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Archive for July, 2011

Links 7/31/11

Dear readers, I am glad to see that many of you are happy with the cross posts of the last few days. The high proportion of them is due to a confluence of good material and a lot of non-blog demands. I should be back to normal programming in the next day or so.

Pollinators ‘lured away by farms’ BBC

Arctic scientist who exposed climate threat to polar bear is suspended Guardian (hat tip Buzz Potamkin)

Southampton engineers fly the world’s first ‘printed’ aircraft University of Southampton (hat tip reader furzy mouse)

Poor countries fight for reform of global tax systems Guardian

Fighting back against the CIA drone war Aljazeera (hat tip Lambert Strether)

Gaddafi is stronger than ever in Libya Guardian (hat tip reader May S)

Foxconn to replace workers with 1 million robots in 3 years Xinhua

Obama Faces Grumbling On The Left NPR (hat tip reader Foppe). It’s going to take more than grumbling to have any impact

The Costs of War CounterPunch (hat tip reader lefteyeonbooks)

Legislation to Phase Out Private Military Contractors is Filed in Senate and House Bernie Sanders (hat tip reader furzy mouse)

Why Voters Tune Out Democrats New York Times (hat tip reader Externality)

Could Apple pull a J.P. Morgan and bail out the U.S. government? Los Angeles Times

The #trilliondollarcoin meme Ed Harrison

A Mobilization in Washington by Wall Street New York Times. Summary: Washington wasn’t as bought and paid for as they thought and now they have a full court press on to get it back into line

Some Bankers Never Learn Gretchen Morgenson, New York Times

Judge threatens to sanction CEO of HSBC for ‘robo-signing’ Seeking Alpha (hat tip Lisa Epstein)

NC chicken plants closing, laying off 1,000 Associated Press (hat tip Buzz Potamkin). “Lack of discipline” here appears to mean the reverse of the usual “price discipline”.

Antidote du jour:

“Time to Take Stock”

Yves here. I had come across the speech mentioned in this post, “The Race to Zero” by Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England and decided not to write it up because I had come across it a bit late. This post will probably persuade readers that that was a bad call.

By Sell on News, a macro equities analyst. Cross posted from MacroBusiness

Exactly how did we get into this mess with the capital markets? A situation where the global stock of derivatives is over $US600 trillion, which is about twice the capital stock of the world. A situation where high frequency trading is over two thirds of the transactions on the NYSE and about the same in the stock markets of the UK and Europe. Likewise they are over half the action in foreign exchange markets and they are rapidly becoming dominant in the futures market. Andrew Haldane from the Bank of England is arguing against allowing high frequency trading — algorithms chasing algorithms chasing algorithms — from being allowed to proliferate pointing at volatility as the problem:

Speed increases the risk of feasts and famines in market liquidity. HFT [high-frequency traders] contribute to the feast through lower bid-ask spreads. But they also contribute to the famine if their liquidity provision is fickle in situations of stress.

Haldane noted that relative to gross domestic product, the equity market capitalisation of the US, Europe and Asia had not grown since 2000, suggesting that “the contribution of equity markets to economic growth … has been static”.

Little wonder, when you consider that companies are putting themselves in the hands of algorithms.

I think this conclusion, which many come to, is to some extent a blind alley. Because the volume of transactions is higher — when it is claimed that it adds liquidity this is a circular argument, like saying “the more we trade the more we trade” — it should mean that “volatility” at least on basic measures, is lower. The trades are made around normative models so they will tend to re-inforce those norms. Right up until the moment when the market does not behave with regard to norms, and then they suddenly start doing weird things, such as the so called “Flash Crash”. So it is probably correct to say that there is less volatility. It is also beside the point.

A better question is: Why do we think liquidity is a good thing?” Answer, because it facilitates trade around the exchange of information. “Information about what?” one might then ask. “The company in which the investment is being made,” is the answer. Does algorithmic trading exchange information about the performance of the company? No, it is only working off information about trading behaviour. Ergo, it may increase “liquidity” but it is not fulfilling the purpose of liquidity.

That kind of shift to traders working mostly off what traders do, rather than assessing the value of what is being traded, has become an absolute plague. It has taken over most Western financial markets. Hedging, for example, used to be all about hedging bets to protect the underling exchanges (usually wheat, or pork bellies or physical things). Now, hedging is all about reading behaviour, which then leads to other hedging strategies that are based on reading the hedging behaviour, and so on.

So the disappearing point is part of the problem. In our “anthrosphere” we are increasingly staring at each other’s navels in the financial markets, trying to make money and sustainable wealth out of ether. That is part of the problem. Regulators forgetting what the PURPOSE of financial markets is and instead just trying to stay faithful to the technical explications of that purpose, or utility. A colossal abrogation of responsibility, in other words, fuelled by thoughtlessness or intellectual laziness (Haldane is a notable exception).

But I think there is another problem. A growing mismatch in TIME between financial markets and commerce or economic activity. I can remember in the currency meltdowns of the last 20 years how the explanations in retrospect for why Russia or Thailand or Mexico or Indonesia “deserved” what they got. They were always plausible enough, if usually circular arguments.

But then you looked at what happened to those economies that had experienced crises and the impact was completely out of alignment. In a matter of weeks, there would be a massive re-rating of the currencies. No economy changes that fast. The problems, if there were problems and sometimes it was just a trading fiction, had usually accumulated for years. After the crises, the economies would take years to recover from the shock. It seemed to me that the misalignment in time is what is fundamentally wrong with this kind of financial behaviour.

The misalignment is even more extreme with high frequency trading, where micro-seconds are the basic unit. How can the exchange of information about a stock occur in such small periods? Obviously they can’t. There is a mismatch. Money should be aligned with what it is supposed to be representing, and that includes aligned in its temporal structure. For at least two decades, that alignment has been progressively picked apart, and now it is reaching endemic proportions.

In terms of its intellectual origins, this has a lot to do with the quasi-scientific methods used by economists and financiers. In science, time is just a dimension of space. The point of creating scientific “rules” is to say that every TIME the rule applies. Time, in other words, has to be eliminated as a problem.

Which is why science applies so poorly to human behaviour, because humans are always changing in time. It is why scientific models have extremely limited application to markets, because every time things are different — at least in their timing. For instance, I may reasonably conclude that the $A will fall, and be right because it will probably revert back t a norm. But what I need to know to make money is the time it will happen.

What one notices about all the fundamental analyses is that, while persuasive, they are extremely limited because they don’t tell you when the predicted events will occur. Those traders who sniff “the times” often do much better.

Time, in other words, cannot be eliminated from human behaviour, it is front and centre.

Which is why I would submit that the misalignment in time between financial market instruments and that which they are supposed to represent is not just extremely dangerous, it is fundamentally inhuman.

Guest Post: Adam Smith Would Neither Recognize Nor Approve Of Our Financial, Monetary, Economic Or Legal Systems

By Washington’s Blog

The father of modern economics – Adam Smith – is used as a poster child to support the status quo that we have today. Smith is invoked as the patron saint of free market economics.

In fact, Smith would neither recognize or approve of our current financial, monetary, economic or legal systems.

I noted last year:

Americans have traditionally believed that the “invisible hand of the market” means that capitalism will benefit us all without requiring any oversight. However, as the New York Times notes, the real Adam Smith did not believe in a magically benevolent market which operates for the benefit of all without any checks and balances:

Smith railed against monopolies and the political influence that accompanies economic power

Smith worried about the encroachment of government on economic activity, but his concerns were directed at least as much toward parish councils, church wardens, big corporations, guilds and religious institutions as to the national government; these institutions were part and parcel of 18th-century government…

Smith was sometimes tolerant of government intervention, ”especially when the object is to reduce poverty.” Smith passionately argued, ”When the regulation, therefore, is in support of the workman, it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of the masters.” He saw a tacit conspiracy on the part of employers ”always and everywhere” to keep wages as low as possible.

Paul Krugman pointed out:

Adam Smith … may have been the father of free-market economics, but he argued that bank regulation was as necessary as fire codes on urban buildings, and called for a ban on high-risk, high-interest lending, the 18th-century version of subprime.

And Damon Vrabel wrote:

It seems ridiculous to point this out, but sovereign debt implies sovereignty. Right? Well, if countries are sovereign, then how could they be required to be in debt to private banking institutions? How could they be so easily attacked by the likes of George Soros, JP Morgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs? Why would they be subjugated to the whims of auctions and traders?

A true sovereign is in debt to nobody and is not traded in the public markets. For example, how would George Soros attack, say, the British royal family? [Vrabel is presumably referring to Soros' currency speculation against the British pound and other currencies.] It’s not possible. They are sovereign. Their stock isn’t traded on the NYSE. He can’t orchestrate a naked short sell strategy to destroy their credit and force them to restructure their assets. But he can do that to most of the other 6.7 billion people of the world by designing attack strategies against the companies they work for and the governments they depend on.

The fact is that most countries are not sovereign (the few that are are being attacked by [the big Western intelligence services] or the military). Instead they are administrative districts or customers of the global banking establishment whose power has grown steadily over time based on the math of the bond market, currently ruled by the US dollar, and the expansionary nature of fractional lending. Their cult of economists from places like Harvard, Chicago, and the London School have steadily eroded national sovereignty by forcing debt-based … currencies on countries.

We long ago lost the free market envisioned by Adam Smith in the “Wealth of Nations” [the book widely considered to be the foundation of modern economic theory]. Such a world would require sovereign currencies…. Only then could there be a “wealth of nations.” But now we have nothing but the “debt of nations.” The exponential math of debt by definition meant that countries would only lose their wealth over time and become increasingly indebted to the global central banking network.

Smith also knew that trust was a basic ingredient of a sound economy. As I noted in March:

In 1998, Paul Zak (Professor of Economics and Department Chair, as well as the founding Director of the Center for Neuroeconomics Studies at Claremont Graduate University, Professor of Neurology at Loma Linda University Medical Center, and a senior researcher at UCLA) and Stephen Knack (a Lead Economist in the World Bank’s Research Department and Public Sector Governance Department) wrote a paper called Trust and Growth, arguing:

Adam Smith … observed notable differences across nations in the ‘probity’ and ‘punctuality’ of their populations. For example, the Dutch ‘are the most faithful to their word.’John Stuart Mill wrote: ‘There are countries in Europe . . . where the most serious impediment to conducting business concerns on a large scale, is the rarity of persons who are supposed fit to be trusted with the receipt and expenditure of large sums of money’ (Mill, 1848, p. 132).

Enormous differences across countries in the propensity to trust others survive
today.

***

Trust is higher in ‘fair’ societies.

***

High trust societies produce more output than low trust societies. A fortiori, a sufficient amount of trust may be crucial to successful development. Douglass North (1990, p. 54) writes,

The inability of societies to develop effective, lowcost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.

***

If trust is too low in a society, savings will be insufficient to sustain
positive output growth. Such a poverty trap is more likely when institutions -
both formal and informal – which punish cheaters are weak.

Because strong enforcement of laws against fraud is a basic prerequisite for trust, I believe Smith would be disgusted by the lack of prosecution of Wall Street fraudsters today.

And Smith warned against the pitfalls of fiat currencies unpegged to anything real:

The problem with fiat money is that it rewards the minority that can handle money, but fools the generation that has worked and saved money.

It is certain that Smith would rail against our current financial, monetary, economic and legal systems as violating the most important foundations of sound economics.

Links 7/30/11

Presidential Commission Seeks Volunteers to Store U.S. Nuclear Waste Scientific American (hat tip reader propertius)

Twitter emerges on Washington front line Financial Times

The Downfall of a Press Baron Adam Curtis (hat tip Philip Pilkington)

House passes GOP debt bill over objections of Obama, Democrats; Senate votes to table Washington Post

Tell President Obama: Invoke the 14th Amendment and stop the contrived default crisis Credo

Veteran Lawmakers Doubt Aug. 2 Deadline Is Possible New York Times. Why is the Times still invoking August 2? It is now widely known the real drop dead date is August 10.

Auerback: Obama Closer to Tea Party Than Democrats FoxBusiness

Regulators willing to go easy on banks Financial Times

Dodd-Frank Update Jon Stewart (hat tip reader helllloooooo)

California Counties Reel From Tax Hit Wall Street Journal (hat tip reader May S)

America and the terrible, horrible, no good, very bad GDP data One Salient Oversight

Merck looks to cut up to 13,000 jobs Financial Times

The top-end-of-town have captured the growth Bill Mitchell (hat tip Philip Pilkington)

The Madoff Trustee’s Bad Day Joe Nocera, New York Times

Stucknation: Schneiderman’s Mission to Restore Faith in the American Mortgage Bob Hennelley

Rating move shocks CMBS investors Financial Times

In Steinbeck’s footsteps: America’s middle-class underclass BBC (hat tip reader Neil Wilson)

Depression in Command Wall Street Journal. See also our The Dark Side of Optimism

It’s really annoying that they resort to the label “mentally ill”. Even though Churchill’s dark moods were intense, it isn’t as if they didn’t have a foundation in reality. He was a has-been in his middle age and early 60s after having been a star in his youth and always fending off creditors (he supported himself through writing). This piece reflects the US having defined the threshold for “mental illness” down so that people who respond emotionally of the vicissitudes of life (and they are aplenty) are pathologized when someone would have to be pretty disturbed NOT to be affected. Notice the emphasis on how annoying Churchill was. The subtext, that of an ideal of bland normalcy, is to keep people from impinging on the socially acceptable neuroses of the general population.

Opinion: GOP’s ‘alternate universe’ Matt Stoller, Politico

Antidote du jour:

“Is Standard and Poor’s Manipulating US Debt Rating to Escape Liability for the Mortgage Crisis?”

By Scarecrow and Jane Hamsher. Cross posted from FireDogLake

The Politico headline says it all: U.S. credit downgrade worries Obama, Congress more than default

It’s not the default that strikes the most fear in the White House and Congress these days. It’s the downgrade

As Robert Reich notes, Standard and Poors is the “biggest driver in the deficit battle.” Why would anyone care what the corrupt and disgraced organizations who quite nearly brought down the world economy think about anything at this point? And yet, that is where elite opinion is focused right now:

[W]hat really haunts the administration is the very real prospect, stoked two weeks ago by Standard & Poor’s, that Barack Obama could go down in history as the president who presided over his country’s loss of its gold-plated, triple-A bond rating.

[]

Financial analysts say such a move would hit Americans with more than $100 billion a year in higher borrowing costs, but it’s not just that. It would be a psychic blow to a nation that already looks over its shoulder at rising economic powers like China and wonders, what’s gone wrong? And it would give the president’s Republican rivals a ready-made line of attack that he’s dragging the country in the wrong direction.

This rumbling has been coming from Capitol Hill for a while, which made us start asking questions about what was really going on with Standard and Poors. It felt like there’s a story-behind-the-story driving S&P’s actions in the debt ceiling debate, which appear inexplicable at face value and go way beyond what Moody’s or Fitch have done. And the more we looked at the timeline of events, the more we wondered how the intertwining dramas of a) S&P downgrade threats, b) the liability that the ratings agencies may have for their role in the 2008 financial meltdown, and c) the GOP’s attempts to insulate the ratings agencies from b) are all impacting each other.

Timeline of Events

On July 21, 2010 President Obama signs Dodd-Frank into law. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the courts found that credit ratings are expressions of opinion that were protected under the first amendment, subject to a demonstration of actual malice:

The Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act stripped away those protections, so that CRA’s were now subject to the same expert liability as an auditor or securities analyst, and required only a “knowing” or “reckless” state of mind for liability, rather than proof of scienter. It also repealed Section 436 of the Securities Act of 1933, which granted “safe harbor” for ratings, which were part of a prospectus.

Which, for obvious reasons, made the ratings agencies extremely nervous.

In October 2010 S&P issued its first threat to downgrade US debt: “If the U.S. government maintains its current policies for the next 40 years in the face of rising health care and pension spending pressure, it is unlikely that Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services would maintain its ‘AAA’ rating on the U.S.” The report paints a target on the back of Social Security and Medicare, says nothing about the wars, the Bush tax cuts, private health care costs or the absurdity of 40 year projections.

Ratings agencies are supposed to be reactive and analyze only what they see. They are not supposed to explicitly or implicitly give ”assurance or guarantee of a particular rating prior to a rating assessment.” By prescribing not only an austerity package for the United States, but stating that “in the long term, the U.S. AAA rating relies on reforms” of Social Security and Medicare, they most assuredly broke that rule.

S&P put forth no legitimate basis for their downgrade threat. As every reputable economist keeps reminding us (James K. Galbraith, Joe Stiglitz, FT’s Martin Wolf, Peter Radford, Bruce Bartlett, Krugman), the US is not Greece and does not face its risk of default. Unlike Greece, the US has its own currency, and unlike Greece, its debt is denominated and would be paid in its own currency. It can create that currency at will. So the only way the US can be forced into default is if Congress and the President do something that would be insane, like refuse to raise the debt limit, and the President then refuse to use the Executive authority of the Constitution to prevent a default.

But S&P was clearly determined to set itself up as arbiter of the US debt ceiling debate. They said nothing in December when the Bush tax cuts were extended, which dramatically exacerbated the deficit problem they warned of in October. But on February 14 President Obama releases his budget, which cut the deficit by $1.1 trillion over 10 years. The Standard and Poors committee found Obama proposal “disappointing.”

Sign our petition to the SEC: Revoke S&P’s authority as a credit ratings agency for their use of ratings as a political weapon and their attempt to avoid responsibility for their role in the financial crisis of 2008.

The White House clearly began to worry about the political implications of what S&P might do. Emails from both Treasury and S&P were provided to the House Financial Services committee earlier this week, showing that in March S&P and Treasury officials began coordinating discussions of the administration’s budget strategy before the S&P committee met to discuss the US credit rating.

But White House officials weren’t the only ones trying to work the refs. On March 14 Congressional Republicans stage their first challenge to 2010′s Dodd-Frank financial regulation reforms — an attempt to repeal the provision exposing credit rating agencies to the legal liability they were chafing to escape from.

And on April 5 Paul Ryan announced his alternative budget plan. Ryan’s budget was claimed (it was mostly a fraud) to produce over $4 trillion in reductions, while reducing tax rates. It also did so by slashing Medicare and making hundreds of billions in unspecified cuts to unnamed domestic programs. S&P were conspicuously silent.

April 13 was a big day

President Obama gave a speech in which he vowed to cut $4 trillion in cumulative deficits within 12 years through a combination of spending cuts and tax increases. Why was he suddenly pursuing $4 trillion in cuts, up from $1.1 trillion in January? Clearly Ryan had upped the ante. But what was he competing for?

Also on April 13 , Timothy Geithner along with Deputy Secretary Wolin, OMB Director Lew and a representative of the vice president’s office met with S&P personnel, per Geithner’s June 13 letter to the House Financial Services subcommittee. ABC reported that Geithner asked S&P’s David Beers to hold off on issuing any report until after the President Obama and Congress had completed negotiating over the rest of the FY2011 budget.

But perhaps the biggest thing that happened on April 13: A bipartisan study on the financial crisis from the Coburn-Levin Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released a report saying the credit ratings agencies were a “key cause” of the financial crisis. They issued a 650 page report, which included the following recommendation (p. 16):

The SEC should use its regulatory authority to facilitate the ability of investors to hold credit ratings agencies accountable in civil lawsuits for inflated credit ratings, when a credit rating agency knowingly or recklessly fails to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security.

Two days later, David Beers reached out to Undersecretary Goldstein to let Treasury know that the Standard and Poors committee has changed its outlook to “negative.” On April 18: Standard and Poors issued press release downgrading the outlook for US sovereign debt from stable to negative and giving a 30% chance of a ratings downgrade from AAA to AA.

“U.S.’s fiscal profile has deteriorated steadily during the past decade and two years after the financial crisis” they say — with no mention of their own role in that crisis. And whereas the October threat had been based on concerns over Social Security and Medicare, the latest press release contained no mention of either. Now they were worried that “Republicans and Democrats are deeply divided on a plan to reduce debt” and that political squabbling will prevent the debt ceiling from being raised.

On April 19 Geithner was dispatched to do an exhaustive round of talk shows, saying he disagrees with Standard and Poors and that there is “no risk” of a credit ratings downgrade.

But Geithner isn’t the only one. On April 20 Mitt Romney begins using the S&P threat of a downgrade for political advantage. In a radio interview he says that S&P “just downgraded their view for the future of America” and called for the President to “sit down and personally meet with S&P” as he said he did as governor of Massachusetts.

SEC takes the gloves off

In the midst of all of this, the SEC was moving to implement Dodd-Frank in ways that would negatively impact all the ratings agencies, and looking into S&P’s role in the 2008 mortgage crisis:

May 18: the SEC commissioners “voted unanimously to propose new, tougher regulations for credit rating agencies,” which would “implement certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and enhance the SEC’s existing rules governing credit ratings.”
June 9: Bloomberg reports the SEC may recommend recommend that ratings agencies be prohibited from advising investment banks on how to earn top rankings for asset- backed securities
June 14: Reports emerge that the SEC is considering civil fraud charges against S&P and Moody’s in the run up to the financial crisis.

But Standard and Poors was not cowed by the SEC’s sudden rash of action. On July 14 they raised the threat of a downgrade to 50% within the next 90 days.

And now they were very explicit about what they were looking for in exchange for a AAA rating. They wanted a number….which just happened to be the magic $4 trillion number:

If Congress and the Administration reach an agreement of about $4 trillion, and if we to conclude that such an agreement would be enacted and maintained throughout the decade, we could, other things unchanged, affirm the ‘AAA’ long-term rating and A-1+ short-term ratings on the U.S.

Incredibly, S&P’s Devan Sharma told Congress this week that that S&P had been “misquoted” regarding the $4 trillion figure and that it had been “inaccurately stated that the company was calling for that specific threshold.” I really don’t know any other way you could read it. He also accused the administration of “meddling in the ratings process,” a charge quickly trumpeted by Republicans on the committee.

Politico reported that administration officials were “shocked by the move,” suggesting that it did not seem to square with prior S&P reports (duh).

But S&P wasn’t done. On July 21: David Beers met with Congressional Republicans in a closed door meeting to brief them on a potential downgrade of US debt.

And on that same day, the House Financial Services Committee approved the bill to remove the Dodd-Frank provisions that subject credit ratings agencies to expert liability. It passed 31-19 “over the opposition of the senior Democrat on the panel,” devolving into a clear partisan effort.

Then on Tuesday of this week, the SEC unanimously approved a plan to erase references to credit ratings from certain rulebooks. They also adopted alternatives to the credit ratings — a blow to the CRA’s entire business model.

Conclusion

It’s becoming more and more obvious that Standard and Poor’s has a political agenda riding on the notion that the US is at risk of default on its debt based on some arbitrary limit to the debt-to-GDP ratio. There is no sound basis for that limit, or for S&P’s insistence on at least a $4 trillion down payment on debt reduction, any more than there is for the crackpot notion that a non-crazy US can be forced to default on its debt.

Whatever S&P’s agenda, it has nothing to do with avoiding default risks or putting the US on sound fiscal footing. It appears to be intertwined with their attempts to absolve themselves from responsibility for their role in the 2008 financial crisis, and they are willing to manipulate not only the 2012 election but the world economy to escape the SEC’s attempts to regulate them.

It’s time the media and Congress started asking Standard and Poors what their political agenda is and whom it serves.

Sign our petition to the SEC: Revoke S&P’s authority as a credit ratings agency for their use of ratings as a political weapon and their attempts to avoid responsibility for their role in the financial crisis of 2008.

“Moody’s Places AAA Ratings Of 177 U.S. Public Finance Issuers On Review For Possible Downgrade Due To Review Of U.S. Government’s AAA Rating”

By Washington’s Blog


Moody’s announced today:

Moody’s Investors Service has placed under review for possible downgrade the Aaa ratings of 177 public finance credits, affecting a combined $69 billion of outstanding debt. The credits include 162 local governments in 31 states, 14 housing finance programs and one university. A complete list of affected securities and additional analysis is available at www.moodys.com/USRatingActions.

These actions relate to Moody’s July 13 decision to place the Aaa government bond rating of the United States under review for downgrade, and reflect the rating agency’s assessment that some Aaa public finance ratings would likely be indirectly affected by potential credit deterioration of the sovereign.

***

In a previous action on July 19, Moody’s placed the ratings of five Aaa U.S. state governments under review for possible downgrade, affecting approximately $24 billion of general obligation and related debt. Those states are Maryland, New Mexico, South Carolina and Tennessee and the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The entities on down grade watch include:

  • The Colorado Housing and Finance Authority’s Single Family Mortgage Bonds and the Single Family Program Bonds, 2009 Class I
  • Idaho Housing and Finance Association’s Single Family Mortgage Senior Bonds, Series 1996B, Series 1996C, Series 1998D, Series 1999F, Series 1999-I*, Series 2000A, Series 2000C, and Series 2000D
  • Kentucky Housing Corporation’s Housing Revenue Bonds
  • Utah Housing Corporation’s Single Family Mortgage Senior Bonds, Series 1998G, Series 2000A and NIBP

  • The University of Washington
  • The Smithsonian Institution

Given that Moody’s and Standard & Poor both say that they’ll likely downgrade U.S. credit even if a debt ceiling deal is reached, it’s looking dire for the above-described entities and bond issues.

Harald Hau: Eurozone Bailout – Tax Transfer to the Wealthy?

Yves here. In comments, a reader recently expressed skepticism that bank bailout represented a massive looting of the public purse. Since the bank PR efforts have been more successful than I realized, it’s important to keep shining a bright light on this issue.

This post by business school professor Harald Hau not only discusses how this transfer from the many to the few works in the Eurozone rescue context, but also illustrates that the banksters have improved their game. And his observation that this bailout favors bondholders, and those constitute the top 5% of the population, is a generous estimate. Remember that the prime objective of this exercise is to spare big Eurobanks any pain, which means the highly paid professionals and executives in their employ are the biggest beneficiaries.

By Harald Hau, Associate Professor of Finance, INSEAD. Cross posted from VoxEU

Last week, the European heads of government added €109 billion to the existing €110 billion rescue plan for Greece. As Europe’s financial sector would have otherwise taken a huge hit, this column address the question: How did the financial sector manage to negotiate such a gigantic wealth transfer from the Eurozone taxpayer and the IMF to the richest 5% of people in the world?

When the deal was announced, German Chancellor Merkel highlighted the private-sector involvement. She stressed that this was the result of German intransigence. According to the spin, private creditors have to accept a 21% write-down on their claims. This amounts to a €37 billion private-sector contribution. They also provide €12.8 billion in new loans for debt buyback. This buyback, however, should not count as a private-sector contribution as it amounts to an exchange of one debt for another.

The private creditors’ contribution is therefore extremely modest compared to the €109 billion in new public commitments. Especially given that private creditors had the most to lose. Given that the market discount was already 50% for Greek debt, giving up 21% could be viewed as a gain. This has to be qualified as a very bad negotiation outcome for the Eurozone taxpayer.

A closer look shows the deal is much worse for taxpayers

The new plan foresees so-called credit enhancement for the new debt, which means that the new Greek debt is mostly guaranteed by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) – and thus by the taxpayers. Now, in the financial world, a guarantee is worth hard cash – it’s like getting automobile insurance for free.

This is no small concession given that a successful turnaround for Greece is highly uncertain. The economy still is burdened with an excessive debt of around 132% of GDP; large structural policy reforms have not yet begun and may well fail. Most creditors can foresee this and are happy to accept the public guarantees for their debt before the next and much bigger haircut comes.
We can therefore expect that they take up the debt exchange offer “voluntarily”, since it is effectively a gift to sovereign creditors and not a bailout contribution.

What about Egalité? Tax for wealth, or on wealth?

More surprising is Sarkozy’s spin on these events. He interpreted the new deal as an important step towards Europe’s economic governance. But before taking too much pride, Sarkozy should remember that a €200 billion subsidy to sovereign creditors is a gigantic wealth transfer from the taxpayer to essentially the richest 5% of the world. In the US, the 5% richest households control roughly 70% of all financial wealth, and this percentage is not much different in the rest of the world. Ultimate ownership of bank capital and sovereign debt is so concentrated among high-wealth individuals that we should characterise the bailout subsidy as an “impôt pour la fortune” (“a tax for wealth”) – a wealth tax supporting the rich.

This should be problematic in a country like France which has been fighting bitterly over the so-called “impôt sur la fortune” (a wealth tax on the rich). This latter wealth tax amounts to a mere €4 billion annually in state revenue.

Why are the French not at the barricades over the structure of the Greek bailout?

This is a difficult question. Self-censorship by the mainstream French media might play a role, which – mostly left-leaning – does not want to provide ammunition to Eurosceptics like Marine le Pen before next year’s presidential elections. But even in France it will not remain unnoticed that almost all of the public funds go to creditors and hardly benefit the ordinary Greek citizen.

Why did taxpayers get such a bad deal?

In principle, governments should have been in a very strong position. Private default can end in the liquidation of a company, but a country cannot be liquidated. This puts private creditors in a very weak position when it comes to negotiating with a government and empowers the latter. But why was this not the case in the current debt crisis?

Bankers and many journalists convey the impression that we face a choice between a full sovereign bailout and a catastrophic banking crisis.

ECB executive board member Lorenzo Bin Smaghi even suggested that any talk about private bail-ins would increase the costs for the taxpayer.

Such assertions confuse more than they clarify, because they (falsely) suggest that there was no alternative.

The banking sector is the weak spot of any restructuring plan involving sovereign default. Here, direct bank support through bank recapitalisation is a much more effective and cheaper solution than a full guarantee of sovereign debt.

The taxpayers could get bank equity in exchange for their money. If this crisis is like others, there is a chance that share values recover and taxpayers break even in the long run. The 2007-2009 crisis has shown that governments are indeed able to contain a banking crisis by resolute action like forced recapitalisation and temporary nationalisation of banks.

The better prepared we are for such an event the smaller will be the impact on the economy. Europe’s governments have had plenty of time to prepare over the last year, so why was such a solution not even considered?

The reasons are political. Such a solution would have upset powerful vested banker interests, even though it would have imposed the costs on those most responsible for the massive credit misallocation.

A strong negotiating position of politicians confronts two important obstacles:

First, the finance ministry and banking authority typically lack competence and information in order to prepare contingency plans for bank recapitalisation.

There is an acute skill shortage in the finance ministry and what talent there is meets a wall of secrecy put up by an uncooperative banking sector.

Secondly, the strong lobbying power of the banking sector deters politicians from preparing in advance and taking risks in favour of the taxpayer.

Conflicts of interest between the politicians and the bankers are rampant.

After the disastrous risk-management performance of many bankers revealed in the 2007-2009 banking crisis, it is surprising that the same people still enjoy great influence in the policy process. The consequences are predictable.

If you ask a frog to come up with a plan for draining a swamp, you are like to end up with a proposal for more flooding.

Bankers were asked to come up with a plan for private-sector involvement under the leadership of Ackermann and the Institute for International Finance; what they came up with was a plan for more support.

We would never ask the tobacco industry to work out a new public health policy.

A further problem is the fragmentation of political power in Europe. This prevents the political authority from taking a strong negotiating position against the sovereign-debt creditors. In 1982, when the US faced a sovereign-debt crisis brought about by US banks’ lending to Latin American nations, US finance minister Baker rejected private-sector demands that the US taxpayer bail out of creditors. While this seems similar to the position of German Chancellor Merkel, her position is much weaker.

Lastly, the ECB played a very obstructive role in preventing any effective bail-in of private creditors. This strengthened the “hostage taking” of the political authorities. At times, ECB board members gave the impression of being themselves captured by the financial elite of their home country. The ECB severely damaged its own reputation by siding so strongly with creditors and bankers rather than defending Europe’s taxpayers and citizens.

And the future?

If the recent Greek bailout foreshadows the future of Eurozone “economic governance”, the real question is “how much of this governance can the euro survive?”

The political economy of these European bailouts is unlikely to improve before the next sovereign-debt crisis hits. This would require that politicians take on the powerful banking lobby by forcing much higher capital standards on Europe’s undercapitalised banks. There is no sign of this happening. The real peril for the euro may come from a taxpayer revolt against a financial elite that has betrayed the interests of the majority of citizens.

Pro-cyclical fiscal policy

Cross-posted from Credit Writedowns

Looking up the term procyclical on the Internet, I see the Wikipedia entry defines it as:

Procyclical is a term used in economics to describe how an economic quantity is related to economic fluctuations. It is the opposite of countercyclical

In business cycle theory and finance, any economic quantity that is positively correlated with the overall state of the economy is said to be procyclical. That is, any quantity that tends to increase when the overall economy is growing is classified as procyclical. Quantities that tend to increase when the overall economy is slowing down are classified as ‘countercyclical’…

Procyclical has a different meaning in the context of economic policy. In this context, it refers to any aspect of economic policy that could magnify economic or financial fluctuations. An economic policy that is believed to decrease fluctuations is called countercyclical.

I talked about this in the first context in 2008. What got me thinking about procyclicality again was the chatter about cut, cap and balance which the Republicans in the US Congress are proposing. The goal is to reduce deficits. The plan is to cut spending, cap spending increases and pass a balanced budget amendment to the US Constitution.

Balanced budget amendments are another one of these artificial constraints that look better on paper than they do in reality because they are procyclical.

In the euro zone, the stability and growth pact provides a 3% deficit hurdle which almost all of the euro zone breached during the recession. Austerity attempts to meet the hurdle have created larger deficits in the periphery (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland).

The same problems were apparent in the US states where balanced budget amendments are the order of the day. Before Barack Obama entered the White House, I asked in January 2009 “Will federal largesse be countered by state and local cutbacks?” By June 2010, it was obvious the answer was yes. That’s what procyclicality means.

Procyclicality is fine for states as a constraint despite how it exacerbates the swings in the business cycle, and creates deadweight losses. That is because the federal government can always counter this pro-cyclicality and smooth out the cycle. Procyclicality is one of the structural flaws of the euro zone; there is no federal agent to do counter procyclical budget cuts during a recession. Thus, the euro zone business cycle will invariably be volatile, making current account imbalances a lightening rod for intra-European recrimination.

Now, America is looking to impose the same sort of procyclicality on the US federal government. When downturns hit, revenues drop because tax receipts drop due to income shortfalls and spending increases because of automatic stabilisers. So, a balanced budget amendment would require even more cuts. But since those cuts reduce income and tax receipts, you need enough cuts to overcome the negative revenue effects on the budget. That means a balanced budget amendment would require deep, deep cuts in federal spending at precisely the worst moment in the business cycle. That’s procyclicality.

This is a recipe for disaster. And it will lead to huge volatility in the business cycle, deadweight economic losses and growth underperformance. If you hear anyone telling you this is a good mechanism for reining in deficit spending, you will know they haven’t thought through the effects of procyclicality.

GDP numbers make double dip threat real

Cross-posted from Credit Writedowns

I have stopped reporting the quarterly GDP numbers but this last reading bears mentioning. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis reported the following at 830AM ET:

Real gross domestic product — the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States — increased at an annual rate of 1.3 percent in the second quarter of 2011, (that is, from the first quarter to the second quarter), according to the "advance" estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  In the first quarter, real GDP increased 0.4 percent.

The immediate reaction was a drop in the dollar to record lows against the Japanese yen and Swiss franc, a drop in Ten-year yields to 2.88%, a drop in the Dow Futures to –137 and a rise in the Gold price by $10 to $1626.

While the headline number was well below expectations of 1.8%, what must be noted are the major revisions. Q1 2011 is now reported as +0.4%. That’s a major downward revision which demonstrates that QE2 was in fact doing nothing for growth and that the US is already at stall speed even without the negative impact of the European sovereign debt crisis and the debt ceiling fiasco. The double dip scare is real.

Here is how the BEA explains the extensive revisions:

Current-dollar GDP was revised down for all 3 years: $77.6 billion, or 0.5 percent, for 2008; $180.0 billion, or 1.3 percent, for 2009; and $133.9 billion, or 0.9 percent, for 2010. The percent change from the preceding year was revised down from an increase of 2.2 percent to an increase of 1.9 percent for 2008; was revised down from a decrease of 1.7 percent to a decrease of 2.5 percent for 2009; and was revised up from an increase of 3.8 percent to an increase of 4.2 percent for 2010. Current-dollar gross national product (GNP) (GDP plus net receipts of income from the rest of the world) was revised down for all 3 years: $82.9 billion, or 0.6 percent, for 2008; $174.1 billion, or 1.2 percent, for 2009; and $132.8 billion, or 0.9 percent, for 2010… Current-dollar GDP was also revised down for all 4 years from 2004-2007: $14.5 billion for 2004, $15.4 billion for 2005, $21.7 billion for 2006, and $33.1 billion for 2007.

While I am reporting this, I should note that the President made news regarding his understanding of the origins of the deficit and our slow growth recently when he said:

“For the last decade, we have spent more money than we take in. In the year 2000, the government had a budget surplus. But instead of using it to pay off our debt, the money was spent on trillions of dollars in new tax cuts, while two wars and an expensive prescription drug program were simply added to our nation’s credit card. As a result, the deficit was on track to top $1 trillion the year I took office.”

This is patently false. In fact, this is scary. Dean Baker tells us:

This is seriously mistaken.

The Congressional Budget Office’s projections from January of 2008, the last ones made before it recognized the housing bubble and the implications of its collapse, showed a deficit of just $198 billion for 2009, the year President Obama took office. In other words, the deficit was absolutely not "on track to top $1 trillion."… Obama does not have the most basic understanding of the nature of the budget problems the country faces. He apparently believes that there was a huge deficit on an ongoing basis as a result of the policies in place prior to the downturn. In fact, the deficits were relatively modest. The huge deficits came about entirely as a result of the economic downturn…. This misunderstanding of the origins of the budget deficit could explain President Obama’s willingness to make large cuts to core social welfare programs, like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid…

Hat tip to Brad DeLong for the information

In sum: The President has no idea why the deficit exploded, we are in jeopardy of default, and we will cut spending in into the teeth of a serious growth slowdown. America is rudderless. God help us.

Links 7/29/11

Plant has a bat beckoning beacon BBC

New Twitter Algorithm Could Out Dudes Pretending to Be Lesbians Atlantic

Bill Would Force Intel Chief to Renounce ‘Secret Patriot Act’ Wired (hat tip reader Robert M)

Tax Trio Would Put an End to Euro Arson: Perotti and Zingales Bloomberg (hat tip reader Tim C)

Republicans abandon vote on debt ceiling Financial Times. The unhappy reaction to this news is weird. This would seem to bring a deal closer. If Boehner can’t hold his block and the banks and companies are starting to freak out, this suggests some corporate Republicans could be picked off to join the Dems (particularly since the “plans” are so similar).

Obama Tied Against Generic Republican Jon Walker, FireDogLake

Lenders keep ‘zombies’ alive Financial Times. Zombie banks help zombie companies, just like Japan.

Lehman Case Hints at Need to Stiffen Audit Rules Floyd Norris, New York Times

Just Before Deadline, County in Alabama Delays Bankruptcy Move New York Times

Debt Ceiling Charade impacting Short-Term Credit Markets Calculated Risk

If we see no debt ceiling deal, the US will prioritise Treasuries Ed Harrison


For-Profit Higher Education Industry Sues to Block Weak “Gainful Employment” Rule
Credit Slips

From Outside the Beltway Tim Duy

Who Is In Worse Shape – the United States or Europe? Simon Johnson

How Greedy Corporations Are Destroying America’s Status as ‘Innovation Nation’ William Lazonick, New Deal 2.0

Dead Souls ClubOrlov (hat tip reader Scott A)

Kiwi readers take note: We will be on the Saturday Morning with Kim Hill show on Radio New Zealand National at 8:45 AM on Saturday.

Antidote du jour:

Third Way Document Proves Democratic Party Supports Institutionalized Looting by Banks

It is one thing to suspect that something is rotten in Denmark, quite another to have proof. Ever since Obama appointed his Rubinite economics team, it was blindingly obvious that he was aligning himself with Wall Street. The strength of the connection became even more evident in March 2009, when Team Obama embarked on its “stress test” charade and bank stock cheerleading. Rather than bring vested banking interests to heel, the administration instead chose to reconstitute, as much as possible, the very same industry whose reckless pursuit of profit had thrown the world economy off the cliff.

But now we see evidence in a new paper by the think tank Third Way of an even deeper commitment to pro-financier policies. The Democratic party has made clear that it supports institutionalized looting by banks, via the innocuous-seemeing device of rejecting the idea of writedowns on bonds they hold.

Policy advisors Lauren Oppenheimer and David Hollingsworth argue that point in the context of Greece, but the exact same logic would apply to banks anywhere. As Michael Hudson has warned:

…the war being waged against Greece by the European Central Bank (ECB) may best be seen as a dress rehearsal not only for the rest of Europe, but for what financial lobbyists would like to bring about in the United States.

And make no mistake about the role of Third Way. Third Way runs the policy apparatus of the Democratic Party. In Congress, staffers attend regular Third Way policy briefings, where the group hands out pre-packaged legislative amendments in legal form, generic press releases, polling around those policy ideas, and talking points. It’s a soup-to-nuts policy apparatus. Most of these ideas are harmless – like increased volunteerism – but some are not, like various tax proposals.

The group has enormous juice. On the Congressional side, it has six honorary Senate co-Chairs, and seven House-side co-Chairs. Jim Clyburn, a co-Chair, is in the House Democratic leadership. Two current cabinet members are former co-Chairs. Steny Hoyer, the House minority whip, held regular briefings for the freshmen member staff in the last Congress.

On the administration side, former Third Way board member Bill Daley is now White House chief of staff. Ron Klain, who was Biden’s Chief of Staff, is now with Third Way. The White House is pretty much full of Third Way-style apparatchiks.

Third Way also echoes, nearly entirely, the White House’s political line (though it is slightly ahead on gay rights). Here’s Third Way praising the Gang of 6 talks, opposing cut, cap, and balance, encouraging entitlement cuts, pushing various free trade agreements

Finally, most of the Board members are from the FIRE Sector (Wall Street and real estate), including the head of equity trading for Goldman Sachs and one of the heads of investment banking for Morgan Stanley.

It’s a highly optimized political operation for the White House and Congressional Democrats, with PR muscle, elite validators, access, and policy-making infrastructure.

This nine-page paper, Why Greece Matters, is lightweight, particularly for anyone who has kept up even minimally on the Eurozone mess. From the overview sent via e-mail:

As if DC policymakers don’t have enough to worry about with our own debt, we argue that the Greece bailout package announced last week may not stop the bleeding. And in our new memo, Why Greece Matters, we dissect and explain how a Greek default could affect the American economy—from Wall Street titans to widows on pensions—due to the interconnectedness of the global financial system.

A Greek default could lead to:

Stunning losses for European banks that hold Greek bonds;

A steep reduction in the value of the bonds of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy and exponentially increasing losses for the European banking sector;

Dissolution of the euro, the second most important world currency behind the dollar, with dire consequences for the world economy; and

Possible crippling losses for American financial institutions that lend to European banks, American exporters who rely on the European market, and anyone who holds a money market fund.

The tone is apocalyptic. And notice the failure to define what “default” means. Since it is never spelled out in the paper, a DC non-finance savvy reader would take it to mean “miss a bond payment”. But as anyone who has been paying attention knows, a good bit of effort was expended in the latest Greek package to devise a restructuring that did not constitute a default (technically a “credit event”) as defined for credit default swaps. Yet some commentators depict the latest rescue as a default, since banks will take an estimated 21% losses on Greek debt. Mirabile dictu, the world did not stop spinning.

Yet given the fulminating about the need to spare banks from taking meaningful hits, it’s not hard to see that a large writeoff would produce large losses to banks and hence would also be an outcome Third Way would see as detrimental.

The paper’s argument rests on two fallacies. First it that it would be very bad to have Greece fail because it would spread to other periphery countries. They are quite explicit about that they see the risk propagating, using metaphors like dominoes and mountaineers tethered together. Second is that “the Greece contagion could spread to Eurozone banks”. We’ll deal with them in order.

Like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, each of the so-called periphery countries that is at risk is for reasons specific to each county, not because the spectacle of Greece about to fall over suddenly produces Ebola-like financial hemorrhaging in its neighbors. The document never once acknowledges that the other periphery countries are independently at risk. They all have independent stresses that are coming to a head in a closely synchronized manner thanks to the impact of the global financial crisis. One connecting device of the oft-abused notion of “contagion” is the poor policy responses at the EU level. If the EU can’t come up with a workable remedy for Greece, which is badly impaired but not all that large, it is not going to be credible in dealing with Spain, Italy, or France. That too is absent from the Third Way account.

Marshall Auerback pointed out via e-mail:

The economies of Europe continue to look weaker.

Spanish real retail sales get worse and worse. In June they were down a huge -7% year on year versus -5% for the since November of 2010. Nobody is taking notice. Perhaps they are focusing too much on this debt ceiling crisis, which is a manufactured one, as opposed to Europe’s which is an institutional weakness of EMU.

Italian and Spanish sovereign interest rate spreads are resuming their rise. This is raising interest rates on some private borrowers, which could add to economic weakness. This should especially be the case for Spain where the ratio of private non-financial debt to GDP is exceedingly high and collateral values are gravely imperiled.

The second channel of contagion is the interconnectedness of the banks. As this blogger and many other commentators have pointed out, the most important corrective measure that needed to take place in the wake of the global financial crisis was to reduce the tight coupling among major financial firms. Right now, the banking system is like a badly designed power grid, where a bolt of lightning hitting a single transformer takes down not just a neighborhood but half the country. The Third Way paper, by contrast, tries to have its cake and eat it too on this point. It gives the tight coupling prominent play, not in its discussion of the origins of the Greek mess but in its urgent call to spare the banks any pain, predictably invoking the Lehman trope and arguing for another bailout. And the bailout metaphor is well chosen. The failure to fix the defective architecture of the financial system means these rescues are tantamount to bailing out a leaky boat. A full bore effort is unlikely to keep it afloat.

It’s critical to understand the real vectors of contagion if you are to propose sound remedies. But if the aim is to product bank-supporting propaganda, plausible-sounding stories within hailing distance of reality work just fine.

But let’s examine the core foundational argument in more detail, “”the Greece contagion could spread to Eurozone banks”. There’s a huge lie misapprehension here. The pretense is that the banks are sound. They aren’t.

The authorities are playing Schrodinger’s banks. They want to preserve the notion that we really don’t know whether the major financial firms are alive or dead. As long as we keep the quantum uncertainty game going and don’t open the box the stress tests are an effort to discredit critics who manage to pry the top open and peek), the banks remain in an indeterminate state and the authorities can carry on as if they are really alive. In fact, based on the decay rules established for this game, informed observers know well that if the box were opened, the banks are pretty certain to be dead.

To put this in simpler terms: experts were predicting losses of 50% to 75% when the first iteration of the Greek crisis hit in May 2010. Some are now predicting 90%. The latest rescue took a major step forward, in that it substantially reduced interest rates and pushed maturities out. But if you take the most recent projections of Greek indebtedness, and apply the effective writedowns contained in the latest package, you still have a debt to GDP ratio in excess of 150% for 2012, when a year ago, the IMF forecast that it would never breach 144%. Virtually all experts agree that more aggressive writedowns now would lead to lower losses later, but the political incentives are to delay the day of reckoning as long as possible.

And where has Third Way been? The authors honestly seem to believe that if Greece is bailed out, all will be well. As we noted above, the paper presents the odd notion that if Greece were saved, the Eurozone can soldier on, and it fails to mention some obvious suspects, namely Belgium and Cyprus, as among the walking wounded. There have been a gazillion charts generated in the last year of which countries’ banks are exposed to the debt of various sovereigns. And all the arrows point to one conclusion: the effort to shield the banks from taking losses in the crisis has simply imperiled Eurozone states (the core will not escape the damage to the periphery), and will inevitably redound to the banks.

Pretending a better bailout is the answer is just plain naive unless you start considering much more radical measures, namely having the ECB step up in a much bigger manner than before and abandon austerian policies. The latest estimates are that the rescue costs are two to three times the size of the facilities now authorized. But most observers believe that the ECB’s Bundesbank reflexes and other impediments like the parliaments of countries like Finland and the Netherlands and the German constitutional court will block this path.

Why is the Third Way position tantamount to endorsing institutionalized looting? Consider the definition in the classic George Akerlof and Paul Romer paper (emphasis ours):

. . . an economic underground can come to life if firms have an incentive to go broke for profit at society’s expense (to loot) instead of to go for broke (to gamble on success). Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations. Bankruptcy for profit occurs most commonly when a government guarantees a firm’s debt obligations. The most obvious such guarantee is deposit insurance, but governments also implicitly or explicitly guarantee the policies of insurance companies, the pension obligations of private firms, virtually all the obligations of large banks, student loans, mortgage finance of subsidized housing, and the general obligations of large or influential firms. . . .

If so, the normal economics of maximizing economic value is replaced by the topsy-turvy economics of maximizing current extractable value, which tends to drive the firm’s economic net worth deeply negative. Once owners have decided that they can extract more from a firm by maximizing their present take, any action that allows them to extract more currently will be attractive—even if it causes a large reduction in the true economic net worth of the firm). . . .

Notice the Third Way script is a refinement of the process. We no longer bother with the actual stage of bankruptcy; that would be too messy and would embarrass too many powerful people. We now have a drip feed running directly from governments to banks via various hidden subsidies (super cheap interest rates being the biggest one of late) and the official “no more Lehmans” policy stressed in this paper.

“Bondholders can’t take losses” is now an explicit part of the “preserve the zombie banks” strategy. This is utterly ridiculous, since bonds are risk capital. Even before the crisis hit, economists like Nouriel Roubini were advocating wiping out bank equity and forcible conversion of some bank debt to equity as the remedy. Instead, the authorities are committing themselves to what will be at best a Japan trajectory of near zero growth (and unlike many European countries and the US, Japan has the social cohesion to carry this off with some grace). It assures high unemployment and low wage growth and is a very costly way to stabilize French and German banks. At this juncture, it would be better to write off the dud loans held by Eurobanks and thus re-capitalize them by using the currency-issuing power of the ECB and abandoning the Orwellianly-named Stability and Growth Pact. The other option is, contra the Third Way’s alarmism, to let the eurozone fracture into two or three more economically homogenous groups.

As we’ve said before, saving a banking system does not mean preserving individual firms in their current form or coddling diseased managements. Failed banks should be resolved and their executives should be replaced by more realistically paid and publicly-focused professionals and their operations reoriented to public purpose. The ECB clearly has the financial capacity to do but the banks in the US and their Democratic party mouthpieces at the Third Way want to make sure ideas like that never get a hearing.

Team Obama Fiddles While Debt Ceiling Fires Burn

Some historical accounts of the Great Fire of Rome, which destroyed three of the city’s fourteen districts and damaged seven others, depict it as an urban redevelopment project gone bad. Emperor Nero allegedly torched the district where he wanted to build his Domus Aurea. Hence any lyre-playing was not a sign of imperial madness, but a badly-informed leader not knowing his plans had spun badly out of control.

President Obama’s plan at social and economic engineering, of rolling back core elements of the Great Deal out of a misguided effort to cut spending in a weak economy, is similarly blazing out of control. The debt ceiling crisis was meant to be a scare to provide an excuse for measures that are opposed by broad swathes of the public. Polls predictably show that voters want five contradictory things before noon: they are against cutting Social Security and care much more about more jobs than about less deficit, but yeah, they’d like that too if they can have it.

While members of the administration may dimly recognize what a firestorm they have unleashed, their crisis responses look to be no better than Nero’s. Obama has severely limited his options by playing up the rigidity of the debt limit. In the meantime, the Republicans are playing chicken and are looking very convincing by claiming the Tea Partiers had removed the steering wheel from the car. As John Kay warned in the Financial Times, this produced a toxic “bidding” dynamic:

The game theorist Martin Shubik invented an unpleasant economists’ party game called the dollar bill auction. The players agree to auction a dollar bill with one cent increments to the bids. As usual, the dollar goes to the highest bidder. The twist is that both the highest bidder and the second-highest bidder must pay.

You might start with a low bid – but offers will quickly rise towards a dollar. Soon the highest bid will be 99 cents with the underbidder at 98 cents. At that point, it pays the underbidder to offer a dollar. He will not now gain from the transaction, but that outcome is better than the loss of 98 cents. And now there is a sting in the tail. There is no reason why the bidding should stop at a dollar. The new underbidder stands to lose 99 cents. But if a bid of $1.01 is successful, he can reduce his loss to a single cent.

The underbidder always comes back. So the auction can continue until the resources of the players are exhausted. The game must end, but never well. There are reports that over $200 has been paid for a dollar in Shubik’s game.

In the DC version, neither the Democratic Senators nor the Republicans in the House want to be underbidders. And the Obama appears recklessly unwilling to circumvent the debt ceiling, since it would eliminate his leverage for pushing through entitlement cuts.

Yet as we’ve discussed, the outcomes the players have committed themselves to are either shooting the economy or bleeding it to death. A sudden curtailment of Federal spending, unless it was very brief, would assure a slowdown. And that’s before you get to wild cards of what might happen to the Treasury market. With Timmie in charge, an actual default seems unthinkable but not all investors will be willing to trust that, and it is not at all clear what would happen in the event of a downgrade. It has had remarkably little effect on Japan, but crisis psychology has kicked in. While I think worries on that front are exaggerated, even small changes will still have an impact. And utter failure of the Treasury or Fed to make any reassuring noises or discuss contingency plans is making rattled nerves much worse than they need to be.

Put it another way: you know things have gotten really bad when you realize having Larry Summers back in a position of authority would probably have led to less stupidity than what we are seeing now. As bad as many of his reflexes are, Obama’s and Geithner’s are even worse.

It has, late in the game, hit the point where Wall Street is imploring Team Obama and Congress to raise the debt ceiling. Obama has claims that his lawyers told him that he could not use the 14th Amendment to ignore the debt ceiling. But the few precedents suggest otherwise, and opinion is certain to be divided enough among authorities that the President could easily have found legal cover if he wanted to (the Administration has had no compunctions on taking aggressive positions on habeas corpus and a raft of other Constitutional issues).

Respected Constitutional scholar Lawrence Tribe, who had obligingly provided Obama with an ass-covering, not-convincingly-argued New York Times op ed against the viability of invoking the 14th Amendment, has effectively reversed himself since then, admitting that that both a court challenge and impeachment were highly unlikely. Yale constitutional scholar Jack Balkin wrote today (hat tip Arthur) of three additional routes the President could use to work around the debt ceiling. One is the coin seigniorage idea that has been discussed here and on other sites. Another is the “exploding option”:

The government can also raise money through sales: For example, it could sell the Federal Reserve an option to purchase government property for $2 trillion. The Fed would then credit the proceeds to the government’s checking account. Once Congress lifts the debt ceiling, the president could buy back the option for a dollar, or the option could simply expire in 90 days.

Balkin also argues for a third route, effectively, that the President can’t use the 14th Amendment casually, but could when circumstances became more extreme:

If the president reasonably believes that the public debt will be put in question… Section 4 [of the 14th Amendment] comes into play once again. His predicament is caused by the combination of statutes that authorize and limit what he can do: He must pay appropriated monies, but he may not print new currency and he may not float new debt. If this combination of contradictory commands would cause him to violate Section 4, then he has a constitutional duty to treat at least one of the laws as unconstitutional as applied to the current circumstances.

The increased urgency has also led to a change in stance in the Democratic hackocracy. Matt Yglesias, a reliable purveyor of party orthodoxy, pooh poohed the coin seigniorage idea two weeks ago. Today, Brad DeLong (who is generally a loyalist but not an official water-carrier) came out in favor of it based on the Balkin reading. Yglesias made a partial retreat and admitted that Balkin might be right but invoked the bogeyman of a debt downgrade.

But a related question is why is the Administration not doing a better (as in any) job of crisis preparation as a way of calming rattled nerves? Of course, part of the answer is that since this is a manufactured crisis, they really feel they need to keep the heat on and are locked into their current strategy. But a piece by Gillian Tett of the Financial Times lists five areas where the Fed and Treasury owe the public answers on what takes place if there is no debt deal before official finances become strained. I’m not in agreement with all the questions on her list. For instance, “What might the US government do to support the US money market funds if American debt is downgraded, or suffers a technical default?” Paul Volcker was vehemently opposed to the backstopping of money market funds in the crisis, and the assumption underlying Tett’s question assumes that these reserves are entitled to some sort of official protection. Money market fund managers have reportedly raised cash levels substantially in anticipation of redemptions; Treasury-only money market funds won’t dump Treasuries; AAA only funds would presumably in the event of a downgrade (other types of institutional investors are seeking waivers, but I think it would be a non-starter in a product branded as AAA). But her general point is valid: the authorities have been way too close mouthed given the worries they have whipped up. It is astonishing, for instance, that the false August 2 deadline is still widely reported in the media when it is now acknowledged that the real drop dead date is August 10.

We know that the end game is the Democrats will blink, but uncharacteristically, they haven’t done so yet. And enough Senators regard cuts to Social Security with no corresponding sacrifices from better heeled interests (from the military industrial complex to the rich) as fatal to their re-election chances so as to make bringing them to heel daunting in the limited time left.

It is hard to come up with words that are strong enough to describe what an appalling display of misguided ego, inept negotiating postures, bad policy thinking, and utter disregard for the public interest are on display in this fiasco. But as a friend of mine likes to say, “Things always look darkest before they go completely black.”

ECRI expects ‘double dip scare’

Cross-posted from Credit Writedowns

Below is a video of Lakshman Achuthan, co-founder and chief operations officer of the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), talking about the economic outlook for the US. I profiled Achuthan’s views on a broad US slowdown when I wrote in May about why a global slowdown will hit by summer. Now that we are in Summer, both economic and earnings growth estimates are being cut. The question is “what should we expect going forward?” Achuthan answers this in speaking with Matt Miller, Deirdre Bolton and Lizzie O’Leary on Bloomberg Television’s "InsideTrack". He also also discusses corporate earnings.

Note that last year we had a slowdown which analyst Albert Edwards could foresee as far back as April. Throughout the summer, many people were using at the change in the ECRI’s leading indicators as a potential sign of a double dip. Achuthan repeatedly assured us there was no a double sip sign, telling Barron’s in June:

“While the plunge in WLI growth to a one-year low assures a significant slowing in U.S. economic growth in the coming months, the recent weakness has not lasted long enough to signal a new recession threat.”

When I wrote a note on recessions and recoveries in September, I mentioned that Achuthan thought we had even odds of a double dip. Eventually, the double dip threat faded. Achuthan was saying no double dip recession by October of last year even as the Fed started QE2 to deal with the slowdown.

For his part, Achuthan proved to be an accurate forecaster of the economy throughout that episode. Timing-wise, this dip is similar. I would say, though, Achuthan seems less optimistic this year than last. Take a look. I think this is a good segment.

Links 7/28/11

Minority Rules: Scientists Discover Tipping Point for the Spread of Ideas Science Blog (hat tip reader furzy mouse). This is an important piece.

The Great Gulf Holocaust David Hodges

The New York Times Paywall Is Working Felix Salmon, Columbia Journalism Review

A very secret agent Asia Times (hat tip reader Deus DJ)

Emerging markets warn IMF over fresh Greek loan plan

How fast will the Chinese revalue to dump dollars? Ed Harrison

China’s crumbling infrastructure model MacroBusiness

O’Reilly’s Muslim-Hatred and Christian Terrorists Juan Cole (hat tip reader James B)

Krugman on the Debt Debate: Cults, Centrists and Balance Scarecrow, FireDogLake

Treasury to Weigh Which Bills to Pay New York Times. They are actually saying they might not pay Social Security.

Debt-ceiling threat has Wall Street scrambling Los Angeles Times (hat tip reader furzy mouse). The important part is that businesses have woken up and are lobbying.

Wall Street Traders Are Postponing Vacations Because They’re Too Scared To Leave The Floor Before August 2 Clusterstock (hat tip reader furzy mouse)

Fed under fire over default talks Financial Times. They never worried about such niceties during the last crisis. But then again, the Fed was consistently slow to act and then overreacted.

Residents Soldier On as Alabama County Mulls Bankruptcy Wall Street Journal

Orders for U.S. Durable Goods Fell in June Bloomberg. The only reason for including this article is as an example of the preferred formula for reporting bad economic news: it was “unexpected”. And they make it sound like random bad luck: first it was Fukushima, now it’s consumers as opposed to “we are deleveraging and any good new is temporary until we get private debt levels down.”

America’s turbulent jobs flight John Gapper, Financial Times

How America Could Collapse Matt Stoller, Nation

Antidote du jour:

Orwell Watch: Banks Put a Happy Face on Demolishing Foreclosed Homes

In the through the looking glass world of reality according to banks, tearing down foreclosed houses is a good thing. Really.

The spin that Bank of America is using to justify the notion of bulldozing buildings is that the houses in question are worth bupkis, say $10,000 or less. There’s a wee omission in their discussion. Many if not most of the houses in question have fallen in value because the bank failed to maintain them on behalf of investors. They were stripped for copper and appliances, or got moldy, or had squatters move in and make a mess of the place. I’ve heard numerous stories from not only foreclosure attorneys, but also from readers bidding on properties out of foreclosure. For instance, one attorney told me of a house with a $1.3 million mortgage where the owner had arranged a short sale at $1.1. million. The bank refused to take the offer, foreclosed on the house, sat on it, and eventually sold it for, if I recall correctly, $200,000, which I’d bet was the value of the land. The bank made marginally more in fees via this route and delivered a much bigger loss to investors. I’ve heard similar tales from readers greatly lowering their bids on bank owned properties because they deteriorated so much as the process dragged on.

But here is the scam, um, program, via Bloomberg:

Bank of America Corp. (BAC), faced with a glut of foreclosed and abandoned houses it can’t sell, has a new tool to get rid of the most decrepit ones: a bulldozer.

The biggest U.S. mortgage servicer will donate 100 foreclosed houses in the Cleveland area and in some cases contribute to their demolition in partnership with a local agency that manages blighted property. The bank has similar plans in Detroit and Chicago, with more cities to come, and Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), Citigroup Inc. (C), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Fannie Mae are conducting or considering their own programs…

The lender will pay as much as $7,500 for demolition or $3,500 in areas eligible to receive funds through the federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program. Uses for the land include development, open space and urban farming, according to the statement. Simon declined to say how many foreclosed properties Bank of America holds.

Donating a house may create an income-tax deduction, said Robert Willens, an independent accounting analyst based in New York. A bank might deduct as much as the fair market value if a home wasn’t acquired with the explicit intent of knocking it down, he said…

It’s an economically justifiable transaction,” {P.J.] McCarthy [of Fannie Mae] said. “Holding on to a property that might sell for $1,000 or $2,000 or $5,000 for several hundred days is not in anybody’s best interest.”

The argument made in the article is “No one needs these homes, no one is going to buy them.” But that’s bogus. As reader Justica pointed out,

Last I checked, we still have a large population of homeless people in Chicago, Cleveland and Detroit where they plan to demolish houses. Remember this next time you hear someone talk about how “efficiently” the market allocates resources. This is waste on a monumental scale.

The benchmark should not be the low purchase price, it should be whether the building is a health hazard or in such serious violation of local building standards as to be irredeemable ex very significant investment.

In the days when Harlem was full of abandoned buildings, there were many homesteading programs, some not exactly legal, others whereby people who presented a plan and could prove they had sufficient resources to execute on it could take over an abandoned building (this was for personal use rather than to flip them). These were considered to be positive measures, since they brought in new residents into the neighborhood and improved the properties.

The only good news is that this program is expected to remain small scale. But with 10.8 million homes at risk of default in the next six years, and banks overwhelmed by the volume of delinquencies now, I wouldn’t bet against short sighted bank-favoring expediencies like this becoming widespread.