards, ensuring that each local public credit bank reliably issued equivalent units of currency. A dollar issued by one local public credit bank of the Safety Fund, Kellogg intended, would be worth the same as, and be freely interchangeable with, one issued by any other. The independence of local branches would be guaranteed by the discretionary power reserved to them as a local monopoly actually to loan money; the compatibility of their monies would be ensured under federal law by fixing the value of the dollar by law at 1.1 percent/year – that is, by lending money everywhere to citizens at that rate…

The goal is to establish and preserve economic decentralization. Amounts of money lent in Kellogg’s system would vary considerably from place to place, with some areas needing and creating more currency than others. The solvency of local federal public credit banks would be guaranteed by collateral put up by borrowers, and the money supply would be stabilized by repayment of loans as they came due. The interchangeability of public credit bank notes would ensure a wide circulation for the new money…

To achieve a stable currency, Kellogg insisted that this rate be fixed by law; perhaps today it would take a constitutional amendment.

What’s the Best Option?

People of good faith debate whether the gold standard, or national, state or local public banking is the best solution.

But they agree that the current fiat currency system where the creation of credit is controlled by the private banks has pushed us into an economic crisis and a credit crunch, with little hope of stability for the future.

Changing to a public banking system would clearly be a large change. But remember – as Buckminster Fuller pointed out – building a new model is often easier than fighting the existing one.

The time is right for a new model.

Afterword:  Is a Gold Standard Incompatible with Public Banking?

Many people assume that a gold standard is incompatible with public banking.   But that might not necessarily be true.

An analysis of ways in which a gold standard might possibly complement public banking is beyond the scope of this essay, and I have not yet even thought it through myself.   But before ruling out the possibility, I invite financial experts to brainstorm on this issue to see if we can have the best of both worlds.

After all, when currency speculation is removed from the equation, money simply acts as  a yardstick to measure the exchange of goods and services so that barter is not necessary.  People may be able to create a money system which has the stability and discipline created by a gold backed system. with the credit availability of a public banking system.

Admittedly, the gold standard may at first blush be seen as more conservative than public banking, as the former limits money expansion while the latter encourages it. But as with all liberal-conservative dichotomies, it is important to get beyond labels and to determine what is actually best.  Indeed, public banking – especially if it is on the state or local level – would not create easy credit for the government to launch new imperial adventures.

Nouriel Roubini has officially left the “hedging your bets on the economy” camp. He has declared the markets to be frothy because super low dollar borrowing rates have turned the greenback into the funding currency for the carry trade.

Far more important than the peppy rally in the stock market is the resumption of early 2007 style risk taking in the credit markets. As Gillian Tett of the Financial Times noted last week:

Earlier this month, I received a sobering e-mail from a senior, recently-retired banker. This particular man, a veteran of the credit world, had just chatted with ex-colleagues who are still in the markets – and was feeling deeply shocked.

“Forget about the events of the past 12 months … the punters are back punting as aggressively as ever,” he wrote. “Highly leveraged short-term trades are back in vogue as players … jostle to load up on everything from Reits [real estate investment trusts] and commercial property, commodities, emerging markets and regular stocks and bonds.

“Oh, I am sure the banks’ public relations people will talk about the subdued atmosphere in banking, but don’t you believe it,” he continued bitterly, noting that when money is virtually free – or, at least, at 0.5 per cent – traders feel stupid if they don’t leverage up.

“Any sense of control is being chucked out of the window. After the dotcom boom and bust it took a good few years for the market to get its collective mojo back [but] this time it has taken just a few months,” he added. He finished with a despairing question: “Was October 2008 just a dress rehearsal for the crash when this latest bubble bursts?”

In other words, everyone seems to be in on this bubble except most borrowers in the real economy. But that wasn’t the main objective…it was to reflate asset prices to save the global banking system…by rerunning the same movie that drove it off the cliff in the first place (well, this is a sequel, so there are some minor plot changes, like the dollar rather than the yen as the basis for the carry trade).

From Roubini in the Financial Times:

Since March there has been a massive rally in all sorts of risky assets… and an even bigger rally in emerging market asset classes (their stocks, bonds and currencies). At the same time, the dollar has weakened sharply, while government bond yields have gently increased but stayed low and stable.

This recovery in risky assets is in part driven by better economic fundamentals…. Whether the recovery is V-shaped, as consensus believes, or U-shaped and anaemic as I have argued, asset prices should be moving gradually higher.

But while the US and global economy have begun a modest recovery, asset prices have gone through the roof since March in a major and synchronised rally….Risky asset prices have risen too much, too soon and too fast compared with macroeconomic fundamentals.

So what is behind this massive rally? Certainly it has been helped by a wave of liquidity from near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing. But a more important factor fuelling this asset bubble is the weakness of the US dollar, driven by the mother of all carry trades. The US dollar has become the major funding currency of carry trades as the Fed has kept interest rates on hold and is expected to do so for a long time. Investors who are shorting the US dollar to buy on a highly leveraged basis higher-yielding assets and other global assets are not just borrowing at zero interest rates in dollar terms; they are borrowing at very negative interest rates – as low as negative 10 or 20 per cent annualised – as the fall in the US dollar leads to massive capital gains on short dollar positions.

Let us sum up: traders are borrowing at negative 20 per cent rates to invest on a highly leveraged basis on a mass of risky global assets that are rising in price due to excess liquidity and a massive carry trade. Every investor who plays this risky game looks like a genius – even if they are just riding a huge bubble financed by a large negative cost of borrowing – as the total returns have been in the 50-70 per cent range since March.

People’s sense of the value at risk (VAR) of their aggregate portfolios ought, instead, to have been increasing due to a rising correlation of the risks between different asset classes, all of which are driven by this common monetary policy and the carry trade. In effect, it has become one big common trade – you short the dollar to buy any global risky assets.

Yet, at the same time, the perceived riskiness of individual asset classes is declining as volatility is diminished due to the Fed’s policy of buying everything in sight – witness its proposed $1,800bn (£1,000bn, €1,200bn) purchase of Treasuries, mortgage- backed securities (bonds guaranteed by a government-sponsored enterprise such as Fannie Mae) and agency debt. By effectively reducing the volatility of individual asset classes, making them behave the same way, there is now little diversification across markets – the VAR again looks low.

So the combined effect of the Fed policy of a zero Fed funds rate, quantitative easing and massive purchase of long-term debt instruments is seemingly making the world safe – for now – for the mother of all carry trades and mother of all highly leveraged global asset bubbles.

While this policy feeds the global asset bubble it is also feeding a new US asset bubble….

The reckless US policy that is feeding these carry trades is forcing other countries to follow its easy monetary policy….This is keeping short-term rates lower than is desirable. Central banks may also be forced to lower interest rates through domestic open market operations. Some central banks, concerned about the hot money driving up their currencies, as in Brazil, are imposing controls on capital inflows. Either way, the carry trade bubble will get worse: if there is no forex intervention and foreign currencies appreciate, the negative borrowing cost of the carry trade becomes more negative. If intervention or open market operations control currency appreciation, the ensuing domestic monetary easing feeds an asset bubble in these economies. So the perfectly correlated bubble across all global asset classes gets bigger by the day.

But one day this bubble will burst, leading to the biggest co-ordinated asset bust ever: if factors lead the dollar to reverse and suddenly appreciate – as was seen in previous reversals, such as the yen-funded carry trade – the leveraged carry trade will have to be suddenly closed as investors cover their dollar shorts. A stampede will occur as closing long leveraged risky asset positions across all asset classes funded by dollar shorts triggers a co-ordinated collapse of all those risky assets – equities, commodities, emerging market asset classes and credit instruments.

Why will these carry trades unravel? First, the dollar cannot fall to zero and at some point it will stabilise; when that happens the cost of borrowing in dollars will suddenly become zero, rather than highly negative, and the riskiness of a reversal of dollar movements would induce many to cover their shorts. Second, the Fed cannot suppress volatility forever – its $1,800bn purchase plan will be over by next spring. Third, if US growth surprises on the upside in the third and fourth quarters, markets may start to expect a Fed tightening to come sooner, not later. Fourth, there could be a flight from risk prompted by fear of a double dip recession or geopolitical risks, such as a military confrontation between the US/Israel and Iran. As in 2008, when such a rise in risk aversion was associated with a sharp appreciation of the dollar, as investors sought the safety of US Treasuries, this renewed risk aversion would trigger a dollar rally at a time when huge short dollar positions will have to be closed.

This unraveling may not occur for a while, as easy money and excessive global liquidity can push asset prices higher for a while. But the longer and bigger the carry trades and the larger the asset bubble, the bigger will be the ensuing asset bubble crash. The Fed and other policymakers seem unaware of the monster bubble they are creating. The longer they remain blind, the harder the markets will fall.

The Journal has a less apocalyptic story on the very same topic: “Dollar Calls the Tune for Stocks, Bonds, Oil“:

A joke making the rounds among stock investors is that they’ve all become currency traders. In recent weeks, the relationship between moves in the dollar and stocks has been incredibly tight; as the dollar rises, stocks fall and vice versa.

And it isn’t just stocks. Links between the dollar, corporate bonds, energy prices and gold have grown closer. Traders and analysts point to one factor as the cause: the Federal Reserve’s efforts to flood the financial markets with dollars. They say the Fed has created an unusual environment where investors essentially have two choices — hold onto dollars or buy something, anything else.

The connections between assets have been growing as investors become more fixated on how and when the Fed will turn off the spigot.

The intensity of the links “tells me there is a lot of nervousness and a lot of fast money,” says Michael O’Rourke, a market strategist at BTIG.

As a result, some believe the markets are in a new bubble, driven by interest rates essentially at zero, which will pop sooner rather than later. That camp includes Pimco’s Bill Gross, who last week wrote that the six-month rally in riskier assets, spurred on by the Fed and U.S. Treasury, “is likely at its pinnacle.”

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

Ron Paul tells Bloomberg that Congressman Watt has just more or less killed the bill to audit the fed:

Representative Ron Paul, the Texas Republican who has called for an end to the Federal Reserve, said legislation he introduced to audit monetary policy has been “gutted” while moving toward a possible vote in the Democratic-controlled House.

The bill, with 308 co-sponsors, has been stripped of provisions that would remove Fed exemptions from audits of transactions with foreign central banks, monetary policy deliberations, transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open Market Committee and communications between the Board, the reserve banks and staff, Paul said today.

“There’s nothing left, it’s been gutted,” he said in a telephone interview. “This is not a partisan issue. People all over the country want to know what the Fed is up to, and this legislation was supposed to help them do that.”..

Paul, a member of the House Financial Services Committee, said Mel Watt, a Democrat from North Carolina, has eliminated “just about everything” while preparing the legislation for formal consideration. Watt is chairman of the panel’s domestic monetary policy and technology subcommittee.

Congress is also suggesting that the Fed be given more powers, making it the chief risk regulator of the entire banking system.

Specifically, as summarized by Huffington Post, a new bill introduced by Democrats in Congress “gives the Federal Reserve the power to determine which firms are actually ‘too big to fail’ and pose systemic risk to the financial system.”

Given the Fed’s history (as discussed below), that is like appointing the head of the Medellin drug cartel as drug tzar.

Admittedly, the Congressional bill allows other agencies a seat at the risk regulator table. But those are likely token seats. If the drug tzar’s office was staffed by the head of the Medellin drug cartel – who had the majority vote – and some law enforcement officers who have a history of either (a) being on the take or (b) looking the other way, what do you think would the result would be?

High-Level Fed Officials Speak Out

High-level officials of the Fed itself have criticized the Fed’s actions. For example, the head of the Federal Reserve bank of San Francisco – during a talk on how runaway bubbles can lead to depressions – admitted:

Fed monetary policy may also have contributed to the U.S. credit boom and the associated house price bubble …

Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn conceded that the government’s actions “will reduce [companies'] incentive to be careful in the future.” In other words, he’s admitting that the government’s actions will encourage financial companies to make even riskier gambles in the future.

Kansas City Fed President and veteran Fed official Thomas Hoenig said:

Too big has failed….

The sequence of [the government's] actions, unfortunately, has added to market uncertainty. Investors are understandably watching to see which institutions will receive public money and survive as wards of the state…

Any financial crisis leaves a stream of losses among the various participants, and these losses must ultimately be borne by someone. To start the resolution process, management responsible for the problems must be replaced and the losses identified and taken. Until these actions are taken, there is little chance to restore market confidence and get credit markets flowing. It is not a question of avoiding these losses, but one of how soon we will take them and get on to the process of recovery….

Many of the [government's current policy revolves around the idea of] “too big to fail” …. History, however, may show us a different experience. When examining previous financial crises, both in other countries as well as the United States, large institutions have been allowed to fail. Banking authorities have been successful in placing new and more responsible managers and directions in charge and then reprivatizing them. There is also evidence suggesting that countries that have tried to avoid taking such steps have been much slower to recover, and the ultimate cost to taxpayers has been larger…

The current head of the Philadelphia fed bank, Charles Plosser, disagrees with Bernanke’s strategy of the endless printing-press and ever-increasing fed balance sheet:

Plosser urged the Fed to “proceed with caution” with the new policy. Others outside the Fed are much more strident and want plans in place immediately to reverse it. They believe an inflation storm is already in train.***

Bernanke argued that focusing on the size of the balance sheet misses the point, arguing the Fed’s various asset purchase programs are not easily summarized in a single number.

But Plosser said that the growth of the Fed’s balance sheet was a key metric.

“It is not appropriate to ignore quantitative metrics in this new policy environment,” Plosser said.***

Plosser is bringing the spotlight right back to the Fed’s balance sheet.

“The size of the balance sheet does offer a possible nominal anchor for monitoring the volume of our liquidity provisions,” Plosser said.

The former head of the Fed’s Open Market Operations says the bailout might make things worse. Specifically, the former head of the Fed’s open market operation – the key Fed agency which has been loaning hundreds of billions of dollars to Wall Street companies and banks – was quoted in Bloomberg as saying:

“Every time you tinker with this delicate system even small changes can create big ripples,” said Dino Kos, former head of the New York Fed’s open-market operations . . . “This is the impossible situation they are in. The risks are that the government’s $700 billion purchase of assets disturbs markets even more.”

And William Poole, who recently left his post as president of the St. Louis Fed, is essentially calling Bernanke a communist:

Poole said he was very concerned that the Fed could simply lend money to anyone, without constraint.

In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the Cold War era, economies were inefficient because they had a soft-budget constraint. If a firm got into trouble, the banking system would give them more money, Poole said.

The current situation at the Fed seems eerily similar, he said.

“What is discipline – where are the hard choices – when does Fed say our resources are exhausted?” Poole asked.

But the strongest criticism may be from the former Vice President of Dallas Federal Reserve, who said that the failure of the government to provide more information about the bailout could signal corruption. As ABC writes:

Gerald O’Driscoll, a former vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank, said he worried that the failure of the government to provide more information about its rescue spending could signal corruption.

“Nontransparency in government programs is always associated with corruption in other countries, so I don’t see why it wouldn’t be here,” he said.

Of course, former Fed chairman Paul Volcker has also strongly criticized current Fed policies.

Global Agencies Speak Out

BIS – the central banks’ central bank – slammed the Fed and other central banks for blowing bubbles and then “using gimmicks and palliatives” which “will only make things worse”.

The head of the World Bank also says:

Central banks [including the Fed] failed to address risks building in the new economy. They seemingly mastered product price inflation in the 1980s, but most decided that asset price bubbles were difficult to identify and to restrain with monetary policy. They argued that damage to the ‘real economy’ of jobs, production, savings, and consumption could be contained once bubbles burst, through aggressive easing of interest rates. They turned out to be wrong.

Economists Speak Out

Stephen Roach (former chief economist for Morgan Stanley, and now director of Morgan Stanley Asia) is one of the most influential and respected American economists.

Roach told Charlie Rose this week that we have had terrible Federal Reserve policy for the past 12 years under Greenspan and Bernanke, that they concocted hair-brained theories (for example, that we should let the boom and bust cycle occur, but then “clean up the mess” once things fall apart), and that we really need to reform the Fed.

Specifically, here’s the must-read portion of the interview:

STEPHEN ROACH: And what’s missing in the debate that drives me nuts is going back to the very function of central banking that’s at the core of our financial system. Do we have the right model for the Fed to go forward? And, you know, I think we’ve minimized the role that the custodians, the stewards of our financial
system, the Federal Reserve, played in leading to this crisis and in making sure that we will never have this again. I think we’ve had horrible central banking in the United States for the past dozen of years. I mean, we elevate our central bankers, we probably .

CHARLIE ROSE: From Greenspan to Bernanke.

STEPHEN ROACH: Yeah.

CHARLIE ROSE: Both.

STEPHEN ROACH: We call them maestro, and, you know, we make them
sound larger than life. And, you know, and the fact is, they condoned
policies that took us from one bubble to another. They failed to live up
to their regulatory responsibility granted them by law. They concocted new
theories to explain why these things could go on forever, and they harbored
the belief, mistakenly in my view, that monetary policy is too big and
blunt an instrument, and so you just bring it in to clean up the mess
afterwards rather than prevent a mess ahead of time. Well, look at the
mess we’re in right now. We need a different approach here. We really do.

Leading economist Anna Schwartz, co-author of the leading book on the Great Depression with Milton Friedman, told the Wall Street journal that the Fed’s entire strategy in dealing with the financial crisis is wrong. Specifically, the Fed is treating it as a liquidity problem, when it is really an insolvency crisis.

Moreover, prominent Wall Street economist Henry Kaufman says that the Federal Reserve is primarily to blame for the financial crisis:

“I am convinced that the misbehavior of some would have been much rarer — and far less damaging to our economy — if the Federal Reserve and, to a lesser extent, other supervisory authorities, had measured up to their responsibilities …

Kaufman directly criticized former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan for not using his position to dissuade big banks and others from taking big risks.

“Alan Greenspan spoke about irrational exuberance only as a theoretical concept, not as a warning to the market to curb excessive behavior,” Kaufman said. “It is difficult to believe that recourse to moral suasion by a Fed chairman would be ineffective.”

Partly because the Fed did not strongly oppose the repeal in 1999 of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act, more large financial conglomerates that were “too big to fail” have formed, Kaufman said, citing a factor that has made the global credit crisis especially acute.

“Financial conglomerates have become more and more opaque, especially about their massive off-balance-sheet activities,” he said. “The Fed failed to rein in the problem.”…

“Much of the recent extreme financial behavior is rooted in faulty monetary policies,” he said. “Poor policies encourage excessive risk taking.”

Economist Marc Faber says that central bankers are money printers who create bubbles, and that the system would be much better now if the Fed hadn’t intervened. Specifically, Faber says that – if the Fed hadn’t intervened – the system would be cleaned out, the system would be healthier because debt load and burden on taxpayers would be reduced.

Economist Jane D’Arista has shown that the Fed has failed miserably at its main task: providing a “counter-cyclical” influence (that is, taking the punch bowl away before the party gets too wild).

The Fed has also failed miserably in its role as regulator of banks and their affiliates. As well-known economist James Galbraith says:

The Federal Reserve has never been an effective regulator for the straightforward reason that it is dominated by economists and bankers and not by dedicated skeptics who make bank regulation a full-time profession.

The Fed has performed terribly in many other tasks as well.

And the Fed is unlawfully refusing to disclose to Congress or the American people who it’s giving money to and what it is really doing.

Conclusion

Given the above, isn’t it obvious that Congress is attempting to give the Fed more powers at a time when it should be audited, and then ended?

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

When a liberal labor leader and a conservative financial policy analyst unite against something, you know that something is really bad (actually, I don’t believe in the whole false left-right dichotomy; I think its Americans versus those trying to steal our wallets and our rights, but that’s another story).

Today, AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka has slammed the Fed and the proposed “Tarp on steroids” legislation in his testimony to Congress today. Here are the must-read parts of Trumka’s prepared remarks to the House Financial Services Committee:

We are deeply concerned that the Committee’s work thus far on the fundamental issues of regulating shadow financial markets and institutions will allow the very practices that led to the financial crisis to continue. The loopholes in the derivatives bill and the failure to require any public disclosures by hedge funds and private equity funds fundamentally will leave the shadow markets in the shadows. We urge the Committee to work with the leadership to strengthen these bills before they come to the House floor.

However, these powers must be given to a fully public body, and one that is able to
benefit from the information and perspective of the routine regulators of the financial system. We believe a new agency, with a board made up of a mixture of the heads of the routine regulators and direct Presidential appointees would be the best structure. However, if the Federal Reserve were made a fully public body, it would be an acceptable alternative.

But we cannot support the discussion draft made public earlier this week because it gives dramatic new powers to the Federal Reserve without reforming its governance so that the banks themselves are removed from the governance of the Federal Reserve System. Even more alarmingly, the discussion draft would appear to give power to the Federal Reserve to preempt a wide range of rules regulating the capital markets—power which could be used to gut investor and consumer protections. If this Committee wishes to give more power to the Federal Reserve, it must make clear this power is only to strengthen safety and soundness regulation and it must simultaneously reform the Federal Reserve’s governance. Reform cannot be put off until another day.

The Federal Reserve currently is the regulator for bank holding companies. In that
capacity, it was responsible throughout the period of the bubble for regulating the parent companies of the nation’s largest banks. While regulatory authority rests in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in Washington, routine responsibility for regulatory oversight has been delegated by the Board of Governors to the regional Federal Reserve Banks. The Federal Reserve System’s regulatory expertise resides in these regional banks.

The problem is that these regional Federal Reserve Banks are actually controlled by their member banks—the very banks whose holding companies the Fed regulates. The member banks control the selection of the majority of the regional bank boards, and the boards pick the regional bank presidents, who are effectively the CEO’s of the regulatory staff.

These arrangements may explain why the Federal Reserve has never given any account of how it allowed bank holding companies like Citigroup and Bank of America to arrive at a point where they required tens of billions of dollars of direct equity infusions from the public purse to avoid bankruptcy.

Giving the Federal Reserve with its current governance control over which financial
institutions are bailed out in a crisis is effectively giving the banks the ability to raid the Treasury for their own benefit.

We are also deeply troubled by provisions in the discussion draft that would allow the Federal Reserve to use taxpayer funds to rescue failing banks, and then bill other nonfailing banks for the costs. The incentive structure created by this system seems likely to increase systemic risk.

We believe it would be more appropriate to require financial institutions to pay into an insurance fund on an ongoing basis. Financial institutions should be subject to progressively higher fee assessments, and stricter capital requirements, as they get larger. This would be a way of actually discouraging “too big to fail.”

In addition, language in the draft that appears to limit taxpayer bailouts of bank
stockholders actually does no such thing, rather it simply ensures that when stockholders are rescued with public funds, bondholders and other creditors are rescued with them…

Finally, and not least, the discussion draft appears to envision a process for identifying and regulating systemically significant institutions, and for resolving failing institutions, that is secretive and optional—in other words, the Federal Reserve could choose to take no steps to strengthen the safety and soundness regulation of systemically significant institutions. In these respects, the discussion draft appears to take the most problematic and unpopular aspects of the TARP and makes them the model for permanent legislation.

Instead of repeating and deepening the mistakes associated with the bank bailout,
Congress should be looking to create transparent, fully publicly accountable mechanisms for regulating systemic risk and for acting to protect our economy in any future financial crises.

Conservative Peter Wallison – financial policy study analyst at the American Enterprise Institute – largely agrees. In his prepared remarks to Congress, Wallison says:

The Discussion Draft of October 27 contains an extremely troubling set of proposals which, if adopted, will bring economic growth in this country to a standstill, essentially turn over the control of the financial system to the government, and seriously impair competition in all areas of finance.

Rather than ending too big to fail, the Draft makes it national policy. By designating certain companies for special prudential regulation, the Draft would signal to the markets that these companies are too big to fail, creating Fannies and Freddies in every sector of the economy where they are designated. This will impair competition by giving large companies funding and other advantages over small ones.

The idea that the designation of these companies will be kept secret is, with all due respect, absurd; securities laws alone will require them to disclose their special status; simple truthfulness will do the rest…

If this legislation is passed, every industry will be in Washington, asking for special treatment or exemption. Competition in the market will become competition before this committee or in the halls of the Fed, lobbyist-to-lobbyist and lawyer-to-lawyer…

This will not only create uncertainty and moral hazard, but it will give the large and powerful companies special advantages over small ones. Those that seem likely to be taken over by the government will have easier access to credit, at lower rates, than those likely to be sent to bankruptcy.

In other words, the Draft proposes nothing more or less than a permanent TARP, using government money to bail out the large or politically favored companies, and then taxes the remaining healthy companies to reimburse the government for its costs of competing with them…

The [proposed bill] would take control of the financial industry in the United States, stifle risk-taking and initiative, and change competitive conditions in every sector of the economy so that they favor large, government-backed, too big to fail enterprises…

The Draft … would now give the Fed authority to regulate any financial company that the Council determines should be subject to “heightened prudential standards,” even if there is no insured bank in the group…

The result is that the question becomes one of political clout, with industries fighting in Congress for the competitive result they want. Some industries want to invade others’ turf; the invaded industry uses the law to fend off the competition; consumers are the losers. Congress becomes the battleground. It’s not just unseemly; it’s a frightening example of what happens when the government starts picking winners…

Congress will be injecting itself into competitive fights between firms and industries, further politicizing what should be economic or financial decisions…

The Designated Companies are under the complete control of the Fed. They will not be able to initiate new activities without the Fed’s approval, or enter new competitive fields, or perhaps even open new offices in new places. This is a degree of political control of business that has never been attempted before. Not only will it place the dead hand of government on the activities of financial companies, but it will almost certainly drive many financial companies out of the United States before they submit to these restrictions.

The effect of these restrictions for the U.S. economy will be dire. First, Designated Companies will clearly have been labeled as too big to fail. In effect, the government has notified the capital markets that these firms will not be allowed to go into bankruptcy—they will be rescued in the ways I will describe below. This means they will be less risky borrowers than smaller companies that are not going to be controlled in the same way. As less risky borrowers, the Designated Companies will have lower costs of funding and will be able to drive smaller competitors from the markets they enter. Sound familiar? Yes, it’s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac all over again. The existence of these Designated Companies will impair competition in every market they are allowed to enter, and will force the consolidation of competitors so that markets become dominated by government-backed giants like themselves….

[The bill assumes that] our entire financial system must be subjected, today, to far-reaching control by the Federal Reserve Board. With all due respect, this is absurd, and certainly disastrous for economic growth in the future.

The Draft also contains language that suggest some of the problems of identifying Designated Companies in advance—and thus creating the Fannie/Freddie too big to fail problem—can be avoided if the designation of these companies is not disclosed to the public. This, too, with all due respect, is absurd…

In addition, there is very little incentive for the government not to rescue failing Designated Companies, because the Draft provides that the surviving members of the financial industry larger than $10 billion in assets—whether Designated Companies or not—will be taxed to reimburse the government for its costs in the bailout…

As in the GM and Chrysler bailouts, preferences are going to go to favored groups, and disfavored groups will suffer disproportionate losses. It will be a political free for all, with important legislators pressing the FDIC to treat their constituents better than someone else’s constituents.

What we know is that no losses will be taken immediately by creditors. This is because the objective of the resolution authority is to prevent a “disorderly” failure, which actually means a failure in which creditors suffer immediate losses…

The proposals in the Draft reflect very bad policy—far more likely to be destructive of the financial system and damaging to the economy than an improvement on what exists today.

Wow, I should not be surprised, but this is a stunner nevertheless.

It had generally been assumed that the AIG payouts of 100% on credit swaps (when the insurer was under water and bankrupt companies do not satisfy their obligations in full) was the result of some gap in oversight plus traders at AIG exercising discretion (they were unhappy about bonus rows and had reason to curry favor with dealers, who were potential employers).

The article makes clear that AIG had been negotiating to settle on the swaps prior to getting aid from the government, and was seeking a 40% discount. The Fed might not have gotten that much of a discount, but there was clearly no need to pay out at par.

This massive backdoor subsidy to the likes of Goldman, DeutscheBank was authorized by Geithner while he was at the New York Fed.

From Bloomberg:

[Elias} Habayeb, 37, was chief financial officer for the AIG division that oversaw AIG Financial Products, the unit that had sold the swaps to the banks. One of his goals was to persuade the banks to accept discounts of as much as 40 cents on the dollar....

Beginning late in the week of Nov. 3, the New York Fed, led by President Timothy Geithner, took over negotiations with the banks from AIG, together with the Treasury Department and Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s Federal Reserve. Geithner’s team circulated a draft term sheet outlining how the New York Fed wanted to deal with the swaps -- insurance-like contracts that backed soured collateralized-debt obligations....

Part of a sentence in the document was crossed out. It contained a blank space that was intended to show the amount of the haircut the banks would take, according to people who saw the term sheet. After less than a week of private negotiations with the banks, the New York Fed instructed AIG to pay them par, or 100 cents on the dollar. The content of its deliberations has never been made public.

The New York Fed’s decision to pay the banks in full cost AIG -- and thus American taxpayers -- at least $13 billion. That’s 40 percent of the $32.5 billion AIG paid to retire the swaps. Under the agreement, the government and its taxpayers became owners of the dubious CDOs, whose face value was $62 billion and for which AIG paid the market price of $29.6 billion. The CDOs were shunted into a Fed-run entity called Maiden Lane III...

The deal contributed to the more than $14 billion that over 18 months was handed to Goldman Sachs, whose former chairman, Stephen Friedman, was chairman of the board of directors of the New York Fed when the decision was made.....

“In cases like this, the outcome is always along the lines of 50, 60 or 70 cents on the dollar,” [Donn] Vickrey [of financial research firm Gradient Analytics Inc.] says…..

One reason par was paid was because some counterparties insisted on being paid in full and the New York Fed did not want to negotiate separate deals, says a person close to the transaction. “Some of those banks needed 100 cents on the dollar or they risked failure,” Vickrey says.

As Vickrey indicates, the fact that this was a backdoor rescue means the Fed is acting as an extra budgetary vehicle of the Treasury. This is a violation of the Constitution and shows how patently false the Fed’s claims of independence are.

Update. Some readers have argued “The government was backstopping AIG, ergo it had to honor all contracts.” That argument is rubbish; AIG under Fed supervision stiffed other creditors. From a reader by e-mail:

Liddy sent a letter to Congress which gave a summary the losses at AIG. As I remember it it only 53% of the losses covered by the Fed resulted from activity at AIGFP. Of the 43% realized at the insurance subs a substantial fraction were losses on GIAs with state pension plans-including Californis and Virgina. The losses were in to the billions. Was the Fed suppose to pay 40 cents on the dollar to state pension funds while paying off foreign banks in full?

Now I know the argument goes something like “these were regulated subsidiaries, AIG FP was at the parent level.” Again, I don’t buy it. Creditors in distress who have not declared BK frequently renegotiate their obligations. As readers know well, even credit card issuers will lower the amount due by overextended individuals, and the Fed clearly had more clout here that a mere individual versus has with, say, BofA. The real issue is that the Fed BY DESIGN bailed out banks, including foreign banks, through a device not authorized by Congress.

By Richard Alford, a former economist at the New York Fed. Since them, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

It has been frequently charged that the Fed, under Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, kept interest rates too low for too long, contributing to bubbles in the stock, credit and real estate markets. The Fed has repeatedly denied that this is the case. The arguments, while presented with conviction, remain unsatisfying.

For example in a recent blog posting, an official at one of the Reserve Banks joined the chorus in arguing that monetary policy was not to blame. He presented a chart of the actual Fed funds rate and an estimate path for the Fed funds rates based on measures of inflation, actual output relative to potential output, and the lagged Fed funds rate for the period 1988-2009.

The estimated and actual rates never diverge by very much. (The author explicitly disavows calling his formulation a “Taylor Rule”. Perhaps it is because John Taylor has stated that the Taylor Rule correctly formulated indicates that the Fed funds rate was too low too long.)

The author then draws the following conclusion:

..whatever the underlying structure of policy decisions, after the fact the FOMC appears to have behaved in an extraordinarily consistent way over the period extending from the late 1980s. This observation, in turn, suggests to me that there was nothing all that unusual about monetary policy in 2003 once you account for the state of the economy. Which leads me to my main point…: If you are of the opinion that interest rate policy was good through the late 1980s and 1990s, then there seems to be a good case the FOMC was just sticking with “proven” success as it set interest rates through the dawning of the new millennium.

In its bare bones form, the argument is simply:

1. this policy regime was appropriate in prior years (late 1980s and 1990s);
2. the policy regime was unchanged;
3. therefore the policy regime must have been appropriate during the period in question (2002-2007).

I suggest that the Fed official talk with the fellows from LTCM. They back-tested their models during periods that include the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s and they did well—for a while. I suggest that the policymaker talk to the financial engineers who structured mortgage backed securities and portfolios based on the historically accurate premise that house prices had not fallen on a national basis since the Great Depression (as opposed to just the late 1980s and 1990s). They also did well –for a while. The list goes on.

The author does acknowledge that macroeconomics and policy has not kept pace with changes in financial markets:

…prior to 2007 it was not at all clear that detailed descriptions of how funds moved from lenders to borrowers or how short-term interest rates are transmitted to longer-term interest rates and capital accumulation decisions were crucial to getting monetary policy right. Models without such detail tended to deliver policy decisions not far from the sort depicted above, and, as I noted, they seemed to be working quite well in terms of macroeconomic outcomes.

However, the underlying argument is unchanged. This policy regime was consistent with “getting monetary policy right” in the past. Hence it cannot be responsible for poor outcomes in the present. Given the nature and the pace of recent change in:

1. the US financial sector,
2. the US external position and trade competitiveness,
3. the role of imported disinflationary pressures, and
4. the savings behavior of households

choosing a policy regime because it “got” it right in the late 1980s and 1990s is/was like trying to drive a car by looking through a telescopic rear-view mirror.

Furthermore, by what measure did policy get it right during the period 1988-2002? From 1996 to 2001, we had an economy supported by an unsustainable bubble in stock prices, growing external imbalances and a decline in the household savings rate while measured inflation was held down by imported disinflation. Toss out the Tech bubble years and the author’s base period is down to 1988-1995, which includes one recession. For much of the time in the expanded time horizon (1988-2009), the US economy was either in recession (1990, 2001, 2007), experiencing asset bubbles (1996-2000 and 2002-2007) which eventually burst causing economic dislocation, or enjoying a jobless recovery.

Throughout the discussion of the merits of Fed policy, I get the sense that the Fed wants to be Marked-graded-to-Model (of its own choosing) as opposed to the actual economic outcome. The Fed does appear to have done a credible job when the chosen metric is how closely the actual Fed rates tracks an estimated Fed funds rate (based on one or another variant of the Taylor Rule). However, when the metric is one that includes concerns such as sustainability of growth, external balance, and financial stability, as well as the output gap and inflation, it does not.

The Fed was quick to take credit for the “Great Moderation” and the longest economic expansion in US history, but now the Fed portrays itself as an innocent victim of circumstance. It is almost as if the Fed sees itself as a comic book super hero, endowed with powers that can only be used for good.